LIBRARY 
CALIFORN 


IA 


STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 


BY 


BORDEN   P.   BOWNE, 
o 

PROFESSOR  OF  PHILOSOPHY  IN  BOSTON  UNIVERSITY,   AND  AUTHOR   OF 
"  THE  PHILOSOPHY  OF  HERBERT  SPENCER." 


NEW  YORK : 
PHILLIPS      &      HUNT. 

CINCINNATI: 
HITCHCOCK     &     WALDEN, 

1880, 


Copyright  1879,  by 

PHILLIPS    &    MUNT. 
3/310 

New  York. 


PREFAOffiJNIVERSITY 


r  I  ^HE  following  papers  have  been  written  long 
-*-  enough  for  me  to  become  somewhat  dissatis- 
fied with  them.  But  as  I  still  agree  with  them  for 
"  substance  of  doctrine,"  and  as  I  have  not  the 
time  for  a  rewriting,  I  venture  their  publication. 
The  Introduction  is  written  for  the  sake  of  calling 
attention  to  several  points  which  are  rather  obscurely 
stated  in  the  work  itself,  and  which  are  of  great 
importance  in  estimating  the  value  of  the  theistic 
argument.  The  title  shows  that  the  work  does  not 
claim  to  be  a  complete  treatise  on  theism. 

I  have  dwelt  mainly  upon  the  theoretical  aspects 
of  the  question,  and  have  aimed  to  expound  princi- 
ples rather  than  to  give  illustrations.  No  other 
method  can  be  decisive.  Illustrations  can  have 
little  value  until  principles  are  settled ;  and  when 
they  are  settled,  there  is  less  need  of  illustration. 
At  the  same  time  I  have  not  written  for  a  philo- 
sophical audience.  If  I  had  had  such  readers  in 
mind,  both  matter  and  form  would  have  been  mod- 
ified. This,  however,  does  not  mean  that  I  have 
misrepresented  my  own  views,  but  only  that  many 


IV  PREFACE. 

points  of  philosophic  theory  have  been  omitted,  as 
they  would  have  seemed  to  most  readers  to  be 
needless,  if  not  misleading,  refinements.  I  hope 
at  no  very  distant  date  to  deal  with  these  philo- 
sophic questions  in  a  more  thorough  manner. 

The  "conflict  of  science  and  religion"  has  not 
been  referred  to.  This  is  partly  due  to  a  convic- 
tion that  it  is  both  an  unjust,  and  a  pernicious  prac- 
tice to  gather  all  the  friends  of  religion  into  one 
camp,  and  all  the  friends  of  science  into  another, 
and  then  to  represent  them  as  eternally  hostile. 
Nothing  could  be  more  untrue  to  history,  and  it 
has  a  pernicious  influence  upon  weak  heads,  which, 
unfortunately,  are  not  wanting  on  either  side.  But 
the  omission  is  mainly  due  to  the  fact,  that  what  a 
thoughtful  person  wishes  to  know  is,  not  what  sci- 
ence teaches,  nor  what  religion  teaches,  but  what  is 
proved,  or  made  probable.  Reason  resents  every 
attempt  to  intimidate  it,  in  the  name  of  authority, 
from  whatever  quarter.  It  decides  by  evidence,  not 
by  names.  It  accepts  nothing,  therefore,  because 
it  calls  itself  science,  or  because  it  calls  itself  relig- 
ion, but  because  it  has  evidence  in  its  favor.  No 
more  does  reason  reject  any  thing  because  it  is 
science  or  because  it  is  religion,  but  because  of  a 
lack  of  evidence.  No  attentive  reader  can  have 
failed  to  observe  that  this  simple  principle  has  been 
largely  ignored  by  both  sides  in  the  controversy. 


PREFACE.  V 

Many  a  view  has  been  passionately  rejected  because 
it  was  thought  to  be  irreligious;  and,  conversely, 
the  last  few  years  have  seen  many  a  view  passion- 
ately advocated  whose  chief  recommendation  was, 
that  it  trampled  all  moral  and  religious  convictions 
under  foot.  It  has  taken  a  long  time  to  learn  that 
a  theory  is  not  proved  by  being  religious ;  a  still 
longer  time  is  needed  to  reach  the  conviction  that 
it  is  also  not  proved  by  being  irreligious. 

A  word  about  dogmatism.  A  writer's  statements 
are  only  his  own  opinions,  and  no  vehemence  of 
utterance  can  make  them  more.  This  being  under- 
stood, one  may  be  allowed  to  express  his  views  in  a 
dogmatic  form.  It  saves  both  time  and  space,  and 
is  withal  in  better  taste.  When  a  discussion  is  be- 
tween equals,  professions  of  fallibility  are  both  tire- 
some and  needless,  for  the  audience  will  surely  take 
the  fact  for  granted.  If,  then,  some  rather  vivacious 
expressions  of  opinion  occur  in  these  papers,  they 
are  not  to  be  taken  as  showing  a  belief  in  personal 
infallibility.  Every  rational  author  knows  that  his 
opinions  are  primarily  only  his  opinions ;  he  pub- 
lishes in  the  hope  that  they  may  be  shared  by 
others. 

"There  are  many  echoes,  but  few  voices."  Like- 
all  works  on  this  subject,  this  work  is  more  an  echo 
than  a  voice,  though  it  may  not  be  without  some 
individuality  of  tone  from  the  last  reflecting  sur- 


vi  PREFACE. 

face.  There  is  little  new  to  be  offered  on  either 
side ;  and  any  thing  which  should  be  new  in  princi- 
ple would  almost  certainly  be  a  personal  aberration. 
But  it  is  necessary  for  each  age  to  do  its  own  think- 
ing; and  while  the  truth  may  be  the  same  from  age 
to  age,  the  presentation  will  always  vary.  But 
while  this  work  is  an  echo  of  what  theistic  thinkers 
have  been  saying  from  the  beginning,  I  am  not 
conscious  of  any  specific  obligation  to  other  writers 
which  demands  recognition.  I  shall  always  be  un- 
der general  obligation  to  my  friends  and  former 
instructors,  Professor  Ulrici,  of  Halle,  and  Professor 
Lotze,  of  Gottingen. 

B.  P.  B. 

BOSTON,  May  5,  1879. 


CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  PACK 

INTRODUCTION 3 

I.  KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM 9 

II.  KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF 61 

III.  POSTULATES  OP  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE 108 

IV.  MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY 146 

V.  THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY 199 

VI.  SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.. 226 

VII.  THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM 261 

VIII.  RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD 287 

IX.  THE  RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH  AND  RIGHTEOUSNESS.  . .  326 

X.  THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM 375 

XI.  POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  . .                                                    .  406 


:  N  T  R  0  D  U  C  T  I  0  N . 


TN  order  to  a  correct  estimate  of  the  theistic  argu- 
ment,  we  must  know  its  exact  scope  and  purpose. 
Misconception  on  this  point  is  very  common,  and  in- 
justice is  done  to  theism.  It  is  commonly  assumed 
that  the  theist  aims  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of 
God.  Of  course  a  strict  demonstration  is  impossible, 
and  then  theism  is  held  to  be  overthrown.  No  notice 
is  taken  of  the  great  fact  and  field  of  probable  reason- 
ing upon  which  both  daily  life  and  objective  science 
are  built.  It  is  also  urged  that  the  theist  assumes  that 
all  order  is  designed  order,  and  thus  begs  the  question; 
for  the  dispute  is,  whether  the  natural  order  be  de- 
signed. Most  criticisms  of  theism  turn  upon  one  of 
these  objections.  Either  the  argument  is  rejected  as  a 
failure,  or  it  is  called  a  begging  of  the  question.  Such 
criticisms,  so  far  as  they  are  made  in  good  faith,  rest 
upon  a  failure  to  distinguish  between  demonstrating  a 
theorem  and  solving  a  problem.  The  demonstration 
of  theorems  belongs  entirely  to  the  formal  sciences;  all 
the  sciences  which  deal  with  reality  aim  only  at  the 
solution  of  problems.  They  find  their  problems  in  the 
observed  facts,  and  then  they  raise  the  question  how 
we  must  think  of  the  back-lying  cause  or  causes,  or 


4  INTRODUCTION. 

antecedents,  in  order  that  the  facts  should  be  as  they 
are.  Every  scientific  hypothesis  is  an  attempt  to  solve 
the  problem  presented  by  a  certain  class  of  facts;  and 
the  proof  of  the  hypothesis  always  consists,  not  in  its 
being  impregnably  deduced  according  to  the  canons  of 
formal  logic,  but  in  its  furnishing  the  only  adequate 
solution  of  the  facts.  The  geologist  finds  traces  of  fire 
in  the  rocks,  and  he  explains  them  by  assuming  that 
the  earth  was  once  molten.  ISTow  even  allowing  this 
conclusion  to  be  just,  he  would  not  pretend  that  he  had 
demonstrated  the  original  fluidity  of  the  earth,  but  only 
that  he  had  given  a  rational  solution  of  the  problem 
contained  in  certain  geological  facts.  So  with  the  neb- 
ular, the  atomic,  the  ether,  the  evolution  theories,  etc.; 
they  are  all  solutions  of  problems,  and  our  faith  in  them 
is  based  entirely  upon  their  adequacy  to  the  facts. 

The  theistic  theory  is  of  the  same  kind;  it  has  the 
same  aim,  and  is  judged  by  the  same  canon.  The  theist 
does  not  claim  to  demonstrate  the  existence  of  God,  but 
only  that  the  problem  of  the  world  and  life  cannot  be 
solved  without  God.  He  does  not  assume  that  all  order 
is  designed  order,  but  he  insists  that  the  actual  order, 
which  of  course  includes  man,  cannot  be  understood, 
except  as  the  outcome  of  design.  To  the  objection  that 
he  assumes  that  nature  can  be  understood,  he  replies, 
that  all  science  is  based  on  the  same  assumption,  and  is 
but  an  attempt  to  comprehend  the  facts  of  experience. 
To  the  claim  that  what  is  necessary  to  an  understand- 
ing of  nature  is  not,  therefore,  necessarily  a  fact  of 


INTRODUCTION.  5 

nature,  lie  replies,  that  so  far  as  this  lies  against  theism, 
it  is  equally  valid  against  any  and  every  scientific 
hypothesis.  Atoms,  ethers,  and  a  certain  order  of  past 
events  are  necessary  to  an  understanding  of  the  present 
facts;  but  if  we  choose  to  be  skeptical,  we  can  say  that 
this  necessity  does  not  prove  their  reality;  and  we  can 
say  it  in  this  case  with  as  much  justice  as  in  the  case  of 
theism. 

Another  point  to  be  borne  in  mind  is,  that  every  the- 
ory must  be  judged,  not  only  by  its  power  of  making 
grimaces  at  opposing  theories,  but  also  and  chiefly  by 
its  own  positive  adequacy  to  the  facts.  This  simple 
rule  of  criticism  has  been  so  generally  ignored  in  judg- 
ing theism  that  it  is  necessary  to  insist  upon  it.  Every 
one  acquainted  with  atheistic  treatises  will  recognize 
that  their  chief  force  has  been  in  picking  flaws  in  the 
theistic  argument.  There  has  been  comparatively  little 
effort  to  show  any  positive  sufficiency  of  atheism  to 
give  any  rational  account  of  the  facts.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  failure  of  theism  to  exclude  all  possibility  of 
doubt  has  been  oddly  enough  mistaken  for  a  proof  of 
atheism.  It  never  occurs  to  the  atheist  to  ask  whether 
the  difficulties  and  improbabilities  of  his  own  system  be 
not  infinitely  greater  than  those  of  theism.  In  this  re- 
spect he  is  like  a  disciple  of  the  Ptolemaic  astronomy, 
who,  finding  difficulties  in  Copernicus  and  Newton, 
should  conclude  that,  therefore,  the  Ptolemaic  system 
is  true.  A  rational  judgment  can  be  reached  only  as 
the  theistic  theory,  with  all  its  difficulties,  is  placed  be- 


6  INTRODUCTION. 

side  the  atheistic  theory,  with  all  its  difficulties.  When 
this  is  done,  the  theist  will  have  no  cause  to  be  ashamed 
of  his  faith.  In  neither  case  is  it  a  matter  of  demon- 
stration, but  of  rational  probability.  This  point  is  gen- 
erally kept  out  of  sight  in  atheistic  discussions;  all  the 
more,  then,  must  the  theist  call  attention  to  it. 

Still  another  point  must  be  mentioned.  The  nature 
of  reality  is  never  a  matter  of  perception,  but  solely  of 
inference  from  the  phenomena.  At  this  point  crude 
common  sense  often  lends  aid  and  comfort  to  atheism 
and  materialism.  Matter  as  noumenon  and  as  cause  is 
supposed  to  be  given  in  immediate  perception;  and  as 
God  and  the  soul  are  not  perceived,  but  inferred,  the 
impression  spreads  that  atheism  and  materialism  have 
fact  on  their  side,  while  the  opposing  views  are  only 
subjective  theories.  Of  all  crudities  in  thinking,  this 
is  certainly  one  of  the  worst;  it  is  in  philosophy  what 
Jasperism  is  in  astronomy.  It  will  be  remembered  that 
Brother  Jasper,  of  Richmond,  Va.,  has  reached  the  con- 
clusion that  the  sun  moves  ;  for  he  "  hab  seen  de  sun 
on  one  side  ob  de  house  in  de  mornin',  and  on  de  odder 
side  ob  de  house  in  de  afternoon;  and  as  de  house  hab 
not  moved,  derefo'  de  sun  he  do  move."  This  is  very 
clear  and  convincing.  Brother  Jasper  thought  that  a 
resting  sun  could  not  be  seen  on  both  sides  of  the 
house,  and  hence  he  mistook  the  astronomical  truth  for 
a  denial  of  the  phenomenon.  The  philosophical  Jas- 
pers make  the  same  blunder.  They  mistake  inferences 
from  the  phenomena  for  their  denial.  Hence  when 


INTRODUCTION.  7 

they  hear  that  nature  may  be  but  the  manifestation  of 
a  spiritual  power  working  under  the  forms  of  space  and 
time,  they  fancy  that  visible  and  tangible  phenomena 
have  been  denied;  and  they  think  it  sufficient  to  stamp 
on  the  ground  or  to  kick  a  stone  in  disproof.  It  is  pit- 
iable in  the  extreme  to  find  even  distinguished  editors 
of  distinguished  periodicals  advancing  such  ghastly 
irrelevances.  No  one  dreams  of  denying  any  of  the 
phenomena  of  inner  or  outer  experience.  Brother  Jas- 
per, of  course,  has  a  very  clear  idea  of  matter;  but  the 
physicist  finds  himself  forced  to  go  behind  material 
phenomena — not  to  deny,  but  to  explain.  At  once  he 
finds  himself  in  a  supersensible  world,  which  can  be  en- 
tered only  by  thought,  and  whose  reality  can  be  assured 
only  by  thought.  But  the  results  reached  are  never  to 
be  mistaken  for  denials  of  phenomena,  but  as  conclusions 
from  them.  The  astronomical  heavens  do  not  deny  the 
visible  heavens,  but  are  based  upon  them.  It  is  over- 
sight of  this  fact  which  accounts  for  the  popular  im- 
pression that  philosophy  leads  to  skepticism;  and  which, 
on  the  other  hand,  accounts  for  the  popular  skepticism 
of  philosophical  results.  The  question  of  all  specula- 
tion is  not  whether  there  is  reality,  but  what  it  is,  and 
what  its  nature  may  be ;  and  science  and  philosophy 
alike  recognize  that  this  question  cannot  be  solved  by 
immediate  perception,  but  only  by  consistent  thinking 
upon  the  phenomena.  The  most  of  the  factors  of  phys- 
ical science  belong  entirely  to  a  thought- world,  and  can 
only  be  reached  by  thought.  And  even  the  Jaspers 


8  INTRODUCTION. 

of  speculation  themselves  partly  recognize  this  fact. 
When  they  are  told  of  dynamic  atoms,  and  solid  ethers, 
and  omnipresent  forces,  they  are  charmingly  acquies- 
cent; but  when  the  theist,  by  the  same  method  and 
from  the  same  data,  concludes  to  an  omnipresent  force 
which  is  also  intelligent,  then,  instead  of  examining  his 
logic,  they  think  it  sufficient  to  call  his  view  an  un- 
heard-of absurdity,  and  an  inversion  of  common  sense. 
Custom  explains  many  beliefs;  it  also  explains  many 
unbeliefs.  The  customary  is  clear,  and  clear  because 
customary.  Nevertheless,  we  insist  upon  the  point. 
When  it  is  seen  that  the  complex  and  unintelligible 
theories  of  the  atheist  and  materialist  are  not  facts  of 
observation,  but  only  their  way  of  explaining  the  facts, 
those  theories  will  not  be  long  in  appearing  in  their 
innate  irrationality. 


ERSITY 

FO' 

—       _       — 
•MMMHMBM 

STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 


CHAPTER  I. 

KNOWLEDGE    AND    SKEPTICISM. 

nnWO  questions,  quite  distinct,  are  often  confused  : 
'  1.  Is  knowledge  possible?  2.  How  is  knowledge 
possible  ?  The  former  question  is  plainly  the  more  fun- 
damental, and  the  skeptic's  reply  is,  that  knowledge  is 
not  possible.  Thus,  at  the  outset  of  our  studies  in 
Theistic  Philosophy,  "  No  thoroughfare "  stares  us  in 
the  face.  Before  going  on  we  must  have  a  word  with 
the  skeptic.  Of  course  it  cannot  be  our  intention  to 
prove  that  knowledge  is  possible  ;  this  would  be  the 
Don  Quixotism  of  philosophy.  Our  plan  is  to  examine 
the  skeptic's  objections,  in  order  to  see  if  there  be  any 
thing  in  them  to  shake  the  mind's  trust  in  its  own 
power  to  know.  If  the  objections  fail,  knowledge  will 
not  be  proved  ;  but  skepticism  will  appear  groundless 
and  irrational. 

But  this  question  is  a  purely  philosophic  one,  and 
why  discuss  it  in  an  essay  on  Theism  ?  Skepticism  of 
our  cognitive  faculties  in  general  tells  as  much  against 
one  department  of  knowledge  as  against  another,  and 
universal  skepticism  is  none.  Because  it  doubts  every 
thing,  it,  in  effect,  doubts  nothing.  Being  impartially 


10  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

distributed  over  all  the  faculties,  it  leaves  their  relative 
position  and  rank  undisturbed,  and  decides  nothing. 
The  only  significant  skepticism  is  that  which  discredits 
the  higher  faculties  in  the  name  of  the  lower;  and 
brings  discord  into  the  mind.  A  skepticism  which  ex- 
alts the  senses  and  the  animal,  and  thus  seeks  to  throw 
doubt  upon  the  rational  and  moral  nature,  is  the  only 
dangerous  one.  The  theist  is  quite  content  to  let  the 
skeptic  vapor  as  he  will  about  the  general  uncertainty 
of  knowledge,  so  long  as  it  can  be  made  out  that  rea- 
son, such  as  it  is,  supports  theism.  Reason  may  be 
very  feeble,  and  the  facts  may  be  very  imperfectly 
known,  but  if  they  unite  in  pointing  to  theism  as  the 
only  sufficient  explanation  of  the  world,  the  theist  is 
satisfied.  Why,  then,  burden  ourselves  with  difficulties 
which  are  common  to  every  theory  of  knowledge,  and 
thus  run  the  risk  of  failing  in  our  gratuitously-assumed 
task? 

Theoretically,  these  objections  are  well  taken ;  but, 
practically,  another  course  is  more  promising.  Philo- 
sophic skepticism  is  impotent,  except  in  moral  and  re- 
ligious discussion.  Elsewhere  daily  contact  with  reality 
and  the  imperative  needs  of  life  make  real  skepticism 
practically  impossible.  Busy  men  turn  their  backs  on  it, 
and  answer  it  by  walking  away.  But  it  is  both  wonder- 
ful and  instructive  how  the  objections  are  brought  out 
when  discussion  touches  on  moral  or  religious  ques- 
tions. Points,  which  in  daily  life  would  seem  pedantic 
or  foolish,  are  made  with  the  emphasis  of  conviction  and 
the  zeal  of  a  new  discovery.  After  swallowing  the 
camel?  the  gnat  is  carefully  strained  out;  and,  once  in 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  11 

awhile,  even  conscience  is  invoked  against  the  impiety 
of  ready  belief.  In  an  age  of  dogmatism  religion  is 
impossible,  because  we  know  too  much.  According  to 
the  dogmatist,  there  is  nothing  but  matter  and  force  in 
the  universe,  with  no  room  for  God  or  ghosts.  In  an 
age  of  skepticism  religion  is  impossible,  because  we 
know  too  little.  The  reason  is  unimportant,  if  only  the 
conclusion  be  reached.  No  matter  what  form  the  rav- 
ings of  speculators  may  take,  religion  is  sure  to  be 
beaten.  No  matter  what  the  speech  treats  of,  it  is  apt 
to  end  with — "  Carthage  must  be  destroyed."  Theism, 
then,  has  a  practical  interest  in  examining  the  skeptic's 
arguments,  such  as  none  of  the  sciences  have.  We 
further  reply  to  the  objections  of  the  preceding  para- 
graph, that  our  purpose  is  not  so  much  to  solve  the 
general  difficulties  of  knowledge,  as  to  show  that  they 
are  general.  Volition  cannot  be  argued  with;  but  it  is 
worth  while  to  show  a  candid  objector  that  the  difficul- 
ties at  which  he  hesitates,  are  no  greater  than  others 
which  he  accepts.  The  lack  of  logical  and  philosoph- 
ical training  frequently  results  in  the  imagination  that 
metaphysical  difficulties  are  found  only  in  Natural  The- 
ology. It  is  of  service  to  such  a  one  to  show  that  these 
difficulties  underlie  all  the  sciences,  and  even  logic  it- 
self. We  reply  finally  to  the  objector,  that  it  is  not 
our  purpose  to  give  an  exhaustive  theory  of  knowledge, 
but  only  to  clear  up  the  subject  a  little  by  some  criti- 
cisms and  definitions.  The  chief  difficulty  of  the  ques- 
tion lies  in  the  fog  which  envelopes  it. 

The  prevailing  agnosticism  is  not  speculative,  but 

practical.      It  does  not  arise  from  any  psychological 
2 


1 2  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

study,  but  solely  from  the  necessity  of  avoiding  certain 
disagreeable  conclusions.  It  prevails  especially  in  sci- 
entific quarters.  Physics  is  pushed  up  to  the  verge  of 
atheism  and  materialism,  and  then  a  halt  is  called.  To 
save  trouble,  agnosticism  is  adopted  as  a  compromise. 
Hence  the  dualism  of  agnostic  treatises.  They  give  us 
atheism  and  materialism  for  subject  and  predicate,  but 
omit  the  copula.  The  evilly-inclined  reader  supplies 
the  omission.  Along  with  the  atheism  go  divers  expres- 
sions of  awe  at  the  all-pervading  wonder,  and  the  mys- 
tery of  the  molecule.  These  men  are  not  to  be  blamed. 
Their  inconsistency  is  based  on  the  need  they  feel  for 
supplying  some  foundation  for  morals  and  religion. 
One  must  admire  the  motive,  even  in  criticising  the 
outcome.  But  the  dualism  is  apparent,  and  its  worth- 
lessness  is  equally  plain.  Moreover,  their  agnosticism 
appears  only  upon  occasion.  It  is  when  dealing  with 
an  opponent's  views  that  it  becomes  prominent.  We 
have  made  a  careful  study  of  the  works  of  leading 
agnostics,  and  have  never  detected  the  slightest  indica- 
tion of  conscious  ignorance.  On  the  contrary,  the  zeal 
of  conviction  and  the  dogmatism  of  infallibility,  are 
every-where  apparent.  They  publish  long  theories  of 
things,  and  appear  to  have  great  confidence  in  them, 
although  things  are  declared  unknowable.  They  invest 
the  fundamental  reality  with  various  attributes,  after 
declaring  any  attribution  unallowable.  This  fact  makes 
the  study  of  their  works  vanity  and  vexation  of  spirit. 
The  results  of  compromise,  their  works  have  all  the 
hodge-podge  character  of  compromises  in  general.  We 
must  not  charge  the  writers  with  the  unparalleled  inso- 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  13 

Icnce  of  assuming  that  their  opponents  only  are  incapa- 
ble of  knowledge;  we  must  rather  refer  their  views  to 
the  logic  of  the  situation.  There  was  need  of  a  recon- 
ciliation between  science  and  religion;  accordingly  they 
destroyed  both,  and  called  it  peace.  Meanwhile,  if 
pressed  by  hard  questions,  they  have  but  to  wave  the 
wand  of  the  unknowable,  and  the  difficulties  disappear 
into  chaos  and  impenetrable  night.  This  convenience 
is  an  additional  argument.  The  theoretical  foundation 
is  the  weak  part.  We  know  only  phenomena  is  the 
magic  word.  But  what  is  it  to  know?  What  is  a 
phenomenon,  and  what  is  its  relation  to  its  noumenal 
ground  ?  Can  one  phenomenon  know  another  phenom- 
enon ?  If  not,  can  a  group  of  phenomena  know  another 
group?  Or  is  there  knowing  only,  without  a  knower 
and  a  thing  known  ?  These  are  interesting  questions, 
and  a  little  light  on  them  would  be  a  boon  to  the  stu- 
dent. Unfortunately  the  average  agnostic  seems  never 
to  have  dreamed  of  them.  This  vexatious  state  of  the 
argument  comports  so  ill  with  their  confident  declara- 
tions, that  we  must  assume  that  here,  as  elsewhere, 
wisdom  is  justified  only  of  her  children.  To  attempt 
to  get  any  exact  meaning  from  the  current  expositions 
of  agnosticism  would  only  lead  us  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  doctrine  itself  is  the  true  unknowable.  We 
attempt,  then,  to  examine  the  skeptic's  argument  for 
ourselves. 

Unless  we  know  what  knowledge  is,  how  can  we 
tell  whether  we  have  it  ?  Plainly  a  definition  is  called 
for,  and  we  give  it  as  follows:  knowledge  is  the  cer- 
tainty that  our  conceptions  correspond  to  reality  or  to 


14  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

truth.  By  readty,  we  mean  any  matter  of  fact,  whether 
of  the  outer  or  inner  world.  By  truth,  we  mean  ra- 
tional principles.  By  certainty,  it  is  plain  that  we  can- 
not mean  any  thoughtless  assurance,  but  only  that 
which  results  from  the  necessity  of  the  admission. 
Rational  truth  is  seen  to  be  valid  every- where  and 
always;  and  as  the  result  of  this  insight,  it  is  said  to  be 
necessary  and  universal.  Both  of  these  terms  are  mis- 
leading. Necessity  is  often  interpreted  as  if  it  repre- 
sented only  a  habit  of  the  mind,  or,  at  best,  the  out- 
come of  the  mental  constitution.  In  this  way  color  is 
given  to  the  notion  that,  by  altering  the  mental  consti- 
tution, truth  itself  would  be  altered.  This  notion  is 
without  any  warrant  in  experience.  There  is  nothing 
to  indicate  that  truth  depends  on  any  arbitrary  make 
of  the  faculties  which  recognize  it,  instead  of  on  its 
own  clearness  and  self-evidence.  Universality,  again,  is 
often  understood  to  mean  consciously  present  in  every 
mind.  This  mistake  has  kept  the  empiricists  at  work 
ever  since  the  time  of  Locke,  hunting  in  the  minds  of 
babies  and  savages  for  failing  cases  of  universal  truths. 
The  self-evidence  of  the  truth  is  its  fundamental  sup- 
port. The  test  of  necessity  has  only  the  negative  value 
of  preventing  us  from  deceiving  ourselves  as  to  what  is 
self-evident.  When  we  go  carelessly  to  work,  we  may 
easily  mistake  the  customary  for  the  unquestionable; 
and  then  we  can  right  ourselves  only  by  setting  up  the 
contradictory  of .  the  proposition.  In  this  way  we  de- 
tect the  influence  of  habit,  and  remedy  the  results  of 
loose  analysis.  The  universality,  means  only  that  ra- 
tional truth  is  not  conditioned  by  space  or  time,  or 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  15 

aught  else.  Our  knowledge  of  it  may  be  conditioned 
by  ignorance  and  stupidity ;  but  the  mind  does  not 
make,  it  recognizes,  the  truth.  When  the  mind  has 
this  clear  insight  into  a  principle,  so  that  it  is  seen  to 
be  self-evident,  and  its  untruth  is  impossible,  we  call 
the  result  knowledge. 

Our  knowledge  of  things  consists,  (1)  in  the  certainty 
that  they  exist,  and  (2)  that  they  have  certain  attributes 
or  ways  of  working,  and  certain  relations  among  them- 
selves. When  we  reach  any  such  certainty  about  a 
thing,  we  have  a  knowledge  of  the  thing  to  that  extent. 
This  knowledge  may  be  more  or  less,  but  its  extent  is 
indifferent  to  the  definition.  It  is  conceivable  that 
other  beings  should  have  deeper  insight  into  the  nature 
of  things  than  we  have,  but  in  such  case  their  knowl- 
edge would  not  be  more  real,  but  more  exhaustive,  than 
ours.  But  even  their  knowledge  would  come  under  the 
same  definition — the  certainty  that  things  exist  and 
have  certain  properties  and  powers.  A  large  part  of 
the  skeptic's  argument  consists  in  referring  to  the  vast- 
ness  of  the  unknown  in  comparison  with  the  known. 
He  points  out  that  we  do  not  know  the  inner  nature  of 
tilings,  nor  how  things  are  made.  We  grant  all  this, 
but  insist  that  we  know  sundry  truths  about  things 
after  they  are  made.  The  scientist  does  not  pretend  to 
know  how  the  elements  are  made,  but  he  claims  to 
know  something  about  their  ways  of  working.  Our 
knowledge  of  the  soul  does  not  consist  in  any  insight 
into  the  soul's  being,  but  only  in  the  certainty  that 
souls  exist,  and  have  peculiar  assignable  powers.  Nei- 
ther science  nor  philosophy  has,  or  is  likely  to  have, 


16  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

any  recipe  for  creation.  The  utmost  the  finite  can 
ever  hope  to  do,  is,  not  to  create  things,  but  to  under- 
stand them  after  they  are  created.  When  reality  has 
been  comprehended  under  the  forms  of  thought,  science 
and  philosophy  have  finished  their  work;  and  the  result 
we  call  knowledge,  as  far  as  it  goes.  If  this  is  not 
knowledge,  what  is  ?  References  to  the  mystery  of  be- 
ing, and  the  vastness  of  the  unknown,  are  quite  irrele- 
vant in  discussing  the  reality  of  knowledge. 

The  statement  that  the  reality  of  knowledge  is  inde- 
pendent of  its  extent,  deserves  further  emphasis.  It 
has  been  strangely  enough  assumed  by  both  believer 
and  skeptic,  that  the  reality  of  knowledge  can  be  main- 
tained only  by  proving  that  all  perceptive  beings  must 
see  all  things  alike.  Of  course  such  a  proof  is  forever 
impossible,  and  the  skeptic  wins  an  easy  triumph.  But 
this  question,  also,  must  be  ruled  out  as  irrelevant.  The 
point  is  not  whether  other  beings  see  things  as  we  do, 
but  whether  the  powers  and  relations  which  we  find  in 
them  are  really  there,  independent  of  our  thought. 
Touch  is  not  contradicted  by  vision,  though  each  gives 
some  elements  which  are  impossible  to  the  other.  The 
question  whether  angels  or  animals  see  things  as  we  do, 
is  a  perfectly  idle  one.  Sextus  Empiricus  based  a  skep- 
tical argument  on  the  fact  that  cat's  eyes  have  oblong 
pupils,  while  men's  eyes  have  round  pupils.  It  will 
probably  be  impossible  for  us  to  tell  how  cats  view 
things  until  cats  become  able  to  think  or  speak,  or  un- 
til we  become  cats  without  losing  our  human  faculties. 
Both  events  seem  quite  unlikely,  and  the  advance  of 
knowledge  in  that  direction  is  barred.  The  attempt  to 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  1 7 

find  how  angels,  or  some  hypothetical  beings,  may  re- 
gard things,  appears  equally  hopeless.  Be  it  far  from 
us  to  say  what  such  beings  might  see  and  think.  All 
such  suggestions  are  irrelevant,  unless  it  be  claimed 
that  their  knowings  contradict  ours;  and  in  that  case 
we  should  ask  what  ground  there  is  (l)  for  assuming 
that  these  hypothetical  beings  are  real ;  (2)  for  saying 
that  their  knowledge  contradicts  ours;  and  (3)  for  as- 
suming that,  hi  case  of  contradiction,  these  imaginary 
beings  must  be  in  the  right?  The  last  assumption  is 
plainly  gratuitous,  for  they  would  not  contradict  us 
any  more  than  we  should  contradict  them;  and  hence, 
after  all,  we  should  have  to  decide  the  question  by  ap- 
pealing to  our  own  reason.  Although  this  fashion  of 
appealing  to  imaginary  beings,  in  the  interests  of  skep- 
ticism, has  the  support  of  Descartes,  it  must  neverthe- 
less be  regarded  as  unworthy  a  rational  being,  because 
it  is  both  gratuitous  and  indecisive. 

The  fact  that  the  reality  of  knowledge  is  independent 
of  its  extent  also  contains  an  explanation  of  the  pre- 
tended antithesis  of  absolute  and  relative  knowledge. 
This  antithesis  has  no  meaning  from  the  side  of  the 
subject.  For  the  knower,  there  is  either  certainty  or 
uncertainty  concerning  a  fact  or  proposition;  and  he 
may  either  know  it  to  be  true  or  false,  or  he  may  be- 
lieve it  to  be  true  or  false,  or  he  may  be  in  doubt  con- 
cerning it.  These  are  the  possible  mental  states  of  the 
knower,  and  for  him  the  distinction  of  relative  and  ab- 
solute has  no  assignable  meaning.  We  must,  then,  seek 
the  meaning  of  the  distinction  in  the  object;  and  here 
we  come  upon  the  following  fact :  We  know  things  only 


1  8  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

in  relations  either  to  ourselves  or  to  other  things.  This 
perfectly  true  statement  is,  then,  illicitly  transformed 
into  another  which  is  entirely  different,  namely,  that 
we  know  only  relations.  When  something  is  known  to 
exist  as  this  or  that,  relations  may  also  be  known  to 
exist  between  it  and  other  equally  known  things;  but 
that  we  should  know  the  relations  of  essentially  un- 
known objects  is  a  contradiction  in  psychology.  Knowl- 
edge may  go  deeper  and  deeper,  but  so  long  as  the 
word  represents  any  thing  intelligible,  it  will  always 
consist,  not  in  being  the  thing  known,  but  in  forming 
conceptions  about  the  thing.  Such  a  deepening  of 
knowledge  would  not  displace  what  we  know,  but  only 
extend  it.  Even  in  the  realm  of  rational  principles, 
it  is  possible  that  our  knowledge  does  not  reach  the 
ultimate.  They  lie  in  our  mind  as  mutually  independ- 
ent data.  The  law  of  identity,  or  of  causation,  carries 
with  it  no  necessity  that  the  mind  should  also  have  an 
intuition  of  space.  The  understanding  is  conceivable 
apart  from  the  moral  nature.  This  mutual  independ- 
ence in  our  experience  leads  the  mind  to  surmise  that 
in  the  ultimate  ground  of  being  there  may  be  an  inter- 
dependence of  these  principles,  so  that  all  may  flow 
from  one  root.  German  philosophy  has  made  great 
efforts  to  show  such  a  relation,  but  the  success  has  not 
been  great.  But  if  such  a  relation  existed,  it  would 
not  in  any  way  affect  the  validity  of  rational  principles : 
we  should  only  have  a  deeper  knowledge.  Theoretical 
mechanics  has  advanced  through  successive  generaliza- 
tions until  the  whole  science  is  reduced  to  an  interpre- 
tation of  a  single  principle;  but  no  knowledge  is  dis- 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  10 

turbed  by  the  advance.  In  like  manner,  if  space  were 
found  to  be  only  a  form  of  manifestation,  our  knowl- 
edge of  space  would  remain  just  as  it  is.  The  science 
of  space  relations  would  continue  to  be  valid :  we 
should  only  discover  that  there  is  something  deeper 
than  space,  and  not  that  space  is  delusion.  The  current 
thought  that  the  ideality  of  space  implies  that  space  is 
merely  a  human  delusion,  is  one  of  the  many  misunder- 
standings found  in  the  popular  speculations.  That 
doctrine  denies  that  God  is  limited  in  any  way  by 
space,  as  if  space  were  a  thing  like  other  things,  but  it 
does  not  deny  him  a  knowledge  of  space  relations,  as  if 
something  in  the  world  of  the  thinkable  were  unknown 
and  unknowable  to  the  Source  of  all  thought  and  knowl- 
edge. 

Again,'  with  regard  to  things,  a  deeper  knowledge 
.does  not  discredit  real  knowledge.  If  it  should  turn 
out  that  the  chemical  elements  are  compound,  it  would 
leave  our  present  knowledge  where  it  is.  A  profounder 
insight  into  their  structure  would  not  overturn  their 
known  laws.  Where,  then,  is  the  opposition  between 
absolute  and  relative  knowledge?  The  true  antith- 
esis is  that  of  more  or  less,  and  not  that  of  relative  and 
absolute.  Absolute  knowledge  is  greatly  to  be  de- 
sired, and  its  unattainability  is  a  great  loss,  no  doubt; 
but  still  a  large  reward  might  be  safely  offered  for  any 
definition  of  it  which  would  not  reduce  either  to  an  un- 
intelligible chimera  or  else  to  exhaustive  knowledge. 
But  no  one  ever  claimed  an  exhaustive  knowledge  of 
any  thing  for  any  finite  mind.  Every  thing  stands  in 
infinite  relations  to  the  rest  of  the  system,  and  only 


20  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

Omniscience  could  know  a  thing  through  and  through. 
Even  a  simple  number,  as  two,  can  be  formed  in  an 
indefinite  number  of  ways ;  so  that  no  finite  intelligence 
could  possibly  exhaust  its  relations.  Here  the  relativist 
will  break  out,  that  this  is  only  a  knowledge  of  rela- 
tions; and  we  reply,  that  it  is  not  a  knowledge  of  rela- 
tions, but  a  knowledge  of  real  things  in  actual  relations. 
If  he  adds,  But  I  want  to  know  what  the  thing  is  in 
itself;  the  reply  would  be,  It  is  that  substantial  some- 
thing which  is  capable  of  sustaining  those  relations. 
He  can  next  ask,  But  how  is  it  capable?  This  is  to 
demand  how  reality  is  made;  and  this  is  an  idle  ques- 
tion. Or  he  can  further  object,  All  our  conceptions  of 
things  are  built  up  by  telling,  not  what  they  are,  but 
how  they  act,  or  what  they  do,  etc.  This  objection  was 
made  very  much  of  by  the  Greek  skeptics.  They  urged 
that  we  are  shut  up  to  the  phenomena  of  being,  and 
never  reach  the  knowledge  of  being  in  itself.  A  suffi- 
cient answer  is,  that  the  demand  to  know  what  things 
are  in  terms  of  something  besides  their  essential  attri- 
butes, is  either  a  demand  to  know  how  things  are 
made,  or  else  it  is  utterly  unintelligible.  In  either  case 
it  is  irrelevant  in  discussing  the  validity  of  our  present 
knowledge. 

Here  the  phenomenalist  appears,  and  expresses  his 
delight  at  finding  us  agreeing  with  him  in  rejecting  all 
ontological  and  noumenal  knowledge.  The  truth,  he 
says,  on  which  all  great  thinkers  are  agreed,  is,  that 
knowledge  is  only  of  phenomena.  Here,  again,  we  have 
a  truism  converted  into  a  falsism.  The  truth  that  we 
know  things  only  through  their  appearances  or  mani- 


AND  SKEPTICISM.  I2l 

festations  is  quietly  changed  to  read  that  we  know  only 
appearances;  and  thus  the  possibility  of  real  knowledge 
is  once  more  ruled  out.  But,  in  fact,  there  is  sad  con- 
fusion in  the  use  of  these  words.  A  phenomenon,  or 
appearance,  implies  two  factors:  (1)  something  which 
appears;  (2)  a  mind  to  which  it  appears.  Properly 
speaking,  phenomena  do  not  exist  apart  from  the  mind ; 
and  they  have  mental  existence  only  in  the  moment  of 
perception.  In  strictness,  then,  a  phenomenal  universe 
is  the  creation  of  the  mind,  and  vanishes  with  con- 
sciousness. But  it  rarely  happens  that  the  phenome- 
nalist  ventures  to  regard  the  objects  of  knowledge  as 
merely  modifications  of  ourselves,  although  this  only 
would  be  strict  phenomenalism.  No  one  can  persuade 
himself  that  the  solar  system  is  only  a  subjective  aflev 
tion,  or  that  the  force  of  gravity  is  but  a  relation  be- 
tween ideas.  It  would  be  quite  impossible  to  regard  a 
fierce  dog  who  was  making  suggestive  advances  as  any 
thing  like  a  state  of  self.  This  difficulty  leads  to  an 
other  definition  of  phenomenon.  In  this  second  stage, 
a  phenomenon  is  entirely  objective  to  the  mind,  and 
means  only  a  particular  mode  or  manifestation  of 
reality.  But,  as  thus  used,  it  has  a  double  meaning. 
Sometimes  it  means  just  what  common  sense  means  by 
thing;  and  sometimes  it  means  just  what  common  sense 
means  by  attribute.  The  first  meaning  is  well  illus- 
trated by  what  Spencer  calls  "relative  reality."  In 
his  system  there  are,  (1)  an  absolute  reality;  (2)  a  rel- 
ative reality;  and  (3)  our  knowledge  of  this  relative 
reality.  This  relative  reality  is  declared  to  be  as  real 
as  the  absolute  reality;  in  short,  his  relative  realities 


22  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

are  things  as  they  exist  for  science  and  common 
sense ;  and  these  we  are  allowed  to  know.  Here 
every  thing  is  phenomenal  except  fundamental  be- 
ing. This  view  is  a  reproduction  of  the  Platonic 
doctrine,  that  only  the  independent  truly  is.  Closely 
allied  to  this  view  is  another,  based  on  a  double  mean- 
ing of  thing.  By  thing  we  may  mean  a  metaphysical 
unit,  or  we  may  mean  a  composite  of  such  units.  Now, 
according  to  the  atomic  theory,  none  of  the  things  we 
see  are  metaphysical  units,  but  are  compounds.  Ad- 
vantage is  taken  of  this  double  meaning  to  call  com- 
posites phenomena;  and  then  our  knowledge  is  said 
once  more  to  be  only  of  phenomena.  But  such  phenom- 
ena are  properly  modes  of  reality;  and  our  knowledge 
of  them  is  objectively  valid.  The  ocean  is  not  a  phan- 
tom, because  water  is  a  compound  and  not  an  element. 
Again,  phenomenal  knowledge  is  often  identified  with 
the  product  of  sense-perception,  and  the  denial  of  nou- 
menal  knowledge  is  intended  to  limit  us  to  the  things' 
we  see.  This  is  a  fantastic  mixture  of  sensationalism 
and  the'  crudest  common  sense,  and  is  as  fatal  to  science 
as  to  religion.  It  denies  the  possibility  of  knowledge 
through  inference;  and  thus  reduces  all  scientific  theory 
to  cobwebs  of  the  brain.  But  in  most  cases  a  phenom- 
enon is  simply  an  attribute;  and  the  claim  is,  that  we 
can  know  being  only  through  its  attributes  or  manifes- 
tations. This  is  a  truism.  The  notion  that  thereby 
we  suffer  any  loss,  is  based  on  an  unreal  separation  be- 
tween a  thing  and  its  properties.  We  never  know 
properties  alone,  but  a  thing  as  having  properties. 
Then,  misled  by  our  tendency  to  mistake  abstractions 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  23 

for  things,  we  gather  these  properties  into  a  phenome- 
nal thing  which  we  know,  and  contrast  it  with  a  nou- 
raenal  thing  which  we  do  not  know.  Thus,  back  of  the 
conscious  soul  we  plant  a  noumenal  soul,  and  mourn 
because  we  cannot  know  it.  Or,  back  of  the  thing  we 
know,  we  fancy  some  thing  in  itself  which  obstinately 
refuses  to  come  into  knowledge.  But  all  this  is  delu- 
sion. The  conscious,  active  soul,  or  the  thing  which  is 
known  to  exist  in  certain  relations,  or  to  -have  certain 
properties,  is  all  there  is  to  know,  unless  we  raise  the 
idle  question,  how  reality  is  made.  In  any  other  sense 
the  thing  in  itself  is  as  empty  an  abstraction  as  ever 
imposed  on  men.  The  phenomenalist  may  urge  that 
the  properties  we  attribute  to  things  belong  to  them 
only  in  relations  to  ourselves  ;  but  this  is  true  only  for 
sense-qualities,  and  these  are  but  a  vanishing  fraction 
of  their  qualities.  Things  are  defined  in  general  not 
by  their  relations  to  ourselves,  but  to  one  another.  We 
conclude,  then,  that  if  there  is  any  thing  in  objects  and 
their  relations  which  we  recognize  or  infer,  and  do  not 
make,  the  knowledge  of  that  something  is  absolute  01 
uoumenal  in  the  only  intelligible  sense  of  these  teiui.  . 
It  is  also  plain  that  phenomenal  as  applied  to  knowledge 
lias  no  definite  meaning  and  can  only  lead  to  confusion. 
We  repeat  our  definition  of  knowledge.  Knowledge  is 
the  certainty  that  our  conceptions  correspond  to  the 
fact  or  truth. 

With  this  definition,  we  pass  to  consider  the  skeptical 
objections  to  the  possibility  of  knowing.  It  is  mani- 
fest that  a  skepticism  which  should  deny  all  certainty, 


24  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

subjective  and  objective  alike,  is  suicidal;  for  it  can 
make  out  its  case  only  by  assuming  the  validity  of  the 
laws  of  thought,  and  the  general  testimony  of  con- 
sciousness. If  the  skeptic  question  these,  he  must  be 
content  with  a  purely  dogmatic  skepticism,  without 
reason  and  without  proof.  He  may  not  even  -say  of 
any  proposition  that  it  is  not  proven,  or  does  not  follow 
from  the  premises,  without  assuming  valid  principles 
of  proof.  If  there  are  no  such  principles,  one  thing 
follows  as  well  as  any  other.  Hence,  not  even  the  uni- 
versality of  error  can  be  affirmed  without  admitting  the 
reality  of  truth;  for  error  is  meaningless  except  as  be- 
ing a  departure  from  the  truth.  This  unprincipled 
skepticism  has,  indeed,  appeared  in  the  history  of  phi- 
losophy; but  its  self-contradictions  are  so  great  as  to 
call  for  no  consideration.  Mere  whimsies  must  not  be 
encouraged  to  think  of  themselves  more  highly  than 
they  ought  to  think,  by  a  too  elaborate  refutation. 
Most  of  the  objections  of  the  Greek  skeptics  are  of  this 
sort.  They  either  impress  the  modern  thinker  as  puer- 
ile, or  they  represent  a  theory  of  perception  long  since 
abandoned. 

The  more  common  form  of  the  skeptical  argument 
does  not  question  consciousness  as  revealing  subjective 
states,  and  does  not  deny  that  there  are  certain  sub- 
jective necessities  of  thought.  We  must,  for  instance, 
reason  according  to  logical  laws  ;  we  must  admit  the 
reality  of  the  external  world,  and  the  reality  of  causa- 
tion. All  this  the  skeptic  readily  allows,  and  concludes 
that  knowledge  is  uncertain  on  that  very  account :  for 
while  we  admit  that  there  is  truth,  we  are  only  too  sure 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  25 

that  there  is  error  ;  and  who  shall  say  that  these  neces- 
sary affirmations  do  not  belong  to  the  side  of  error? 
The  history  of  this  form  of  skepticism  is  very  interesting. 
The  early  philosophers  opposed  to  skepticism  the  doc- 
trine of  innate  ideas,  or  laws  of  our  faculties,  which  com- 
pel the  mind  to  act  in  certain  way. .  But  by  and  by  it 
was  urged  that  the  fact  that  an  idea  is  necessary  to  the 
mind  does  not  prove  its  objective  validity;  and  then 
the  doctrine  of  innate  ideas,  modified  into  the  Kantian 
doctrine  of  mental  forms,  became  the  basis  of  the  most 
subtle  and  formidable  skepticism  possible  to  philos- 
ophy— May  we  not,  by  a  law  of  our  nature,  be  held  back 
from  the  truth?  This  question  includes  the  doubt  of 
Descartes  on  the  basis  of  an  imagined  devil,  and  also 
all  the  skepticism  which  has  sprung  from  the  Kantian 
philosophy. 

This  doubt  divides  into  two:  (1)  a  doubt  of  the 
validity  of  rational  principles;  and,  (2)  a  doubt  of  the 
trustworthiness  of  external  perception.  We  shall  find 
it  advantageous  to  consider  them  separately. 

The  skeptical  argument  against  the  truth  of  rational 
principles  takes  on  two  forms  :  One  form  seeks  to  show 
that  if  we  allow  them  to  be  true,  and  then  develop  them 
to  their  logical  results,  we  find  the  reason  contradicting 
itself.  This  is  the  only  method  which  could  be  deci- 
sive. If  the  mind  could  be  involved  in  insoluble  contra- 
diction with  itself,  the  result  would  be  to  cast  discredit 
on  all  our  faculties,  and  reduce  intelligence  to  the  scale  of 
practical  life.  It  is  commonly  supposed  that  Kant  did 
this  in  his  u  Critique  of  the  Pure  Reason,"  and  especially 
in  his  famous  antinomies.  But  it  is  not  only  a  mistake. 


26  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

to  say  that  he  did  it;  it  is  also  a  mistake  to  say  that  he 
meant  to  do  it.     Kant  never  proposed  the  question:  Is 
reason  trustworthy?     His  inquiry  was  the  entirely  dif- 
ferent one :  Where  is  reason  trustworthy  ?     This  ques-    ' 
tion  no  more  implies  a  distrust  of  reason  than  an  inquiry 
into  the  limitations  of   mathematics  implies  a  distrust 
of  mathematics.     Kant  appealed  to  reason  to  set  its 
own  limits,  and  to  declare  those  limits  reasonable.    Yet 
even  Hamilton  charges  Kant  with  making  reason  self- 
contradictory.     Blunders  of  this  sort  are  no  longer  ex- 
cusable.    Kant  claimed  simply  that  the  reason,  in  its 
spontaneous  and  unreflective  activity,  is  the  source  of 
illusion,  just  as  unreflecting  common  sense  forms  theories 
of  things  which  disappear  at  the  first  touch  of  criticism. 
But  Kant  also  claimed  that  reason,  when  reflective  and 
critical,  is  able  to  discern  and  correct  its  unthinking 
errors.     The  very  antinomies  to  which  appeal  is  made, 
prove  that  Kant  did  not  regard  the  reason  as  divided 
against  itself;  for  he  claimed  that  they  result  from  a 
wrong  or  careless  use  of  the  reason;  and  he  also  claimed 
to  have  solved  them  by  showing  that  the  thesis  and 
antithesis  in  each  antinomy  are,  at  the  worst,  only  con- 
traries and  not  contradictories.      So  much  for  Kant's 
skepticism  on  this  point.     We  will  only  add,  that  it  ia 
by  no  means  necessary  to  adopt  the  Kantian  distinction 
of   noumena  and  phenomena  in  order  to  see  that  the 
argument  for  one  member  of  the  antinomy  is  always 
inconclusive,  and  often  bristles  with  paralogism.      A 
little  patient  reflection  will  suffice  for  this  insight. 

Since  Kant's  time,  some  who  thought  they  were  fol- 
lowing him,  have  attempted  to  show  that  the  mind  does 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  27 

fall  into  inevitable  and  insoluble  contradictions.  Hamil- 
ton only  established  the  harmless  theorem,  that  of  con- 
tradictories both  may  be  equally  incomprehensible,  and 
not  that  both  may  be  established  with  equal  cogency. 
The  most  notorious  of  these  attempts  is  that  of  Man- 
sel,  who  claims  that  the  mind  insists  on  regarding  the 
ground  of  the  universe  as  first  cause,  absolute  and  in- 
finite. The  entire  argument  rests  on  playing  with  the 
etymology  of  the  words,  and  ignoring  their  philosoph- 
ical content.  The  argument  has  been  reproduced,  with- 
out improvement,  in  the  philosophy  of  the  unknowable. 
In  sound  philosophy,  the  first  cause,  the  absolute,  and 
the  infinite,  all  mean  only  that  independent  being  upon 
whom  the  conditioned  world  about  us  depends.  But 
etymologically,  the  infinite  may  mean  the  all,  and  the 
absolute  may  mean  the  unrelated.  Hence  arise  many 
puzzling  and  profound  questions.  How  can  the  finite 
coexist  with  the  infinite,  when  the  infinite  must  be  the 
all?  How  can  the  absolute  be  a  cause,  since  the  abso- 
lute is  the  unrelated,  and  a  cause  must  be  related  to 
its  effect  ?  These  difficulties  disappear  as  soon  as  we 
abandon  etymology  and  attend  to  the  philosophical 
meaning  of  the  terms.  These  attacks  on  the  consist- 
ency of  reason  have  a  slight  pedagogical  value  in  fur- 
nishing the  teacher  with  examples  of  various  logical 
fallacies;  but  they  certainly  have  no  philosophical 
significance. 

To  the  same  class  must  be  reckoned  the  attempts 
sometimes  made  to  discredit  our  simple,  geometrical  in- 
tuitions, by  the  doctrine  of  a  space  with  more  than  three 
dimensions.     Helmholtz,  in  an  exposition  of  the  doc- 
3 


28  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

trine,  imagines  beings  living  on  a  sphere,  and  assumes 
that  they  are  capable  of  motion  only  along  the  surface 
of  the  sphere.  Now,  if  we  further  assume  that  our  no- 
tion of  space  is  generated  by  experience  alone,  it  would 
follow  that  these  beings  would  never  get  the  notion  cf 
a  space  of  three  dimensions,  but  only  of  such  a  space 
as  is  represented  by  a  spherical  surface.  Hence  their 
idea  of  space  and  their  geometry  would  differ  from 
ours.  For  them  the  shortest  distance  between  two 
points  would  be  an  arc  of  a  circle,  while  for  us  it  is  a 
chord.  Two  straight  lines  would  inclose  a  space;  and 
they  would  be  just  as  sure  that  they  can  inclose  space, 
as  we  are  that  two  straight  lines  never  can  inclose 
space.  Hence  it  was  concluded  that  our  geometry  is 
only  of  limited  validity.  The  feebleness  of  this  con- 
clusion is  quite  extraordinary,  as  a  scanty  amount 
of  definition  would  have  made  it  impossible.  Under 
the  supposed  conditions,  space  would  be  the  surface  of 
a  sphere,  and  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points 
in  such  a  space  would  be  what  we  mean  by  the  short- 
est distance  between  two  points  on  the  surface  of  a 
sphere.  That  the  imaginary  inhabitants  should  declare 
such  shortest  distance  to  be  an  arc  need  not  surprise  us, 
for  we  say  the  same  thing.  Indeed,  all  the  conclusions 
drawn  by  these  people,  are  simply  the  conclusions  of 
our  own  geometry  with  regard  to  spherical  surfaces. 
But  because  both  propositions  are  about  two  points  in 
space,  advantage  is  taken  of  the  common  term  to  for- 
get that  in  one  proposition  space  means  our  space  of 
three  dimensions^  and  in  the  other  it  means  only  the 
surface  of  a  sphere,  It  would  not  be  surprising  if  sucli 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  29 

splendid  play  secured  an  overwhelming  triumph.  The 
doctrine  of  a  curvature  of  space,  and  of  a  space  of  n 
dimensions,  is  based  on  similar  pettifoggery.  When 
we  say  that  parallel  lines  will  never  meet,  or  that  two 
right  lines  can  never  inclose  a  space,  we  are  told  to  re- 
member that  space  may  have  a  curvature,  so  that  every 
line  shall  return  into  itself,  or  perform  some  other  feat. 
Ii  reply,  we  ask  what  is  meant  by  a  curvature  of  space  ? 
Lines  and  outlines  may  be  curved  in  space,  but  no  one  . 
•can  understand  any  thing  by  a  curvature  of  space  it- 
self. To  mean  any  thing  intelligible,  this  doctrine 
must  only  say  that  there  are  no  absolutely  straight  or 
parallel  lines,  etc.;  but  the  geometrician  does  not  say 
that  there  are.  He  merely  says  that  if  such  lines  exist, 
they  will  not  meet.  A  curvature  of  number,  so  that 
by  adding  unit  to  unit  we  should  finally  come  back  to 
unity,  is  just  as  rational  a  notion  as  that  of  a  curvature 
of  space;  so  that  by  always  going  on  in  a  straight 
line,  one  should  finally  come  back  to  the  starting-point. 
The  talk  about  a  space  of  n  dimensions  is  either  equally 
empty  or  equally  unintelligible.  The  facts  concerning; 
this  notorious  doctrine  are  these:  Algebraic  analysis  is. 
independent  of  synthetic  geometry;  and  as  long  as  we: 
confine  ourselves  to  abstract  symbols  we  are  not  limited 
to  any  number  of  co-ordinate  axes.  Further,  it  is  found 
that  when  there  are  no  more  than  three  axes,  the  analyt- 
ical expressions  can  be  geometrically  represented  by 
lines,  etc.,  in  space.  Now,  nothing  is  easier  than  to  say 
that  if  space  had  n  dimensions,  then  an  expression  in- 
volving n  axes  of  reference  could  also  be  geometrically 
represented.  Of  course  it  could.  If  space  had  n  4A% 


30  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

mansions,  it  would  have  n  dimensions.  But  to  conclude 
from  this  fact  that  real  space  may  have  n  dimensions 
is  not  reasoning,  but  a  pitiable  logical  grimace.  The 
simple  fact  that  a  can  be  represented  by  a  line,  aa  by  a 
plane  surface,  and  a8  by  a  cube,  while  a4  and  all  higher 
powers  cannot  be  geometrically  represented,  is  as  good 
ground  for  believing  in  space  of  n  dimensions  as  any 
thing  which  is  offered  in  support  of  the  notion;  for  we 
can  always  say  that  if  space  had  n  dimensions,  then  an 
could  be  geometrically  represented.  The  analytic  forms 
which  arise  from  the  assumption  of  hypothetical  spaces 
are  often  very  interesting,  and  give  rise  to  most  curious 
conclusions  as  to  what  would  be  true  in  such  space. 
For  example,  it  is  said  that  in  a  space  of  four  dimen- 
sions a  sphere  could  be  turned  inside  out  without  rupt- 
ure, but  a  knot  could  not  be  tied.  And  as  analytics  is 
independent  of  geometrical  representation,  there  is  no 
objection  to  such  assumptions  so  long  as  they  are  not 
mistaken  for  reality.  But,  by  sheer  force  of  talking 
about  spaces  of  n  dimensions  some  writers  have  come 
to  believe  that  the  expression  represents  a  possible  ex- 
istence of  some  sort,  instead  of  being  merely  analytic 
assumptions.  An  extended  algebra  of  imaginary  quan- 
tities is  possible;  but  that  does  not  prove  that  the 
quantities  are  not  imaginary.  We  know  one  real  space 
of  three  dimensions,  and  we  know  no  other.  What 
may  be  meant  by  a  space  of  n  dimensions  is  utterly 
unintelligible.  The  thought  escapes  and  defies  all  con- 
struction. It  is  not  a  thought,  it  is  a  phrase.  The  man 
who  utters  it  has  not  said  something;  he  has  merely 
made  a  noise.  Common  sense  must  defend  itself  against 


&NO  WLED  GE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  3 1 

such  imposition  by  demanding  that  a  phrase  represent 
a  construable  thought  as  well  as  a  combination  of  let- 
ters or  sounds. 

The  attempts  to  prove  that  reason  is  essentially  self- 
contradictory,  have  never  proved  any  thing  but  the 
philosophical  incompetency  of  those  who  made  them. 
It  is  very  easy  to  find  contradictions  in  the  spontaneous 
metaphysics  of  common  sense;  but  reason  itself  always 
suffices  to  detect  and  correct  such  errors.  In  the  failure 
of  this  method,  the  skeptic  adopts  another.  He  next 
'claims  that  rational  principles  cannot  be  proved  even  in 
the  mind;  still  less  can  they  be  proved  to  have  object- 
ive validity.  He  admits  that  they  must  control  our 
thinking,  and  that  we  cannot  conceive  them  false  ;  but 
he  urges  that  this  proves  only  a  subjective  necessity, 
and  does  not  prove  an  objective  necessity.  He  sug- 
gests, therefore,  that  these  principles  do  not  hold  for 
the  external  world,  or  for  what  he  is  pleased  to  call 
"things  in  themselves." 

This  skepticism  seems  fair  and  rational;  let  us  look 
at  it  more  closely.  And  first  we  examine  the  demand 
for  proof  of  first  principles.  If  by  proof  the  skeptic 
means  deduction,  it  is  clear  that  he  is  right  in  saying 
that  rational,  or  first,  principles  cannot  be  deduced,  for 
deduction  implies  something  more  fundamental  than 
the  conclusion.  Since  Jacobi  wrote  the  Faith  Philoso- 
phy, there  is  no  reason  for  calling  this  truism  a  dis- 
covery. But  if  the  skeptic  means  that  what  cannot  be 
deduced  is,  therefore,  uncertain,  we  shall  find  it  neces- 
sary to  inquire  what  proof  is.  Now  the  essence  of 


§2  STUDIES  IN  THEISM 

logical   proof   consists    in    so   combining   propositions 
Which  we  know,  that  we  finally  see  some  other  propo- 
sition to  be  a  necessary  admission,  which  was  not  seen 
a§  Such  before.     That  is,  we  reach  a  feeling  of  certainty 
A  ;n  affirming  the  proposition  which  we  did  not  have  ;  and 
th  en  the  proposition  is  said  to  be  proved.     But  the 
esse  >nc@  of  the  proof  consists  in  just  this  certainty,  and 
not  i'u  tne  number  or  nature  of   the  steps  taken.      If 
now  t  ^e  proposition  should  be  directly  seen  at  the  start 
to  be  n  ecessary,  we  should  need  no  proof :  (1)  because 
we  shou  Id  have  the  essence  of  proof — the  feeling  of 
certainty;     (2)  because  the  longest  argument  could  give" 
us  nothing'  more  than  this  feeling;  and,  (3)  because  the 
certainty  ai  "ising  from  a  logical  demonstration  can  never 
be  greater  tiHan  that  of  the  principles  on  which  it  rests. 
If  the  mind  ii  3  able  to  see  some  truths  to  be  self-evident, 
or  to  know  s  ome  things  without  a  process,  it  is  mere- 
logical  pedantry  to  demand  further  proof.     It  is  more 
than  pedantic;  it  is  absurd.     The  self-evident,  in   its; 
very  notion,  is  that  which  is  able  to  stand  alone.     To 
demand  proof  of  it  is  to  declare  that  it  is  not  self- 
evident.     It   is  plain  that   the  ultimate  test  of   truth 
must  be  the  mind  itself,  and  its  faith  in  its  own  power 
to  know.      The  skeptic  is  unwilling  to  admit  the  dicta 
of  reason,  and  insists  on  having  their  validity  in  some 
way   established.      But    it   is   plain,  again,   that   these 
dicta  can  be  tested  only  by  assuming  some  more  ulti- 
mate dictum  as  a  standard;  and  this  final  standard,  can 
be  known  as  such  only  by  the  self -evidence  with  which 
it  appeals  to  the  mind.     But  the  demand  for  proof  can 
be  repeated  here  with  equal  justice,  and  the  same  sense- 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  38 

less  round  might  be  renewed  forever.  The  skeptic's 
demand  for  proof,  beyond  the  feeling  of  self -evidence 
and  certainty,  is  one  which  in  its  very  nature  cannot  be 
met  by  any  intelligence  whatever.  Angel  or  archangel 
would  be  in  exactly  the  same  condition  as  we  are,  in 
this  regard.  The  skeptic  is  commonly  supposed  to  be 
of  all  men  the  most  acute,  but  surely  there  is  nothing 
very  brilliant  in  making  an  irrational  demand,  and  then 
triumphing  because  it  has  not  been  met.  When  asked, 
then,  for  the  ultimate  warrant  of  rational  principles, 
we  do  not  hesitate  to  declare  it  to  be  reason  itself. 
Whatever  appears  as  truly  self-evident  and  necessary, 
the  mind  will  always  feel  justified  in  regarding  as  true. 
It  is  clear  that  it  must  come  to  this  at  last,  not  only  for 
human  intelligence,  but  for  all  intelligence.  Every  ra- 
tional being  must  at  bottom  trust  his  rational  insight. 
To  call  this  a  circle,  and  quibble  over  it,  is  mere  petti- 
foggery. The  trust  of  the  mind  in  itself  can  be  shaken 
only  by  showing  inconsistency  in  its  intuitions.  The  com- 
plete test  of  truth,  then,  might  be  stated  as  self -evidence 
and  necessity  at  the  beginning,  with  consistency  in  the 
outcome.  The  skepticism  which  is  based  upon  contradic- 
tions in  details,  is  rational  and  valuable  for  details,  and 
the  course  of  the  mind  in  such  cases  is  to  go  over  its 
work  in  the  light  of  rationality,  and  bring  the  warring 
details  into  harmony.  But  a  skepticism  of  rtason  it- 
self, based,  not  on  inner  contradiction,  but  solely  on  the 
possibility  of  verbal  denial,  is  something  which  busy 
and  sincere  men  may  justly  ignore.  To  ask  some  ques- 
tions is  a  proof  of  mental  power.  To  ask  some  others 
is  a  proof  of  mental  weakness  and  confusion.  To  the 


34  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

latter  class  belong  all  skeptical  demands  for  proof  of 
rational  principles. 

But  the  skeptic  rejoins,  that  if  the  rationalist's  argu- 
ment were  allowed,  it  would  only  prove  the  subjective, 
not  the  objective,  validity  of  these  principles.  He  de- 
clines, therefore,  to  believe  that  they  are  objectively 
valid.  It  is  plain  that  a  skepticism  of  this  sort  is  forever 
irrefutable,  resting,  as  it  does,  solely  on  the  possibility 
of  stating  a  verbal  doubt.  Whatever  objective  necessity 
there  may  be,  can  appear  in  the  mind  only  as  a  subject- 
ive necessity,  an  impossibility  of  thinking  otherwise, 
etc.,  and  even  objective  reality  exists  for  us  only  as  it  is 
conceived.  We  can  test  the  value  of  this  objection  by 
applying  it.  A  straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance  be- 
tween two  points;  things  respectively  equal  to  the  same 
thing  are  equal  to  one  another;  every  event  or  change 
must  have  a  cause.  The  rationalist  says,  that  such  prin- 
ciples are  as  valid  for  things  as  for  thought;  but  the  skep- 
tic objects,  because  the  necessity  with  which  they  ap- 
peal to  the  mind  produces  only  a  subjective  necessity  of 
admitting  them;  and  a  subjective  necessity  is  no  proof  of 
objective  fact.  It  is  evident  that  reason  runs  no  serious 
risks  from  attacks  like  these,  for  while  the  doubt  is  for- 
ever possible,  it  is  forever  equally  baseless  and  barren. 
It  appeals  not  to  reason,  but  from  reason,  and  may 
rightly  be  left  to  its  own  irrationality.  One  grave  dis- 
advantage of  language  is,  that  it  allows  men  to  speak 
without  saying  any  thing.  There  is  no  difficulty  in 
framing  such  phrases  as  square  circle,  straight  curve, 
causeless  events,  and  the  like;  but  there  is  a  strict  im- 
possibility in  thinking  any  thing  under  them.  We  are 


UN  1 7 13  R  SIT  7 


KNOWLEDGE  AND 

persuaded  that  skepticism  would  play  a  much  less" 
inent  part  if  the  skeptic  were  forced  to  make  his  hypoth- 
eses intelligible.  This  he  always  neglects  to  do,  but 
furnishes  himself  rather  with  phrase?  ^hich  cannot  be 
construed  in  thought,  as  if  the  first  demand  upon  a 
hypothesis  were  not  that  it  be  at  least  thinkable.  When 
Mr.  Mill  suggested  that  two  and  two  may  make  five  in 
some  other  world,  it  was  an  oversight  not  to  tell  us  why 
five,  instead  of  fifty,  or  five  thousand,  or  three  only,  or 
even  nothing.  We  are  clear  that  in  the  same  world 
four  might  equal  five.  It  might  also  equal  three.  It 
might  equal  any  thing.  It  might  also  equal  nothing. 
Indeed,  every  thing  might  equal  any  thing  and  nothing 
at  the  same  time.  Any  of  these  propositions  are  just 
as  rational  as  the  far-famed  one  of  Mr.  Mill.  Unfor- 
tunately, a  certain  half-heartedness  on  Mill's  part  leaves 
us  in  doubt  as  to  whether  his  proposition  is  any  thing 
but  a  truism  expressed  in  a  most  extraordinary  form. 
He  was  not  quite  prepared  to  deny  the  law  of  identity, 
or  A:=A.  Hence,  four  equals  four,  and  five  equals  five, 
but  four  does  not  equal  five.  But  as  two  and  two  do 
equal  four,  and  four  is  not  five,  it  follows  that  the  five 
which  in  some  other  world  they  equal,  is  not  five  as  we 
understand  it,  but  is  really  what  we  mean  by  four. 
Either  this  fantastic  platitude,  or  else  the  law  of  iden- 
tity, must  be  abandoned.  But  here,  again,  we  are  puz- 
zled by  the  fact,  that  at  times  Mill  seems  to  have  meant 
by  five  what  we  all  mean  by  five;  for  he  quotes  approv- 
ingly the  hint  of  a  barrister  who  suggested  a  way  of 
conceiving  that  two  and  two  should  really  make  five. 
The  barrister  said,  that  if  there  should  be  some  law  of 


&6  STUDIES  tit  THEISM. 

association  whereby,  whenever  we  add  two  and  two,  an 
additional  unit  should  be  suggested  to  the  mind,  then 
the  sum  of  two  and  two  would  always  seem  equal  to  five. 
Both  Mill  and  the  barrister  fail  to  see  that  in  that  case 
not  two  and  two  make  five,  but  two  and  two  plus  the  new 
unit.  Here,  then,  it  would  seem  as  if  Mill  meant  to 
deny  the  law  of  identity.  If  a  theologian  should  utter 
such  wisdom,  no  one  would  hesitate  to  pronounce  him 
imbecile;  but  as  no  theologian  has  ever  won  such  glory, 
let  us  recognize  the  utterance  as  that  of  a  great,  and 
accurate,  and  candid  thinker.  It  is  also  suggested  by 
the  skeptic  that  there  may  be  worlds  where  the  law  of 
causation  does  not  hold.  We  are  quite  clear  that  in 
those  worlds  things  create  themselves,  and  vanish  into 
the  void  whenever  they  tire  of  existence.  By  hypoth- 
esis, nothing  produces  an  event  or  change,  and  yet  the 
event  and  the  change  do  come  to  pass.  They  arise 
from  the  nothing,  and  vanish  into  it.  No  one  can  tell 
whence  they  come  nor  whither  they  go.  There  is  no 
whence  and  no  whither.  Things  are  and  are  not,  and 
probably  both  at  once.  These  propositions  again  are  just 
as  rational  as  the  denial  of  causation.  If  reason  be  re- 
pudiated, there  is  no  longer  any  thing  irrational.  The 
one  measures  the  other.  The  skeptic,  then,  ought  to 
stop  at  nothing  in  the  way  of  absurdity.  There  is 
nothing  to  forbid  any  notion  except  reason  itself;  and 
as  the  skeptic  has  victoriously  overcome  reason,  the 
road  is  fully  open  to  any  and  every  whim  and  supersti- 
tion. A  half-way  skeptic  is  a  sorry  sight.  But  the 
trouble  with  the  propositions  we  have  mentioned  is,  that 
mental  palsy  results  from  any  attempt  to  construe  them 


AND  SKEPTICISM.  37 

in  thought;  and  as  long  as  this  is  so,  we  shall  hold  that 
skepticism  of  rational  principles  is  really  credulity  or 
bravado.  In  either  case,  it  belongs  to  the  department 
of  mental  pathology. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  in  mitigation  of  this  severe 
judgment,  did  not  Kant  deny  that  rational  principles, 
which  are  at  bottom  only  rules  of  mental  action,  apply 
in  any  way  to  things  in  themselves?  He  did,  and 
thereby  destroyed  his  own  system.  He  first  proved 
that  there  are  forms  of  thought  which  are  regulative  in 
the  mental  life.  This  was  his  great  service  to  philoso- 
phy. Then  without  any  warrant  of  any  sort,  he  con- 
cluded that  these  forms  were  not  also  valid  for  things. 
In  this  way  he  transcended  his  own  premises,  which 
would  never  warrant  any  thing  more  than  doubt.  Dog- 
matic denial  is  impossible  to  a  consistent  Kantian.  In 
this  way,  also,  he  made  the  idealism  of  Fichte  a  logical 
necessity.  For  the  categories  he  declared  to  be  sub- 
jective only.  Among  these  he  placed  causality  and 
reality.  The  denial  of  the  former  made  his  "  things  in 
themselves"  useless.  They  do  nothing;  they  do  not 
even  produce  phenomena.  Hence  they  account  for 
nothing,  and  sink  into  metaphysical  ghosts.  By  deny- 
ing the  objectivity  of  the  category  of  reality,  we  are 
forbidden  to  call  "things  in  themselves1"  real.  They 
are  then  nothing.  Phenomena  are  the  only  realities, 
and  absolute  dogmatism  is  reinstalled.  In  short,  one 
cannot  become  a  Kantian  without  a  "  thing  in  itself," 
and  one  cannot  remain  a  Kantian  with  "  a  thing  in  it- 
self." Reason  will  always  revenge  itself  upon  any  the- 
ory which  limits  rational  principles  to  subjective  appli- 


38  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

cation,  by  denying  the  irrational  reality  outright.  Such 
a  thing  is  not  merely  the  unknowable;  it  is  more;  it  is 
the  unamrmable.  It  was  Kant's  subjectivism  which 
produced  the  absolute  philosophies  of  Germany,  Th-3 
later  forms  of  phenomenalism  have  been  constantly 
pressed  with  the  same  difficulty.  By  denying  that 
phenomena  are  proper  manifestations  of  things,  and 
that  things  can  be  truly  known  through  phenomena, 
they  have  made  things  unnecessary  for  the  explanation 
of  phenomena;  and  thus  phenomena  become  the  only 
reality.  Consistent  phenomenalism  must  lead  to  abso- 
lutism. 

Leaving  now  the  question  of  principles,  we  inquire 
next  into  our  knowledge  of  things.  Since  the  time  of 
Heraclitus,  a  knowledge  of  nature  has  been  declared 
impossible,  because  all  things  flow.  Plato,  also,  says, 
that  since  development  is  the  law  of  the  natural,  our 
knowledge  of  nature  can  never  be  more  than  probable. 
Indeed,  physics  recognizes  that  our  knowledge  is  hypo- 
thetical, resting  always  upon  the  implicit  assumption 
of  the  uniformity  of  nature.  But  for  our  purpose  it  is 
not  necessary  to  descend  to  such  refinements.  The 
objection  of  the  Heraclitic  skeptics  is  interesting  as 
showing  the  great  difference  between  ancient  ind  mod- 
ern speculation.  The  fact  of  change  or  becoming,  they 
held,  makes  any  true  statement  about  things  untrue  in 
the  next  moment;  whereas  we  start  with  change,  and 
look  for  its  changeless  laws.  Being,  for  us,  is  not  a  rigid 
sameness,  but  a  concreted  formula  of  change.  But  we 
pass  to  another  point.  The  fact  of  an  objective  reality 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  3  9 

of  some  kind  has  never  been  questioned  except  in  word. 
The  true  idealist  does  not  deny  that  something  is;  he 
only  asks,  What  is  it  which  really  is  ?  Nothing  is  more 
common  in  popular  speculation  than  utter  misunder- 
standing of  idealism.  Fichte's  critics  insisted  that  he  re- 
garded himself  as  the  creator  of  the  universe;  and  Berke- 
1 ay's  critics  have,  with  great  fatuity,  loudly  affirmed  what 
Berkeley  never  denied.  Philosophical  apprentices  and 
counterfeit  idealists  are  commonly  equally  short-sighted. 
They  commonly  mistake  idea  for  delusion  and  individ- 
ual dream,  and  land  necessarily  in  solitary  egoism.  This 
doctrine  really  makes  the  single  thinker  the  universe. 
All  other  thinkers  are  but  states  or  ideas  of  the  first. 
Which  of  many  thinkers  shall  be  the  universe,  depends 
on  which  begins  to  think  first.  Two  such  talkers  meet 
together,  and  each  reduces  the  other  to  states  of  him- 
self. This  is  the  low  farce  of  philosophy.  The  only 
reason  such  a  view  can  offer  in  support  of  itself  is,  that 
the  existence  of  any  thing  independent  of  the  subject, 
cannot  be  proved.  This  has  passed,  for  a  long  time,  as 
a  perfect  abyss  of  philosophic  profundity;  but  it  is,  in 
fact,  only  another  case  of  that  logical  pedantry  which 
fancies  that  proof  can  give  any  thing  more  than  cer- 
tainty, or  that  the  certainty  of  logical  proof  can  ever 
transcend  that  of  the  immediate  intuitions  on  which  it 
rests.  It  is  really  mortifying  to  find  alleged  thinkers 
still  engaged  in  peddling  these  tawdry  rags  of  logical 
finery  and  winning  philosophical  reputation  by  the 
sale.  If  this  view  will  be  logical,  it  results  in  solipsism, 
or  the  doctrine  that  the  solitary  thinker  is  the  universe. 
If  not  logical,  it  belongs  to  volition  rather  than  reason. 


40  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

The  existence  of  something  independent  of  the  finite 
knower  can  never  be  deduced,  but  it  may  be  certainly 
known.  It  lies  in  the  nature  of  immediate  knowledge 
that  it  is  incapable  of  mediation,  but  at  the  same  time 
it  can  dispense  with  it. 

Rational  idealism  raises  no  such  questions  as  counter- 
feit idealism.  It  never  pretends  that  in  self -perception 
the  object  is  the  subject,  or  that  the  thing  known  is 
also  the  knower.  In  every  theory,  account  must  be 
taken  of  the  fact  that  the  world  of  conceptions  is  dual, 
a  part  being  conceptions  of  self  and  states  of  self,  and 
a  part  being  conceptions  of  objects  not  ourselves.  Ra- 
tional idealism  recognizes  this  fact  and  its  full  signifi- 
cance. It  does  not  question  the  existence  of  the  world, 
or  its  independence  of  the  finite  power;  but  it  raises 
the  entirely  different  question  as  to  the  manner  of  its 
existence.  It  leaves  the  object  just  as  it  appears  and 
where  it  appears.  It  questions  nothing  which  the 
senses  can  give  us.  It  only  denies  that  under  phe- 
nomena there  is  any  hard,  inert  materiality  as  their 
source  and  support.  But  it  does  not  claim  that  phe- 
nomena are  produced  by  an  unconscious  activity  of  the 
knower;  it  regards  them,  rather,  as  resulting  from  the 
activity  of  an  omnipresent  spiritual  being.  There  are 
different  types  of  rational  idealism,  but  they  all  agree 
in  declaring  it  absurd  to  posit  an  object  as  unrelated  to 
thought,  while,  as  object,  it  is  essentially  a  complex  of 
thought  relations.  These  views  are  not  well  described 
as  idealism;  they  are  properly  intellectualism  and  spir- 
itualism. Moreover,  they  are  less  a  theory  of  percep- 
tion, than  a  metaphysical  doctrine  concerning  the  nature 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  41 

of  reality.  And  here  skepticism  appears  again.  It  is 
willing  to  admit  the  existence  of  things  independent  of 
the  finite  knower,  but  it  doubts  whether  we  can  ever 
know  them  as  they  are.  We  know  them  as  they  ap- 
pear, but  who  shall  assure  us  that  we  know  them  as 
they  are,  or  that  the  appearance  does  not  misrepresent 
the  fact  ?  This  is  the  form  especially  of  the  relativist's 
objections  to  the  possibility  of  valid  knowledge. 

This  doctrine  is  so  multiform  in  its  misconceptions 
and  philosophical  prejudices,  that  it  is  impossible  to 
give  a  single  decisive  criticism.  It  relies  for  its  defense 
chiefly  upon  an  illustration,  and  upon  the  impossibility 
of  proving  a  correspondence  between  our  conceptions 
and  their  objects.  The  illustration  is  taken  from  the 
doctrine  of  sense-qualities.  It  is  a  commonplace  of 
psychology  that  our  senses  do  transform  things  so  as  to 
have  no  likeness  to  themselves.  All  sense-qualities,  as 
light,  heat,  color,  etc.,  are  only  subjective  affections 
which  resemble  nothing  external.  If  we  stroll  on  the 
moon-lit  beach,  the  moon  shines  and  the  waves  plash 
only  as  we  see  and  hear.  We  return  home,  and  the 
moon  shines  and  the  waves  ripple  no  longer.  All  that 
is  left  is  a  vast  chaos  of  waves  in  sea,  and  air,  and  sky, 
which  neither  sound  nor  shine.  The  eye  comes,  and 
the  dark  ether  tides  burst  into  a  sphere  of  light.  The 
eye  goes,  and  there  is  light  no  longer.  In  the  psycho- 
logical sense,  light  was  not  made  on  the  first  day  nor  on 
the  fourth  day,  but  when  the  first  rudimental  eye  ap- 
peared. On  the  strength  of  this  analogy,  it  is  urged 
that  the  mind  transforms  all  its  objects,  so  that  they 
can  never  be  known  as  they  are, 


42  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

The  subjectivity  of  sense-qualities  serves  to  illustrate 
the  skeptic's  meaning,  but  it  lends  no  support  to  his 
theory.  If  one  were  inclined  to  be  obstinate,  he  could 
rightly  claim  that  this  subjectivity  is  incapable  of  proof. 
He  might  insist  that  things  really  are  colored,  etc., 
and  that  the  various  vibrations  are  only  the  mechanism 
by  which  we  learn  what  the  qualities  of  things  are. 
Still  one  may  allow  this  subjectivity  without  admitting 
the  skeptic's  notion,  for  the  proof  that  any  sense-quality 
is  subjective,  is  based  entirety  on  the  assumption  that 
we  know  what  the  reality  is.  The  physicist  says,  that 
the  antecedents  of  sensations  are  really  vibrations  of 
some  sort.  But  if  we  deny  the  reality  of  the  vibra- 
tions, the  proof  of  the  subjectivity  of  sense- qualities 
fails  entirely.  We  cannot  disprove  the  objectivity  of 
one  set  of  predicates,  without  admitting  the  objective 
validity  of  another  set.  Plainly  the  skeptical  argument 
from  sense-illusion  is  divided  against  itself. 

Two  theories  are  possible  concerning  the  relation  of 
the  mental  life  to  the  external  world.  We  may  regard 
the  world  as  something  complete  in  itself,  and  lying 
there  in  reality  just  as  it  appears  to  common  sense.  In 
this  case  the  mind  is  merely  a  copyist.  It  contributes 
nothing  ;  its  sole  function  is  to  reproduce  in  thought  an 
exact  picture  of  the  external  reality.  This  is  the  view 
of  unreflecting  common  sense.  Another  theory,  equally 
possible,  is,  that  the  mental  life  has  a  value  of  its  own, 
and  a  function  other  than  copying.  The  mind  helps  to 
create  the  facts  it  recognizes.  The  external  world  is 
not  finished  until  the  perceiving  mind  appears.  It  did 
not  exist  as  it  appears  to  our  senses}  until  sensitive 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  43 

minds  were  created.  The  external  reality  is  but  the 
foundation  on  which  the  mental  world  is  built.  But 
the  mental  world  is  not  an  accident ;  it  also  belongs  to 
the  system  of  reality.  It  not  only  belongs  to  the  sys- 
tem ;  it  is  the  very  summit  and  crown.  Here  the  skep- 
tics divide.  Some  innocently  assume  that  the  mind 
is  meant  to  copy  reality,  and  if  it  does  not  do  this,  it 
is  a  failure.  Every  proof  that  the  mind  helps  create  its 
objects,  as  in  light,  sound,  etc.,  they  regard  as  showing 
the  weakness  of  the  knowing  power.  But  this  is  the  vul- 
garest  prejudice  of  the  most  thoughtless  common  sense. 
Color  and  harmony,  heat  and  cold,  are  not  delusions, 
and  do  not  cease  to  exist,  because  they  exist  as  such  only 
in  the  mind.  They  have  all  the  reality  desirable,  and 
our  knowledge  of  them  is  as  valid  as  it  ever  was.  The 
average  skeptic  is  in  such  bondage  to  common  sense 
prejudices  that  he  cannot  see  any  difference  between 
existence  in,  and  for,  the  mind,  and  pure  delusion. 
That  the  mental  life  may  have  a  value  on  its  own 
account,  is  an  unheard-of  notion  to  him.  Other  skep- 
tics adopt  the  second  theory,  that  the  mind  is  a  fac- 
tor of  all  its  objects,  and  conclude  on  that  account 
that  reality  is  unknowable.  The  mind  contributes 
much  ;  who  can  tell  how  much?  The  object  of  knowl- 
edge is  a  composite  of  external  and  internal  factors, 
which  no  analysis  will  ever  serve  to  separate.  We  are, 
then,  forever  shut  out  from  a  knowledge  of  reality  pure 
and  simple. 

This  claim  can  never  be  established,  because  our  con- 
ceptions can  never  be  known  as  false,  without  assum- 
ing that  some  conceptions  correspond  to  the  fact.     But 
4 


44  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

if  it  could  be  proved,  the  loss  would  not  be  great.  For 
it  reduces  to  the  harmless  truism,  that  we  shall  always 
be  limited  to  a  knowledge  of  things  as  they  exist  for 
our  intelligence.  It  is  doubtful  if  the  most  determined 
realist  would  not  be  satisfied  with  such  a  knowledge; 
indeed,  he  would  be  so  far  from  demanding  any  other 
knowledge,  that  he  would  profess  his  inability  even  to 
conceive  what  this  other,  and  impossible,  knowledge 
might  mean.  This  alleged  reality  which  is  unrelated 
to  intelligence,  is  not  a  thought,  but  a  contradiction; 
or,  rather,  it  is  a  mental  blank,  first  obtained  by  cancel- 
ing the  conditions  of  thinking,  and  then  mistaken  for 
the  thing  in  itself.  When  thought  posits  an  object  out 
of  relation  to  thought,  or  one  defined  only  by  negative 
attributes,  it  contradicts  itself.  A  knowledge  of  things 
in  relation  to  mind,  or  as  they  exist  for  intelligence,  is 
all  that  is  possible  to  any  mind  whatever.  To  demand 
more  is  to  be  unintelligible.  It  is  as  if  one  should  ask 
how  something  feels  which  is  not  felt.  The  skeptic  here 
is  really  groping  to  know  how  being  is  made,  or  else  he  is 
fretting  himself  with  the  thought  that  things  may  have 
properties  other  than  those  we  perceive;  but  this  is  irrele- 
vant to  the  question  concerning  the  reality  of  knowledge. 
Still  this  answer  will  hardly  satisfy  the  skeptic,  who  is 
sure  that  the  full  force  of  his  objection  has  not  been  ap- 
preciated. Common  sense,  also,  is  uneasy  for  the  secur- 
ity of  knowledge  when  it  fails  to  reach  the  very  thing 
instead  of  a  relation.  Who  can  tell  that  the  relation  of 
the  mind  to  its  objects  might  not  change,  and  thereby 
knowledge  disappear  ?  To  this  scruple  of  common 
sense,  the  reply  is,  that  such  change  could  only  result 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  45 

from  a  change  either  in  things  or  in  the  mind.  If  things 
change,  our  knowledge  ought  to  change;  because  its  ob- 
jects change.  A  change  in  the  nature  of  the  mind,  on 
the  other  hand,  whereby  its  relation  to  things  should  be 
essentially  altered,  is  an  utterly  gratuitous  assumption. 
All  knowledge  of  things  assumes  their  constancy.  We 
have  no  security  that  every  thing  will  not  suddenly  ac- 
quire new  properties  and  abandon  all  the  old  ones.  The 
constancy  of  intellect  is  at  least  no  more  violent  an  as- 
sumption than  the  constancy  of  external  nature.  But 
we  return  to  the  skeptic's  claim,  that  reality  can  never 
be  known,  because  the  mind  modifies  its  objects. 

This  doubt,  when  universal,  depends  on  overlooking 
the  distinction  of  thought-knowledge  and  sense-knowl- 
edge; and  yet  all  doubt  which  is  not  purely  gratuitous 
rests  upon  this  distinction.  From  the  dawn  of  specula- 
tion, it  has  been  recognized  that  the  world  as  it  appears 
to  sense,  is  not  the  world  as  it  appears  to  thought.  In 
the  ancient  speculation  they  were  regarded  as  in  oppo- 
sition; and  the  early  skeptics  made  the  most  of  the 
contradiction.  But  a  truer  theory  of  perception  shows 
that  the  senses  give  affections  of  self;  and  that  all  per- 
ception is  by  the  mind  itself.  There  is  no  perception 
until  thought-elements  are  introduced  into  sensations,  or 
until  sensations  are  built  up  into  a  thought-system.  In 
this  way  the  mind  reaches  a  world  instead  of  a  chaos 
of  subjective  impressions.  The  world  of  appearances, 
and  even  the  "  phenomena "  with  which  the  skeptic 
conjures  so  mightily,  are  so  penetrated  with  rational 
elements,  that  they  often  amount  to  what  common  sense 
understands  by  things.  The  senses  do  not  give  us 


46  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

things,  causes,  space,  time,  number,  relations.  These 
are  the  metaphysical  data  of  the  mind,  which  alone  en- 
able it  to  pass  from  subjective  sensations  to  a  world  of 
reality.  Grant,  then,  that  the  senses  give  us  only  sen- 
sations, and  that  sensations  are  only  the  effects  which 
things  produce  in  us  ;  grant,  also,  that  these  sensations 
are  totally  unlike  their  causes  ;  still  it  will  not  follow 
that  the  thought-elements  of  perception  are  also  only 
subjective.  The  distinction  between  the  elements  of 
sense  and  those  of  thought  is  so  patent,  that  it  is  un- 
pardonable to  overlook  it.  The  impressions  of  sense 
furnish  the  data  for  a  thought-construction;  and  this 
the  mind  supplies  by  referring  them  to  things  as  their 
causes.  These  things,  again,  are  differentiated  in  quan- 
tity, quality,  space,  time,  and  number;  for  the  difference 
in  impressions  "points  to  corresponding  differences  in 
things.  Law,  or  regularity  in  the  impressions,  points 
also  to  law  and  regularity  in  things.  Thus  there  arises 
in  the  mind  the  conception  of  a  world  of  real  things, 
having  relative  permanence  and  power,  and  in  various 
relations  of  interaction,  co-existence,  etc.,  with  one  an- 
other. As  such  they  are  quite  independent  of  the  finite 
knower;  for  they  exist  for  all  alike,  and  we  are  helpless 
in  their  presence.  We  recognize ;  we  do  not  create.  The 
knowledge  thus  gained,  represents  the  fact  without  mis- 
representing it.  The  further  question,  whether  these 
things  may  not  be  products  of  an  all-embracing  activity 
which  manifests  itself  in  all  things,  is  irrelevant  here. 
We  know  things,  however  produced,  and  however  com- 
pounded, as  having  relative  permanence,  as  having  cer- 
tain properties,  qualities,  or  powers,  and  as  being  in 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  47 

certain  relations.  And  we  further  know  that  the  mind 
does  not  make  these  qualities,  relations,  etc.,  but  recog- 
nizes them.  They  are  independent  of  our  knowing.  The 
other  questions,  as  to  the  mode  of  things'  production, 
or  their  relation  to  the  infinite,  are  metaphysical  ones, 
which  are  for  us  insoluble,  but  which  must  not  be  con- 
founded with  the  theory  of  knowing.  The  creative,  or 
modifying  action  of  our  minds  in  knowing,  must  be 
limited  to  sense-qualities.  There  is  no  hint  in  experi- 
ence that  the  rational  relations  and  elements  which  we 
seem  to  find  in  things  are  not  really  there.  The  reason 
is  evident.  These  rational  factors  are  the  frame-work 
of  our  mental  life,  and  enter  into  all  our  mental  opera- 
tions. It  is  not  so  with  the  elements  of  sense,  they  do 
not  belong  to  rationality. 

But  the  doubt  is  raised,  how  can  it  be  laid  ?  The 
skeptic  adopts  our  own  language  as  his  best  justifica- 
tion. Because  the  categories  of  thought  are  the  frame- 
work of  our  mental  life,  we  can  never  escape  them;  and 
who  shall  assure  us  that  they  are  also  categories  of  fact  ? 
The  jaundiced  eye  must  see  all  things  yellow,  no  mat- 
ter what  their  proper  color.  The  kaleidoscope  imposes 
a  form  on  its  objects  whatever  their  own  shape.  The 
skeptic,  so  far  from  ignoring  the  distinction  of  sense 
and  thought-knoAvledge,  bases  his  skepticism  on  the 
universality  of  the  latter  as  compared  with  the  former; 
for  while  he  allows  its  universality,  he  also  affirms  its 
subjectivity.  This  brings  us  to  close  quarters  with  the 
problem.  A  groundless  skepticism  is  irrational.  Being 
groundless,  it  is  forever  possible,  and  forever  irrefuta- 
ble; but  being  also  irrational,  it  should  be  left  to  its 


48  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

own  irrationality.  Now  the  mind  cannot  deal  with  the 
external  world  without  applying  its  metaphysical  no- 
tions of  thing  and  quality,  or  of  substance  and  attri- 
bute, of  cause  and  effect,  of  space  and  time,  of  quantity 
and  quality,  of  unity  and  number,  of  likeness  and  dif- 
ference, etc.,  and  the  mind  affirms  with  absolute  cer- 
tainty that  these  categories  apply  to  things.  The 
denial  of  their  validity  leads  necessarily,  as  in  the  case 
of  Kant's  philosophy,  to  a  denial  of  the  thing.  To 
affirm  something  which  is  neither  active  nor  passive, 
substance  nor  attribute,  neither  one  nor  many,  without 
quantity  or  quality,  etc.,  is,  so  far  as  thought  is  con- 
cerned, merely  to  make  an  inarticulate  noise.  Now  the 
skeptic  should  show  some  ground  for  his  doubt.  He 
cannot  show  any  contradiction  which  results  from  al- 
lowing their  objective  validity  of  the  categories.  He 
cannot  "show  any  reason  for  affirming  the  existence  of 
any  "  thing  in  itself,"  if  the  categories  are  denied.  He 
can  only  claim  that  their  objective  validity  cannot  be 
proved.  If  this  were  true,  it  is  perfectly  clear  that  it 
cannot  be  disproved.  Strangely  enough,  the  relativist 
and  phenomenalist  have  rarely  failed  to  become  nega- 
tive dogmatists.  Not  content  with  doubting  the  ob- 
jective validity  of  our  conceptions,  they  have  also 
denied  it.  The  contradiction  of  this  position  is  evi- 
dent. Before  I  can  rationally  deny  the  correspondence 
of  my  thought  with  reality,  I  must  in  some  way  be  able 
to  compare  my  false  thought  with  the  truth  of  things. 
I  must  always  have  a  true  knowledge  of  things  before 
I  can  declare  my  knowledge  false.  This  is  the  contra- 
diction into  which  all  modern  systems  of  relativity  have 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  4  9 

fallen.  The  largest  conclusion  which  reason  can  ever 
draw  is,  that  our  conceptions  may  not  correspond  to  the 
fact;  and  this  conclusion  is  based  upon  the  impossibil- 
ity of  proving  a  correspondence.  But  this  is  to  fall 
back  into  the  logical  pedantry  of  which  we  have  so 
often  complained;  for  though  it  may  not  be  deduced, 
it  may  be  certainly  known. 

In  this  demand  for  proof,  again,  the  skeptic  mistakes 
the  nature  of  the  case.  He  has  such  a  habit  of  asking  for 
proof,  that  he  calls  for  it  even  when  the  demand  is  irra 
tional.  Things  themselves  can  never  enter  the  mind,  and 
the  mind  can  never  transcend  its  conceptions  of  things. 
We  have,  and  can  have,  no  other  mental  content  with  re- 
gard to  things  than  the  conceptions  which  arise  in  the 
mind  concerning  them.  But  this  is  the  case,  not  only 
with  our  intelligence,  but  with  all  intelligence.  So  long 
as  knowing  means  any  thing  intelligible,  it  consists  in 
forming  conceptions  of  things  and  their  relations;  when 
it  does  not  mean  this,  it  means  nothing.  There  can,  then, 
be  no  proof  of  the  correspondence  of  thought  and  thing 
by  comparing  our  thought  with  the  thing,  and  for  the 
simple  reason  that  the  thing  exists  for,  and  in,  the  mind 
only  as  it  is  conceived.  This  is  as  true  for  an  infinite 
intelligence  as  for  a  finite  one.  Proof  by  comparison 
is  more  than  absurd;  it  is  a  contradiction.  The  only 
proof  which  the  nature  of  the  case  admits  of,  is  the  feel- 
ing of  necessity  or  of  fact,  which  attends  knowledge, 
together  with  the  inner  harmony  of  our  experience.  No 
other  proof  is  possible,  even  to  omniscience.  Neither 
the  skeptic  nor  the  every-day  realist  can  grasp  the  prin- 
ciple that  we  can  never  transcend  our  conceptions,  and 


50  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

that  reality  can  exist  for  the  mind  only  as  it  is  con- 
ceived. Both  are  haunted  by  the  notion  that  things 
may  somehow  turn  up  in  thought  and  discredit  our  con- 
ceptions. But  it  is  clear  that  all  the  skeptic  can  justly 
claim  is,  that  our  conceptions  may  yet  fall  into  contra- 
diction. We  reply,  that  doubt  should  be  postponed 
until  then.  As  long  as  our  conceptions  are  forced  upon 
us  and  are  mutually  consistent,  doubt  is  gratuitous. 

To  estimate  the  force  of  this  no-proof  objection,  let 
one  ask  himself  how  he  knows  that  he  is  not  standing 
on  his  head,  or  that  he  exists,  or  that  he  is  not  in  some 
other  place  than  where  he  is;  and  then  let  him  further 
ask  himself  how  much  patience  he  would  have  with 
the  suggestion,  that  his  conception  of  the  fact  does  not 
guarantee  the  fact.  We  offer  the  whole  body  of  phys- 
ical science  in  illustration  of  the  possibility  of  valid 
knowledge.  The  discoveries  of  the  physicist  and  the 
chemist  are  real  discoveries.  If  it  be  said  that  physical 
science  deals  only  with  phenomena,  the  reply  is,  that  it 
deals  with  the  phenomena  and  relations  of  things.  We 
have  previously  referred  to  the  confusion  in  the  use  of 
the  word  phenomenon.  The  claim  that  we  know  only 
phenomena,  is  either  the  truism  that  we  can  never  tran- 
scend our  conceptions  of  things,  or  else  it  means  that 
our  conceptions  misrepresent  the  fact.  To  say  that  we 
know  things  only  as  they  appear  is  a  harmless  common- 
place, unless  it  mean  that  things  do  not  appear  in  their 
true  nature  and  relations.  In  the  latter  case,  we  shall 
ourselves  be  skeptical  of  skepticism,  until  some  good 
reasons  be  given  for  this  dogmatic  statement.  It  would 
be  hard  to  persuade  the  astronomer,  or  the  physicist,  or 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  51 

the  chemist,  that  the  relations,  and  properties,  and  laws 
which  he  discovers  are  the  creations  of  his  own  fancy. 
Indeed,  it  would  be  hard  to  get  him  to  listen  to  such  a 
claim,  unless  patience  had  had  its  perfect  work. 

What  our  general  doctrine  is,  will  best  appear  in  an 
illustration :  A  desk  is  before  us  of  certain  form  and  prop- 
erties. It  has  certain  relations  to  other  things  in  the 
room,  and  to  the  entire  system  of  things.  Of  noume- 
nal  and  absolute  desks  we  know  nothing,  not  even  that 
they  exist;  but  this  real  desk  before  us  exists,  and  we 
claim  to  know  certain  of  its  properties  and  relations. 
They  are  not  creations  of  our  mind,  but  are  quite  inde- 
pendent of  our  knowing;  for  they  exist  for  others  as 
well  as  for  ourselves.  This  desk  is  not  a  phenomenon, 
unless  phenomenon  means  thing,  or  whatever  is  not 
self-dependent.  Our  knowledge  of  it,  so  far  as  it  goes, 
is  parallel  to  the  fact.  If  it  be  said  that  the  desk  is  a 
phenomenon  because  it  is  composed  of  atoms,  the  reply 
is,  that  this  would  not  make  it  a  phenomenon,  but  a 
combination  of  real  elements.  We  did  not  claim  that 
the  desk  is  a  metaphysical  unit;  but  if  it  be  composed 
of  real  elements,  it  remains  as  real  as  ever.  The  prop- 
erties and  relations  of  the  desk  remain  what  they  were, 
in  spite  of  the  atomic  theory.  These  properties  and 
relations  may  result  from  something  deeper  than  ap- 
pears; no  matter,  they  are  what  they  are.  The  desk 
itself  may  be  destroyed;  still  our  knowledge  of  it, 
while  it  remains,  is  valid.  If  the  idealist  say  that  the 
desk  is  only  an  idea,  the  reply  is,  that  the  name  is  indif- 
ferent, if  the  thing  be  retained.  This  which  he  IB 
pleased  to  call  an  idea,  is  independent  of  my  knowing, 


52  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

both  in  its  existence  and  in  its  relations ;  and  that 
which  thus  exists  and  supports  relations,  is  the  precise 
definition  of  a  thing.  This  class  of  ideas  differs  from 
all  others  in  just  the  way  in  which  things  differ  from 
subjective  thoughts.  If  he  adds  that  it  is  only  a  mani- 
festation of  a  universal  spirit,  we  have  no  objection; 
for,  as  such  manifestation,  it  has  the  attributes  which 
we  ascribe  to  it.  If  he  further  call  it  a  mode  of  real- 
ity, we  agree  again;  for  as  such  mode  it  is  real;  and  we 
know  both  it,  and  reality  as  manifested  in  it.  It  may 
not  be  self -existent;  for  all  we  know,  it  may  be  the  con- 
stant product  of  an  activity  not  its  own.  Nevertheless, 
however  produced  and  however  compounded,  our  knowl- 
edge of  it  is  undisturbed.  These  questions  as  to  the  ul- 
timate nature  of  metaphysical  reality,  are  foreign  to  a 
theory  of  cognition.  Much  can  be  known  about  a  thing, 
and  its  relations  to  other  things,  even  if  we  cannot  tell 
how  the  thing  is  made,  or  how  it  is  related  to  the  infi- 
nite. Now,  throughout  this  illustration,  nothing  has 
been  suggested  which  makes  against  the  knowledge  we 
have;  and  the  ignorance  which  has  been  pointed  out,  is 
merely  ignorance  of  what  we  do  not  pretend  to  know. 

Now  since  our  conceptions  of  things  are  all  with  which 
the  mind  has  to  do,  it  follows  that  error  can  be  known  as 
such  only  by  the  appearance  of  discord  among  these  con- 
ceptions. This  the  mind  will  always  regard  as  a  sure 
sign  of  error,  and  will  proceed  to  rectify  it.  This  discord 
always  arises  from  taking  a  new  mental  stand-point,  or 
from  a  more  extended  experience;  and  the  rectification 
never  consists  in  abandoning  the  mind's  power  to  know, 
or  in  discrediting  its  principles  of  judgment,  or  in  over- 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  53 

turning  what  it  really  knew  before.  It  consists,  rather, 
in  showing  that  false  inferences  have  been  based  on 
real  facts,  or  in  limiting  too  extensive  generalizations. 
The  doctrines  of  the  antipodes  and  of  the  world's  rev- 
olution are  cases  in  point.  The  necessity  of  these  doc- 
trines arose  from  the  fact  that  only  thus  was  it  possible 
to  bring  all  our  conceptions  and  experiences  into  har- 
mony; and  their  acceptance  involved  no  abandonment 
of  rational  principles,  but  only  a  more  careful  applica- 
tion of  them.  Reason  received  no  shock  from  these 
doctrines;  and  knowledge  was  not  overthrown,  but 
extended.  This  is  the  case  with  the  thousand  rectifi- 
cations which  we  are  constantly  making.  We  find  dis- 
cord among  our  conceptions,  and  are  compelled  to. 
limit  and  modify  our  previous  positions;  yet  never 
does  actual  knowledge  become  shaken,  but  only  its  in- 
terpretation. Even  our  theories  of  knowing  undergo 
similar  modifications,  but  no  fact  of  knowledge  is  dis- 
turbed. We  begin  by  thinking  that  sense-qualities  re- 
veal things  as  they  are.  Soon  this  view  is  rejected;  but 
the  nature  and  relations  of  these  qualities  are  the  same 
as  before.  Then  sense-perception  presents  the  world  as 
a  plurality  of  objects  of  various  kinds.  Finally,  we  sus- 
pect that  even  this  view  does  not  give  us  the  deepest 
fact,  but  that  things  which  appear  are  functions  of  things 
which  do  not  appear,  and  that  the  many  are  forever  de- 
pendent on  the  one.  Thus  we  reach  at  last  the  view, 
that  neither  sensation  nor  sense-perception,  but  reason 
only,  is  able  to  reveal  the  truth  of  things.  Yet  all  the 
while  we  question  nothing  which  the  senses  give,  and 
we  deny  no  fact  of  perception.  We  only  deny  those 


54  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

false  implications  with  which  our  spontaneous  percep- 
tions are  filled.  Perception,  as  well  as  reasoning,  needs 
the  constant  supervisioft  of  the  reason.  The  question 
which  reason  asks  is,  How  must  we  think  of  things  ? 
And  when  there  is  necessity  and  perfect  harmony  in  our 
conceptions,  the  mind  will  regard  that  as  the  highest 
proof  that  thought  and  thing  are  parallel.  Of  course, 
the  old  doubt  is  still  possible;  we  may  still  question 
whether  things  may  not  in  truth  be  altogether  different 
from  what  we  think  them;  but  until  some  reasons  can 
be  given  beyond  the  possibility  of  the  verbal  doubt,  the 
doubter  must  be  left  to  himself.  He  is  amenable  to 
neither  argument  nor  intelligence. 

But  the  skeptic  is  not  easily  baffled.  He  clutches 
eagerly  at  what  we  have  said  about  the  antipodes  and 
the  world's  revolution,  and  claims  that  the  opposite  be- 
liefs were  once  universal  and  necessary;  and,  therefore, 
universality  and  necessity  are  not  sufficient  tests  of 
truth.  He  next  asks,  how  we  know  that  some  future 
revolution  of  thought  will  not  displace  all  our  current 
conceptions.  To  the  claim,  we  reply  that  the  doctrines 
of  the  earth's  flatness  and  steadfastness  were  never 
either  universal  or  necessary  in  the  philosophical  sense 
of  those  words.  The  conception  of  a  round  and  mov- 
ing earth  is  as  easy  as  that  of  a  flat  and  fixed  earth. 
To  the  ancients  the  antipodes  were  not  inconceivable, 
but  simply  incredible.  They  had  not  the  evidence  or 
the  facts  which  make  them  credible.  When  the  facts 
were  discovered,  reason  had  no  difficulty  with  the  be- 
lief. With  rational  principles,  however,  the  case  is 
entirely  different*  Their  opposites  are  not  only  incred- 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  55 

ible,  they  cannot  even  be  conceived.  Their  denial  is 
possible  in  word,  but  not  in  thought.  Like  the  phrase, 
square  circle,  it  defies  all  construction.  Now,  to  con- 
found the  simply  incredible  with  the  truly  inconceiva- 
ble, or  the  impossible  in  thought,  is  infantile  in  the 
extreme.  The  objection  we  are  considering  rests  upon 
this  confusion.  The  conception  of  universality,  which 
appears  in  the  objection,  proves  only  the  need  of  fur- 
ther philosophical  study  on  the  part  of  the  objector. 
To  the  question,  whether  our  present  conceptions  may 
not  be  displaced  in  the  future  by  the  discovery  of  rev- 
olution in  what  we  now  regard  as  fixed,  we  reply  that 
this  is  very  possible  with  regard  to  our  empirical 
knowledge  of  things.  But  no  skeptical  conclusion  con- 
cerning knowledga  follows  from  this  admission.  The 
bulk  of  our  so-called  knowledge  is  theory,  and  is  far 
from  being  either  self-evident  or  necessary.  This  de- 
partment of  theory  is  in  constant  change,  but  the 
knowledge  on  which  it  is  based  abides.  The  rotundity 
of  the  earth  displaced  a  false  theory,  but  overthrew  no 
knowledge.  The  theories  of  physics  and  chemistry 
change,  but  the  known  facts  and  laws  abide.  Water 
and  its  properties  are  just  what  they  were  when  it  was 
regarded  as  an  element.  Phlogiston  and  caloric  have 
vanished  as  theories  of  heat,  but  no  known  fact  about 
heat  has  been  disturbed.  Whatever,  then,  the  discov- 
eries of  the  future,  and  however  they  may  overturn 
current  theories,  we  may  feel  sure  that  they  will  not 
displace  present  knowledge,  provided,  always,  that  the 
objects  of  knowledge  remain  as  they  are. 

But  do  we  really  know  things  as  they  are  ?     Is  it  not 


56  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

possible  that  if  we  had  some  angel's  eyes,  we  should  see 
things  to  be  quite  other  than  we  now  see  them  ?  Such 
is  the  doubting  question  which,  not  knowing  what  it 
asks,  ever  returns.  Well,  let  an  angel  draw  near  and 
make  revelations.  He  might  very  possibly  tell  us  many 
things  which  we  do  not  know.  He  might  correct  our 
errors,  and  confirm  our  knowledge.  But  if  he  should 
begin  by  contradicting  what  we  know,  we  should  lose 
all  faith  in  his  further  revelations.  If  an  angel  should 
arrive  from  Mill's  world,  where  two  and  two  make  five, 
and  should  announce  this  great  truth,  we  should  be 
quite  sure  either  that  he  meant  something  different 
from  what  we  do  by  two  and  five,  or  else  that  he  was 
mistaken.-  The  skeptic  can  greatly  strengthen  his  faith 
by  imagining  some  such  principle  as  _this  of  Mill's  to  be 
a  matter  of  revelation.  Let  him  think  of  the  doctrine 
of  the  Trinity,  if  he  wants  to  know  how  strong  his  faith 
is  in  numerical  axioms.  Let  him  put  Mill's  suggestion 
into  the  Bible,  if  he  wants  to  know  how  abjectly  irra- 
tional it  is.  Yet  we  continue  to  say,  if.  our  eyes  were 
only  opened  to  the  reality  of  things,  how  we  should  be 
surprised  and  astonished.  Let  us  grant  it.  It  is  still 
clear  that  this  surprise  and  astonishment  are  possible 
only  as  we,  and  the  world,  remain  the  same.  If  the 
world  were  changed  by  this  opening,  it  would  be  an- 
other world;  and  it  would  not  be  surprising  if  another 
world  were  different  from  this.  If  we  were  changed, 
and  our  memory  of  our  old  conceptions  were  lost,  there 
would  still  be  no  ground,  and  no  possibility,  of  surprise. 
It  is  plain  that  this  hypothetical  surprise  conld  only  con- 
gist,  not  in  the  loss  and  overthrow  of  our  present  knowl- 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  5  f 

edge,  but  in  seeing  that  the  commonplace  objects  about 
us  stand  in  a  multitude  of  relations,  and  have  various 
powers  which  we  had  not  suspected  before.  Such  an 
opening  of  the  eyes  might  well  surprise  us,  but  it 
would  not  destroy  our  present  knowledge;  it  would 
only  enrich  and  extend  it. 

A  marked  characteristic  of  all  these  skeptical  argu- 
ments is,  that  they  all  assume  that  the  mind  is  a 
stranger  in  the  universe,  and  without  any  relation  to 
the  nature  of  things.  Hence,  thought  and  thing  are 
incommensurable,  and  can  never  come  into  correspond- 
ence. But  suppose  we  turn  skeptics,  and  ask  for  the 
ground  of  this  strange  assumption.  This  reality,  which 
is  the  negation  of  thought,  what  warrant  is  there  for  af- 
firming it  ?  What  is  it  but  the  void  ?  This  mind,  also, 
which  is  alien  to  all  reality,  whence  comes  it  ?  Whence 
has  it  its  strange  laws,  which  so  mask  and  transform 
the  fact,  that  it  is  itself  no  longer  ?  We  have  here  a  dual- 
ism of  the  worst  kind,  and  one  which,  according  to  the 
theory,  can  never  be  reconciled.  But  if  the  world  be 
the  product  of  mind,  there  is  no  reason  why  our  minds 
should  not  know  it  as  it  is.  No  theist  is  justified  in 
being  an  agnostic,  except  in  the  commonplace  sense 
that  our  knowledge  is  limited  and  imperfect.  If,  on 
the  other  hand,  mind  is  a  product  of  the  external  world, 
we  should  expect  a  still  more  exact  correspondence  of 
thought  and  thing.  For  does  not  evolution  teach  that 
the  mind,  and  all  that  is  in  it,  result  from  the  "  interac- 
tion of  the  organism  and  the  environment?"  And  is 
not  all  thinking  defined  to  be  an  internal  adjustment  to 
the  environment?  And  is  not  this  "correspondence" 


58  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

said  to  go  on  increasing  in  exactness,  both  in  space  and 
time,  until  "  the  adjustment  of  inner  relations  to  outer 
relations"  becomes  complete?  Certainly,  in  such  a 
theory  one  would  look  for  exact  knowledge.  Judge, 
then,  of  our  surprise  on  learning  that  thought  com- 
pletely misrepresents  the  fact,  and  that  the  so-called 
adjustment  is  only  an  ever- widening  alienation.  The 
result  is  so  unexpected,  so  alien  to  the  reasoning,  that 
one  knows  not  what  to  make  of  it.  The  universe  is  set 
to  developing  minds,  and  to  stocking  them  with  proper 
notions  about  itself;  and  although  it  does  this  under 
the  law  of  necessity,  and  under  every  possible  obliga- 
tion to  tell  the  truth,  it  proceeds  to  give  a  garbled 
account  of  itself,  and  makes  no  account  of  the  truth 
whatever.  We  must  reckon  this  among  the  many  mys- 
teries which  the  evolutionists  have  bequeathed  to  the 
world. 

Our  aim  in  this  discussion  has  not  been  to  determine 
what  we  know,  but  rather  what  it  is  to  know.  We 
have  sought,  by  giving  a  definition  of  knowledge,  to 
enable  the  reader  to  judge  for  himself  whether  knowl- 
edge is  possible.  A  universal  standard  of  certitude  is  a 
chimera;  but  certitude  is  possible  for  persons.  Doubt- 
less a  careful  analysis  would  show  that  we  know  much 
less  than  we  think  we  do;  or  that  the  realm  of  knowl- 
edge is  much  smaller  than  that  of  belief.  It  may 
occur  to  some  that  our  argument  for  the  reality  of 
knowledge  moves  in  a  circle,  because  it  consists  in  say- 
ing that  the  mind  must  have  faith  in  itself;  but  such 
a  criticism  involves  a  complete  misunderstanding  of  the 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  SKEPTICISM.  59 

question.  The  mind  begins  with  trust  in  itself;  and 
the  skeptic  seeks  to  break  down  that  trust.  To  do  so 
he  must  bring  reasons.  If  he  bring  no  reasons,  or  if 
his  reasons  prove  irrelevant,  or  admit  of  sufficient  re- 
ply, then  his  skepticism  becomes  groundless  and  irra- 
tional, and  the  mind  may  resume  its  trust  in  itself. 
We  have  not  sought  to  demonstrate  the  validity  of 
knowledge,  but  the  groundlessness  of  skepticism.  This 
we  stated  at  the  beginning.  The  skeptical  argument 
we  regard  as  a  weak  misunderstanding.  Rational  skep- 
ticism is  healthful  and  necessary;  and  there  never  was 
greater  need  of  it  than  at  present.  It  is  also  a  ques- 
tion whether  there  ever  was  less  of  it  than  now.  But 
the  skepticism  with  which  we  have  been  dealing  is  not 
of  this  character.  Its  positive  arguments  against 
knowledge  are  all  failures.  Its  chief  reason  for  doubt 
is,  that  knowledge  cannot  be  proved  to  be  objectively 
valid.  This  demand  for  proof  is  either  a  misunder- 
standing of  the  nature  of  proof,  or  else  it  is  absurd. 
We  cannot  estimate  such  efforts  very  highly.  On  the 
contrary,  all  fundamental  skepticism  is  a  mark  of  weak- 
ness and  disease.  Its  rebellion  against  reason  tends  to 
issue  in  abject  credulity.  As  a  preparation  for  adopt- 
ing the  most  debasing  superstition,  there  is  nothing 
equal  to  a  little  practice  in  philosophical  skepticism.  It 
produces  the  same  effect  upon  the  understanding  which 
unchastity  does  upon  the  character ;  and  it  might  not 
improperly  be  called  a  mental  whoredom.  The  ration- 
al being  denied,  there  is  no  longer  any  irrational;  and 
one  view  is  as  tenable  as  another. 

Concerning  the  reconciliation  of  science  and  religion 
5 


60  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

which  agnosticism  was  supposed  to  effect,  it  is  needless 
to  speak.  Events  have  judged  it.  The  religious  world 
has  been  deservedly  punished  for  invoking  skepticism 
to  defend  obnoxious  doctrines.  The  unknown  God  may 
be  a  ground  for  fear;  he  is  no  subject  for  love  or  wor- 
ship. If  agnosticism  be  taken  in  earnest,  both  science 
and  theology  are  only  subjective  dreams.  If  it  be  al- 
lowed that  our  conceptions  may,  more  or  less  well,  rep- 
resent reality,  then  the  question  arises  whether  phys- 
ical or  spiritual  conceptions  best  represent  the  ultimate 
fact.  Thus  the  so-called  war  between  science  and  re- 
ligion emerges  at  the  end  of  the  agnostic  controversy 
in  the  same  form  which  it  had  at  the  beginning.  We 
pass  now  to  consider  belief. 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  61 


CHAPTER  II. 

KNOWLEDGE    AND    BELIEF. 

ANLY  that  is  properly  said  to  be  known  whose  evi- 
dence  or  nature  is  such  as  to  compel  acceptance. 
Very  little,  however,  of  our  so-called  knowledge  has 
such  a  degree  of  certainty.  Rational  principles,  and 
the  facts  of  consciousness  and  immediate  perception, 
are  all  that  can  claim  to  be  strictly  knowledge.  Still 
it  does  not  follow  that  all  else  is  delusion;  for,  though 
not  strictly  certain,  it  may  be  rationally  probable,  and 
thus  a  subject  for  rational  belief.  By  rational  belief, 
then,  we  mean  the  acceptance  of  any  thing  on  grounds 
which,  while  they  render  it  probable,  do  not  strictly 
compel  its  admission.  They  justify  the  mind  in  accept- 
ing it,  but  do  not  exclude  the  possibility  of  the  oppo- 
site. We  believe  that  the  present  laws  of  nature  will 
be  valid  to-morrow,  but  we  do  not  know  it.  It  is  con- 
ceivable that  some  change  might  occur  in  the  nature 
of  things,  which  would  reverse  all  the  present  orders 
of  co-existence  and  sequence.  The  assumption  of  the 
uniformity  of  nature  is  necessary  to  enable  us  to  ad- 
vance a  step  beyond  our  experience,  whether  in  space  or 
time;  but  this  assumption  is  no  necessity  of  thought. 
The  mind  finds  no  difficulty  in  the  conception  that  all 
the  laws  with  which  we  are  acquainted  may  be  limited 
both  in  space  and  time.  The  physicist  believes  that 


62  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

material  things  are  composed  of  ultimate  atoms,  but  lie 
does  not  know  it.  The  entire  structure  of  scientific 
theory  is  equally  a  matter  of  belief.  Theories  are 
never  facts  of  observation,  but  inferences;  and  they 
never  rise  to  the  rank  of  certainty.  Probability  is  more 
than  the  guide  of  daily  life;  it  is  also  the  guide  of  sci- 
ence and  reason  itself.  Were  the  natural  sciences  re- 
stricted to  what  is  truly  known,  they  would  shrivel  up 
to  a  handful  of  unrelated  facts,  of  much  value  for 
practice,  but  of  little  or  none  for  intelligence. 

A  belief,  to  be  rational,  must  have  rational  grounds. 
When  held  without  grounds,  it  is  a  volition;  when  held 
on  irrational  grounds,  it  is  a  prejudice  or  a  superstition. 
But  the  grounds  of  belief  may  be  manifold.  They  may 
be  such  as  appeal  only  to  the  passionless  understand- 
ing, and  hence  such  as  any  one  with  common  sense 
would  recognize.  The  mathematical  doctrine  of  prob- 
abilities is  a  great  illustration.  Such  grounds  01  oelief 
are  elementary,  and  call  no  elements  of  character  into 
play.  They  admit  of  calculation,  and  result  in  sub- 
stantial harmony  of  opinion.  But  the  grounds  of  belief 
may  also  be  such  as  appeal  not  only  to  the  understand- 
ing, but  also  to  the  esthetic,  and  moral,  and  religious 
nature.  As  such,  they  are  no  less  rational  than  the 
former,  though  their  validity  would  not  be  recognized 
by  any  in  whom  the  esthetic  and  religious  elements  were 
lacking.  All  beliefs  are  of  this  class  into  which  senti- 
ment of  any  kind  enters,  whether  it  be  of  patriotism, 
or  of  duty,  or  of  love,  or  of  art,  or  of  religion.  We 
may  say,  then,  with  sufficient  accuracy  for  our  purpose, 
that  the  grounds  of  belief  may  be  objective  and  sub- 


AND  BELIEF.  63 

jective.  The  former  are  the  facts  of  sense-perception: 
the  latter  are  the  manifold  facts  of  feeling  and  instinct, 
the  longing  for  the  true,  the  beautiful  and  the  good, 
the  sense  of  dependence  and  moral  obligation,  the  de- 
sire to  worship,  and  the  fervors  of  religious  aspiration. 
Belief  on  such  grounds  might  be  denned  as  the  accept- 
ance of  something,  for  reasons  subjectively  sufficient, 
but  objectively  insufficient.  In  every  such  case,  the 
development  of  the  subject  determines,  to  a  great  ex- 
tent, the  credibility  of  the  fact.  Belief  on  objective 
grounds  is  entirely  simple;  belief  on  subjective  grounds 
demands  some  further  explanation. 

When  we  speak  of  believing  on  subjective  grounds, 
the  first  impression  is  that  we  are  advocating  mere  cre- 
dulity; indeed,  credulity  consists  in  taking  our  feelings 
and  impressions  for  arguments.  This  is  plausible  only 
when  abstractly  stated,  or  when,  by  feelings,  whims  are 
meant.  For  feeling  also  is  a  fact;  it  is  the  product  of 
the  universe,  and  must  have  some  relation  to  it.  It 
must  further  be  borne  in  mind  that  when  the  grounds 
of  belief  are  objective,  they  are  seldom  capable  of  for- 
mal statement.  Just  as  we  recognize  a  face  with  per- 
fect certainty,  though  we  might  be  unable  to  describe  a 
single  feature  in  detail,  so  in  daily  life  we  discern  a  be- 
lief, or  a  course  of  action,  to  be  rational,  even  while  it 
would  be  impossible  to  formulate  the  real  grounds  of 
our  opinion.  If  we  attempt  it,  we  find  that  our  state- 
ments do  not  state,  but  rather  misstate,  our  reasons. 
This  is  characteristic  of  daily  life.  We  constantly  be- 
lieve and  act  upon  impressions  which  we  could  not  put 
into  words  without  seeming  ridiculous,  and  which  we 


64  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

could  not  ignore  without  being  irrational.  The  mer- 
chant, or  captain,  knows  well  that  one  course  is  better 
than  another,  but  he  would  often  be  sadly  puzzled  to 
justify  his  opinion  by  any  thing  but  the  favorable  re- 
sult. Such  action  and  judgment  partake  of  the  nature 
of  instinct.  They  are  the  total  outcome  of  our  past 
experience;  and,  although  the  reasoning  element  has  al- 
most entirely  disappeared,  they  are,  in  general,  far 
more  trustworthy  than  our  labored  calculations.  The 
reasons  for  trusting  or  distrusting  persons,  also,  are  sel- 
dom susceptible  of  formulation;  and  that,  too,  in  cases 
where  the  greatest  interests  are  ventured.  This  is  es- 
pecially the  case  with  personal  influence.  An  impres- 
sion is  made  upon  us,  and  we  are  stirred  and  molded  by 
something  which  we  feel  but  cannot  tell.  In  short,  the 
great  bulk  of  human  belief  and  action  rests  upon 
grounds  which  admit  of  no  satisfactory  statement;  yet 
we  cannot  disallow  such  grounds  of  belief  and  action 
without  declaring  life  to  be  illogical  and  irrational. 
But  in  that  case,  the  practical  man  could  retort  upon 
the  theorist,  that  unless  he  is  able  to  do  better,  perhaps 
the  mistake  is  with  him.  As  a  rule,  no  one  is  more  help- 
less, or  more  stupidly  absurd,  in  dealing  with  reality, 
than  the  fanatical  logician.  As  long  as  this  is  so,  com- 
mon sense  will  be  more  concerned  to  have  its  beliefs  in 
harmony  with  reality  as  tested  by  results,  than  to  have 
them  in  harmony  with  formal  logic.  Experience  tends 
to  issue  in  instinctive  action  and  judgment,  arid  of  such 
action  results  are  the  great  test.  We  conclude,  then, 
that  it  is  no  objection  to  a  belief  that  its  grounds  do 
not  admit  of  satisfactory  formal  statement,  provided 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  65 

always  that  it  works  well.  Is  it  any  greater  objection 
that  its  grounds  are  subjective,  and  even  incommuni- 
cable ? 

Feeling  proves  nothing.  This  oft-repeated  dictum  is 
one  of  those  which,  from  frequency  and  vehemence  of 
utterance,  have  been  mistaken  for  self-evident.  It  is 
true  only  for  individual,  isolated,  and  transitory  feel- 
ings ;  the  great,  fundamental,  and  abiding  feelings  of 
the  race  may  prove  much.  Those  who  appeal  to  this 
dictum  are  seldom  aware  to  what  an  extent  feeling  and 
sentiment  enter  into  our  intellectual  life,  and  even  into 
their  own  theories.  The  deepest  propositions  concern- 
ing life,  and  duty,  and  character,  have  no  other  proof 
than  the  moral  recoil  which  attends  their  denial.  At 
the  same  time  the  only  disproof  possible  is  the  absence 
of  that  recoil.  It  is  an  attempt  to  prove  a  negative  on 
the  strength  of  negative  evidence.  Every  one  in  whom 
the  moral  nature  is  active,  needs  no  proof  of  the  beauty 
of  holiness;  and  he  regards  a  denial  as  we  regard  a 
blind  man's  protest  against  the  absurd  doctrine  of  vision. 
In  Fenelon's  "Telemaque,"  Ulysses  tries  to  convince 
one  of  his  crew  who  has  been  changed  into  a  hog  by 
Circe,  that  it  is  shameful  for  a  man  to  be  a  pig,  but  with- 
out success.  Here  is  a  point  where  argument  is  impos- 
sible. If  there  be  no  sense  of  dignity  in  man  nothing 
can  appear  degrading.  Both  in  ethics  and  esthetics  the 
ultimate  fact  upon  which  all  theory  is  built,  is  a  move- 
ment of  the  sensibility,  which  thus  founds  the  distinc- 
tion of  good  and  bad,  beautiful  and  ugly.  The  most 
rigorous  rationalist  in  morals  cannot  escape  the  ultimate 
appeal  to  feeling  to  sanction  his  theories.  The  whole 


66  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

mental  life,  also,  springs  out  of  feeling.  It  is  extremely 
doubtful  if  a  purely  perceptive  being,  without  any  sub- 
jective interests,  could  attain  to  rationality,  even  if  its 
physical  existence  were  secured.  Indeed,  it  is  demon- 
strable that  our  sentiments  outline  and  control  all  men- 
tal development.*  Before  mental  growth  can  begin, 
there  must  be  an  awakened  interest,  and  when  the  in- 
terest is  awakened,  the  leaden  chaos  of  sense-experience 
begins  to  take  on  intelligible  forms.  The  love  of  truth, 
which  is  the  mainspring  of  science,  is  only  one  phase  of 
religious  feeling  and  worship.  Truth,  as  simple  corre- 
spondence of  thought  with  fact,  cannot  arouse  enthusi- 
asm. It  has,  indeed,  a  low  value  of  utility,  but  nothing 
on  which  a  soul  may  live.  It  would  be  an  interesting 
psychological  problem  to  trace  the  history  of  a  gigantic 
intellect  from  which  all  feeling  of  interest  had  vanished. 
The  enthusiasm  of  knowledge  tacitly  assumes  that  the 
object  is  worth  knowing.  It  assumes  that  the  universe 
is  the  abode  and  manifestation  of  a  wisdom  infinitely 
more  august  than  our  own.  Without  this  implicit  as- 
sumption, science  becomes  a  mere  hunt  for  bread  and 
butter,  or  for  personal  notoriety.  This  subjective  ele- 
ment appears  even  more  prominently  in  all  theories  of 
life  and  the  world.  No  such  theory  can  be  framed 
without  teleological  implications,  and  the  choice  of 
many  possible  standards  depends  upon  the  subject.  A 
very  common  notion  with  skeptically  inclined  persons 
is,  that  the  only  fit  end  of  life  is  to  learn  physical  facts. 
They  would  empty  the  mind  of  all  esthetic  and  moral 

*  This  point  has  been  very  happily  put  by  Dr.  James  in  the  "  Jour- 
nal of  Speculative  Philosophy,"  for  January  and  July.  1878. 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  67 

aims,  and  turn  it  into  a  store-house  of  statistics.  One 
man  thinks  hasty  belief  a  blasphemy  to  be  visited  with 
the  penalty  of  deathless  fire;  and  another  declares  that 
he  will  go  to  hell  rather  than  worship  a  being  whom  he 
does  not  respect.  But  why  fill  the  mind  with  bare  facts 
rather  than  with  good  feelings?  Why  exalt  statistics 
at  the  expense  of  esthetics  ?  This  apotheosis  of  fact  in 
cognition  over  pleasure  and  exaltation  in  feeling,  may  be 
entirely  justified,  but  its t  evidence  is  purely  subjective. 
If  it  be  said  that  the  former  works  better  in  the  long 
run,  still  we  do  not  escape  subjective  standards.  For 
the  working  better  must  be  tested  by  the  effect  upon 
well-being,  and  this,  again,  involves  several  assumptions. 
It  assumes  either  that  the  truest  must  work  best,  and, 
conversely,  that  what  works  best  is  the  truest;  or  else 
it  assumes  that  truth  in  itself  is  worthless,  and  that 
our  interests  are  the  only  standard  of  truth  and  falsehood 
for  us.  Moreover,  well-being  itself  is  ambiguous.  It 
may  be  physical,  mental,  or  moral  well-being,  and  the 
theorist  must  decide  which  he  means.  But  the  standard 
of  judgment  can  only  be  a  feeling  of  worth,  and  not  any 
objective  norm.  Thus  subjective  interests  and  senti- 
ments constantly  turn  up  as  the  decisive  factors  of  the- 
ory. The  theist  and  optimist  are  often  twitted  with 
making  human  welfare  the  standard  by  which  they 
judge  the  system.  But  the  pessimist  does  the  same 
tttng.  When  he  declares  that  this  world  is  worse  than 
none,  he  has  human  well-being  as  his  standard,  and 
commonly  he  thinks  only  of  physical  well-being.  No 
theory  of  the  world  is  so  vilely  anthropocentric  as  that 
of  the  pessimist.  The  same  subjectivity  appears  in  all 


68  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

the  atheistic  criticisms  of  nature  and  life.  None  are  so 
purely  subjective  as  those  who  affect  to  renounce  sub- 
jectivity. As  between  world-theories,  therefore,  no  one 
has  any  right  to  charge  any  other  with  resting  on  feel- 
ing rather  than  on  fact,  because  all  alike  are  built  on 
this  foundation.  Some  claim  that  the  end  of  man  is  to 
eat,  and  drink,  and  die.  Others,  again,  insist  that  there 
is  something  better  than  living  and  worse  than  dying. 
The  atheistic  evolutionist  holds  that  the  mind  exists 
only  to  secure  the  physical  survival  of  the  individual  and 
the  species.  This  doctrine  is  as  purely  teleological  as  any 
other,  only  its  teleology  is  of  the  lowest  form.  The 
theist  holds,  on  the  contrary,  that  the  whole  physical 
system  exists  only  as  means  for  securing  mental  and 
moral  existence.  The  positivist  claims  that  the  great 
duty  of  man  is  to  fill  his  mind  with  physical  facts.  The 
artist  and  the  moralist  alike  detest  a  merely  statistical 
mind,  and  demand  that  the  mind  devote  itself  to  realiz- 
ing the  true,  the  beautiful,  and  the  good.  We  may  as 
well  recognize  that  as  soon  as  we  leave  the  facts  of 
immediate  perception,  and  begin  to  frame  theories  of 
things,  subjective  interests  and  impressions  are  the  most 
important  factor.  Nature  furnishes  the  raw  material, 
and  each  one  builds  his  own  image.  The  supremacy  is 
claimed  for  sense,  for  reason,  for  physical  interests, 
and  for  esthetic  and  moral  interests.  The  uncondi- 
tioned good  is  put  in  eating  and  drinking,  in  feeling 
good,  in  knowing  facts,  and  in  mental,  moral,  and  re- 
ligious development.  All  alike,  then,  being  subjective, 
the  only  question  which  remains  is,  which  of  these  sub- 
jective interests  shall  control  our  theories,  and  which  of 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  69 

• 

them  is  best  supported  by  all  the  facts.  Teleological 
our  theories  must  be;  is  there,  then,  any  end  which  has 
an  absolute  value  and  a  divine  right  to  rule  ?  And  in 
discussing  this  question,  we  must  never  forget  that  the 
mind  itself,  and  its  experiences,  are  also  facts.  They 
are  no  chance  products,  but  rather  the  flower  of  the  uni- 
verse. Whatever  end,  therefore,  we  may  propose,  it 
must  be  able  to  satisfy  the  mind's  deepest  and  highest 
wants.  No  other  end  is  likely  to  be  parallel  to  reality, 
for  on  any  theory,  except  that  of  utter  skepticism,  these 
wants  and  aspirations  must  be  viewed  as  oracles.  They 
are  the  voice  of  the  universe  in  us.  Something  must  be 
ventured:  either  we  must  trust  the  higher  against  the 
lower,  or  we  must  trust  the  lower  against  the  higher. 
Formal  proof  is  no  more  impossible  in  one  case  than  in 
the  other. 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  restate  this  view  in  an- 
other form.  When  the  human  mind  comes  to  self-con- 
sciousness, it  becomes  aware  of  many  interests.  There 
are  practical,  speculative,  esthetic,  and  moral  interests. 
These  are  the  motive-powers  of  the  mind,  and  outline 
its  development.  The  only  function  of  the  logical 
understanding,  with  regard  to  them,  is  to  expound  their 
implications,  and  determine  their  mutual  relations.  Of 
course,  the  man  who  believes  only  in  what  he  sees 
belongs  to  no  intellectual  class.  All  that  he  demands 
of  the  system,  is  something  to  eat  and  drink.  But 
every  other  man  assumes  instinctively  that  the  sys- 
tem contains  what  his  nature  prompts  him  to  seek.  The 
speculator  finds  himself  unable  to  rest  in  an  un- 
related manifold,  and  hence  he  posits  unity  in  the 


70  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

diverse.  His  mental  discontent  leads  him  to  assume 
the  possibility  of  unification.  But  why  should  nature 
be  unifiable  ?  Why  should  a  mental  unrest  be  made 
the  ground  for  assuming,  that  the  system  really  is  what 
we  wish  it  to  be?  The  scientist  also  assumes  that  the 
system  is  intelligible  and  rationally  construable;  and 
any  suggestion  to  the  contrary  he  regards  as  essentially 
absurd.  But  why?  Why  should  the  system  be  con- 
struable ?  Is  that  the  highest  end  of  its  existence  ?  If 
we  have  a  general  order  in  the  leading  phenomena  of 
nature,  that  is  enough  for  practical  purposes.  Until 
the  present  time,  the  world  has  contrived  to  get  on, 
although  whole  departments  of  facts  have  been  to  us 
almost  utterly  lawless  realms,  and  it  is  quite  conceiv- 
able that  they  should  never  manifest  any  consistent 
intelligible  order.  No  practical  interest  would  be  af- 
fected, but  our  speculative  interest  would  receive  a 
great  shock.  Yet  the  scientist  does  not  hesitate  to  re- 
gard this  mental  unrest  as  pointing  to  the  conclusion 
that  reason  and  law  are  universal.  If  we  ask  him  why, 
he  replies  that  on  any  other  assumption,  science  would 
not  be  possible.  But  why  should  science  be  possible? 
What  crying  need  is  there  for  such  a  universal  science 
as  he  dreams  of?  The  scientist  often  mistakes  his 
enthusiasm  for  science,  and  his  passion  for  formulation, 
for  proofs  that  reason  and  law  are  universal.  It  never 
occurs  to  him  that  this  is  a  tremendous  assumption, 
based  only  on  his  subjective  needs;  and  hence,  he  often 
tells  what  science  can  and  cannot  allow,  as  if  its  needs 
were  the  fixed  points  of  the  inner  and  outer  universe. 
But  the  man  of  artistic  and  poetic  temperament  is 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  1l 

quite  indifferent  to  the  aim  of  the  scientist  and  specu- 
lator. He  thinks  it  a  very  small  matter  to  gather  up 
many  things  into  a  single  formula.  It  may  have  a 
certain  low  value  in  our  mental  book-keeping,  but, 
otherwise,  such  summation  is  meaningless  and  worth- 
less. Suppose  it  possible  to  unite  all  things  under  a 
common  law,  what  of  it?  What  we  want  to  know  is, 
the  meaning  and  worth  of  things.  Formulation  gives 
no  value  to  things  essentially  meaningless  and  worthless. 
He  declares,  therefore,  that  the  work  of  the  speculator 
and  scientist  is  unutterably  stupid  and  tedious,  unless 
it  introduce  us  to  a  world  of  meanings  and  values. 
He  insists  that  the  universe  must  have  grand  meanings, 
which  our  only  aim  as  rational  beings  should  be  to  read 
off  and  interpret.  He  dwells  upon  the  riddle  of  the 
world  and  life,  and  seeks  to  charm  its  meaning  from  it. 
He  catches  glimpses,  as  he  thinks,  of  a  supreme  beauty, 
and  gets  hints  of  meanings  too  deep  for  utterance. 
These  are  the  things  for  whose  revelation  the  great 
world  stands.  Allied  to  this  view  is  that  of  the  moral 
enthusiast.  For  him  the  free  moral  personality  is  the 
only  unconditioned  good.  For  him  there  is  no  science 
like  that  of  duty,  and  no  beauty  like  the  beauty  of 
holiness.  Personal  righteousness  is  the  highest  thing, 
and  he,  therefore,  insists  on  holding  that  the  system 
was  constructed  for  righteousness'  sake.  Now  all  of 
these  views  alike  start  from  subjective  sentiments. 
Mental  unrest  causes  us  to  assume  that  law  and  reason 
are  universal.  Mental  unrest  causes  us  to  assume  that 
the  universe  has  magnificent  meanings  hidden  in  it. 
Mental  unrest  also  causes  us  to  assume  that  its  most 


2  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

magnificent,  its  all-interpreting  meaning,  is  love  and 
righteousness.  Thus  we  see  that  the  great,  leading  man- 
ifestations of  the  mind  are  based  entirely  on  subjective 
interests;  and  thus  these  interests  become  to  us  the  great 
interpreters  of  the  universe.  These  several  sentiments 
are  not  equally  strong  in  all;  and  there  is  a  tendency  in 
every  one-sided  person  to  ignore  or  ridicule  those  things 
which  he  does  not  appreciate.  The  physicist  laughs  at 
the  philosopher,  and  the  half-philosopher  scorns  the 
physicist.  The  lover  of  beauty  cares  for  little  else; 
and  the  moralist  often  places  duty  so  high,  as  to  make 
all  else  vanity  and  vexation  of  spirit.  But  as  long  as 
the  world  stands,  and  man  remains  man,  there  will  be 
physicists,  and  poets,  and  artists,  and  thinkers,  and 
lovers  of  righteousness. 

Now,  what  we  wish  especially  to  insist  upon  is,  the 
subjective  character  of  the  scientific  and  speculative 
sentiment.  Because  this  fact  is  commonly  overlooked, 
there  is  all  the  more  need  to  insist  upon  it.  The  moral 
sentiment  is  forbidden  to  make  its  needs  an  argument 
for  objective  correspondence,  yet  this  is  precisely  what 
the  scientific  speculator  does  in  his  own  case.  He 
assumes  that  the  world  was  made  on  an  intelligible 
and  rational  plan,  and  for  no  other  reason  than  the 
mental  distress  which  results  from  denial.  He  may 
say  that  experience  at  least  partly  supports  the  as- 
sumption; but  the  moralist  also  can  say,  that  experi- 
ence at  least  partly  supports  his  assumption,  that  the 
world  was  made  on  a  moral  plan.  In  general,  the 
power  not  ourselves  does  make  for  righteousness.  It 
is,  then,  idle  to  imagine  that  any  of  our  general  views  of 


;U1T!7:!RSJTY 

KNO  WLED  GE  AND 

things  can  escape  the  control  of  subjective  inl 
All  such  theories  are  alike  assumptions;  and  there  is 
nothing  to  do  but  to  ask  which  of  them  best  satisfies 
the  mind,  and  which  is  best  supported  by  the  sum  of 
our  experience.  It  is  equally  idle  to  imagine  that 
the  scientific  interest  will  ever  expel  the  others;  for, 
as  pointed  out,  the  doctrine  of  meanings  and  values  is 
the  only  thing  which  gives  any  significance  whatever 
to  science  and  speculation.  At  times,  the  speculative 
interest  may  overtop  all  others,  but  not  long.  The  re- 
action against  the  usurpation  of  the  scientific  senti- 
ment is  already  apparent.  By  ignoring  or  denying 
the  doctrine  of  meanings  and  values,  it  has  become  a 
prey  to  pessimism,  and  pessimism  is  the  reductio  ad  ab- 
surdum  of  any  theory.  This  does  not  follow  as  a  form- 
al conclusion  from  formal  premises,  but  none  the  less 
does  it  follow  from  the  total  experience  of  the  human 
mind.  It  may  be  an  opaque  fact  in  the  soul,  but  it  is 
beyond  doubt,  that  no  theory  will  endure  which  blas- 
phemes the  system  of  things,  and  makes  life  not  worth 
living.  Whether  such  a  fact  proves  any  thing  we  shall 
see  hereafter;  at  present,  we  insist  upon  the  fact. 

The  practical  man  might  further  retort  upon  the  spec- 
ulator, that  his  theories  have  never  been  able  to  cope  even 
with  physical  reality,  and  still  less  with  mind  and  life. 
All  reality  has  obstinately  refused  to  come  into  his  for- 
mula, and  has  scoffed  at  the  vain  attempts  of  the  spec- 
ulative reason.  The  history  of  thought  is  the  his- 
tory of  failure.  The  history  of  scientific  theory  is  one 
of  incessant  change.  Hence,  philosophic  skepticism. 
Hence,  also,  phenomenalism  both  in  science  and  philos- 


74  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

ophy.  The  most  prominent  feature  of  the  scientific 
and  speculative  thought  of  the  century  is  the  convic- 
tion that  reality  is  unknowable.  We  do  not  share  this 
conviction,  but  its  wide  acceptance  does  certainly  show 
that  speculation  has  little  ground  for  boasting  against 
life  and  conscience.  One  cannot  glance  along  the  his- 
tory of  thought  without  saying,  with  Mephistopheles, 
"  A  speculating  fellow  is  like  a  beast  on  blasted  heath, 
led  round  in  circles  by  an  evil  spirit."  It  is  not  with- 
out ground,  therefore,  that  Kant  insisted  upon  the 
primacy  of  the  practical  reason,  and  the  subordinate 
character  of  the  speculative.  Man  is  life  rather  than 
reason;  and  reason  only  strives  to  formulate  what  life 
and  reality  are.  Certainly,  if  it  were  only  a  matter  of 
mutual  recrimination,  the  practical  reason  has  much 
the  stronger  case.  In  the  light  of  its  own  history,  no 
faculty  should  be  so  humble  as  the  speculative,  for  none 
has  so  disgraced  itself.  What  has  it  achieved,  but  con- 
fusion and  mischief?  The  claim  that  practice  is  illog- 
ical, is  met  by  the  retort,  so  much  the  worse  for  logic; 
for  thereby  it  confesses  that  it  is  unable  to  cope  with 
the  real.  Speculation  owes  far  more  to  life  than  life 
owes  to  speculation.  If  it  were  possible  to  shut  up  a 
body  of  speculators  apart  from  all  contact  with  prac- 
tical interests,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  outcome  would 
be  the  supreme  of  grotesqueness  and  absurdity.  Even 
now  the  so-called  advanced  science  is  so  possessed  of 
the  unifying  and  formulating  mania,  that  it  can  hardly 
be  restrained  from  destroying  all  its  own  data.  By 
consequence  we  are  presented  with  the  odd  but  in- 
structive spectacle,  of  a  science  which  overthrows  life. 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  75 

denies  consciousness,  obliterates  all  distinctions,  repudi- 
ates all  those  principles  by  which  men  and  governments 
live,  and  confounds  even  the  most  heterogeneous  things, 
for  the  sole  purpose  of  bringing  every  thing  under  a  com- 
mon formula.  This  is  simply  speculation  gone  mad,  and 
committing  suicide.  Life  has  the  field,  and  the  might 
of  the  actual  will  always  prevail  at  last  over  aberrant 
speculation.  We  conclude,  then,  once  more,  that  all 
general  theories  of  life  and  the  world  are  based  on 
subjective  interests,  and  that  the  only  questions  which 
can  be  raised  are,  which  of  these  interests  should  rule, 
and  which  works  best  as  a  ruler.  In  this  inquiry,  too, 
we  cannot  help  making  the  general  assumption  that 
nature  is  no  more  of  a  step-mother  to  man  than  to  the 
lower  animals,  and  that  his  instincts  are  equally  trust- 
worthy. Those  views,  therefore,  of  man  and  his  rela- 
tions which  must  develop  and  dignify  human  nature, 
and  which  work  best  in  practice,  are  at  least  presump- 
tively true.  Pessimism  and  despair  are  the  only  alter- 
native. In  addition,  then,  to  beliefs  deduced  from 
formal  data,  there  are  other  beliefs  which  are  based  on 
results.  Such  beliefs  have  not  the  support  of  formal 
proof,  but  they  have  what  is  better,  the  attestation  of 
reality. 

But  still  we  have  not  shown  that  feeling  points  to  any 
thing  objective.  Thus  far  we  have  only  made  out,  that 
all  theories  are  subjective;  why  not,  then,  abandon  all, 
and  have  faith  in  none?  One  reason  is,  that  it  cannot 
be  done.  The  pretense  has  often  been  made,  but  it  has 
never  been  more  than  pretense.  Teleology  is  the  frame- 


?6  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

work  of  both  the  speculative  and  the  practical  reason. 
But,  it  will  be  urged,  do  you  seriously  mean  to  say  that 
a  thing  is  real  because  we  wish  it?  I  wish  to  believe 
in  God,  therefore  there  is  a  God;  what  logic  is  there  in 
such  a  conclusion?  We  reply,  that  of  course  we  can- 
not intend  to  base  any  conclusion  on  individual  and  non- 
essential  feelings  and  interests,  but  only  on  the  essential 
needs  of  the  mind;  and  these,  we  hold,  render  an  object- 
ive correspondence  highly  probable.  Indeed,  not  even 
the  atheist  ought  to  object  to  this  position.  The  power 
which  has  brought  us  forth  is  not,  indeed,  intelligent,  but 
it  acts  as  if  it  were;  and  hence  we  may  assume  as  prob- 
able, that  what  intelligence  would  call  for,  that  the 
blind  power  will  furnish.  It  has  been  able  to  create 
animals  and  fit  them  to  their  lot,  to  supply  them  with 
proper  organs  and  instincts,  and  in  wonderful  ways  to 
provide  for  its  children.  But,  curiously  enough,  the 
atheist  supposes  that  this  power  must  turn  blockhead 
with  man.  Here  it  has  produced  wants  which  it  cannot 
meet,  and  instincts  without  any  object.  Surely,  if  it 
can  do  all  that  the  atheist  assumes  it  can,  there  should 
be  no  difficulty  in  believing  that  it  has  also  provided 
for  the  human  wants  and  instincts  which  it  has  created. 
The  power  which  has  been  wise  enough  to  make  us, 
ought,  especially  on  atheistic  principles,  to  be  able  to 
keep  us  in  existence,  and  even  to  punish  and  reward  us 
according  to  our  works.  But,  seriously,  we  do  hold 
that  a  general  belief  renders  a  corresponding  reality 
highly  probable,  even  when  no  sufficient  formal  defense 
is  possible.  Such  a  belief  represents  the  total  outcome 
of  a  race-experience,  the  impression  which  the  universe 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  BELIEF.  7  7 

has  made  upon  us.  Especially  should  philosophical 
evolutionists  allow  the  force  of  this  argument;  for  they 
insist  that  all  our  beliefs  are  made  for  us,  and  represent 
the  totality  of  our  experience.  But,  oddly  enough, 
while  they  allow  its  full  force  with  regard  to  rational 
principles,  they  dispute  it  with  regard  to  moral  and  re- 
ligious beliefs.  The  oldest  truths,  they  say,  represent 
the  most  fundamental  elements  of  experience.  If  there 
be  any  relations  which  are  fundamental,  we  should  ex- 
pect that  they  would  appear  in  all  our  experiences,  from 
the  earliest  to  the  latest.  Hence  their  superior  age  and 
cogency.  Conversely,  a  general  belief  can  only  be  re- 
garded as  a  transcript  of  our  most  general  experiences, 
and  hence  as  having  the  highest  degree  of  probability. 
Yet  when  these  philosophers  have  occasion  to  criticise 
ethical  and  religious  principles,  the  opposite  doctrine  is 
set  up,  that  the  new  is  most  trustworthy.  We  are  often 
called  upon  to  reject  theism  as  having  a  suspicious  par- 
entage, being  the  outgrowth  of  fetichism,  and  the  prod- 
uct of  a  savage  state.  Yet  it  would  seem  that  a  belief 
which  has  been  able  to  impress  itself  upon  all  ages  and 
stages  of  humanity,  ought  to  be  at  least  as  probable  as 
the  late  opinion  of  a  little  clique.  But  a  narrow  con- 
sistency is  not  one  of  the  failings  of  the  evolutionist. 
We  are  not  prepared,  then,  to  reject  the  argument  from 
general  feeling  and  belief,  because  on  any  theory  of 
knowledge,  a  feeling  or  want  which  is  common  to  men 
is  the  expression  of  a  fact;  it  is  the  way  in  which  reali- 
ty manifests  itself  in  us.  Our  feelings  are  the  subjective 
side  of  the  universe.  Upon  this  point  we  are  in  full  ac- 
cord with  the  evolutionist.  They  conserve  well-being, 


78  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

point  out  duty,  and  outline  development.  We  must  once 
more  express  our  surprise  that  the  evolutionist  should 
fail  to  see  that  on  his  theory  feeling  and  instinct,  rath- 
er than  understanding,  are  the  great  guides  of  life.  It 
looks  almost  as  if  the  subjectivity  of  prejudice  were 
needed  to  explain  so  peculiar  an  oversight. 

Our  position  will  appear  less  strange  if  we  attend  to 
perception  in  general.  All  sense-perceptions  are  but 
conclusions  from  sense-impressions;  or  rather,  the  ob- 
ject is  posited  by  the  mind  because  of  its  sensations. 
The  senses  do  not  give  us  reality,  but  only  states  of 
self.  The  reality  is  reached  only  by  the  mind.  Now 
the  final  test  of  reality  in  perception  is,  that  it  compels 
and  coerces  our  sensations.  How  the  object  does  this 
we  do  not  know;  and  we  know  that  there  is  an  object 
only  because  the  sensations  are  coerced.  If,  then,  there 
is  any  other  element  in  the  totality  of  our  experience 
which  equally  coerces  our  belief,  and  which,  when  de- 
nied, invariably  comes  back,  then  there  is  the  best 
ground  for  saying  that  in  such  experience,  as  well  as  in 
sense-perception,  we  come  in  contact  with  something 
not  ourselves.  There  is  nothing  in  psychology  to  forbid 
the  thought,  that  contact  with  reality  may  take  place 
other  than  through  the  senses.  Indeed,  the  world  of 
physical  reality  is,  for  the  most  part,  inaccessible  to  the 
senses.  At  best,  the  senses  give  us  only  impressions; 
the  interpretation  is  of  the  mind.  Forces,  and  atoms, 
and  ethers  do  not  exist  for  the  senses.  Tne  senses  nev- 
er reveal  that  the  points  of  light  above  us  are  suns  and 
systems.  The  mind  affirms  these  realities,  because  of 
its  sense-impressions.  In  the  same  way  the  subjective 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  79 

impressions  of  conscience,  the  haunting  conviction  of 
things  not  realized,  the  dreams  of  a  beauty  and  a  good 
beyond  all  that  we  have  experienced,  may  well  be  the 
revelation  in  us  of  some  power  which  besets  us  on  every 
hand,  and  makes  for  righteousness.  They  have  this  ex- 
ternal character  in  experience.  They  are  in  us,  but  not 
of  us.  Conscience  has  always  seemed  to  the  race  to 
speak  less  in  its  own  name  than  as  the  delegate  of  an 
invisible  king.  And  the  sense  of  things  unseen  often 
drifts  in  upon  us  with  such  a  feeling  of  reality  that  the 
solid  earth  grows  phantom-like  in  contrast.  This  is  the 
conviction  which  these  experiences  have  made  upon  the 
race.  They  coerce  us,  and  we  cannot  escape  them. 
That  they  are  indeed  the  working  of  an  objective  pow- 
er may  not  be  proved,  but  still  less  is  it  disproved.  A 
race-psychology  is,  in  many  respects,  far  more  trust- 
worthy than  the  psychology  of  the  individual;  and  its 
verdict  is,  that  these  things  are  indeed  the  manifesta- 
tion in  us  of  a  person  not  ourselves.  And  if  we  find 
that  with  the  growth  of  moral  character  such  convic- 
tions become  firmer  and  firmer,  until  they  arise  to  a  sub- 
jective certainty  which  cannot  be  shaken,  then  there  is 
good  ground  for  assuming  that  they  lie  parallel  to  real- 
ity, and  are  derived  from  it.  On  the  basis  of  certain 
impressions,  we  posit  material  objects.  On  the  basis  of 
other  impressions,  we  posit  spirits  like  our  own.  On 
the  basis  of  its  total  mental  and  moral  experience,  the 
race  has  posited  God. 

This  general  conviction  in  a  divine  existence,  we  re- 
gard as  less  an  inference  than  a  perception.  This  is 
shown  by  the  history  of  the  belief,  which  is  older  than 


80  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

reflection  and  speculation.  The  sense  of  the  supernat 
ural  is  a  distinguishing  feature  of  the  human  mind, 
even  in  its  lowest  stages.  And  this  conviction  cannot 
be  deduced  from  our  sense-experiences  alone;  for  a 
sense-object  is  simply  a  sense-object,  and  cannot  be  any 
thing  more,  unless  there  be  some  sense,  or  feeling,  or 
conviction  of  the  supernatural.  This  feeling  being 
given,  our  sense-experience  may  serve  to  give  it  form; 
but,  without  the  feeling,  the  senses  can  never  transcend 
themselves.  A  stick  must  be  more  than  a  stick  before 
it  can  be  made  a  fetich.  The  sun  must  be  more  than  it 
seems  before  it  can  be  worshiped.  Until  the  feeling  of 
the  supernatural  in  general  is  given,  man  is  on  the  re- 
ligious level  of  the  brute.  The  senses  of  the  latter  are 
sharp  enough,  and  it  experiences,  too,  the  same  vicissi- 
tudes of  fortune  as  man,  but  without  religious  manifes- 
tations. Some  speculators  attempt  to  deduce  the  belief 
from  the  phenomena  of  dreams.  They  trace  the  whole 
religious  history  of  the  race  to  the  fact  that  some  an- 
cestral savage  dreamed,  and  mistook  his  dreams  for  re- 
alities. The  idea  of  the  supernatural  once  afloat,  was 
speedily  and  greedily  taken  up  by  the  race,  and,  with 
the  exception  of  a  few  rare  and  choice  spirits,  it  has 
been  haunted  by  the  notion  ever  since.  This  view  needs 
no  criticism.  It  assumes  that  men  in  general  are  fools; 
and  there  is  nothing  to  do  but  to  return  the  compliment. 
It  is  no  argument  against  our  view  that  the  perception 
of  God  is  vague,  and  in  itself  almost  formless.  For  even 
sense-perception  derives  its  certainty  from  our  inces- 
sant experience.  We  learn  to  perceive.  A  vague  sense 
of  objectivity  is  all  that  is  immediate  in  perception.  If 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  81 

the  mind  should  remain  as  it  is,  but  the  sensations  on 
which  perception  depends  should  be  rare,  or  conditioned 
on  character,  we  should  have  the  same  belief  about  the 
external  world  which  we  now  have  about  God.  There 
would  be  a  general  belief  in  the  outer  world,  but  the 
content  of  the  belief  would  be  vague  and  misty.  A 
constant  experience  is  necessary  to  reduce  the  vague 
objectivity  which  is  given  in  sensation  to  definite  order 
and  meaning.  There  would,  also,  be  many  skeptics 
demanding,  What  is  this  outer  world  ?  Where  is  it  ? 
What  is  the  proof  of  its  existence  ?  Of  course,  they 
would  denounce  the  general  belief  of  the  race  as  worth- 
less. Finally,  there  would  be  uncertainty  whether  this 
outer  world  were  an  inference  or  a  perception.  For 
ourselves,  we  hold  that  God  himself  is  the  great  source 
of  the  belief  in  God;  yet  only  in  the  sense  indicated. 
Just  as  sensation  needs  reason  to  interpret  and  arrange 
it,  and  without  reason  remains  chaotic,  so  the  feeling  of 
the  divine  needs  reason  to  interpret  it;  and  without 
reason  and  conscience,  it  remains  a  confused  suspicion  of 
an  object  which  can  be  neither  escaped  nor  understood. 
But  just  as  sensation  is  an  absolute  condition  of  percep- 
tion, so  this  feeling  of  God  is  the  absolute  condition  of 
theistic  belief.  The  reflective  reason  does  not  originate 
it,  but  justifies  or  rectifies  it.  The  arguments  for  the- 
ism have  never  originated  the  belief,  but  have  only 
aimed  to  give  reasons  for  the  belief  already  there. 

With  regard  to  individual  beliefs  on  the  basis  of  per- 
sonal experience,  there  can  be  no  argument;  for  there 
is  no  common  ground  between  the  believer  and  the 
doubter.  All  that  the  latter  can  rationally  say  is,  that 


82  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

his  experience  warrants  no  such  beliefs;  and  the  former 
replies,  that  his  does.  Direct  perception,  whether  of 
sense  or  spirit,  can  never  be  mediated,  and  its  grounds 
can  never  be  communicated.  The  attempt  to  tell  how 
we  perceive,  always  results  in  simply  restating  the  fact 
of  perception.  Only  experience  under  similar  condi- 
tions can  in  any  way  test  its  truth.  When  the  doubter 
and  believer  thus  come  face  to  face,  each  will  have  to 
allow  the  other  his  opinion.  The  former  cannot  deny 
the  experience,  and  the  latter  cannot  supply  the  expe- 
rience to  another.  There  is  no  ground  for  claiming  that 
perceptive  power  must  be  equal  in  all.  Some  may  see 
farther  than  others ;  why  may  not  some  see  more  than 
others?  On  the  low  plane  of  sense-perception,  great 
diversity  of  perception  would  work  confusion;  yet  even 
here  it  is  a  question  how  much  of  apparent  harmony  is 
due  to  a  common  language,  rather  than  to  identity  of 
sense-experience.  But,  in  the  higher  realm  of  spiritual 
perception,  it  is  not  incredible  that  there  should  be  va- 
rying power,  and  that  such  variation  should  be  condi- 
tioned by  the  moral  character  of  the  person.  If  the 
poet,  the  mystic,  and  the  Christian  affirm  a  spiritual 
communion  with  the  unseen,  only  narrowness  and  con- 
ceit  can  find  any  argument  against  the  reality  of  such 
communion  in  the  fact  that  others,  who  do  not  fulfill  the 
conditions,  are  not  conscious  of  it.  Argument  is  idle; 
experience  only  can  truly  test  such  a  claim.  The  only 
demand  we  can  make  upon  such  persons  is,  that  their 
higher  experience  shall  not  distort  the  lower.  A  mind 
which  distorted  all  the  facts  of  daily  life,  and  all  the 
common  principles  of  judgment,  w.ould  be  justly  sus- 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  83 

pected  of  madness  rather  than  illumination;  but  a  mind 
which  is  healthy  in  its  lower  perceptions  is  not  to  be 
distrusted  simply  because  its  higher  perceptions  tran- 
scend the  range  of  the  five  senses.  When  the  Christian 
finds  that  faith  in  Christ  is  attended  by  a  growing  love 
of  righteousness,  and  by  growing  power  to  realize  it, 
and  when  he  further  finds  that  a  multitude  of  others 
have  the  same  experience,  then  he  has  a  right  to  con- 
clude that  he  is  not  deceiving  himself,  but  that  he  and 
they  have  come  within  the  range  of  some  mighty  spir- 
itual attraction,  whose  effects  are  as  real  and  as  demon- 
strable as  those  of  gravitation.  Why  should  it  be 
thought  a  thing  incredible,  he  demands,  that  God 
should  raise  the  dead  soul  and  fill  it  with  himself? 
Speculation  cannot  give  experience,  and  cannot  give  the 
matter  for  thought.  There  must  be  reception  from 
some  quarter  before  thought  can  begin;  and  then  the 
only  function  of  thought  is  to  work  *ver  the  raw  mate- 
rial. A  great  fact,  therefore,  like  the  consistent  expe- 
rience of  Christians  for  many  centuries,  can  be  tested 
only  by  accepting  their  standing  challenge  to  the  world 
to  try  it  and  see.  As  the  mind  posits  the  physical 
world  upon  occasion  of  sensation,  so  it  may  posit  a  spir- 
itual power  on  the  basis  of  its  spiritual  experience.  In 
either  case  the  validity  of  the  perception  must  be  tested 
by  each  for  himself,  and  never  by  another.  The  per- 
ception of  an  infinite  personality  is  in  itself  no  more 
mysterious  than  the  perception  of  a  finite  personality. 
We  never  see  one  another.  The  senses  never  reveal  the 
person.  The  fact  of  personal  communion  is  so  familiar, 
that  we  lose  sight  of  its  mystery;  but,  on  reflection, 


84  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

nothing  is  more  mysterious  than  the  way  in  which  we 
posit  persons  other  than  ourselves,  and  even  enter  into 
their  secret  thoughts  and  sympathies.  A  touch,  a  thrill, 
a  sound  falls  upon  us,  and  we  say  that  a  person,  a  spirit 
is  speaking  to  us,  and  demanding  entrance  into  our 
thought.  Experience  has  no  greater  mystery.  But  the 
infinite  is  nearer  than  the  finite;  and  it  must  be  solely 
a  question  of  experience  whether  there  may  not  be  as 
intimate  and  real  a  communion  between  the  finite  and 
the  infinite,  as  between  the  finite  and  the  finite.  We 
doubt  the  senses,  at  times,  but  the  coercive  power  of 
reality  soon  expels  the  doubt.  We  question,  also,  the 
reality  of  the  spiritual  and  moral;  but  here,  too,  the 
doubt  is  soon  driven  off  by  the  experiences  of  daily  life. 
Persistence  and  power  to  compel  experience,  the  only 
tests  of  reality,  are  present  in  both  cases,  though  in  dif- 
ferent degrees.  If  it  be  rational  to  affirm  the  existence 
of  the  physical  world  on  these  grounds,  it  is  equally 
rational  to  affirm  the  existence  of  a  spiritual  and  moral 
world  on  the  same  grounds.  The  arguments  which 
shake  our  faith  in  the  latter,  are  equally  valid  against 
the  former.  It  is  for  each  to  determine  for  himself 
whether  the  sphere  of  rational  belief  and  objective  re- 
ality is  bounded  by  the  five  senses,  or  by  the  impressions 
upon  the  senses. 

Our  purpose  in  the  preceding  paragraphs  has  been 
complex.  One  aim  has  been  to  suggest  questions  and 
possibilities,  and  leave  each  to  deal  with  them  for  him- 
self. We  have,  also,  sought  to  show  that  the  grounds 
of  belief  are  generally  complicated,  and  often  incom- 
municable. Nevertheless,  the  human  mind  as  it  is,  re- 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  BELIEF.  85 

gards  them  as  justifying  belief  and  action.  Frequently 
they  are  individual  and  class  experiences.  In  such  cases, 
those  who  have  not  the  experiences  must  simply  sus- 
pend judgment.  To  claim  that  their  experiences  ex- 
haust reality,  and  that  all  else  is  delusion,  is  insufferable 
insolence.  It  is  the  railing  of  the  eyeless  against  vision. 
Or  the  grounds  of  belief  may  be  the  great  feelings  and 
instincts  of  humanity.  We  have  sought  to  show  that 
in  any  theory  of  knowledge  which  is  not  purely  skep- 
tical, such  feelings  and  instincts  as  have  objective  cor- 
relates must  be  regarded  as  affording  a  high  probability 
that  such  objective  correlates  really  exist.  They  give 
the  psychology  of  the  race,  and  are  in  many  respects 
more  trustworthy  than  the  psychology  of  the  individ- 
ual. They  eliminate  all  that  is  individual  and  peculiar, 
and  express  in  its  purest  form  the  impression  which  re- 
ality makes  upon  the  mind.  Finally,  in  reply  to  the 
charge  of  subjectivity,  we  have  pointed  out  that  all 
theories  of  life,  and  mind,  and  the  universe,  are  and 
must  be  subjective.  Human  interests  and  aims  are  the 
raw  material  of  which  all  theories  are  built,  and  the 
standard  by  which  all  are  judged.  Teleology  cannot 
be  escaped.  It  only  remains  that  we  choose  the  stand- 
ard which  shall  bring  the  greatest  peace  and  dignity 
into  life.  We  must  venture  beyond  knowledge.  Let 
the  venture  be  toward  the  highest. 

What  we  have  next  to  say  is  pedagogical  rather  than 
speculative.  Commonplace  errors  can  be  met  only  by 
the  repetition  of  commonplace  truths.  A  romantic 
credulity  in  the  direction  of  irreligion  has  led  to  a 


86  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

wide-spread  notion  that  all  the  doctrines  of  physical 
science  are  absolutely  certain.  The  holders  of  this 
notion  seem  never  to  have  heard  that  positivism  and 
agnosticism,  both  of  which  agree  in  limiting  science  to 
phenomena,  and  in  discarding  all  theories  except  as  con- 
venient fictions,  have  never  before  flourished  as  they  do 
in  this  century.  In  this  way  undue  authority  is  claimed 
for  physical  speculations,  and  unjust  disparagement  is 
cast  upon  other  departments  of  knowledge.  To  such  an 
extent  has  this  grown,  that  the  bare  word  science  acts 
like  an  enchantment  to  disarm  criticism;  and  mental 
quacks  perceiving  this,  hasten  to  call  their  nostrums 
science.  In  this  way  great  injury  is  done  to  science  it- 
self. Atheists  and  materialists,  in  particular,  have  squat- 
ted on  scientific  territory  to  such  an  extent,  that  the  opin- 
ion has  got  abroad  that  science  is  identical  with  atheism 
and  materialism;  and  of  course  the  squatters  do  their 
best  to  keep  up  the  delusion.  Whoever,  therefore,  feels 
irreligiously  inclined,  has  but  to  make  a  picnic  party  into 
the  scientific  realm,  and  pick  up  a  few  scientific  phrases 
and  misunderstood  doctrines,  and  at  once  his  irreligion 
takes  rank  as  science  with  all  kindred  spirits.  This  com- 
bination of  credulity  and  insolence  threatens  to  become 
pathologic,  and  it  certainly  has  been  for  a  long  time  a  se- 
rious infestation  of  popular  thought  and  literature.  The- 
ism especially  suffers  injustice  from  this  state  of  things. 
Speculative  and  metaphysical  doctrines  are  taken  on  trust 
when  assumed  by  science,  but  are  combated  with  won- 
derful acuteness  and  fervor  when  assumed  by  theism. 
It  is,  then,  worth  while  to  point  out  that  the  greater  part 
of  natural  science  is  a  matter  of  belief  rather  than  knowl- 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  BELIEF.  8  7 

edge,  and  that  the  difficulties  involved  in  theism  are,  at 
least,  no  greater  than  those  involved  in  any  objective 
science,  and  even  in  thought  itself.  But  as  the  error 
is  an  exceedingly  vulgar  one,  the  refutation  must  be 
correspondingly  commonplace.  Of  course,  we  do  not 
attribute  these  oversights  to  all  scientists,  but  only 
to  the  half-educated,  who,  unfortunately,  are  always 
with  us. 

All  objective  science  assumes  the  uniformity  of 
nature,  both  in  space  and  time.  The  limits  of  this  uni- 
formity are  the  limits  of  science.  By  sheer  force  of 
repetition  many  have  brought  themselves  to  think  such 
uniformity  universal  and  necessary;  but,  in  fact,  we 
have  to  regard  it  as  a  happy  circumstance.  There  is 
not  the  slightest  rational  ground  for  affirming  that  any 
of  the  laws  which  we  know,  excepting,  possibly,  the  laws 
of  motion,  are  not  temporary  and  limited.  The  laws 
we  know  may  be  but  a  transient  function  of  unknown 
laws,  which,  like  the  laws  of  motion,  allow  complete 
disorder  in  the  outcome.  But  allowing  the  uniformity 
of  nature,  natural  science  falls  into  two  parts.  There 
arc,  first,  the  perceived  facts  and  their  orders  of  co- 
existence and  sequence.  There  is,  second,  the  depart- 
ment of  theory  and  hypothesis,  whereby  we  seek  to 
explain  the  observed  facts.  If,  now,  we  reckon  the 
facts  perceived  to  the  realm  of  knowledge,  we  must 
reckon  scientific  theories  mainly,  if  not  entirely,  to  the 
realm  of  belief.  In  sound  science  the  first  thing  is  the 
facts,  and  then  comes  the  attempt  at  rational  explana- 
tion. For  example,  there  are  sundry  peculiar  planetary 
phenomena,  and  the  mind  says  that  they  become  Intel- 


88  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

ligible  only  as  we  assume  that  all  the  planets  go  around 
the  sun.  Sundry  other  phenomena  are  explained  by 
assuming  that  the  particles  of  matter  attract  one  anoth- 
er, according  to  certain  laws.  Various  facts  of  physics 
and  chemistry  are  accounted  for  by  teaching  that  mat- 
tor  has  an  atomic  and  molecular  constitution.  Optical 
phenomena  seem  to  demand  for  their  comprehension 
the  assumption  of  a  new  and  peculiar  kind  of  matter. 
Now,  it  is  claimed  that  biological  phenomena  make  it 
necessary  to  assume  a  common  genealogical  origin  for 
living  things.  Such  is  the  nature  of  all  scientific  ex- 
planations. The  facts  to  be  explained  are  referred  to 
a  number  of  observed  or  hypothetical  causes,  which  are 
further  assumed  with  just  such  powers  and  just  such 
relations  as  are  necessary  to  account  for  the  facts.  But 
it  is  clear  that  all  these  theories  are  only  inferences 
from  the  facts,  and  that  it  must  be  difficult  to  reach  ab- 
solute certainty.  For  this  whole  process  assumes,  in 
addition  to  the  uniformity  of  nature,  the  rationality  of 
nature.  It  assumes  not  only  that  an  explanation  is  pos- 
sible, but  that  a  rational  explanation  is  possible.  It 
further  assumes,  that  of  many  consistent  explanations, 
that  one  is  true  which  is  most  simple  and  rational. 
But  why  should  an  explanation  be  possible  ?  least  of  all, 
why  should  a  rational  explanation  be  possible?  But 
even  if  nature  be  rational,  why  should  its  methods  be 
such  as  we  think  them?  Why  may  they  not  be  inef- 
fable and  even  transcendental  to  any  conceptions  we 
can  form  ?  Why  may  not  all  our  theories  of  the  pro- 
duction of  phenomena  be  but  the  makeshifts  of  our 
feeble  minds,  which  do,  indeed,  serve  some  purpose, 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  89 

but  which  reveal  no  fact?  Such  is  the  doctrine  of  the 
positivist  and  agnostic.  But  allowing  all  that  can  be 
claimed  for  the  rationality  and  openness  of  nature,  it  is 
still  seldom  possible  to  reach  certainty  with  regard  to 
any  scientific  theory.  It  is  always  easy  to  postulate  a 
cause  or  causes,  which,  if  real,  would  explain  the  facts ; 
but  we  can  seldom  be  sure  that  they  were  not  produced 
in  any  other  way.  That  a  hypothesis  fits  the  facts,  is 
far  from  proving  that  it  corresponds  to  reality;  for  the 
hypothesis  was  made  for  that  very  purpose,  and  the  cor- 
respondence ought  not  to  surprise  us.  The  only  excep- 
tion to  this  principle  is,  where  a  theory  is  seen  to  be  not 
only  a  possible  explanation,  but  also  the  only  one  pos- 
sible to  reason.  In  other  cases  a  theory  may  even  be 
susceptible  of  mathematical  expression,  and  lead  to  theo- 
retical results  which  most  experiments  shall  justify,  and 
yet  be  no  fact  of  nature.  Such  a  one  is  the  emission 
theory  of  light,  or  that  of  electric  and  magnetic  fluids; 
and  Mill  and  Comte  insisted  that  the  present  ether 
theory  is  of  the  same  sort.  A  useful  working  theory 
may  still  be  unclear  in  itself;  or  it  may  conflict  with 
some  known  facts;  or  it  may  introduce  more  difficulties 
than  it  resolves,  and  thus  cancel  its  own  reason  of  ex- 
istence. It  is  not  until  a  theory  devised  to  account  for 
certain  facts  is  found  to  account  for  many  other  facts, 
not  included  in  the  original  plan,  that  it  acquires  even 
a  tolerable  degree  of  probability.  If  a  single  motion 
were  to  be  accounted  for,  and  we  were  restricted  solely 
to  accounting  for  the  motion  without  regard  to  any 
other  conditions,  an  indefinite  number  of  solutions 
would  be  possible.  So  in  nature  there  are  very  few 


90  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

facts  which  do  not  admit  of  many  explanations.  Hence 
the  theory  reached  can  only  result  from  weighing  dif- 
ferent possibilities,  and  the  various  arguments  for  each. 
But  thereby  the  possibility  of  error  is  increased  so  rap- 
idly, that  it  is  never  possible  to  reach  any  thing  higher 
than  a  rational  probability. 

In  estimating  the  claim,  often  heard,  that  science  is 
infallible  and  impregnable,  it  is  of  first  importance  to 
distinguish  sharply  between  science  as  fact,  and  science 
as  theory.  The  latter  is  forever  shifting;  the  former 
only  abides.  It  must  be  added  that  the  practical  value 
and  utility  of  science  belong  entirely  to  science  as  fact, 
and  not  to  science  as  theory.  Its  power  consists,  not  in 
any  insight  into  causes,  but  solely  in  having  the  law  of 
phenomena.  Having  this,  it  can  read  the  past,  and 
previse  the  future;  and,  by  arranging  the  antecedents, 
it  can  determine  the  consequents.  Given  the  laws  of 
chemical  combination,  we  have  all  that  is  practically 
valuable  in  chemistry.  Given  the  laws  of  heat  or  of 
electricity,  it  is  practically  indifferent  what  theory  we 
may  adopt.  Indeed,  we  should  be  no  worse  off  without 
any  theory.  Even  in  gravitation,  the  law  is  every  thing 
and  the  theory  is  nothing.  The  law  is,  that  all  bodies 
tend  to  approach  one  another  with  an  intensity  which 
is  directly  as  the  masses,  and  inversely  as  the  squares 
of  the  distances.  It  is  absolutely  indifferent  to  the  as- 
tronomer how  this  result  is  produced,  whether  by  uni- 
versal attraction,  or  by  universal  repulsion,  or  by 
universal  pressure,  or  by  the  .impact  of  some  assumed 
ether  atoms.  The  practical  astronomer  has  no  call  to 
decide  for  any  of  these  possibilities.  His  sole  business 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  91 

is  to  apply  the  law,  and  determine  the  resulting  posi- 
tions and  orbits  of  the  heavenly  bodies;  and  as  long  as 
the  law  holds,  his  calculations  will  be  valid,  even  if  we 
should  adopt  the  theory  that  every  planet  is  led  or 
driven  in  its  orbit  by  some  angel  or  devil.  Had  New- 
ton announced  only  the  fact  of  gravitation,  he  would 
have  said  nothing  either  new  or  valuable.  It  is  the  law 
only  which  gives  the  fact  significance.  This  is  the 
reason  why  the  notion  of  gravitation  has  been  so  much 
more  fruitful  than  that  of  affinity  or  cohesion.  We 
have  the  law  in  the  former  case,  and  can  mathematic- 
ally deduce  its  consequences.  In  the  case  of  affinity, 
this  is  impossible  at  present,  and  hence  the  notion  re- 
mains barren.  In  strictness,  the  law  of  gravitation 
itself  is  not  known  to  be  exact.  All  that  can  be  said 
is,  that  no  appreciable  error  has  arisen  from  assuming 
its  correctness.  But  when  it  comes  to  an  explanation 
of  this  law,  we  are  once  more  outside  of  the  realm  of 
fact  and  knowledge,  and  come  again  into  the  realm  of 
theory  and  belief.  But  here  the  difficulties  are  so 
great,  that  one  can  hardly  help  sympathizing  with  the 
positivist's  doctrine,  that  the  function  of  science  is  only 
to  find  the  law  of  phenomena,  and  never  to  inquire  into 
causes. 

A  glance  at  the  actual  state  of  scientific  theory  justi- 
fies us  in  excluding  it  from  the  realm  of  knowledge. 
When  the  attractive  theory  of  matter  was  accepted,  it 
displaced  the  previous  doctrine,  that  all  material  action 
is  by  pressure  or  impact.  Its  disciples  soon  grew  so 
enamored  of  it,  that  they  sometimes  declared  the  notion 
of  non-gravitating  matter  to  be  unthinkable.  The  ether 


92  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

theory,  however,  has  given  them  some  light  in  this  di» 
rection,  and  now  they  find  it  easy  to  conceive  the  im- 
possible notion.  We  said  in  the  last  paragraph,  that 
the  law  of  gravitation  does  not  explain  itself,  and,  ac- 
cordingly, we  find  the  most  diverse  theories  for  its  ex- 
planation. It  seems  clear  to  us,  that  universal  attraction, 
or  universal  tendency  of  every  atom  toward  every  other, 
is  the  best  and  simplest  statement  of  the  physical  fact; 
and  if  any  explanation  of  the  fact  is  to  be  found,  it  must 
be  in  assuming  an  omnipresent  spiritual  being.  The  doc- 
trines of  universal  repulsion  and  impact  involve  many 
auxiliary  hypotheses,  and  their  mechanical  possibility  is 
far  from  evident.  Nevertheless,  both  doctrines  are  not 
without  advocates.  The  Cartesian  doctrine,  that  all 
action  is  by  impact,  has  been  revived  in  Le  Sage's  the- 
ory, and  this,  again,  has  been  renewed  in  the  mechan- 
ical theory  of  gases.  In  these  theories  a  universal  rain 
of  atoms  is  made  to  account  for  attraction  and  repul- 
sion. Sir  William  Thomson  says,  that  he  has  no  faith 
whatever  in  atoms  endowed  with  attractive  and  repul- 
sive forces.  Of  course,  no  defender  of  these  views 
denies  the  law  of  gravitation;  but,  while  all  agree  as 
to  the  law,  there  is  the  widest  difference  as  to  its  ex- 
planation. Whence  it  becomes  clear,  ihsoi  not  even  the 
attractive  theory  of  matter  can  rank  higher  than  a 
rational  probability.  In  chemistry  it  is  still  worse. 
There  one  theory  has  displaced  another,  until  at  present 
there  is  no  theory  which  has  general  acceptance,  or 
which  is  at  all  satisfactory.  A  few  years  ago,  the 
electro-chemical  doctrine  was  the  reigning  view,  but  it 
has  fallen  into  complete  disfavor,  Since  then  we  have 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  93 

been  surfeited  with  types  and  radicals,  etc.;  but  it  is 
hard  to  find  any  agreement  among  the  speculators. 
Our  text-books  do,  indeed,  give  us  the  most  elabo- 
rate representations  of  the  inner  structure  of  mole- 
cules, but,  except  as  a  convenient  fiction,  the  thought- 
ful chemist  has  little  use  for  them.  In  Germany,  this 
state  of  the  science  has  led  to  the  proposition  to  ex- 
clude it  from  all  but  the  technical  schools,  on  the 
ground  of  its  lack  of  rational  system.  Mere  heaps  of 
facts  do  not  train  the  reason,  as  they  appeal  only  to 
memory. 

Geological  theory  is  still  less  at  rest.  Whoever  has 
read  much  in  geology  will  doubtless  agree  with  the  fol- 
lowing opinion  of  a  German  geologist,  F.  Pfaff,  quoted 
by  Ulrici:  "It  is  certainly  an  undeniable  and  surprising 
fact,  that,  in  spite  of  the  oft-mentioned  i  agreement  of 
investigators,'  not  a  single  geological  phenomenon  can 
be  mentioned  which  would  not  be  explained  in  the  most 
diverse  and  contradictory  ways.  From  the  form  and 
temperature  of  the  earth,  to  the  motions  in  the  earth's 
crust,  and  the  effects  of  water,  which  are  taking  place  be- 
fore our  eyes,  there  is  not  a  single  geological  fact  con- 
cerning which  the  most  diverse  theories  have  not  been, 
and  are  not,  proposed;  but  of  these  theories  there  are 
none,  however  well-founded  they  may  seem,  which  have 
not  been  doubted;  and  none,  however  ill-founded,  which 
have  not  been  believed."*  The  great  trouble  with 
geology  is,  that  many  hypotheses  are  possible,  and  no 

*  Ulrici:  Gott  und  die  Natur,  p.  343.  For  examples  of  differing 
opinions  in  geology,  see  the  second  edition  of  Prof.  T.  Sterry  Hunt's 
most  instructive  work,  "  Chemical  and  Geological  Essays," 


94  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

one  is  so  firmly  and  necessarily  deduced  from  the  facts 
as  to  exclude  the  other  possibilities.  For  example, 
none  of  the  plutonic  theories  has  been  regarded  as 
more  firmly  established  than  the  doctrine  of  a  fluid 
and  fiery  center  of  the  earth.  In  particular,  volcanic 
phenomena  and  the  increasing  heat  as  we  descend  into 
the  earth,  were  held  to  make  such  a  conclusion  neces- 
sary. Both  points  have  become  very  doubtful.  The 
Sperenberg  borings  indicate  that  the  common  assump- 
tion of  a  regular  increase  of  heat  as  we  descend  into 
the  earth,  is  a  mistake.  On  the  contrary,  the  results 
pointed  to  a  constant  temperature  much  below  the 
melting  point  of  metals.  In  1872  Professor  Le  Conte 
declared  that  "  the  whole  theory  of  igneous  agencies — 
which  is  little  less  than  the  whole  foundation  of  theo- 
retic geology — must  be  reconstructed  on  the  basis  of  a 
solid  earth."  *  We  are  all  familiar  with  the  long  peri- 
ods which  evolution  geologists  have  been  accustomed 
to  claim  for  the  most  trifling  modifications.  Having 
eternity  at  their  backs,  they  did  not  hesitate  to  allow 
that  only  indefinite  time  would  suffice  to  evolve  the 
higher  from  the  lower  forms.  According  to  Mr.  Dar- 
win, in  the  first  edition  of  the  "Origin  of  Species," 
(p.  287,)  three  hundred  million  years  will  not  suffice 
for  a  very  recent  portion  of  geological  history.  But 
now  the  physicists  claim,  from  calculations  on  the  tidal 
wave,  the  form  and  internal  heat  of  the  earth,  and  the 
rate  of  dissipation  of  heat  from  the  sun,  that  fifteen 
million  years,  at  the  utmost,  are  all  that  can  be  allowed 

*  Essay  on  the  Formation  of  the  Features  of  the  Earth's  Crust, 
American  Journal  of  Science  for  November  and  December, 


KttO  WLED  GE  A  ND  BELIEF.  95 

for  geological  transformations.*  These  conclusions 
have  been  before  the  world  since  1868,  without  any 
damaging  criticism.  In  one  of  his  "Lay  Sermons,' 
Mr.  Huxley  attempted  a  reply,  which,  in  turn,  was 
demolished  by  Sir  W.  Thomson.  In  1876  Professor 
Tait  reaffirmed  the  conclusion  in  the  most  emphatic 
manner.  Whatever,  then,  the  truth  may  be,  it  is  plain 
that  geological  theory  is  still  militant,  without  any  im- 
mediate prospect  of  being  triumphant.  But,  in  case  of 
a  collision  between  physics  and  geology,  there  can  be 
no  question  as  to  which  is  the  law-giving  science.  In- 
deed no  geological  hypothesis  can  be  viewed  as  estab- 
lished until  it  is  seen  to  be  a  consequence  of  the  laws 
of  physics  under  the  assumed  conditions. 

No  more  are  the  general  theories  of  light,  heat,  mag- 
netism, and  electricity  rescued  from  all  doubt  and  ob- 
scurity. When,  some  years  ago,  Professor  TyndalPs 
friend  asked  him  if  he  had  not  a  theory  of  the  universe, 
the  professor  replied  that  he  had  not  even  a  theory  of 
magnetism.  Whether  he  is  any  better  furnished  since 
he  "prolonged  his  vision  backwards,  and  discerned  in 
matter  the  promise  and  potency  "  of  every  form  of  life, 
we  cannot  say;  but  it  is  certain  that  the  most  distin- 
guished scientists  remain  without  any  theory  which  they 
regard  as  having  more  than  a  working  value.  In  regard 
to  all  these  subjects,  a  host  of  useful  facts  are  known;  it 
is  the  explanation,  the  rational  comprehension,  which  is 

*0n  this  point,  see  Tait:  "Recent  Advances  in  Physical  Science," 
Lect.  VII.  Also,  two  papers  by  Sir  W.  Thomson,  in  the  "  Transac- 
tions of  the  Geological  Society  of  Glasgow,"  for  1868  and  1869,  on 
Geological  Time  and  Geological  Dynamics.  Professor  Huxley's  ob- 
jections are  criticised  in  the  latter  paper. 


96  BftjblES  IN  THEISM. 

wanting.    The  present  state  of  scientific  theory,  even  in 
the  basal,  inorganic  sciences,  is  emphatically  one  of  fer- 
mentation, with  no  signs  of  a  speedy  settling.     In  biol- 
ogy, we  have  an  epoch  making  discovery  every  few 
years,  and  the  epoch  and  the  discovery  vanish  together. 
To  hear  the  biologist  speaking  of  the  certainties  of  bio- 
logical theories,  is  enough  to  move  the  most  saturnine  to 
mirth,  and  to  fill  the  humane  bystander  with  compassion. 
The  archeologist  and  ethnologist  have  long  been  allowed 
their  claim,  that  disagreement  with  the  Bible  does  not 
disprove  a  theory;  but  there  is  little  hope  for  solid  ad- 
vance, until  they  grasp  the  far  more  difficult  principle, 
that  such  disagreement  alone  does  not  prove  a  theory. 
There  is  a  growing  suspicion  that  an  irreligious  tendency 
is  not  of  itself  sufficient  to  justify  a  theory.      Now, 
whatever  the  truth   may  be  in  the  cases  mentioned, 
these  facts  show  that  the  greater  part  of  science  is  a 
matter  of  belief  only;  part  of  it  rational,  part  of  it  not 
so  rational.     One  must,  then,  be  always  on  his  guard 
against  the  imposition  which  claims  for  scientific  theory 
the  certainty  which  belongs  only  to  scientific  fact.     It 
is  an  auspicious  omen  that  scientists  are  laying  unusual 
emphasis  upon  this  distinction.    They  have  been  forced  ' 
to  do  this  in  self-defense.     Reckless  and  extravagant 
dogmatizers  have  sought,  by  sheer  force  of  noise  and 
insolent  intimidation,  to  capture  science,  and  to  whip 
in  scientists  to  vote  as  ordered.     The  reaction  which 
has  set  in  is  most  healthy  and  prophetic  of  progress. 

These  facts  will  serve  to  show  the  value  of  a  class  of 
objections  against  philosophy  and  religion  which  may 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  97 

all  be  summed  up  in  the  claim,  that  neither  can  demon- 
strate its  conclusions.     At  best  they  can  only  reach  a 
probable  result,  and  thus  they  must  ever  stand  at  a 
great  remove  from  the  certainties  of  science.     If  we 
grant  that  philosophy  is  in  this  plight,  we  now  see  that 
physical  science  is  no  better  off.     A  bottomless  pit  of 
acuteness  is  found  by"  some  writers  in  the  claim  that  no 
hypothesis  can  be  allowed  in  science  which  cannot  be 
verified.     Hence  the  hypothesis  of  a  personal  and  intel- 
ligent First  Cause  is  inadmissible,  because  it  is  essen- 
tially unverifiable.     There  is  an  air  of  great  logical  rigor 
about   this   canon;   but    unfortunately   it   is    delusive. 
Before  applying  this  dictum  against  theism,  it  may  be 
well  to  point  out  that  its  scope  is  somewhat  greater  than 
those  who  use  it  seem  to  think.     Can  the  hypothesis  of 
evolution  be  verified?     Can  the  origination  of  life  from 
the  lifeless  be  verified  ?     Can  the  ether  theory,  or  the 
atomic  theory,  or  the  nebular  theory,  or  the  original 
fluidity  of  the  earth,  be  verified?     In  truth  this  objec- 
tion, so  far  as  it  is  urged  against  theism,  is  based  on 
pure  thoughtlessness.     For  how  is  a  theory  verified? 
If  it  be  such  that  observation  is  possible,  it  is  verified 
by  observation.     But  most  theories  are  not  susceptible 
of  such  a  test,  and  here  verification  takes  another  form. 
In  this  case,  we  reason  back  from  the  facts  to  a  sufficient 
cause;  and  verification  consists  in  showing  that  only 
this  theory  will  meet  the  conditions  of  the  problem. 
"Where  such  a  showing  is  possible,  the  theory  becomes  a 
matter  of  knowledge. 

The  demonstration  of  by  far  the  greater  part  of  scien- 
tific hypotheses  consists  simply  in  showing  that  the 


98  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

facts  are  unintelligible  upon  any  other  assumption. 
No  one  ever  saw  an  atom,  and  no  one  ever  will. 
But  the  phenomena  of  matter  are  inexplicable  except 
upon  the  atomic  theory,  and  this  fact  is  its  only  proof. 
No  one  ever  saw  the  ether,  but  we  cannot  compre- 
hend heat  and  light  without  assuming  it.  To  show 
this,  is  to  verify  the  theory.  No  one  was  present 
when  the  earth  was  fluid.  We  verify  such  an  assump- 
tion only  by  showing  that  the  present  state  of  the  earth 
is  incomprehensible  without  it.  The  hypothesis  of  a 
spiritual  author  of  nature  is  verified  in  the  same  way; 
and  if  it  can  be  shown  that  the  physical  universe  is  un- 
intelligible without  this  assumption,  and  that  from  every 
side  we  are  led  down  to  this  ultimate  affirmation,  then 
the  hypothesis  of  an  intelligent  creator  has  just  the 
same  kind  of  verification  which  the  bulk  of  scientific 
theories  have.  But  it  is  urged  in  rebuttal,  that  phys- 
ical science  must  explain  every  thing  by  physical  agents; 
and  since  an  intelligent  creator  would  be  non-physical, 
the  hypothesis  is  intrinsically  inadmissible.  This  is 
merely  an  old  saw  of  the  positivists,  which  has  played  a 
greater  part  than  is  becoming.  The  aim  of  science  is  not 
to  explain  things  in  any  particular  way,  but  to  find  the 
truth;  and  if  facts  point  toward  theism,  it  is  the  duty  of 
all  truth  seekers  to  recognize  it.  The  earlier  positivists 
urged  the  same  objection  against  the  ether  theory.  A 
material  substance  without  weight,  they  said,  is  foreign 
to  all  our  experience  of  matter,  and  hence  the  theory  is, 
in  its  very  terms,  inadmissible.  But  the  physicist  is 
calmly  superior  to  all  such  suggestions,  and  endows  the 
ether,  not  with  such  qualities  as  the  positivist  allows,  but 


KNO  WLED GE  AND  BELIEF.  99 

with  such  as  enable  him  to  explain  the  facts.  The  only 
care  necessary  in  the  process  is,  to  make  assumptions 
which  shall  not  contradict  existing  knowledge  or  one 
another.  In  short,  the  notion  that  science  has  any  other 
aim  than  to  find  the  truth,  whatever  it  may  be,  is  a 
pestilent  heresy. 

Many  reasoners  upon  the  philosphy  of  science  seem 
fond  of  playing  the  positivist  upon  occasion.  Accord- 
ingly we  meet,  now  and  then,  with  the  following  pro- 
fundity. They  say:  What  help  do  we  get  from  any  of 
these  theories  ?  We  explain  light  by  an  ether,  but  leave 
the  ether  unexplained.  We  explain  gravity  by  a  grav- 
itating force;  chemical  affinity  by  chemical  force,  etc. 
But,  in  all  these  cases,  what  do  we  win  more  than  a 
name?  Do  we  get  a  shadow  of  insight  into  the  facts 
by  any  such  postulates?  And,  notably,  in  what  is  our 
comprehension  of  the  world  increased  when  we  have 
explained  it  by  referring  it  to  God?  Is  God  any  less  in- 
comprehensible than  the  world?  and,  if  not,  are  we  not 
once  more  rolling  the  world  on  the  tortoise's  back,  with- 
out in  any  way  finding  relief  from  the  necessity  of 
standing  at  last  on  nothing?  But  if  it  must  finally  come 
to  this,  why  not  stop  with  the  first  puzzle,  the  world  of 
phenomena,  and  let  the  metaphysical  elephants  and  tor- 
toises go? 

In  the  mouth  of  a  positivist,  this  is  intelligible  and 
consistent;  but,  when  uttered  by  any  one  else,  it  in- 
volves a  complete  misunderstanding  of  scientific  method. 
The  guiding  principle  in  forming  hypotheses  is,  the  law 
of  the  sufficient  reason;  and  the  justification  of  a  theory 
is  not  to  be  found  in  its  utility,  but  in  its  providing  an 


tOO  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

adequate  cause.  Hypotheses  are  commonly  only  nu  ntal 
supplements  by  which  the  mind  seeks  to  render  the 
facts  intelligible.  Their  value  consists,  not  in  removing 
the  mystery  of  the  facts,  nor  in  giving  the  mind  more 
power  over  the  facts,  but  solely  in  enabling  the  mind  to 
reconcile  the  facts  with  its  demand  for  a  sufficient  cause. 
We  can  deduce  no  valuable  practical  results  from  the 
atomic  theory;  so  far  as  utility  is  concerned,  we  are  as 
badly  off  with  this  theory  as  with  any  other.  The  af- 
firmation of  the  ether  as  an  objective  fact,  is  valueless 
for  optics.  The  fact  that  the  phenomena  of  light  are 
analogous  to  wave  phenomena  in  elastic  fluids,  contains 
all  that  is  necessary  for  the  mathematical  development 
of  the  science.  The  doctrine  of  an  objectively  vibrating 
ether  depends  solely  on  the  mental  demand  for  a  suffi- 
cient cause;  it  contributes  nothing  to  practical  optics. 
The  doctrine  of  -the  soul  in  psychology,  and  of  God  in 
nature,  contributes  as  much  to  practical  science  as  the 
bulk  of  scientific  theories,  that  is,  simply  nothing.  At 
the  same  time,  as  necessary  to  our  comprehension  of  the 
facts,  they  have  the  same  evidence  and  value  as  the  bulk 
of  physical  theories.  Finally,  the  reason  for  making  an 
nypothesis  does  not  consist  in  its  answering  all  ques- 
tions. It  may  involve  utterly  mysterious  and  incompre- 
hensible conceptions,  and  still  be  none  the  less  necessary. 
The  conception  of  an  eternal  spirit  involves  many  unan- 
swerable questions;  but  the  conception  of  eternal  matter 
involves,  at  least,  as  many  more.  The  question,  in  either 
case,  is  not  whether  the  conception  is  perfectly  luminous 
to  us,  but  whether  it  is  demanded  by  facts  ?  To  play  off 
the  metaphysical  difficulties  of  all  ultimate  facts  against 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  101 

theism,  and  take  every  thing  on  trust  from  atheism,  im- 
plies neither  mental  nor  moral  insight. 

In  truth,  all  science  and  all  thought  are  full  of  what 
the  Germans  call  limit-notions;  that  is,  notions  which 
the  facts  force  upon  us,  and  which  are  perfectly  clear 
from  the  side  of  the  facts,  but  which  from  the  farther 
side  are  lost  in  difficulty  and  mystery.  They  express 
an  ultimate  affirmation  along  a  given  line  or  thought, 
and  can  never  be  grasped  from  the  farther  side.  When 
taken  out  of  their  relations,  or  when  we  seek  to  compre- 
hend them  without  remembering  the  law  of  their  for- 
mation, nothing  is  easier  than  to  make  them  seem  con- 
tradictory or  absurd.  We  find  such  notions  even  in 
mathematics,  in  the  case  of  the  so-called  imaginary  quan- 
tities. These  appear  as  the  results  of  entirely  rational 
processes,  and  not  a  little  use  is  made  of  them  in  the 
higher  analysis.  But  they  express  a  limit  where  our  or- 
dinary conceptions  of  mathematical  quantities  vanish 
into  the  unrepresentable.  So,  also,  in  the  case  of  the 
infinitesimal  calculus.  Here  we  deal  with  infinites  and 
infinitesimals  of  different  orders;  so  that  while  a  quan- 
tity is  infinite  or  infinitesimal,  it  may  be  infinitely  less 
or  infinitely  greater  than  some  other  quantity.  Now,  if 
we  cut  these  notions  from  their  connections,  and  at- 
tempt to  conceive  them  in  themselves,  the  contradiction 
is  palpable;  and  it  will  be  easy  to  wax  merry  over  the 
absurdities  of  the  higher  analysis.*  WTiat,  it  might  be 
asked,  is  meant  by  a  quantity  which  is  infinitely  smaller 

*  The  statement  of  these  difficulties  has  been  made,  once  for  all,  by 
Bishop  Berkeley  in  his  papers :  "  Free  Thinking  in  Mathematics," 
and  "  Defense  of  Free  Thinking,"  etc. 


102  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

than  another  which  is  already  infinitesimal.  The  verbal 
difficulty  would  be  equally  great  if  we  adopted  the  New- 
tonian notion  of  fluxions  rather  than  the  Leibnitzian 
notion  of  infinitesimals.  But  if  we  bear  in  mind  the 
way  in  which  these  quantities  are  formed,  or  their  rela- 
tions to  other  quantities,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  dealing 
with  them  with  perfect  rationality  and  certainty. 

Even  in  logic  it  is  not  difficult  to  start  questions 
about  the  theory  of  reasoning,  which  admit  of  no  easy 
answer.  In  physics  the  notion  of  the  atom  is  a  limit- 
ing notion.  It  is  the  unanimous  voice  of  the  scien- 
tists, that  the  atomic  theory  is  supported  by  all  the 
phenomena  of  matter.  Thought  itself  finds  it  difficult 
to  escape  the  notion;  for  if  matter  be  truly  composite, 
there  must  be  indivisible  ultimates.  The  notion  of 
a  composite  where  there  is  nothing  simple,  is  an  out- 
right contradiction.  To  affirm  the  infinite  divisibility 
of  matter  is  to  make  the  notion  of  matter  an  insoluble 
absurdity,  like  the  notion  of  number  without  any  unit. 
But  on  the  other  hand,  who  understands  the  atom? 
The  metaphysical  difficulties  connected  with  it  are  so 
great,  that  the  moment  we  lose  sight  of  the  facts 
which  demand  the  assumption,  we  are  tempted  to  aban- 
don it.  The  ether  doctrine  is  of  the  same  kind.  The 
physicists  seem  to  have  combined  to  make  the  notion 
as  contradictory  as  possible.  It  must  be  as  non-resist- 
ing as  a  vacuum,  and  more  solid  than  steel  itself.  It 
is  at  once  the  plenum  and  the  void.  The  mode  of  trans- 
mission is  as  difficult  of  conception  as  the  ether  itself. 
As  long  as  only  a  single  ray  is  to  be  transmitted,  we 
can  form  some  tolerable  conception  of  the  process;  but 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  BELIEF.  1  Ob 

when  we  remember  the  actual  conditions  of  the  prob- 
lem, clear  conception  becomes  impossible.  At  any 
given  point  in  our  atmosphere  an  infinite  number  of 
rays  are  passing  at  the  same  moment,  and  in  opposite 
directions.  Moreover,  these  waves  are  of  different 
lengths,  even  for  light;  but  if  we  add  the  chemical  and 
heat  waves,  the  complexity  is  greatly  increased.  Now, 
in  this  case  every  particle  of  ether  must  be  vibrating  so 
as  to  forward  all  these  waves  of  different  lengths  in  all 
directions  at  the  same  instant  of  time.  It  is  hard  to 
see  why  a  particle,  under  such  conditions,  should  move 
at  all,  because  for  each  impulse  in  any  direction  an 
equal  and  opposite  one  ought  to  exist.  But  if  it  move, 
and  if  the  plane  of  its  orbit  must  have  a  constant  incli- 
nation to  the  direction  of  the  ray,  then  it  would  seem 
as  if  the  particle  must  be  describing  all  the  surfaces  of 
a  series  of  concentric  ellipsoids  at  the  same  moment. 
The  mathematician  is  apt  to  mistake  the  possibility  of 
expressing  such  a  doctrine  by  a  series  of  equations,  for 
a  true  conception  of  it;  but  plainly  there  is  a  difference 
between  an  abstract  equation  and  a  geometrical  con- 
ception of  its  meaning.  There  is  no  need  to  further 
complicate  the  matter  by  attempting  to  make  the  ether 
account  for  magnetism,  electricity,  and  gravitation. 
How  the  demands  which  optics  makes  upon  the  ether 
are  mechanically  possible,  is  past  finding  out*  Some 
speculators,  pressed  by  these  difficulties,  are  inclined  to 

*"We  said  that  the  transmission  of  a  single  ray  is  easily  conceived, 
but  it  is  well  known  that  the  principle  of  transverse  vibrations  was 
for  a  long  time  regarded  as  mechanically  impossible,  and  was  one  of 
the  great  stumbling-blocks  of  the  theory.  See  "Whewell's  "Hist. 
Inductive  Sciences,"  3d  edit.,  p.  101, 


1 04  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

assume  one  or  two  extra  ethers;  but  it  is  really  in- 
sufferable that  a  new  ether  should  be  invented  when- 
ever a  theory  begins  to  limp.  It  is  clear,  then,  that 
the  ether-theory  involves  many  difficulties,  and  no  in- 
telligent holder  of  it  will  pretend  that  it  is  ultimately 
comprehensible. 

We  need  only  refer  to  the  doctrine  of  gravitation. 
All  the  facts  seem  to  call  for  it;  but  the  bare  possi- 
bility of  the  fact  lies  beyond  all  comprehension.  That 
the  inert  clod  at  our  feet  should  be  striving  toward 
all  other  matter  in  the  universe — that  it  should  fill 
space  with  drawings  toward  itself — and  that,  too,  with- 
out any  consciousness  either  of  itself  or  of  its  ob- 
jects, and  without  any  visible  or  assignable  media  of 
connection,  is  certainly  a  conception  which  is  not  per- 
fectly luminous  to  an  unbesotted  intelligence.  The  ma- 
terialist sometimes  swaggers  out  with  the  assertion,  that 
an  eternal  mind  is  so  incomprehensible  as  to  be  quite 
inadmissible,  but  it  fares  no  better  with  his  own  theory. 
For  this  demands  the  conception,  not  only  of  eternal 
matter,  which  is,  to  say  the  least,  no  easier  than  that 
of  an  eternal  mind,  but  also  the  conception  of  eternal 
conditioned  motion,  which  borders  on  a  contradiction. 
The  Spencerian  finds  the  notion  of  self-existence  obscure 
and  incomprehensible,  and  thinks  to  mend  the  matter 
by  denying  self-existence,  and  affirming  only  dependent 
existence,  which,  after  all,  depends  on  nothing.  In  psy- 
chology and  physiology  also,  we  come  down  to  similar 
ultimate  notions  which  are  forced  upon  us,  but  which 
can,  in  no  true  sense,  be  explained  or  comprehended, 
are  the  notions  of  space?  time?  cause?  etc.?  an4  such 


KNO  WLED  GE  AND  BELIEF.  105 

is  the  relation  of  sensation  and  consciousness  to  their 
physical  antecedents.  This  latter  question  has  been  one 
of  the  black  beasts  of  psychology  from  the  beginning. 
To  escape  it,  some  have  denied  the  soul,  and  have  only 
increased  the  mystery.  Others  have  denied  the  body, 
and  have  only  made  matters  worse.  Body  and  soul 
coexist  and  interact,  but  the  method  is  lost  in  mystery. 
There  is  no  surer  mark  of  mental  weakness  than  to  take 
offense  at  the  difficulties  of  some  ultimate  fact,  and  then 
exchange  it  for  one  in  every  respect  more  obnoxious  to 
intelligence.  At  the  same  time,  nothing  is  more  com- 
mon. After  one  has  vindicated  his  acuteness  by  reject- 
ing a  received  doctrine,  he  feels  justified  in  accepting 
any  thing.  Hence  the  doubter  of  Christianity  is  prone 
to  accept  the  profoundly  rational  doctrines  of  spiritual- 
ism, and  the  denier  of  theism  finds  great  mental  peace 
and  satisfaction  in  atheism  and  materialism.  But  this 
is  only  counterfeit  thinking.  True  reason  looks  before 
and  after.  It  is  never  disturbed  at  the  mystery  of  a 
notion.  It  asks,  first,  whether  the  facts  call  for  it;  and, 
second,  whether  the  mystery  would  be  any  less  on  any 
other  theory.  If  the  facts  do  call  for  it,  and  if  any 
other  conception  is  equally  difficult,  then  reason  holds 
fast,  its  beliefs. 

Here,  then,  is  our  theory  of  knowledge.  We  begin 
with  knowledge;  but  this  is  confined  chiefly  to  rational 
principles,  and  the  facts  of  direct  perception  and  con- 
sciousness. These  facts,  however,  are  of  such  a  kind 
that  the  mind  cannot  entertain  them  without  supple- 
menting them  by  affirming  certain  other  facts,  If  the 


106  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

case  is  of  such  a  kind  that  the  mind  sees  these  other 
facts  to  be  the  only  ones  which  will  explain  the  given 
experience,  then  they,  also,  may  be  reckoned  as  knowl- 
edge. When  the  facts  admit  of  more  than  one  expla- 
nation, but  still  favor  one  more  than  another,  that 
explanation  cannot  be  regarded  as  knowledge,  but  as  a 
scientific  faith.  The  strength  of  this  faith  will  vary, 
of  course,  with  the  number  of  possibilities,  with  the 
strength  of  the  conflicting  evidence,  and  with  the  dis- 
tance of  the  conclusion  from  the  premises  on  which  it 
is  based.  We  have,  then,  a  center  of  knowledge,  a 
border  of  faith,  and  poured  around  all,  the  great  ocean 
of  the  unknown.  It  is  both  unnecessary  and  impossi- 
ble to  draw  a  sharp  dividing  line  between  what  is 
known  and  what  is  believed.  This  is  a  question  which 
every  one  must  settle  for  himself. 

Thus  it  appears  that  the  method  is  the  same  for  both 
scientific  and  religious  investigation.  Both  must  pro- 
ceed from  the  known  to  the  unknown,  and  both,  when 
certainty  cannot  be  reached,  must  content  themselves 
with  rational  probability.  Reason  does  not,  indeed, 
give  a  very  strong  light,  but  it  is  the  only  light  we 
have,  and  we  can  lay  claim  to  rationality  only  as  we 
follow  it.  If  we  declare  its  powers  limited,  reason  it- 
self must  draw  the  limit,  and  declare  the  limitation 
reasonable.  It  is  not  rational  to  take  what  we  like, 
and  cover  our  inconsistency  by  appealing  to  the  un- 
knowable. It  is  not  rational,  in  the  failure  of  knowl- 
edge, to  reject  probability.  It  is  not  rational,  when  all 
the  facts  support  a  given  proposition,  to  reject  it  be- 
cause we  cannot  fully  comprehend  it,  Least  of  all  is 


KNOWLEDGE  AND  BELIEF.  107 

it  rational,  when  a  proposition  cannot  be  strictly  demon- 
strated, to  conclude  that  therefore  it  is  certainly  false. 
This  assumption  has  been  so  confidently  made  in  athe- 
istic discussions  as  to  call  for  this  disclaimer.  Whether 
the  divine  existence  can  be  shown  to  be  necessary  to 
an  understanding  of  the  world,  or  whether  it  remains, 
like  most  of  our  science,  only  a  rational  probability, 
each  may  decide  for  himself.  We  have  only  sought  to 
make  clear  the  principles  which  must  govern  such  a 
discussion. 
8 


UNIVERSITY 


108  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 


CHAPTER 

POSTULATES    OF    SCIENTIFIC   KNOWLEDGE. 

fTlHE  discussion  with  the  skeptic  turned  upon  the 
question  :  Is  knowledge  possible?  Assuming  this 
to  be  answered  in  the  affirmative,  the  question  next 
arises:  How  is  knowledge  possible?  This  is  the  great 
question  of  philosophy. 

To  plain  common  sense,  knowing  is  the  simplest  thing 
in  the  world.  One  has  only  to  open  his  eyes,  and  the 
world  stands  before  him  just  as  it  is.  The  process  is  so 
simple  that  no  question  can  be  raised  about  it,  except 
by  some  mole  of  a  thinker  who  delights  to  root  in  the 
dark.  But,  upon  a  little  reflection,  the  matter  is  not  so 
simple,  and  soon  it  becomes  plain  that  a  true  knowledge 
of  the  world  can  be  affirmed  only  as  we  make  certain 
definite  assumptions  about  the  nature  (1)  of  the  world, 
(2)  of  the  mind,  and  (3)  of  the  relation  between  the 
two. 

N"ot  every  philosophy  of  mind  and  nature  is  con- 
sistent with  the  possibility  of  objective  knowledge.  For 
example,  the  theory  of  knowledge  held  by  the  material- 
istic evolutionists  is  fatal  to  objective  science.  That 
theory  has  for  its  foundation  the  notion  of  an  unknow- 
able force,  which  is  known,  however,  to  be  subject  to 
mechanical  and  necessary  laws.  In  its  manifold  "  dif- 
ferentiations and  integrations"  it  produces  various 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.        109 

minds.  All  these  are  produced  by  necessity,  and  all 
that  takes  place  in  them — all  thinking,  feeling,  and  will- 
ing— is  the  necessary  product  of  that  only  force  which 
is  the  sole  reality  of  the  universe.  All  finite  minds  and 
persons  are  but  its  phenomenal  and  transitory  products. 
There  is  but  one  actor  and  one  thinker.  But,  plainly, 
it  is  irrational  to  speak  of  false  and  true  thoughts  in 
such  a  system;  for  one  thought  is  just  as  necessary  as 
another,  and  all  alike  are  the  product  of  the  one  un- 
knowable. Now,  when  this  unknowable  says  one  thing 
in  one  mind,  and  takes  it  back  or  contradicts  it  in  an- 
other, we  are  at  a  loss  to  know  when  to  believe  it.  For 
example,  the  unknowable,  as  modified  into  the  Spen- 
cerians,  has  written  long  accounts  of  itself,  in  which  it 
declares  the  doctrine  of  mechanical  evolution  to  be  true; 
but  then  the  same  unknowable,  as  modified  into  other 
men,  has  criticised  this  doctrine,  and  emphatically  re- 
jected it.  In  the  one  place  the  unknowable  gives  out 
the  doctrine  as  true;  in  another  place  it  rejects  it  as 
the  baldest  absurdity  and  falsehood.  Or  take  the  feud 
between  the  scientists  and  theologians.  It  is  the  same 
unknowable  which  speaks  on  both  sides,  and  with  equal 
necessity  in  each  case;  and  yet  what  a  different  report 
it  gives!  Or  take  the  opinions  of  different  generations: 
again,  it  is  the  same  unknowable  which  has  produced 
them  all;  but  how  fond  it  is  of  variety,  and  even  of 
contradiction!  All  the  absurdities  now  held,  and  that 
ever  have  been  held,  are  its  work.  Even  the  antics  of 
the  fetich  worshiper  are  the  doings  of  this  same  un- 
knowable. Are  there  evil  and  folly  in  the  world  ?  both 
have  an  unknowable  parentage.  And,  seeing  that  the 


110  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

unknowable  has  changed  its  mind  so  often,  who  knows 
what  it  may  yet  do,  or  that  it  will  finally  content  itself 
with  the  evolution  philosophy?  Now,  we  cannot  speak 
of  true  and  false  without  the  possession  of  some  stand- 
ard, for  truth  means  the  agreement  with  the  standard, 
and  error  means  the  departure  from  it.  But  on  this 
theory  the  standard  cannot  be  the  necessity  of  truth 
and  the  non-necessity  of  error,  for  we  are  expressly  told 
that  all  opinions  are  alike  produced  by  and  from  neces- 
sity. Truth,  then,  can  be  found  only  by  taking  a  vote. 
If  the  unknowable  says  yes,  oftener  than  it  says  no,  we 
may  conclude  that  on  the  whole  it  inclines  to  the  af- 
firmative. But,  alas  for  truth  in  that  case!  Unfortu- 
nately, even  this  method  is  worthless;  for  as  the  un- 
knowable is  often  in  error,  it  might  be  in  error  in  the 
vote.  We  hold  opinions  different  from  those  of  our 
ancestors;  but  they  differ  from  us  as  much  as  we 
from  them,  and  by  the  ;  ame  necessity.  Who  shall  de- 
cide between  us?  The  unknowable  has  contradicted 
itself  so  often,  that  we  can  never  know  when  it  does 
speak  the  truth.  Indeed,  the  doctrine  is,  that  it  never 
does;  for  not  one  of  the  opinions  about  itself  which  it 
has  produced  is  found  to  have  any  likeness  to  reality. 
This  seems  an  absurd  and  farcical  result,  but,  if  the 
theory  be  true,  it  must  come  to  this.  In  short,  the 
evolutionist  of  this  type  can  give  no  account  of  error, 
and  no  valid  test  of  truth.  He  can  properly  recognize 
no  distinction  between  truth  and  error,  for  all  opinions 
are  fleeting.  The  unknowable  is  forever  weaving  and 
forever  unweaving;  and,  sooner  or  later,  all  things  and 
opinions  pass.  Laws  and  principles  flow  as  well  as 


POSTULA  TES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNO  WLED  OK       111 

things.  Of  course,  no  science  is  possible  on  such  a  ba- 
sis; but  the  evolutionist  has  a  ready  answer.  Uncrit- 
ical common  sense  has  its  own  views,  and  among  these 
are  the  reality  of  the  finite  mind,  and  the  distinction  of 
truth  and  error.  When,  then,  the  evolutionist  is  pressed 
with  the  skeptical  consequences  of  his  own  theories,  he 
has  but  to  fall  back  on  this  unreflecting  common  sense; 
and  when  common  sense  promptly  repudiates  the  con- 
sequences, the  evolutionist  mistakes  the  fact  for  a  vin- 
dication of  himself.  Meanwhile,  the  philosophical  critic 
hardly  knows  whether  to  be  vexed  or  charmed  at  the 
innocence  of  the  procedure.  Innocent  it  certainly  is, 
and  denotes  that  the  beginnings  of  philosophical  criti- 
cism have  yet  to  be  mastered.  Every  theory  of  neces- 
sary development  which  is  not  based  on  a  free  creation 
leads  to  like  skeptical  results.  The  basal  power  of  the 
universe  is  either  rational  and  self -determining,  or  it  is 
blind  and  necessitated.  In  whatever  form  the  latter 
view  may  be  held,  it  leads  to  the  destruction  of  knowl- 
edge and  science. 

We  reach  the  same  skeptical  conclusion  from  another 
point  of  view.  Rational  principles  in  application  must 
be  above  all  doubt,  if  we  are  to  have  faith  in  the  con- 
clusions. But  the  doctrine  of  the  mental  evolutionists 
is,  that  our  primal  beliefs,  as  well  as  all  others,  are  gen 
erated  in  us.  Apart  from  experience  we  know  nothing. 
The  mind  is  totally  unable  to  know  any  thing  on  its  own 
account.  All  beliefs,  then,  fundamental  and  derived 
alike,  represent  only  the  deposit  of  experience  in  us. 
In  our  anxiety  to  retain  faith  in  objective  knowledge, 
it  occurs  to  us  to  ask  whether  this  experience  might  not 


112  STUDIES  Itf  THEISM. 

have  been  otherwise,  or  whether  it  will  always  continue 
as  it  is.  Do  we  know  that  the  universal  and  abiding 
laws  of  the  universe  have  so  revealed  themselves  in  our 
experience,  that  we  are  secure  against  the  reversal  of  all 
our  laws  of  thinking?  Are  we  even  sure  that  there 
are  any  fixed  and  universal  laws  in  the  system?  The 
scanty  experience  of  the  whole  race  is  far  from  proving 
so  large  a  conclusion.  Do  we  know  that  the  cohesions 
among  our  ideas,  which  now  determine  our  beliefs,  will 
not  shift  in  the  future  so  as  to  determine  us  to  contra- 
dictory beliefs?  The  writings  of  most  mental  evolu- 
tionists already  reveal  a  strong  tendency  in  this  direc- 
tion. Unfortunately,  we  have  no  such  knowledge. 
If  derived  from  experience,  all  primary  beliefs  must 
be  doubtful;  and  yet,  as  principles  of  investigation, 
they  must  be  unquestionable.  Here  is  the  dilemma  of 
the  mental  evolutionist:  he  cannot  prove  his  theory 
without  assuming  the  certainty  of  first  principles;  and 
as  soon  as  the  theory  is  proved,  they  become  uncertain. 
The  way  in  which  this  difficulty  is  escaped,  is  one  of  the 
most  striking  examples  of  that  philosophical  innocence 
which  is  so  common  in  evolutionist  circles.  An  outer 
world  is  first  assumed  in  intelligible  relations,  and  with 
constant  and  rational  laws,  and  when  we  ask  for  a  rea- 
son for  the  constancy  of  intellect,  we  are  referred  to 
the  rational  universe.  But  how  do  we  know  that  there 
is  a  constant  and  rational  universe  ?  We  assume  that. 
These  philosophers  have  even  been  known  to  bluster 
when  charged  with  not  providing  for  the  constancy  of 
the  mental  life.  It  would  be  a  hard-hearted  critic,  in- 
deed, who  would  not  be  disarmed  by  such  childlike  sim- 


POSTULA  TES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNO  WLED  GK       113 

plicity.  We  repeat,  that  evolution  as  opposed  to  free 
creation,  cannot  be  made  a  fundamental  principle  with- 
out destroying  science. 

The  associationalist,  also,  is  in  the  same  dilemma,  and 
commonly  emerges  by  the  same  illegitimate  assumption. 
Why  do  we  believe  and  think  about  any  thing  as  we 
do?  The  answer  which  he  gives,  when  stripped  of  its 
verbiage,  reduces  to  this:  We  think  and  believe  as  we 
do,  because  we  have  become  used  to  it.  Habit  is  at  the 
bottom.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  necessary  truth. 
Two  and  two  may  make  five;  and,  if  so,  they  may 
make  any  thing  or  nothing.  Events  need  not  have  a 
cause.  We  are  used  to  thinking  so,  and  now  we  can- 
not help  it;  but,  in  fact,  one  thing  is  just  as  possible 
as  another.  There  is  no  rational  and  no  absurd,  no 
consistent  and  no  contradictory;  but  every  thing  is  in- 
differently one  or  the  other,  as  we  have  learned  to 
think.  This  doctrine,  though  commonly  held  in  the 
interests  of  skepticism,  is  the  extreme  of  credulity  and 
superstition;  yet,  strangely  enough,  its  holders  are  the 
most  sensitive  of  all  critics  to  the  irrationalities  of  re- 
ligion. No  one  has  a  more  vivid  intuition,  at  such 
times,  of  what  can  and  cannot  be  than  the  association- 
alist. Theism,  miracles,  divine  control  of  nature,  and 
divers  other  doctrines,  are  pursued  by  him  as  with  the 
besom  of  destruction.  They  are  irrational,  absurd,  im- 
possible; nevertheless,  he  holds  that  two  and  two  may 
make  five,  and  that  there  is  no  necessary  truth. 

A  similiar  mode  of  reasoning  applies  to  every  ma- 
terialistic theory.  In  such  theories,  thought  is  a  prod- 
uct of  the  brain,  just  as  bile  is  a  product  of  the  liver. 


114  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

But  as  we  never  speak  of  true  or  false  bile,  or  of  true 
or  false  blood,  so  we  can  never,  with  any  sense,  speak 
of  a  true  or  false  brain  or  of  a  true  or  false  thought.  The 
consistent  materialist  can  know  no  true  or  false,  no 
high  or  low.  These  are  ideals  of  the  mind,  and  have  no 
objective  existence.  For  the  materialist,  the  actual  is 
all;  and  the  ideal  is  delusion.  He  can  know  only  what 
his  brain  secretes.  When  it  produces  true  thoughts 
and  when  false  ones,  or  whether  it  ever  produces  true 
thoughts,  he  cannot  tell.  He  may  attempt  to  distin- 
guish between  true  and  false  by  saying  that  true 
thoughts  result  from  the  normal  action  of  the  brain, 
while  false  ones  result  from  its  abnormal  action;  but 
this  distinction  will  not  save  him.  For  normal  means, 
according  to  the  standard,  and  abnormal  means,  not 
according  to  the  standard;  and  the  materialist  has  no 
standard.  He,  like  the  evolutionist,  may  attempt  to 
reach  a  standard  of  normality  by  taking  a  vote;  but 
this  would  be  especially  unfortunate  for  the  materialist. 
For  brains  are  so  constructed,  that  they  almost  in- 
variably decide  that  there  is  a  soul,  a  God,  a  moral 
government  of  the  universe,  and  a  future  life.  But  as 
the  materialist  rejects  these  notions,  although  held  by 
the  majority,  it  is  clear  that  he  cannot  determine  what 
is  normal  in  brain  action  by  appealing  to  a  vote;  for  in 
that  case,  we  should  have  to  conclude  that  the  material- 
ist has  an  abnormal  and  untrustworthy  brain.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  a  rather  startling  proposition  that  the 
only  normal  brains  in  the  world  belong  to  a  few  ma- 
terialists, who,  as  a  class,  have  never  manifested  es- 
pecial power  in  any  direction  except  that  of  self-stulti- 


POSTULA  TES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNO  WLED  GK        115 

fication.  In  that  case,  it  would  become  a  serious 
question  whether  a  normal  brain  would  be  an  especially 
desirable  possession. 

Here  the  materialist  may  object  that  all  this  pleas- 
antry is  quite  irrelevant,  that  he  has  a  standard  of 
truth  and  error,  and  that  it  is  not  determined  by  any 
vote.  This  standard  is  simply  results.  Those  thoughts 
and  views  are  true  which  work  well;  and  those  are 
false  which  work  ill.  In  a  rational  system  such  a 
test  would  be  valid;  but  the  materialist  has  no  such 
system.  Moreover,  he  fails  to  see  that  in  setting  up 
such  a  standard,  he  has  fallen  into  the  jaws  of  his 
black  beast,  teleology.  In  assuming  that  the  use- 
ful is  the  true,  he  either  assumes  an  unexplained  har- 
mony between  the  true  and  the  useful,  or  else  he  as- 
sumes that  the  useful  is  the  only  true.  The  former  as- 
sumption entangles  us  in  the  doctrine  of  design;  and  the 
latter  is  a  complete  abandonment  of  science  in  order  to 
hunt  for  our  own  interest.  And  here  again  we  fall  into 
difficulty,  for  if  we  allow  that  the  useful  is  the  only  true ; 
the  question  arises,  Useful  for  what?  Of  course,  use- 
ful to  promote  well-being;  but  what  well-being  ?  Phys- 
ical, or  mental,  or  moral  well-being?  It  will  hardly  be 
claimed  that  materialism  elevates  and  enriches  the  moral 
nature;  or  that  it  leads  man  to  think  highly  either  of 
himself  or  of  his  kind;  or  that  it  leads  to  social  and 
political  prosperity.  In  spite,  too,  of  the  materialist's 
"  normal  brain,"  the  doctrine  makes  an  equally  sorry 
show  in  producing  mental  power.  If,  then,  we  are  to 
test  its  truth  by  its  outcome  for  well-being,  we  can  hold 
it  only  by  showing  that  the  supreme  end  of  man  is  to 


116  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

develop  a  body,  and  that  materialism  is  especially  use- 
ful in  promoting  the  interests  of  the  animal  nature. 
The  normal  brain  is  that  which  takes  care  of  itself; 
and  the  test  of  truth  is  self-preservation.  Moral  aims 
and  scientific  truth,  so  far  as  they  have  no  physical 
value,  must  be  voted  not  merely  worthless,  but  de- 
lusion; for  the  test  of  truth  is  physical  preservation. 
Hence  the  inhabitant  of  the  sty  would  be  the  prince  of 
materialistic  philosophers;  he  is  not  troubled  by  delu- 
sions, and  he  preserves  himself.  He  has,  then,  the 
deepest  truths  of  the  universe.  Of  course,  the  mate- 
rialist will  indignantly  repudiate  these  conclusions  as 
caricatures;  but  he  is  more  given  to  repudiating  than 
to  reasoning.  Let  him  for  once  forego  indignation, 
and  give  his  standard  of  truth  and  error,  or  his  test  of 
a  normal  brain.  It  will  be  an  unusual,  but  profitable 
subject  for  reflection. 

Now  it  is  not  our  purpose  to  criticise  any  of  the  pre- 
ceding doctrines  as  to  their  truth  and  falsehood,  but 
only  to  show  that  they  are  fatal  to  scientific  knowl- 
edge. And  we  think  it  must  be  plain,  that  it  is  not  in- 
different to  science  what  kind  of  a  philosophy  we  hold. 
On  the  contrary,  the  philosophic  and  anthropologic 
problems  concern  the  very  life  of  science.  What  is  the 
mind,  and  what  is  its  relation  to  reality?  What  is 
truth,  and  how  may  it  be  known?  In  a  skeptical 
time,  these  questions  must  be  answered  before  there 
can  be  any  question  about  science.  But  language 
allows  the  formation  of  such  phrases  as  materialistic 
science  and  atheistic  science;  and  confusion  and  inca- 
pacity accept  them  as  representing  great  facts;  where- 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.        11 Y 

as,  they  are  as  contradictory  as  the  phrases  square 
circles,  wooden  irons,  etc.  The  existence  of  rational 
science  is  involved  in  that  of  the  theistic  and  spiritual 
philosophy.  We  lay  down,  then,  the  following  thesis: 
(1)  Unless  we  admit  the  existence  of  the  mind  with  an 
outfit  of  rational  principles,  and  for  which  principles  it 
needs  no  proof  beyond  its  own  power  of  insight,  there 
is  no  rational  science  possible;  (2)  Unless  we  admit 
that  these  rational  principles  are  also  the  laws  of  re- 
ality, or  that  reason  is  law-giving  for  objective  fact, 
again  no  rational  science  is  possible;  (3)  Unless  we 
allow  that  the  basal  fact  of  the  universe  is  a  free  and 
rational  creator,  there  is  no  rational  science  possible. 

The  first  part  of  the  thesis  needs  no  further  proof. 
The  attempt  to  deduce  first  principles  from  experience 
always  results,  when  thought  is  tolerably  clear,  in 
dragging  all  rational  knowledge  down  into  ruin.  Em- 
piricism cannot  deny  that  two  and  two  may  make  five, 
although  but  one  empiricist  has  had  the  courage  to 
avow  it.  On  such  a  theory  not  even  mathematics  can 
be  saved ;  where,  then,  shall  the  other  sciences  appear  ? 
Since  the  time  of  Hume,  empirical  philosophy  has  been 
a  patent  anachronism;  and  the  zeal  with  which  its 
claims  have  been  upheld,  clearly  disproves  the  notion 
that  thought  never  goes  backward.  It  was  a  long  time 
before  the  empiricists  understood  Hume,  and  then  they 
ignored  him.  By  consequence,  the  most  of  our  English 
philosophy  is  in  the  crude,  uncritical  state  in  which 
Locke  left  it.  The  method  by  which  they  cover  up 
their  inconsistency  has  been  already  referred  to.  In 
practice  they  hold  the  common  sense  view  of  reality 


118  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

and  rationality.  In  polemics,  when  on  the  offensive, 
they  hold  the  sensational  view;  but  when  pressed  with 
the  skeptical  consequences  of  their  doctrines,  and  forced 
to  act  on  the  defensive,  they  fall  back  on  common 
sense,  and  make  sundry  remarks  about  the  absurdities 
of  skepticism.  Neither  madman  nor  fool,  they  say, 
could  doubt  the  testimony  of  common  sense  about  the 
external  world;  and  thus  they  think  to  escape  from 
themselves.  But  plainly  what  is  needed  is,  not  a  judg- 
ment about  the  sanity  of  the  skeptic,  but  a  showing 
that  these  insane  consequences  do  not  necessarily  follow 
from  the  principles  of  empiricism.  Such  a  showing 
would  be  relevant,  and  is  sadly  needed.  To  forget  that 
the  existence  of  a  rational  and  objective  universe  is  one 
of  the  great  battle-grounds  of  philosophy,  and  calmly 
beg  the  question  in  the  interests  of  empiricism,  is  a  fact 
which  gives  an  accurate  measure  of  the  philosophical 
insight  of  empiricists.  When  consequences  are  insane, 
it  does  not  prove  that  they  do  not  follow  from  the 
premises,  but  rather  that  the  premises  are  insane  also. 
We  are  persuaded  that  this  simple  principle,  if  fairly 
grasped,  would  work  a  revolution  in  empirical  philos- 
ophy. 

The  second  part  of  our  thesis  claims  that  the  laws  of 
reality  and  of  rationality  must  be  identical,  in  order  to 
make  science  possible.  This  borders  on  the  self-evi- 
dent. The  unintelligible  cannot  be  understood.  The 
irrational  cannot  be  thought.  The  astronomer  cannot 
allow  that  two  and  two  may  anywhere  make  any  thing 
but  four.  He  cannot  allow  that  the  principles  of  rational 
mechanics  can  be  subverted  or  defied  by  any  material 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.        119 

reality.  He  regards  those  principles  as  law-giving  for 
the  heavens.  And  every-where  the  scientist  assumes 
that  whatever  rationally  flows  from  any  fact  of  reality 
is  as  real  as  that  fact  itself.  The  syllogism  is  sovereign, 
and  nothing  can  withstand  its  might.  The  real  aim  of 
the  scientist,  though  often  he  is  not  fully  conscious  of 
it,  is  to  detect  the  reason  in  things.  He  assumes  that 
nature  is  not  merely  a  complex  of  phenomena;  it  is 
also  a  rational  system.  Nature  is  concrete  reason.  In 
brief,  every  attempt  to  form  a  theory  of  things  assumes 
that  the  world  is  composed  of  intelligible  elements  in  in- 
telligible relations.  This  assumption  cannot  be  escaped 
by  any  philosophical  school  whatever.  The  evolution- 
ist may  assume  that  reality  is  prior  to  rationality;  but 
at  the  same  time  he  must  allow  that  rationality  is  but 
the  thought-side  of  reality,  and  parallel  with  it.  With- 
out this  assumption,  our  thoughts  have  only  a  subject- 
ive validity,  and  objective  science  perishes.  Without 
allowing  the  mind  an  independent  insight  into  ra- 
tionality, it  would  puzzle  the  evolutionist  to  justify  his 
assumption  of  a  real  and  intelligible  system  of  things; 
but  we  omit  to  press  this  difficulty  any  further,  and 
point  out  that  the  evolutionist  as  well  as  the  rationalist 
must  assume  the  identity  of  the  rational  and  the  real. 
His  own  theory  of  knowledge  ought  to  prevent  any  ob- 
jection; for  it  expressly  teaches  that  the  laws  of  think- 
ing are  the  results  of  an  adjustment  of  thought  to 
thing  which  has  been  going  on  during  the  life,  not  only 
of  the  human  race,  but  also  of  the  lower  forms  from 
which  we  descend.  The  steady  objective  laws,  which 
the  evolutionist  assumes  without  warrant,  have  pro- 


120  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

duced  and  reaffirmed  the  laws  of  thought  during  so 
many  aeons  that  we  may  now  regard  their  agreement 
with  fact  as  complete.  Besides,  they  have  been  so 
integrated  by  heredity  that  they  now  appear  in  us  as  a 
priori  mental  forms  which  we  cannot  escape.  For  us, 
then,  who  inherit  the  ages,  there  is  a  true  pre-estab- 
lished harmony  between  the  laws  of  our  thinking,  and 
the  laws  of  the  external  universe.  But  by  a  most  un- 
accountable inconsistency,  most  philosophical  evolu- 
tionists overlook  this  implication  of  their  doctrines,  and 
take  refuge  in  that  suicidal  notion  of  the  unknowable. 
Any  thing  valuable  which  such  thinkers  may  thereafter 
say,  must  be  regarded  as  clear  gain;  just  as  in  mono- 
moria  and  monomania  in  general,  we  rejoice  that  any 
of  the  faculties  have  been  left  intact. 

This  principle  of  the  identity  of  the  rational  and  the 
real  as  the  postulate  of  science,  is  of  such  importance 
as  to  warrant  us  in  being  unusually  tedious  in  its  ex- 
position and  illustration.  We  set  off,  then,  by  a  some- 
what roundabout  way,  in  the  hope  of  more  clearly  es- 
tablishing it. 

The  activity  of  the  mind  in  knowing  is  a  principle 
which  rational  philosophy  will  never  consent  to  give  up. 
It  was  gained  only  after  centuries  of  criticism;  and  the 
failure  to  grasp  it  is  at  the  bottom  of  the  chief  errors 
both  of  ancient  and  modern  philosophy.  The  doctrine 
contains  the  implicit  refutation  of  empiricism3  because 
it  shows  that  experience  itself,  on  which  the  empiricist 
relies,  is  impossible  without  a  constructive  mental  ac- 
tivity. The  empiricist's  vision  rarely  enables  him  to 
perceive  the  mental  elements  which  underlie  sense-ey- 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.       121 

perience,  and  hence  the  imagination  that  sense-experi- 
ence can  be  the  source  of  rational  principles.  Hence, 
also,  the  plausibility  of  the  claim;  for  there  is  no  great 
art  in  bringing  out  that  which  is  already  in.  But  know- 
ing is  not  a  passive  reception  of  ready-made  knowl- 
edge; it  is  an  active  construction  and  interpretation  by 
the  mind  of  its  raw  material.  But  owing  to  the  influ- 
ence of  habit,  this  doctrine  is  not  readily  recognized. 
It  is  necessary,  therefore,  to  illustrate  it. 

How  does  knowledge  get  into  the  mind?  The  an- 
swer of  unreflecting  common  sense  would  be,  that  a 
picture  of  the  things  we  see  passes  into  the  mind.  This 
was  the  answer  of  philosophy  until  the  time  of  Des- 
cartes. Things  were  supposed  to  be  throwing  off  im- 
ages of  themselves,  which  entered  the  eye  and  ear,  and 
thus  reached  the  mind.  But  now  we  see  that  this  is  a 
mere  figure  of  speech.  Things  are  not  throwing  off 
pictures  which  are  then  transported  into  the  mind,  but 
knowledge  originates  in  the  mind.  When  two  men 
speak  together,  no  ideas  leave  the  mind  of  the  one  and 
ride  across  the  airy  waves  into  the  mind  of  the  other. 
The  fact  is,  that  upon  occasion  of  certain  ideas  in  the 
mind  of  the  one,  certain  vibrations  are  produced  in  the 
air,  and  finally  in  the  ear  of  the  other,  and  that  other 
mind  then  constructs  out  of  itself  the  corresponding 
thoughts,  feeling,  etc.  But  nothing  leaves  the  one 
mind,  and  nothing  enters  the  other,  in  any  spatial 
sense.  The  new  knowledge  is  constructed  by  the 
mind  in  itself.  Or,  suppose  one  writes  a  letter;  except 
in  a  loose  figurative  sense,  there  are  no  ideas  in  the 
letter.  Ink-scratches  on  paper  are  all  that  is  really 


122  STUDIES  IN.  THEISM. 

there.  But  when  the  receiver  gets  the  letter,  his  mind 
will  interpret  those  scratches  back  into  the  ideas  and 
feelings  they  were  intended  to  represent.  Here,  again, 
we  see  that  it  is  a  mere  figure  of  speech  to  talk  of 
knowledge  as  going  into  the  mind;  in  every  such  case 
the  mind  creates  its  ideas  from  within;  and  the  possi- 
bility of  communication  plainly  depends  upon  the  as- 
sumption that  both  minds  work  alike,  and  that  the 
same  symbol  shall  have  the  same  meaning  for  both. 

In  these  cases  the  constructive  action  of  the  mind  is 
evident.  The  symbols  are  totally  unlike  what  the  mind 
perceives  through  them.  Now,  strange  as  it  may  seem, 
all  perception,  even  visual  and  tactual,  depends  upon 
a  similar  mental  reading  of  signs,  which  have  no  more 
resemblance  to  the  object  perceived  than  the  letters  of 
a  book  have  to  the  ideas  conveyed.  And  just  as  the 
mind  constructs  the  thoughts  and  feelings  corresponding 
to  the  words  of  a  letter,  so  it  constructs  within  itself 
the  conception  of  external  objects  out  of  the  signs  of 
sensation.  According  to  physiology,  the  immediate  and 
only  physical  antecedent  of  perception  is  vibration  in 
the  brain.  The  physical  raw  material  of  perception 
consists  entirely  in  nerve  vibrations  of  varying  rapidity 
and  length.  The  psychological  raw  material  consists 
solely  of  varying  intensities  of  sensation.  This  is  as  near 
to  the  outer  world  as  the  mind  ever  comes.  Let  there  be 
an  external  world  of  things  in  space  and  time,  and  quan- 
titatively and  qualitatively  different,  the  only  hint  the 
mind  gets  of  the  fact  and  of  all  these  distinctions  is  such 
as  varying  intensities  of  sensation  can  convey.  But 
clearly,  these  bear  no  more  likeness  to  the  external  facts 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.       123 

than  the  ink-scratches  on  paper  have  to  the  ideas  they 
represent.  Yet  this  formless  stuff  is  all  that  the  mind 
has  to  work  upon,  and  out  of  it  it  builds  and  projects  its 
knowledge.  It  has  no  copy  by  which  to  go,  and  no  law 
but  its  own.  As  letters  and  sounds  are  symbols  of 
thoughts  unlike  themselves,  so  sensations  are  the  symbols 
of  things  unlike  themselves;  and  as  letters  and  sounds 
demand  a  constructive  action  of  the  mind  before  the 
thought  can  be  reached,  so  the  symbols  of  sensation 
demand  a  constructive  action  of  the  mind  before  things 
can  be  perceived  at  all.  Thought  does  not  exist  in  the 
alphabet,  but  in  the  mind  which  uses  it  and  assigns 
it  a  meaning.  No  more  does  the  outer  world  exist  in 
sensations,  which  are  the  alphabet  of  realities  beyond 
them;  it  exists  only  for  the  mind  which,  through  sensa- 
tions, discerns  or  affirms  a  world  of  reality  beyond  them. 
Perception  proper  does  not  exist  at  all  until  the  raw 
material  of  sensation  has  been  differentiated,  and  inter- 
preted, and  systematized.  But  the  principles  of  inter- 
pretation and  differentiation  must  be  in  the  mind  itself. 
If  the  language  faculty  be  wanting,  language  must  be 
forever  meaningless.  Or,  even  if  we  lack  only  the  law 
of  the  given  language,  it  is  a  sealed  book  unto  us.  If, 
then,  the  mind  have  no  principles  of  interpretation  in  it- 
self, it  can  never  get  beyond  the  plane  of  sensation,  and 
attain  unto  perception  and  cognition.  But  it  has  its 
own  principles  of  interpretation.  The  law  of  causation 
enables  it  to  refer  the  sensations  to  an  external  reality 
of  some  sort.  Thus  the  distinction  of  subject  and  object 
is  founded,  and  also  that  of  cause  and  effect.  The  law 

of  identity,  together  with  the  law  of  causation,  gives  rise 
9 


124  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

to  the  distinction  of  number  in  objects.  The  principle 
of  being,  or  substance,  produces  the  distinction  of  sub- 
stance and  attribute.  The  principle  of  space  enables 
the  mind  to  arrange  things  as  here  and  there.  The 
principle  of  time  underlies  their  arrangement,  as  now 
and  then.  The  principle  of  quantity  permits  the  dis- 
tinction of  more  and  less;  that  of  quality  allows  the  dis- 
tinction of  kind.  None  of  these  distinctions  are  found 
in  the  sensations,  but  are  brought  into  them  by  the 
mind  as  principles  of  interpretation.  This  does  not 
deny  that  they  may  also  be  objectively  real;  but  pri- 
marily they  are  forms  of  our  knowing,  and  are  carried 
into  things  rather  than  found  in  them.  Our  concep- 
tions of  things,  with  all  their  manifold  distinctions  of 
cause  and  effect,  substance  and  attribute,  space  and 
time,  quantity  and  quality,  are  but  the  forms  which  the 
mind  builds  up  out  of  the  raw  material  of  sensation, 
and  when  these  conceptions  are  objectified  they  stand 
to  us  fpr  the  external  world.  As  our  perception  of 
another's  thought  is  simply  our  own  thought  attrib- 
uted to  him,  so  our  perception  of  the  external  world 
is  simply  our  conceptions  objectified.  This  is  so  strict- 
ly the  case,  that  if  we  suppose  the  external  world  to 
fall  away,  and  the  present  orders  of  sensation  to  be 
maintained  by  an  omnipresent  spirit  or  otherwise,  there 
is  not  the  slightest  ground  for  thinking  that  we  should 
become  aware  of  the  change.  Or,  if  we  assume  a  mind 
working  under  the  same  laws  as  our  minds,  which 
should  never  come  in  contact  with  things,  but  in  which 
the  same  order  of  sensations  should  be  maintained  as 
in  us,  again  there  is  no  ground  for  assuming  that  the 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.        125 

world  would  not  appear  to  him  as  it  does  to  us.  In 
the  perception  of  familiar  objects  this  constructive 
action  is  overlooked,  but  it  becomes  prominent,  even 
to  the  unreflecting,  when  the  object  is  unfamiliar,  or 
vague,  or  at  a  distance.  The  true  heavens  are  not  seen 
by  the  eye,  they  are  affirmed  by  the  mind.  For  un- 
aided sense-perception,  the  heavens  are  only  a  low  arch 
studded  with  points  of  light ;  but  reason,  reflecting  upon 
the  facts,  posits  infinite  space,  and  fills  it  with  worlds 
and  suns.  Here  the  mind  posits  or  affirms  its  object; 
and  the  same  is  true  even  for  the  most  familiar  objects. 
So  far  as  they  exist  for  the  mind,  they  are  posited  by 
the  mind.  And  here  is  a  fathomless  mystery.  The 
stirrings  of  sensation  within  the  mind,  arouse  it  to  build 
up,  conceptions  of  things  and  persons,  and  to  objectify 
these  conceptions,  or  to  affirm  them,  as  objective  real- 
ities. How  this  can  be  we  know  not,  and  yet  we  are 
forced  to  admit  both  that  the  object  thus  affirmed 
really  exists,  and  also  that  to  perceive  the  object,  the 
mind  must  construct  the  object  within  itself.  Now, 
throughout  this  process,  the  mind  is  speaking  its  own 
language.  This  does  not,  indeed,  hinder  that  it  may 
also  be  speaking  the  language  of  things;  but  what  we 
wish  to  emphasize  is,  that  all  perception  is  a  mental 
activity,  according  to  certain  subjective  forms  and  laws, 
and  that  these  are  primarily  forms  of  thought,  and  not 
of  things.  On  account  of  this  mechanism  of  knowledge 
some  have  denied  that  our  conceptions  can  ever  be 
known  to  correspond  to  reality.  We  have  discussed 
this  question  in  the  chapter  on  skepticism.  Here  we 
point  out,  that  if  our  objectified  conceptions  do  repre- 


126  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

sent  things  as  they  are,  it  can  be  only  as  the  forms  of 
nature  and  the  forms  of  thought  are  identical.  That 
mind  speaking  its  own  language,  and  working  accord- 
ing to  its  own  laws,  should  agree  with  things  which 
also  speak  their  own  language  and  have  their  own  laws, 
is  forever  inexplicable  without  the  assumption  that  na- 
ture is  only  thought  realized  in  objective  fact.  Hence 
not  science  alone,  but  even  the  simple  perception  of 
things  as  they  are  is  impossible,  except  as  nature  is  cast 
in  the  mold  of  thought.  We  conclude,  then,  that  what- 
ever will  speak  to  man,  whether  it  be  nature  or  God, 
must  come  into  the  forms  of  human  thought  if  com- 
munication is  to  be  possible. 

It  may  be  worth  while  to  attempt  another  proof  of 
this  proposition.  The  nature  of  knowledge  itself  ne- 
cessitates it;  for  all  knowledge  depends  upon  distinc- 
tion. An  object  exists  for  the  mind  only  as  it  is  dis- 
tinguished from  other  objects.  We  see  things  by  the 
differences  of  light  and  shade.  In  unbroken  light  we 
should  see  no  more  than  we  do  in  perfect  darkness. 
Always  to  have  the  same  sensation  is  equivalent  to  hav- 
ing none.  There  will  be,  indeed,  a  difference  for  the 
organism,  but  none  for  the  mind.  Hence  we  never 
perceive  the  air  until  it  moves.  We  are  unconscious  of 
the  pressure  of  our  clothing,  so  long  as  it  is  easy  and 
constant.  The  foul  atmosphere  of  a  room  is  not  per- 
ceived by  the  inmates.  The  organic  conditions  of  sen- 
sation may  be  fulfilled,  but  the  perception  can  only  take 
place  through  difference;  and  this  is  lacking.  The  in- 
distinguishable or  indiscriminable  does  not  exist  for 
thought.  The  object  must  be  distinguished  from  the 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.     127 

subject,  and  from  other  objects,  before  it  can  be  proper- 
ly perceived;  or  rather,  perception  consists  in  this  proc- 
ess of  distinction.  But  distinction  is  impossible  with- 
out comparison.  A  thing  cannot  be  known  as  either 
like  or  unlike  another,  unless  it  be  compared  with  it. 
But  both  comparison  and  distinction  assumes  norms,  or 
points,  of  comparison  and  distinction.  If  a  thing  be 
like  another,  it  must  be  like  it  in  some  point,  in  form, 
or  in  position,  or  in  quantity,  or  in  quality,  etc.  If  there 
are  no  common  elements  in  things,  they  are  neither  like 
nor  unlike,  but  incommensurable;  and  each  would  be 
the  negation  of  every  other.  In  truth,  absolute  unlike- 
ness  can  exist  only  between  being  and  the  void.  This 
differentiating  action  of  the  mind  is  not  consciously 
recognized  in  the  simpler  activities  of  the  mind,  but  it 
becomes  very  prominent  in  the  higher  operations  of  in- 
telligence. But  as  a  law  of  the  mental  constitution,  it 
underlies  the  lowest  forms  of  the  mental  life.  We  have 
seen  that  not  even  sensation  can  exist  for  the  mind,  or 
be  recognized  by  it  as  a  mental  object,  without  being 
discriminated  from  its  surroundings,  and  from  the  mind 
itself.  Thus,  we  see,  that  there  are  norms  of  distinc- 
tion in  the  mind  which  are  prior  to  all  sense-experience, 
and  which  constitute  the  only  possibility  of  sense-expe- 
rience. The  associationalist  makes  the  association  of 
ideas  the  deepest  fact  of  the  mind ;  and  fails  to  see  that 
we  must  have  ideas  before  they  can  associate,  and  that 
we  cannot  have  ideas  without  the  differentiating  and 
constructive  action  of  the  mind.  The  ideas  to  which  he 
appeals  are,  themselves,  mental  constructions;  and  the 
sense-experience  on  which  he  builds  is  composed  of  ra- 


128  STUDIES  IX  THEISM. 

tional  factors.  Mental  activity  begins  back  even  of 
conscious  sensation  itself;  much  more  does  it  underlie 
our  sense-perceptions.  To  offer,  then,  to  construct  phi- 
losophy on  the  basis  of  sense-perception,  with  the  aim 
of  excluding  all  rational  elements,  is  the  Rip-Van- Win- 
kleism  of  speculation.  If  the  associationalist  object 
that  this  activity  does  not  appear  in  consciousness,  we 
reply:  (1)  That  which  underlies  and  conditions  con- 
sciousness, can  only  be  reached  by  reasoning  from  the 
nature  of  consciousness;  and  (2)  the  wonderful  pro- 
cesses of  association  upon  which  the  objector  builds,  are 
equally  below  consciousness,  and,  in  addition,  are  not 
very  cogently  inferred  from  the  facts.  However,  not 
to  lose  ourselves  in  the  depths,  we  shall  not  attempt  any 
list  of  these  norms  of  the  mental  activity,  or  categories 
of  thought,  as  they  may  also  be  called.  Whoever 
wishes  to  see  the  fullest  and  best  development  of  the 
form  of  Kantianism  which  we  are  supporting,  should 
consult  Professor  Ulrici's  Logik,  which,  unfortunately, 
has  not  yet  been  translated.  It  is  sufficient  for  our  pur- 
pose to  refer  the  notions  of  cause  and  effect,  of  being 
and  attribute,  of  dependence  and  independence,  of  space 
and  time,  of  quantity  and  quality,  as  examples  of  such 
norms.  These  are  not  objects  of  perception;  they  are, 
originally,  principles  of  knowing.  They  are  the  norms 
of  distinction  by  which  the  mind  proceeds  in  transform- 
ing sensation  into  knowledge.  Sensation  does  not  bring 
them  into  the  mind;  but  the  mind  brings  them  into 
sensation. 

This  view  receives  a  negative  support  from  all  con- 
sistent empiricism;  for  the  consistent  empiricist,  from 


POSTULA  TES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNO  WLED  GE.       129 

Hume  to  J.  S.  Mill,  has  admitted  the  impossibility 
of  getting  them  from  sensation.  Hence,  Hume  denied 
the  reality  of  substance,  or  being,  and  made  the  law  of 
causation  a  delusion.  J.  S.  Mill  follows  in  his  wake. 
Substance  is  not  given  in  sensation;  and  hence  Mill  denies 
substantial  being.  All  that  he  will  allow  matter  to  be, 
is  a  "permanent  possibility  of  sensation,"  which  is  only 
an  ingenious  phrase  for  concealing  the  difficulty  from 
both  himself  and  his  readers.  Mind,  in  like  manner,  is 
reduced  to  a  succession  of  feelings  without  substantial 
support.  The  same  difficulty  appears  in  his  theory  of 
predication.  Since  matter  is  only  a  bundle  of  qualities, 
the  categorical  judgment  becomes  the  absurdity  of  af- 
firming one  quality  of  another.  For  example,  gold  is 
yellow;  but  gold  is  only  a  name  for  the  sum  of  certain 
qualities  of  weight,  density,  malleability,  color,  etc.; 
and  the  judgment  becomes :  certain  qualities  of  weight 
density,  etc.,  are  yellow.  But  this  is  absurd;  and  hence, 
we  must  change  the  simplest  forms  of  logic,  and  say 
that  certain  qualities  belong  together,  though  for  the 
sake  of  good  sense  and  the  conventions  of  language,  we 
may  always  use  the  old  form.  But  this  belonging  to- 
gether is  a  treacherous  phrase.  It  indicates  a  kind  of 
inner  connection  which  secures  the  thing  from  breaking 
up  and  vanishing.  We  must,  then,  guard  ourselves 
against  this  delusion  by  saying  that  the  judgment,  gold 
is  yellow,  only  means  that,  in  our  experience,  certain 
qualities,  of  which  yellow  is  one,  have  always  been 
found  together.  The  empiricist  can  adopt  no  other 
theory  of  predication;  but,  unfortunately,  common  sense 
protests  that  it  cannot  even  understand  what  is  meant 


130  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

by  qualities  which  are  qualities  of  nothing.  Space,  too, 
cannot  be  found  in  sensation,  and  Mr.  Mill,  in  obedi- 
ence to  his  philosophy,  aims  to  explain  it  away.  Cau- 
sation and  dependence  are  also  denied,  and  reduced  to 
temporal  sequence.  In  short,  Mill  was  too  clear-sighted 
to  fancy  that  the  categories,  as  objective  facts,  can  ever 
be  won  from  experience;  his  whole  strength  was  devot- 
ed to  explaining  them  away.  To  do  this,  he  was  forced, 
first,  to  twist  the  categories  out  of  all  likeness  to  them- 
selves; and,  second,  to  attribute  to  association  utterly 
imaginary  powers.  That  consciousness  itself  depends 
on  an  application  of  the  categories  seems  never  to  have 
occurred  to  him.  Finally,  the  outcome  of  his  philoso- 
phy was  nihilism,  and  the  denial  of  rationality. 

It  might  occur  to  common  sense  that  the  existence  of 
things  as  different  must  result  in  our  seeing  them  as 
different;  but  this  notion  disappears  upon  reflection. 
Even  the  simple  differences  of  quantity  and  quality  de- 
pend for  their  perception  upon  different  effects  in  us. 
If  the  mind  were  such  that  it  did  not  react  differently 
upon  different  impressions,  the  most  highly  differenti- 
ated world  would  be  perceived  only  as  dead  uniformity. 
Such  is  the  world  of  molecular  motion  in  things  about 
us.  The  most  complex  and  wonderful  activity  is  going 
on  in  the  clod  at  our  feet,  but  we  fail  to  perceive  it  be- 
cause it  does  not  impress  us  strongly  enough  to  arouse 
the  soul  to  reaction.  The  waves  of  light  may  make 
melody,  and  the  morning  stars  may  still  sing  together, 
but  we  hear  them  not.  Hence  if  the  categories  existed 
in  things  as  the  universal  predicates  of  all  being,  they 
could  never  be  reached  by  the  mind  unless  they  also  ex- 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.        131 

isted  in  the  mind;  for  without  that  complex  qualitative 
nature  which  enables  the  mind  to  react  differently  upon 
its  impressions,  and  distinguish  subject  from  object,  sub- 
stance from  attribute,  cause  from  effect,  quantity  from 
quality,  space  from  time,  etc.,  the  world  of  differences 
would  go  unrecognized.  The  categories  may  be  in 
things,  but  primarily  they  are  in  the  mind,  and  repre- 
sent the  norms  of  those  basal  differentiations  by  which 
the  mind  attains  to  consciousness  and  knowledge. 

This,  then,  is  the  point  to  which  we  come:  In  opposi- 
tion to  empiricism  we  hold  that  knowing  is  not  a  pas- 
sive reception  of  impressions,  but  an  active  construction 
of  them  into  rational  system.  Below  perception,  and  be- 
low conscious  sensation,  there  is  an  activity  by  which 
the  mind  prepares  its  objects  for  knowledge.  This 
activity  is  fundamentally  one  of  distinction,  or  differ- 
entiation. As  such  it  must  have  norms  of  distinction. 
These  are  the  fundamental  ideas  of  the  mind.  As  such 
they  are  to  us  the  interpreters  of  the  universe.  The 
symbols  of  sensation  acquire  meaning  only  as  they  fall 
into  these  mental  molds.  That  they  inhere  in  the  na- 
ture of  the  mind  as  the  laws  of  its  procedure  is  proved, 
first,  by  an  analysis  of  knowledge  and  consciousness, 
and,  second,  by  the  failure  of  empiricism  to  account  for 
them  without  either  denying  them  or  begging  the  ques- 
tion. By  their  use  the  mind  constructs  from  the  form- 
less material  of  sensation  a  thought  of  the  external  uni- 
verse, and  this  thought  is  as  near  to  the  outer  world  as 
the  mind  ever  comes.  As  our  perception  of  another's 
thought  or  feeling  is  our  own  thought  or  feeling  attrib- 
uted to  him,  so  our  perception  of  the  external  world  is 


132  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

solely  our  conception  of  it  objectified  under  the  mental 
forms  of  being  and  attribute,  cause  and  effect,  spuce 
and  time,  etc.  If  now  we  assume  that  our  thought 
truly  represents  things,  and  otherwise  our  science  is  de- 
lusion, we  must  admit  that  the  forms  of  thought  are 
also  the  forms  of  reality,  that  things  are  but  thoughts 
made  substantial,  and  that  thoughts  are  the  ideal  forms 
of  things.  A  true  and  comprehensive  thought  of  a 
thing  differs  from  the  thing  in  nothing  but  in  substan- 
tiality. But  whatever  flows  rationally  from  the  thought 
must  also  flow  from  the  thing.  For  example,  the  phys- 
icist regards  the  physical  universe  as  subject  only  to 
mechanical  laws.  In  that  case  the  material  system  is 
nothing  but  crystallized  mathematics,  and  the  laws  of 
mechanics  are  law-giving  for  the  universe.  What  cal- 
culation demands,  we  expect  reality  to  fulfill.  We 
constantly  overlook  this  wonder.  The  mind  spins  a 
system  of  abstract  and  impalpable  relations;  and  they 
prove  strong  enough  to  bind  with  invincible  bonds  thb 
whole  system  of  physical  reality.  They  are  airy  crea- 
tions of  the  mind,  and  yet  they  are  the  chief  instru- 
ments of  science.  How  mathematical  conceptions  can 
be  set  in  reality  so  as  to  be  its  inmost  law,  involves 
the  mystery  of  creation;  but  the  physical  system  is 
such  a  realization.  And,  in  general,  the  entire  sys- 
tem of  material  reality,  so  far  as  intelligible  and  a 
subject  of  science,  must  be  regarded  as  crystallized 
mind.  Its  laws  are  the  laws  of  thought;  its  forms 
are  the  forms  of  thought ;  and  if  there  be  any  reason 
for  viewing  it  as  dependent,  we  must  regard  the  pow- 
er which  realized  it  as  one  proceeding  according  to 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.       133 

the  norms  of  intelligence;  so  that  the  categories  by 
which  we  comprehend  the  world  are  the  rules  by  which 
it  was  originally  realized.  But  as  the  categories  are 
primarily  norms  of  mental  action  and  manifestation, 
and  since  the  physical  universe  is  but  these  categories 
realized,  there  is  good  reason  for  believing  that  the  sim- 
ple existence  and  knowability  of  the  world  points  to  a 
rational  power  which  is  realizing  rational  principles  in  it. 
At  all  events,  the  facts  are  opaque  and  unintelligible  on 
any  other  assumption.  The  mental  evolutionist  may 
object  that  the  mental  laws  are  accounted  for  by  our 
experience  of  the  outer  world;  but  (1)  he  forgets  that 
the  mental  laws  and  forms  antedate  and  condition  all 
experience;  (2)  he  assumes  without  warrant  a  rational 
objective  world;  and  (3)  he  assumes  that  the  physical 
system  is  ultimate.  If  he  will  reflect  upon  the  first 
point,  and  prove  the  two  assumptions  before  further 
theorizing,  it  will  be  of  value  to  himself,  and  a  relief  to 
his  readers.  The  materialist  may,  also,  bring  up  objec- 
tions, but  we  have  seen  that  his  system  destroys  all 
knowledge,  and  we  are  arguing  only  on  the  assumed 
possibility  of  science.  But  allowing  this  theistic  argu- 
ment to  pass  for  what  it  is  worth,  we  are  content  with 
having  shown,  (1)  that  knowing  is  an  active  process, 
and  (2)  that  the  possibility  of  objective  science  depends 
on  the  assumption  of  perfect  parallelism  between  the 
rational  and  the  real,  between  mind  working  according 
to  its  laws  and  things  working  according  to  their  laws. 
Here  a  scruple  may  arise  which  it  is  well  to  notice  in 
passing.  If  the  real  is  rational,  and  if  the  reason  is 
law-giving  for  reality,  what  need  is  there  for  induction 


134  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

and  observation?  And,  on  the  other  hand,  have  not 
a  priori  deductions  been  the  bane  and  disgrace  of  sci- 
ence? This  objection  rests  upon  an  illegitimate  con- 
version of  our  proposition.  Science  must  always  hold 
that  the  real  is  rational,  but  it  does  not  follow  that  the 
rational  is  always  real.  The  confusion  of  these  propo- 
sitions has  been  a  fruitful  source  of  mistake  with  ideal- 
istic philosophers.  Accordingly,  many  purely  formal 
systems  have  been  built  up,  and,  because  they  were  .log- 
ically consistent,  they  were  viewed  as  objectively  valid. 
The  error,  however,  was  not  in  the  principle,  but  in  its 
application.  In  order  that  the  development  of  thought 
should  correspond  to  the  development  of  fact,  the 
thought  must  accurately  comprehend  the  fact.  If  the 
two  have  any  parallax,  there  will  be  discord  in  the  re- 
sults. Now  we  human  beings,  who  dwell  apart  from 
the  center,  and  not  at  the  root  of  things,  are  seldom  able 
to  get  so  accurate  a  conception.  Rational  mechanics  is 
the  only  realm  where  our  thought  fully  grasps  the  fact, 
and  there  we  do  regard  the  development  of  thought  as 
equivalent  to  that  of  fact.  What  the  equations  call  for, 
the  flying  planet  must  fulfill.  And  the  theist  cannot 
doubt  that  there  is  a  stand-point,  though  perhaps  the 
Creator  only  can  reach  it,  whence  the  entire  physical 
universe  might  be  seen  to  unfold  with  logical  necessity 
from  the  basal  idea  upon  which  it  is  built.  Even  the 
mathematician  is  impatient  of  the  sciences  of  observa- 
tion, and  dreams  of  the  possibility  of  so  comprehend- 
ing the  physical  system,  in  a  vast  series  of  differential 
equations,  that  we  might  read  its  entire  history  from 
eternity  to  eternity.  But  we  cannot  grasp  the  all  -con- 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.       135 

ditioning  thought,  and  our  insight  even  into  things 
about  us  is  small.  Hence  the  need  of  observation  and 
experiment.  Moreover,  the  laws  of  reason,  as  the 
frame-work  of  all  intelligible  systems,  do  not  account  for 
the  peculiarities  of  any  system.  They  merely  secure 
intellectual  sequence  and  consistency.  To  distinguish 
between  many  systems,  all  equally  consistent  with  the 
laws  of  thought,  we  must  rise  to  the  notion  of  purpose. 
Either  we  must  give  up  all  hope  of  understanding  the 
system,  or  we  must  appeal  to  teleology.  In  this  case, 
purpose  would  be  the  determining  principle  of  the  sys- 
tem, and  the  logic  of  reality  could  be  fully  understood 
only  through  the  end  at  which  it  aims.  But  both  the 
end  and  the  means  are  largely  hidden  from  our  sight; 
and  hence,  while  affirming  the  rationality  of  the  real, 
we  must  still  allow  that  induction  will  always  have  to 
assist  deduction  in  dealing  with  objective  fact.  Hegel's 
immortal  merit  consists  in  his  thorough-going  identifi- 
cation of  the  real  and  the  rational  in  the  sense  in  which 
we  have  explained  it.  The  rock  on  which  he  split  was 
oversight  of  the  weakness  of  the  human  mind,  and  the 
resulting  attempt  to  give  it  the  position  of  the  absolute 
reason. 

Another  scruple  may  also  be  noticed.  It  will  occur 
to  many  that  it  is  a  matter  of  no  significance  that  things 
should  exist  in  rational  relations,  and  obey  rational  laws, 
because  these  relations  and  laws  are  necessary  principles 
of  all  existence.  They  are  metaphysical  necessities, 
and  hence  point  to  no  reason  in  which  they  exist  as 
modes  of  manifestation.  To  uncritical  common  sense  this 
position  seems  self-evident  truth j  to  reflective  thought 


136  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

it  is  palpably  false.  For  we  know  nothing  of  onto- 
logical  necessity;  we  know  only  rational  necessity.  To 
take  the  simplest  mental  notions,  space  and  time  are  not, 
metaphysical  necessities,  but  mental  principles.  They 
are  never  objects,  but  forms  of  arrangement.  Hence, 
also,  mathematics  affirms  no  ontological  necessities;  it 
is  only  the  science  of  these  rational  principles.  We 
cannot  affirm  the  objective  validity  even  of  these  sim- 
plest principles  without  identifying  the  rational  and  the 
real.  It  is  utterly  absurd  to  ask  what  would  be  true  for 
the  real,  if  it  be  allowed  to  be  irrational.  Such  a  real 
would  know  no  law,  no  necessity,  and  would  admit  of 
no  interpretation  and  prevision.  Hence  we  can  never 
affirm  an  ontological  necessity  except  as  reason  is  law- 
giving  for  being.  This,  however,  does  not  favor  agnos- 
ticism, for  the  affirmation  of  being  without  relation  to 
thought  is  an  utterly  thoughtless  performance.  Ag- 
nosticism rests  upon  the  amazing  notion  that  a  rational 
experience,  or  a  world  composed  of  rational  elements, 
justifies  the  assumption  that  fundamental  being  is  with- 
out any  essential  relation  to  reason;  whereas,  in  truth, 
no  being  can  be  rationally  affirmed  whose  essence  and 
law  are  any  thing  but  reason. 

Thus  far  we  have  used  rational  as  meaning  harmony 
with  the  laws  and  forms  of  thought  which  condition  all 
mental  action.  But  rationality,  in  this  sense  alone,  is 
not  sufficient  to  make  science  possible.  Nature  might 
be  crystalline  in  its  elements,  and  the  outcome  might 
still  be  unintelligible.  The  laws  of  motion  and  the 
principles  of  mechanics  find  as  absolute  illustration  in 


POSTULA  TES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNO  WLED  GE.       137 

the  whirling  leaf  or  rushing  torrent  as  they  do  in  the 
motion  of  the  planet,  but,  owing  to  the  complicated  con- 
ditions in  the  former  cases,  we  are  wholly  unable  to  trace 
them.  It  is,  therefore,  quite  conceivable  that  with  per- 
fect rationality  in  the  elements,  the  outcome  should  "be 
without  assignable  order.  There  must  be  a  certain  ar- 
rangement of  the  constants  of  nature  so  as  to  produce 
an  intelligible  phenomenal  order.  Hence,  in  our  scien- 
tific investigations  we  must  further  postulate  (1)  a  cer- 
tain openness  or  fairness  in  nature,  and  (2)  its  ration- 
ality in  the  higher  sense  of  the  fit  adaptation  of  means 
to  ends.  With  regard  to  the  first  point,  it  is  plain  that 
in  our  study  of  things  we  are  confined  to  surface  indica- 
tions; and,  without  the  assumption  of  truthfulness  on  the 
part  of  nature,  we  are  hopelessly  adrift.  It  is  quite 
conceivable  that  wheat  should  be  mimicked  by  poisonous 
plants,  which  should  be  known  as  such  only  by  their 
effects.  It  is  equally  conceivable  that  nature  should  be 
just  as  tricky  throughout — that  here,  as  well  as  in  so- 
ciety, appearances  should  be  deceiving.  In  that  case, 
the  apparent  uniformities  of  nature  would  be  all  mis- 
leading, and  a  mental  existence  would  be  impossible. 
The  openness  of  nature  is  as  necessary  a  postulate  of 
science  as  the  uniformity  of  nature.  We  find  the  as- 
sumpiior  every-where.  For  example,  the  theory  of 
descent  i*-  based  upon  sundry  resemblances  of  the  ani- 
mal kingdom.  Of  their  production  we  have  no  direct 
knowledge,  but  they  are  assumed  to  point  tu  a  common 
genealogy.  The  pointing  in  this  case  is  not  very  clear, 
for  the  possibility  of  arranging  species  in  ascending  se- 
ries no  more  points  to  such  common  origin  than  the 


138  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

possibility  of  arranging  chemical  combinations,  or  crys- 
tals, or  equations  in  systems  of  growing  complexity, 
proves  genealogical  relations.  The  only  fact  patent  in 
these  cases  is  the  rational  order.  But,  allowing  the  ar- 
gument for  descent,  it  is  plain  that  it  assumes,  to  an 
almost  extravagant  extent,  the  truthfulness  of  nature. 
Who  knows  the  resources  of  reality  ?  Who  knows  that 
birth  is  the  only  means  of  producing  resemblance?  Is 
not  birth  in  thought  infinitely  more  potent  in  this  direc- 
tion than  physical  generation?  Moreover,  if  descent  is 
to  account  for  the  likeness,  what  shall  account  for  the 
difference?  If  the  scanty  likeness  point  to  a  common 
genealogy,  much  more  should  the  striking  unlikeness 
point  to  diverse  origins.  But,  letting  the  argument  on 
either  side  pass  for  what  it  is  worth,  it  is  clear  that  our 
science  must  assume,  not  only  the  rationality  of  being, 
but  also  a  certain  ethical  condescension  of  nature  to  the 
weakness  and  wants  of  the  human  mind.  The  skeptic 
may  deny  the  objective  validity  of  this  postulate;  but 
it  cannot  be  dispensed  with  if  we  are  to  have  faith  in 
science. 

Our  second  point  was,  that  rationality,  in  the  sense  of 
a  fit  and  exact  adaptation  of  means  to  ends,  is  a  nec- 
essary assumption  of  science.  This  follows  directly 
from  the  character  of  all  scientific  hypotheses.  '  All 
these  are  formed,  as  we  have  seen,  by  postulating  an 
agent,  or  set  of  agents,  with  just  such  powers  and  in 
just  such  relations  that  they  shall  be  exactly  adapted  to 
produce  the  facts.  From  this  point  of  view,  the  whole 
of  scientific  theory  appears  as  a  gigantic  teleological 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.        139 

construction.  Every  scientific  hypothesis  is  so  inter- 
locked with  every  other,  that  the  assumed  agents  are 
exactly  fitted  to  produce  what  they  do,  and  nothing  else. 
And  this  is  no  meaningless  claim,  for  the  actual  harmony 
of  the  world  is  won  from  the  conflict  of  the  most  gigantic 
forces;  but  these  are  so  nicely  adapted  to  one  another 
that  they  maintain  the  universal  order.  The  four 
chemical  elements  which  enter  into  organic  life  are  the 
chief  disturbers  of  the  universe.  Oxygen  is  the  parent 
of  fire;  hydrogen  is  the  most  inflammable  substance 
known;  carbon  is  doomed  to  burning;  and  nitrogen  is 
the  base  of  gunpowder  and  nitro-glycerine.  Yet  these 
are  so  nicely  balanced  that  the  organic  world  results, 
and  no  hint  is  given  of  the  tremendous  forces  which 
build  up  the  organism.  Were  their  combining  power 
varied  a  little,  either  life  would  be  impossible,  from  the 
too  great  stability  of  their  compounds,  or  the  earth 
would  be  rocked  and  shattered  by  their  incessant  and 
tremendous  explosions.  A  glance  into  the  realm  of  sci- 
entific theory  reveals  to  us  a  multitude  of  agents  whose 
unrestrained  action  would  plunge  the  system  into  chaos; 
but  which  are  so  adjusted  to  one  another  that  order  and 
harmony  results.  To  this  it  will  be  objected,  that  if 
a  thing  does  any  work,  it  must,  of  course,  be  fitted  to  do 
it.  If,  then,  the  atoms  and  the  ether  are  the  substantial 
realities  of  the  physical  system,  and  produce  the  phe- 
nomenal order,  they  must,  by  hypothesis,  be  able  to  pro- 
duce it;  but  that  does  not  prove  that  they  were  intended 
to  produce  it.  This  may  be  true,  but  it  misses  the 
point.  The  present  question  is,  not  how  this  adaptation 

has  been  produced;  we  insist  only  upon  its  existence  as 
10 


140  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

a  necessity  of  scientific  construction.  In  short,  all  must 
allow  that  the  universe  is  constructed,  from  beginning 
to  end,  on  just  those  rational  principles,  and  with  just 
those  adaptations  and  harmonies  which  mind  would  have 
employed  if  it  had  intended  to  realize  the  present  order 
with  the  present  agents.  One  may  claim  that  the  end 
is  not  worth  realizing,  or  that  it  might  have  been  real- 
ized in  some  better  way;  but  no  one  can  deny  that  if 
the  present  order  were  to  be  realized  by  similar  agents, 
only  the  prof  oundest  adaptation  of  means  to  ends  would 
make  such  realization  possible.  Universal  adaptation  of 
means  to  ends,  therefore,  if  not  by  a  rational  being,  at 
least  such  as  a  rational  being  would  make  if  he  proposed 
to  realize  the  present  order  with  similar  agents,  is  an 
absolute  postulate  of  science.  For  scientific  theory  is 
simply  teleology  read  backward.  Teleology  conceives 
the  end  and  adapts  the  agents;  science  starts  from  the 
end  and  reasons  back  to  the  adapted  agents;  but  the 
adaptation  in  the  agents  is  identical  in  each  case. 

But  we  must  advance  still  further.  The  universe 
works  together  with  nicest  balance  and  adaptation  to 
produce  any  effect;  but  it  may  be  claimed  that  science 
need  only  regard  the  effect  as  a  rational  result  of  its 
antecedents,  and  never  as  an  end  for  whose  realization 
things  are  working.  In  the  daily  detail  of  science,  it  is 
quite  possible  to  leave  the  purpose  of  things  out  of 
sight;  but  science,  as  a  whole,  must  assume  the  univer- 
sality of  the  principle  of  final  cause.  The  reality  of 
final  cause  in  nature  is  a  necessity  of  theoretical  science, 
not  merely  as  a  conclusion  from  the  facts,  but  as  an 
a  priori 'postulate.  Final  causality  is  the  causality  of 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.        141 

will.  It  is  self-conscious  power  moving  toward  a  pre- 
conceived goal.  Now  we  must  conceive  the  basal 
power  of  the  universe  as  either  intelligent  or  non-intel- 
ligent. In  the  former  case,  final  causality  is  the  basal 
causality  of  nature,  and  the  principle  of  final  cause  is 
the  determining  principle  of  the  universe.  In  the  lat- 
ter case  we  fall  back  into  the  skeptical  difficulties  men- 
tioned in  the  beginning  of  the  chapter.  Apart,  then, 
from  all  scrutable  purpose  in  nature,  science  is  theoret- 
ically impossible  without  assuming  that  all  action  in 
the  universe  is  for  an  end.  This  is  what  President 
Porter  means  by  declaring  the  reality  of  final  cause  to 
be  an  intuition;  a  doctrine  which  has  been  largely  mis- 
understood, and  still  more  extensively  not  understood 
at  all.  American  and  English  thought  has  been  so  ac- 
customed to  the  argument  from  design,  that  when  one 
declares  the  principle  of  final  cause  to  be  an  a  priori 
necessity  of  science,  he  is  almost  sure  to  be  misunder- 
stood. And  this  assumption,  that  natural  effects  are 
also  ends,  constantly  manifests  itself  in  our  theories 
and  criticisms.  If  a  theory,  even  in  the  inorganic  sci- 
ences, is  found  to  be  clumsy  and  stupid,  it  is  rejected 
without  hesitation.  But  why  should  not  nature  be 
clumsy  ?  The  pessimists  assure  us  that  the  world  works 
so  ill,  that  it  must  be  viewed  as  a  failure;  why  should 
it  not  play  the  blockhead  in  physics,  as  well  as  in  soci- 
ology ?  One  great  argument  against  the  separate  crea- 
tion of  species  is,  that  it  seems  an  awkward  way  of 
realizing  the  end.  And  one  great  argument  for  evolu- 
tion is,  that  it  will  enable  us  to  think  more  highly  of 
the  creative  wisdom.  But  none  of  these  criticisms  are 


142  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

of  any  value,  unless  we  assume  (1)  that  the  results 
reached  are  more  than  effects,  but  are  ends  also;  and 
(2)  that  the  manner  in  which  these  ends  are  reached,  is 
the  measure  of  some  creative  wisdom.  For  atheism, 
the  actual  is  all.  There  is  nothing  high  nor  low,  noth- 
ing wise  nor  unwise,  nothing  benevolent  nor  malignant, 
nothing  good  nor  bad,  in  nature.  All  these  words  im- 
ply some  standard  of  reference,  and  that  must  always 
be  teleological.  We  cannot  criticise  at  all  without  as- 
suming some  end  for  whose  realization  things  exist; 
and  we  cannot  allow  any  inherent  clumsiness  and  stu- 
pidity in  nature  without  setting  all  scientific  theory 
adrift.  Every  scientist  must  implicitly  assume  that  the 
wisdom,  insight,  and  rationality  of  the  cosmos  surpass 
ours,  and  that  we  can  hope  only  to  learn,  never  to 
teach.  When  we  come  to  the  organic  sciences,  the  no- 
tion of  an  end  which  conditions  the  means,  becomes  the 
guiding  principle,  both  of  investigation  and  of  criticism. 
Every  organ  is  looked  upon  as  existing  to  perform  cer- 
tain functions,  and  all  description  and  all  criticism  de- 
pends upon  reference  to  that  function  as  the  final  cause 
of  the  organ.  An  eye  that  did  not  see,  would  be  called 
imperfect.  But  why  imperfect?  The  word  has  no 
meaning,  except  as  we  assume  that  the  end  of  eyes  is 
vision.  The  same  is  true  of  any  other  organ,  or  of 
the  entire  organism;  it  can  be  neither  described  nor 
criticised  without  assuming  an  end  for  which  it  exists. 
Even  those  who  are  most  careful  to  refrain  from  attrib- 
uting any  purpose  to  nature,  hasten,  after  recording 
their  protest,  to  make  the  freest  use  of  teleological 
notions  and  language.  To  deny  that  these  notions  have 


POSTULATES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNOWLEDGE.        143 

objective  validity,  is  to  declare  the  biological  sciences 
impossible,  except  as  a  series  of  observations.  For  we 
know  almost  nothing  of  the  causes  which  produce  the 
organism,  and  it  is  not  probable  that  we  ever  shall 
know  much.  We  know  what  purpose  the  eye,  the  ear, 
the  blood,  the  reproductive  organs,  etc.,  serve;  but  we 
have  not  the  slightest  insight  into  the  mode  of  their 
production.  We  know,  too,  that  this  purpose  contains 
the  ground  why  the  organs  should  be  as  they  are;  so 
that,  even  while  we  deny  a  mind  which  conceived  these 
ends,  we  have  still  to  assume  them  in  order  to  make 
investigation  possible.  And  every-where  this  necessity 
appears.  We  speak  of  the  members  of  a  species  as 
perfect  or  imperfect  specimens.  But  this  language, 
again,  acquires  meaning  only  from  the  assumption  that 
there  are  certain  forms  and  functions  which  every  mem- 
ber of  the  species  ought  to  reach.  Now  however  these 
ends  may  have  been  brought  about,  it  is  impossible  to 
deny  their  existence  as  facts  which  condition  both  sci- 
entific investigation  and  the  organs  which  realize  the 
ends.  Had  there  been  no  such  end  as  vision,  the  eye 
would  never  have  been  as  it  is.  Hearing,  as  an  end, 
has  conditioned  the  structure  of  the  ear.  Motion  and 
sensation,  as  ends,  have  conditioned  the  structure  and 
disposition  of  the  muscular  and  nervous  systems.  No 
matter  how  this  conditioning  has  taken  place,  the  fact 
is  unquestionable,  and  the  organs  can  be  understood 
only  in  the  light  of  their  functions.  Some  claim  that 
there  was  no  foresight  of  ends;  but,  pressed  by  the 
difficulties  of  any  mechanical  explanation,  they  take 
refuge  in  the  notion  of  an  unconscious  intelligence 


144  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

wljich  does  every  thing  with  infinite  wisdom,  but  with- 
out consciousness.  Others  hold  that  an  end,  as  such,  has 
only  an  ideal  existence,  and,  therefore,  can  condition 
the  means  only  as  it  exists  in  a  prearranging  mind. 
They  also  insist  that  the  phrase,  unconscious  intelli- 
gence, is  a  sheer  absurdity,  devised  for  the  sole  purpose 
of  recognizing  ends  in  nature  without  admitting  the 
correlated  thought  of  an  adapting  mind.  We  believe 
these  points  well  taken;  but,  instead  of  deciding  the 
question,  we  are  content  with  reaffirming  our  position, 
that  science  must  assume  that  nature  is  founded  in  pur- 
pose. Many  points  we  reserve  for  future  discussion. 
In  particular,  we  expect  to  show  in  the  next  chapter  the 
untenability  of  the  claim  that  mechanical  forces  might 
in  indefinite  time  realize  universal  adaptation  without 
any  basal  intelligence. 

In  ethics  and  social  science  the  notion  of  an  end  is 
equally  controlling.  No  theory  of  duty  or  of  rights  is 
possible  without  assuming  some  end  for  which  man 
exists.  No  theory  of  government  can  be  stated  which 
is  not  teleological.  In  proportion  as  we  think  highly 
of  man's  destiny  will  his  duties  appear  great,  and  his 
rights  sacred.  In  the  previous  chapter  we  have  suffi- 
ciently illustrated  the  teleological  nature  of  all  world- 
theories.  We  have  seen  that  pessimism  and  material- 
istic evolution  are  as  fully,  though  not  as  frankly,  tele- 
ological as  the  most  optimistic  theism,  the  only  differ- 
ence being  that  theistic  teleology  gives  some  dignity 
and  value  to  life,  while  atheistic  teleology  is  revolting  in 
the  ends  it  assumes,  and  stupid  in  the  method  of  their 
realization.  We  come,  then,  to  this  point :  Materialism, 


POSTULA  TES  OF  SCIENTIFIC  KNO  WLED  GE.        1 45 

materialistic  and  necessary  evolution,  and  all  empirical 
theories  of  mind,  are  fatal  to  science;  and  as  atheism 
necessarily  leads  to  these  doctrines,  atheism  is  fatal  to 
science.  The  materialist  and  atheist,  therefore,  may 
be  valuable  as  day-laborers  in  science,  but,  left  to  them- 
selves, the  outcome  must  be  a  scientific  Babel.  Fur- 
ther, we  must  assume,  (1)  the  universal  rationality  of 
nature;  (2)  the  fairness  and  condescension  of  nature; 
(3)  a  universal  rational  adaptation  of  every  thing  to 
every  other  in  nature;  (4)  the  reality  of  ends  in  nature, 
which  have  conditioned  the  means  of  their  realization; 
and,  (5)  that  nature,  as  a  whole,  is  founded  in  purpose. 
Without  these  assumptions,  science  falls  a  prey  to  skep- 
ticism. We  conclude,  therefore,  (1)  from  the  skeptical 
outcome  of  atheism  and  pantheistic  substantialism;  and, 
(2)  from  the  positive  necessities  of  scientific  theory,  that 
God  is  as  much  the  postulate  and  support  of  science  as 
he  is  of  religion. 


146  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 


CHAPTER  IV. 

MECHANISM   AND    TELEOLOGY. 

A  LL  theoretical  science  is  built  upon  some  form  of 
•**•  the  atomic  theory.  Those  who  disclaim  belief  in  the 
reality  of  atoms,  are  still  forced  to  assume  some  molec- 
ular unit  which  is  the  substantial  reality  of  material 
things,  and  whose  properties  condition  all  material 
manifestation.  Accordingly  those  who  adopt  the  notion 
that  atoms  are  vortical  rings  in  a  frictionless  fluid,  can 
do  nothing  with  said  fluid  until  they  get  their  vortical 
rings;  that  is,  until  they  get  their  atomic  units.  We 
may,  then,  abandon  the  Democritic  notion  of  the  atoms 
as  little  lumps  secure  forever  in  solid  singleness  against 
destruction;  but  we  cannot  dispense  with  the  notion 
of  discrete  material  units  of  some  kind.  It  may  be 
that  these  units  are  but  discrete  activities  of  some  all- 
embracing  power;  but  whatever  they  may  be,  they  are 
the  basis  of  all  current  scientific  theory.  We  shall, 
then,  until  further  notice,  argue  upon  the  assumed  truth 
of  the  atomic  and  molecular  doctrines  of  matter.  All 
mechanica?  theories  of  nature  assume  that  the  visible 
universe  can  be  explained  by  the  various  grouping  of 
these  atomic  units,  and  that  these  groupings  take  place 
in  accordance  with  the  simple  laws  of  motion  and  the 
principles  of  mechanics.  Hence  the  name.  In  such 
theories  every  problem  is  one  of  either  molar  or  mo- 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  14? 

lecular  mechanics.  We  propose  to  examine  the  relation 
of  this  theory  to  the  doctrine  of  purpose  in  nature;  as 
it  is  often  held  that  the  two  are  incompatible.  We 
have  already  shown,  from  the  side  of  theory,  that  sci- 
ence must  be  teleological  if  it  is  to  avoid  skepticism. 
We  now  aim  to  show,  from  the  side  of  the  facts,  that 
mechanism  can  never  affect  teleology. 

The  belief  that  the  order  of  nature  cannot  be  ex- 
plained without  assuming  an  intelligent  creator,  has 
never  held  undisturbed  possession  of  the  human  mind. 
Very  early  the  attempt  was  made  to  explain  the  world 
by  referring  it  to  physical  causes;  and  every  genera- 
tion since  has  seen  the  attempt  renewed.  But  the  be- 
lief in  purpose  or  nature,  while  always  more  or  less 
militant,  seems  of  late  to  have  fallen  into  unusual  dis- 
credit. Strangely  enough,  too,  this  distrust  always 
springs  up  among  just  those  men  who  are  best  ac- 
quainted with  the  facts  commonly  urged  to  prove  the 
reality  of  design  in  nature.  A  good  part  of  the  blame 
in  this  connection  is  popularly  attributed  to  Mr.  Dar- 
win. It  is  a  wide-spread  conviction  that  Darwinism  is 
a  Medusa  head  upon  which  no  teleologist  can  look  and 
live;  for  in  the  doctrine  of  natural  selection  we  have 
at  last  a  means  of  accounting  for  the  nicest  adaptations 
without  referring  to  any  adapting  intelligence.  In 
truth,  however,  the  controversy  lies  back  of  Darwin- 
ism. The  facts  gathered  under  this  theory  are  quite 
susceptible  of  a  teleological  interpretation.  The  objec- 
tions based  upon  this  theory  are  but  special  phases  of  a 
long-standing  dispute  between  science,  as  such,  and  the 


148  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

belief  in  design,  as  such.  In  studying  the  history  of 
thought,  we  are  met  by  the  strange  fact  that  when 
men  have  discovered  how  a  natural  effect  is  produced, 
they  begin  to  think  that  there  is  no  purpose  in  its  pro- 
duction. To  learn  how  a  thing  is  done,  weakens  faith 
in  any  design  in  its  doing.  Thus  the  nebular  theory, 
inadequate  as  it  is  to  the  facts,  has  greatly  lessened 
faith  in  any  design  displayed  in  the  heavens.  The  so- 
lar system,  it  is  said,  is  a  necessary  outcome  of  gravi- 
tation and  inertia,  and  can  dispense  with  any  guiding 
intelligence.  And  from  the  beginning,  the  study  of 
efficient  causes  has  tended  to  discredit  the  belief  in  de- 
sign; and  conversely  the  believers  in  design  have  tended 
to  ignore  the  reality  and  necessity  of  efficient  causes 
in  order  to  its  realization.  Both  Plato  and  Aristotle 
complain  of  Anaxagoras,  that,  having  assumed  mind  as 
the  cause  of  order,  he  still  continues  to  explain  natural 
phenomena  by  physical  agents.  Aristophanes  attacked 
Socrates  for  seeking  a  physical  explanation  of  jbhe 
clouds ;  for  this,  he  held,  was  downright  atheism.  Both 
theists  and  atheists  have  repeated  this  error  ever  since. 
A  partial  reason  of  the  hostility  of  physics  to  tele- 
ology is  found  in  a  coarse  conception  of  the  latter  doc- 
trine. To  our  human  purposes,  matter  exists  as  some- 
thing given,  and  our  aims  are  impressed  upon  it  from 
without.  Hence  in  all  our  machines  there  are  two  ele- 
ments :  (1)  the  material  and  its  laws,  and  (2)  the  laws 
of  the  combination  which  have  been  impressed  upon  it ; 
or,  to  use  the  Aristotelian  phrase,  there  are  matter  and 
form.  The  matter  does  not  explain  the  form,  and  the 
form  is  not  inherent  in  the  matter.  Now  when  we  speak 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  149 

of  the  universe  as  designed,  the  undeveloped  mind  is 
prone  to  look  for  these  two  factors  there  also,  and  in  the 
same  external  relation  matter  is  viewed  as  external 
to  form,  and  form  is  imposed  on  matter.  Accordingly 
we  think  of  the  matter  of  the  universe  as  being  just 
as  external  to  the  purpose  of  the  system  as  it  is  to  our 
human  aims.  In  this  way  teleology  comes  to  be  re- 
garded as  implying  constant  interference,  and  a  me- 
chanical making  of  things.  Thus  the  notion  arises  that 
whatever  can  be  explained  by  physical  laws  and  agents 
is  rescued  from  the  control  of  mind.  We  find  this 
thought  in  the  oft-made  criticism,  that  the  design-argu- 
ment at  best  would  only  prove  an  arranger  and  not 
a  creator  of  the  universe.  We  find  it,  too,  in  the  eager 
search  for  breaks  in  the  physical  order  which  is  so  often 
made  by  theistic  writers.  But  such  a  conception  be- 
longs to  the  infancy  of  thought;  and  teleology  is  not 
bound  to  accept  such  a  view.  Since  the  time  of  Leib- 
nitz, and  even  of  Aristotle,  there  ought  to  be  no 
difficulty  in  the  conception  of  an  immanent  purpose  of 
which  nature  is  but  the  substantial  expression.  The 
teleologist  may  hold,  then,  to  the  absolute  continuity  of 
natural  laws,  and  at  the  same  time  hold  that  purpose 
was  the  prius  and  condition  of  the  system's  existence. 
He  may  hold  that  purpose  is  realized,  not  by  raids  into 
the  realm  of  natural  law,  but  through  natural  law;  and 
that  purpose  was  legislated  into  the  inmost  law  and 
essence  of  things,  so  that  things  and  their  laws  are 
what  they  are  because  of  that  purpose;  and  BO  that  in 
their  necessary  unfolding  they  shall  realize  that  pur- 
pose. This  was  the  conception  held  by  Leibnitz,  and 


150  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

this  was  the,  way  in  which  he  reconciled  mechanism 
and  teleology.  The  universality  and  continuity  of  law 
were  never  more  stoutly  maintained  than  by  him;  but 
he  held,  also,  that  the  system  sprang  from  a  purpose 
which  conditioned  it  throughout.  And  all  study  is 
valuable  which  leads  us  to  abandon  the  vulgar  notion 
of  design  as  interfering  with  the  nature  of  things  in- 
stead of  working  through  the  nature  of  things.  In 
proportion,  too,  as  the  order  of  nature  is  seen  to  flow 
from  the  nature  of  things,  the  design-argument  points 
not  merely  to  arrangement,  but  to  creation. 

The  chief  cause,  however,  of  the  hostility  of  phys- 
ical science  to  teleology  lies  in  the  fact,  that  the  phys- 
icist, as  such,  and  the  teleologist,  as  such,  occupy  en- 
tirely different  stand-points.  The  former  regards  nature 
as  driven  from  behind;  the  latter  regards  it  as  led  from 
before.  The  former  views  every  event  as  the  neces- 
sary result  of  its  antecedents;  the  latter  views  it  as  the 
realization  of  a  plan.  The  physicist  asks  of  any  natural 
product,  how  it  was  brought  about;  and  sets  himself 
to  discover  the  agents  which  have  produced  it.  The 
teleologist  asks,  what  it  means  now  that  it  is  here,  and 
what  place  it  takes  in  the  universal  plan.  He  says:  It 
is  here  to  fulfill  a  purpose;  but  the  physicist  says:  It  is 
here  because  there  was  a  series  of  antecedents  which 
necessarily  produced  it.  Here,  again,  we  see  traces  of 
the  error  noticed  in  the  last  paragraph.  The  physicist 
studies  how  things  are  produced;  and  from  failure  to 
grasp  the  thought  of  an  immanent  purpose,  once  more 
he  begins  to  doubt  whether  there  is  any  purpose  in  the 
product.  A  system  of  necessary  law,  he  says,  can 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  151 

know  nothing  of  purpose,  because  purpose  implies 
choice,  and  necessity  is  fated.  Moreover,  such  a  sys- 
tem can  dispense  with  purpose;  for  the  system  being 
given,  it  must  produce  its  implied  effect.  He  holds, 
then,  not  that  the  system  exists  to  produce  its  effects; 
but  that  the  system  exists;  and  its  implied  effects  re- 
sult. Here,  then,  is  an  antinomy  between  efficient  and 
final  cause;  and  the  claim  is,  that  necessary  physical 
action  can  dispense  with  design;  if,  indeed,  the  notion 
of  one  is  not  logically  inconsistent  with  that  of  the 
other.  This  claim  we  have  to  examine. 

Before  proceeding  to  criticism,  we  point  out  that  the 
perception  of  design  in  any  thing  is  not  a  matter  of 
science,  but  solely  of  common  sense.  Any  person,  of 
average  reflective  power,  is  as  able  to  judge  whether  a 
work  is  designed  as  a  scientist  who  can  talk  most  learn- 
edly about  it.  For  all  that  physical  study  can  do  in 
such  a  case  is,  to  show  how  the  effect  has  been  reached. 
Whether  there  was  purpose  in  the  action  which  has 
resulted  in  the  effect  can  be  known  only  by  an  inspec- 
tion of  the  effect  itself.  We  further  point  out  that  de- 
sign is  not  properly  proved  by  argument,  but  by  in- 
spection. It  is  an  intuition,  rather  than  a  conclusion. 
We  prove  that  a  straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance 
between  two  points,  not  by  argument,  but  by  construct- 
ing the  lines  and  looking  at  them.  So,  also,  we  convince 
ourselves  that  a  machine  was  designed  by  looking  at  it. 
It  is  necessary  to  make  this  remark,  as  critics  often 
insist  that  the  argument  begs  the  question  because  it 
cannot  demonstrate  design.  But  the  teleologist  whq 


152  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

understands  himself  does  not  pretend  to  demonstrate 
design.  His  aim  is  to  solve  a  problem  rather  than  to 
demonstrate  a  proposition.  Accordingly,  he  calls  atten- 
tion to  the  complex  harmonies  and  adaptations  of  t*  ings, 
which  are  just  like  what  a  designing  mind  would  pro- 
duce. These  constitute  the  problem;  and  his  daim  is, 
that  a  prearranging  mind  is  the  only  solution  which  is 
at  once  satisfactory  to  the  mind  and  adequate  to  the 
facts.  This  is  the  true  meaning  of  the  design-argu- 
ment. As  such  it  is  not  a  begging  of  the  question,  but 
is  an  argument  in  harmony  with  universal  common 
sense.  Verbal  quibbling  will  never  suffice  to  overthrow 
it,  however  clearly  it  may  show  the  lack  of  stronger 
objections. 

As  an  introductory  criticism,  we  point  out  that  in  our 
experience  efficient  and  final  causes  are  not  only  not  in 
opposition,  but  each  implies  the  other.  Our  purposes 
always  demand  some  agents  for  their  realization;  and 
our  adaptation  always  consists  in  so  arranging  natural 
objects,  that  while  following  their  own  laws,  they  also 
realize  our  ends.  The  action  of  a  locomotive  is  a  pure- 
ly mechanical  affair.  It  flows  directly  from  the  ante- 
cedents; and  given  the  antecedents,  it  must  act  as  it 
does.  Still,  we  should  not  feel  convinced  if  an  enemy 
of  design  should  conclude  from  this  fact  that  there  is 
no  purpose  in  the  construction  of  a  locomotive.  The 
tones  of  a  piano  result  from  the  properties  of  the  wires 
and  the  sounding-board;  and  we  might  conceive  that 
some  one  should  set  out  to  prove  that  there  is  no  design 
in  a  piano's  construction,  because  from  beginning  to 
end  the  resulting  notes  are  the  products  of  the  com- 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  153 

ponent  parts.  We  should  not  be  greatly  impressed, 
however,  with  the  conclusiveness  of  the  logic.  When, 
therefore,  a  physiologist  tells  us  that  all  the  properties 
of  an  organism  flow  necessarily  from  the  nature  of  its 
constituent  parts,  we  can  very  readily  believe  him.  But 
when  he  adds,  and  therefore  the  organism  is  explained 
withou:  assuming  any  purpose  in  its  construction,  we 
ask  for  further  proof.  This  is  a  very  popular  argument 
with  the  physiologists  at  present.  Physiological  notions 
have  been  largely  remodeled  within  the  last  twenty-five 
years.  We  hear  much  of  colloids  and  crystalloids,  of 
immediate  and  proximate  principles,  of  physiological 
units,  etc.  These  notions  have  been  thrust  so  persist- 
ently in  the  faces  of  the  teleologists,  that  it  seems  to 
have  escaped  notice  all  round,  that  they  really  increase, 
to  an  almost  inconceivable  degree,  the  structural  wonder 
of  the  organism.  The  claim,  then,  may  be  just,  that 
these  principles  explain  the  organism;  but  we  see  no 
cogency  in  the  conclusion  that,  therefore,  the  organism 
is  in  no  way  a  product  of  design.  In  our  experience, 
purpose  is  realized  only  through  means;  and  hence  it  is 
a  possible  thought  that  natural  agents  exist  to  realize 
ends,  and  that  they  are  what  they  are,  because  of  the 
ends  for  which  they  were  created.  In  such  a  case  the 
laws  of  nature,  in  their  necessary  working,  would  result 
in  the  end  proposed;  and  a  study  of  natural  agents 
would  show  us  a  series  of  effects  unfolding  with  neces 
sity,  and  at  the  same  time  realizing  a  preconceived  pur- 
pose. This,  as  we  have  said,  was  Leibnitz's  conception. 
We  conclude  from  these  cousiderations  that  physical 
causes,  working  by  necessity,  do  not  necessarily  dis- 


154  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

pense  with  the  belief  that  their  products  were  designed. 
And  it  is  greatly  to  be  desired  that  objectors  would 
present  some  more  cogent  argument  against  purpose  in 
nature,  than  a  mere  showing  how  it  has  been  realized. 
In  our  experience,  all  order  and  harmony  which  we  can 
trace  to  a  beginning,  existed  first  in  thought;  we  know 
of  no  other  explanation.  It  is,  then,  no  far-fetched  or 
violent  supposition  that  the  natural  order,  also,  existed 
first  in  thought. 

These  suggestions  are  weighty,  and  quite  in  harmony 
with  common  sense,  but  serious  objections  are  possible. 
If  it  could  be  shown  that  things  had  a  beginning,  or  are 
dependent  on  some  power  not  themselves,  or  that  they 
once, existed  in  a  chaotic  state  without  definite  powers 
and  relations,  the  argument  for  design  in  nature  would 
be  practically  a  demonstration.  It  is  infinitely  improb- 
able that  any  agent  should  produce  and  maintain  the 
order  of  the  universe  without  knowing  what  he  is  doing. 
It  is  equally  improbable  that  a  series  of  blind,  mechan- 
ical agents,  which  were  once  without  definite  law  and 
order,  should  ever  rise  above  chaos.  Every  rational 
objector  to  design  in  nature  allows  this  with  the  utmost 
cheerfulness,  but  he  denies  the  beginning  and  the  chaos. 
The  phenomenal  order  has,  indeed,  had  a  beginning, 
and  will  have  an  end.  But  this  order  is  only  the  mani- 
festation of  a  world  of  substantial  realities  which  have 
their  laws  and  properties  in  themselves,  and  the  objector 
claims  that  there  is  no  proof  that  these  basal  realities 
ever  began.  In  short,  he  regards  the  physical  system 
as  self-sufficient  and  eternal.  But  it  may  be  worth 
while  to  let  him  explain  his  views  at  greater  length  and 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  155 

in  the  first  person.  He  says :  The  problem  for  all  think- 
ers is  to  find  a  sufficient  ground  for  phenomena;  and 
this  cannot  be  done  by  any  a  priori  speculation,  but  only 
by  studying  the  facts.  Now,  I  find  the  order  and  ar- 
rangement of  things  fully  explained  by  the  nature  and 
disposition  of  physical  causes,  and  these  are  in  no  case 
free,  but  work  under  the  scheme  of  necessity.  I  find 
to-day  the  necessary  result  of  yesterday.  That  all 
admit.  But  the  same  principle  makes  it  necessary  to 
assume  that  yesterday  flowed  with  equal  necessity  from 
the  day  before.  If  you  ask  how  I  account  for  the  be- 
ginning, I  reply,  I  recognize  no  beginning.  The  pres- 
ent forms  of  things  have  not,  indeed,  always  existed,  but 
I  see  no  reason  for  denying  that  the  present  ultimate 
agents  of  nature  have  always  existed,  and  that,  too,  un- 
der just  the  same  laws  as  now.  We  all  have  to  admit 
that  something  has  always  existed.  This  external  exist- 
ence you  find  in  a  mind  back  of  nature.  I  find  it  in  na- 
ture, or  in  that  complex  of  agents  which  we  call  nature. 
To  appeal  to  the  fact  of  an  original  chaos,  is  simply  to 
mistake  dispersion  for  disorder.  I  find  the  reign  of  law 
just  as  absolute  in  that  nebulous  time  as  it  is  to-day. 
If  you  ask  how  this  manifold  of  agents  should  work 
together  as  they  do,  I  say,  I  don't  know.  But  I  must 
assume  them  in  some  relation,  and  why  not  the  present 
as  well  as  any  other?  The  objection  that  it  is  infinitely 
improbable  that  such  a  mass  of  elements  should  hit 
upon  just  this  order  of  intelligence  and  escape  all  others, 
makes  three  unwarrantable  assumptions.  The  first  is, 
that  a  calculus  of  probabilities  can  be  applied  to  first 

facts,  which  is  a  decidedly  false  assumption.     Such  cal- 
U 


156  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

culus  is  meaningless,  except  as  you  have  already  a  body 
of  known  and  calculable  agencies;  and  then  your  cal- 
culus has  no  effect  upon  the  fact  itself,  but  only  upon 
your  expectation  before  the  fact  declares  itself.  If,  for 
instance,  I  throw  a  cube  marked  as  in  dice-playing, 
there  are  five  chances  to  one  that  an  ace  will  not  turn 
up.  This  consideration  would  make  it  quite  hazardous 
to  bet  on  the  ace,  and  I  should  govern  my  action  ac- 
cordingly. But  when  the  cube  has  been  thrown  and 
the  ace  has  turned  up,  I  must  accept  the  fact,  and  can 
never  call  in  my  previous  calculus  of  probabilities  to 
show  that  the  ace  has  not  turned  up.  I  had  previously 
little  ground  for  expecting  the  ace  to  turn  up;  but  I 
had  just  as  much  reason  for  expecting  the  ace  as  any 
one  of  the  other  sides.  And,  now  that  the  ace  has 
turned,  I  accept  the  fact,  and  my  previous  calculus  of 
probabilities  has  no  further  application.  Such  calculus, 
therefore,  does  not  apply  to  first  facts,  because  it  is 
meaningless  without  first  assuming  a  known  set  of  agents 
and  conditions.  And,  furthermore,  it  cannot  be  played 
off  against  any  fact  after  the  fact  is  once  there.  More- 
over, if  we  should  apply  this  calculus  to  first  facts, 
would  a  harmony  among  the  elements  be  any  more  im- 
probable than  the  existence  of  an  eternal  and  omnis- 
cient mind? 

The  second  unwarrantable  assumption  is,  that  the  ele- 
ments were  once  in  such  indeterminate  relations  that 
an  infinity  of  directions  were  possible;  and  hence  the 
question  arises,  how  they  could  have  escaped  all  the  in- 
harmonious and  chaotic  combinations,  and  hit  upon  the 
present  orderly  and  harmonious  one.  This  assumption 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOtirt'ftl^    15* 

is  an  unpardonable  sin  against  the  firsa^r^oipJes  of 
mechanical  science.  It  is  based  upon  the  fnlse  notion 

*  ^***^^L        '  -     —=^ 

that  all  being  must  have  had  a  beginning;  whereas 
every  system  has  to  admit  an  eternal  being  of  some 
kind  as  its  foundation,  which  being,  again,  is,  and  is  as 
it  is,  simply  because  it  is.  Explanation  cannot  go  on 
forever;  but  must  come  down  to  an  ultimate  fact  of 
which  no  further  account  can  be  given  than  that  it  is, 
and  has  such  or  such  attributes  or  ways  of  working. 
Now,  continues  our  anti-teleologist,  there  is  no  place  for 
indeterminateness  in  a  mechanical  system  such  as  I  be- 
lieve in.  The  present  is  the  necessary  result  of  the 
past  and  the  only  possible  one.  Make  a  cross  section 
of  the  stream  of  things  at  any  point  whatever,  within 
the  nebula  or  beyond  it,  and  you  find  the  complete  pro- 
vision for  the  present  order  of  things,  with  the  exclu- 
sion of  every  other.  We  can,  indeed,  think  of  other 
orders;  but  no  other  order  was  ever  possible  in  fact. 
En  reality,  the  actual  is  the  only  possible.  When,  there- 
fore, the  teleologist  calls  upon  the  scientist  to  explain 
how  the  original  indefiniteness  escaped  all  the  chaotic 
arrangements  possible,  and  hit  upon  the  present,  which 
seems  so  replete  with  intelligence,  he  mistakes  the  most 
fundamental  mark  of  mechanical  science;  and  when  the 
scientist  admits  such  an  original  indeterminateness,  and 
attempts  to  show  how  it  has  gradually  acquired  defi- 
niteness,  he  sins  equally  against  the  first  principles  of 
the  mechanical  theory.  This  theory  comes  down  to  the 
notion  of  definite  elements,  in  definite  relations,  and 
claims  that  they  explain  all,  and  that  it  is  unnecessary 
to  go  behind  them.  Its  first  fact  is  a  world-order 


158  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

among  the  elements.  This  fact  is  an  eternal  miracle; 
but  then  it  exists,  and  all  else  exists  in  consequence. 
The  elements  must  be  in  some  relation,  and  why  not  in 
harmonious  relation?  What  better  right  to  existence 
has  chaos  than  order?  What  real  ground  is  there  for 
assuming  that  disorder  must  have  been  first? 

We  are  anxious  to  let  the  anti-teleologist  have  fair 
play;  and  so  we  listen  to  his  criticism  of  the  third  as- 
sumption. He  says:  It  is  tacitly  assumed  by  the  teleol- 
ogist  that  the  present  order  is  not  only  a  miracle  of  de- 
sign but  of  perfection,  too,  and  that  any  other  grouping 
of  the  atoms  would  have  resulted  in  comparative  dis- 
order. It  is,  therefore,  a  ground  for  great  wonder,  that 
of  all  possible  combinations  the  most  perfect  should 
have  been  hit  upon,  if  there  were  no  guiding  mind. 
The  anti-teleologist  adds,  that,  admitting  the  untenable 
thought  of  various  possible  combinations,  the  teleol- 
ogist's  view,  that  the  present  is  the  best  possible  order, 
is  sheer  assumption.  So  far  as  our  experience  goes, 
there  is  much  to  criticise  in  the  order  of  things.  There 
is  much  that  seems  to  us  useless;  there  is  very  much 
that  seems  positively  mischievous;  and  there  is  very 
little  that  appears  to  have  such  transcendent  worth 
that  we  cannot  imagine  a  better,  or  that  it  should  seem 
absurd  to  ask  what  it  is  for.  Nature  is,  to  a  certain 
extent,  usable,  and  much  has  been  made  of  this  fact  in 
the  design-argument.  We  do  empoy  natural  agents 
to  a  large  extent  as  our  servants;  but  the  argument 
forgets  that  nature  is  often  obstinate  and  intractable. 
Certainly  nature  is  not  so  eminently  usable  that  we 
must  assume  a  purpose  to  account  for  it.  Moreover,  in 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  150 

great  departments  of  natural  activity  we  see  no  pur- 
pose at  all;  at  least  we  see  none  which  it  seems  worth 
while  to  realize.  What  great  need  was  there  of  filling 
the  world  with  noxious  nuisances,  such  as  the  insect 
world  is  for  the  most  part  ?  What  crying  necessity  for 
producing  the  parasitic  orders?  Would  the  universe 
have  been  less  perfect  if  fangs  and  claws  and  venom 
had  been  left  out?  Nay,  even  this  tedious  sameness, 
which  is  called  the  uniformity  of  nature,  would  not 
that  be  improved  by  an  occasional  change  ?  Why  not 
something  new  and  interesting,  at  least  once  in  awhile? 
Moreover,  is  it  at  all  sure  that  the  good  results  we  see 
could  not  have  been  reached  in  a  far  better  way  ?  The 
world,  with  all  its  imperfections,  does,  indeed,  contrive 
to  keep  a-going,  but  that  is  all.  The  notion  that  it  is 
the  best  possible  is  in  sharp  contradiction  to  our  expe- 
rience, and  is  in  no  way  susceptible  of  proof. 

The  denier  of  design  in  nature  has  expounded  his 
theory  at  great  length  and  with  much  force.  It  is 
certain  that  the  doctrine  of  probabilities  is  often  mis- 
used in  theistic  writings.  It  is  assumed  that  there  was 
a  period  when  matter  was  lawless  and  chaotic,  and  the 
easy  conclusion  is  drawn,  that  order  could  never  have 
arisen  from  such  a  state.  But  the  atheist  need  not 
admit  such  a  state,  without  more  proof  than  is  com- 
monly given.  The  denier  of  design  in  his  last  objec- 
tion has  assumed  that  the  argument  for  ends  in  nature 
rests  upon  observation  only,  whereas,  in  the  previous 
chapter,  we  have  seen  that  they  are  postulates  of  in- 
ductive science.  He  has  also  touched  upon  the  prob- 
lem of  evil,  before  which  all  human  wisdom  is  dumb. 


1  60  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

It  will  not  escape  notice  that  his  criticisms  of  the  actual 
order  are  both  teleological  and  anthropomorphic.  He 
judges  it  throughout  by  the  standard  of  human  in- 
terests; and  where  he  can  see  no  end,  he  assumes  that 
there  is  none.  But  omitting  further  reference  to  these 
points,  his  position  is  this:  Nature  does,  indeed,  show 
harmony  and  adaptation;  but  they  are  accounted  for 
by  natural  agents;  and  there  is  no  need  to  go  behind 
these  agents  for  further  explanation.  But  in  judging 
this  view  we  must  guard  against  an  unconscious  self- 
imposition  of  which  we  are  often  guilty  at  this  point. 
Theism  is  often  spoken  of  as  a  metaphysical  and  re- 
ligious theory,  while  the  atomic  doctrine  is  opposed  to 
it  as  a  scientific  fact.  In  truth,  both  are  theories,  and 
both  are  equally  metaphysical  and  speculative.  That 
the  atoms  exist,  is  as  much  a  matter  of  inference  as 
that  God  exists.  That  they  are  adequate  to  the  facts, 
is  known  by  assuming  them  so.  The  physical  agents 
explain  phenomena  because  they  are  expressly  con- 
structed for  that  purpose  by  the  scientific  theorist. 
The  theist  reasons  to  God,  to  explain  the  unity  and  har- 
mony of  the  universe.  The  atheist,  for  the  same  pur- 
pose, reasons  to  atoms,  which,  no  one  knows  how  or 
why,  do  actually  work  together  without  intelligence 
and  without  knowledge  of  one  another's  existence,  yet 
in  such  a  way  as  not  only  to  mimic  intelligence  but 
also  to  produce  it.  But  after  the  atheist  has  thus  rea- 
soned to  his  atoms,  and  has  endowed  them  with  all 
they  need  in  order  to  get  along  with  the  facts,  he  re- 
gards them  as  self-existent  and  eternal.  The  argu- 
ment is,  that  if  such  wonderful  atoms  did  exist,  they 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  161 

would  explain  the  universe;  and  the  facts  prove  that 
such  atoms  do  exist:  hence  they  explain  the  universe. 
It  is  allowed  that  if  such  atoms  were  created,  they 
would  be  a' miracle  of  wisdom;  but  there  are  no  facts 
which  point  to  their  origination,  and  why  may  they  not 
be  viewed  as  the  uncreated  facts  of  the  universe  ?  The 
rational  atheist  does  not  appeal  to  chance,  for  a  me- 
chanical system  knows  nothing  but  necessity.  He  does 
not  say  that  the  atoms  happened  to  be,  but  that  they  are. 
He  does  not  say  that  they  chanced  upon  their  harmonious 
relations  and  interactions,  but  that  they  actually  exist 
and  work  in  harmony.  Why  things  do  not  work  other- 
wise, he  does  not  pretend  to  say.  It  is  their  nature  to 
work  as  they  do,  and  that  is  the  last  word  upon  the 
subject.  Their  harmonious  interaction  and  adjustment 
do  not  prove  the  dependence  of  the  system,  because 
the  elements  were  postulated  in  such  rational  and  pur- 
pose-like adjustment;  and  the  atheist  claims  that  there 
are  no  other  facts  which  prove  their  dependence.  The 
theist  makes  God  his  ultimate  fact;  the  rational  atheist 
finds  that  fact  in  the  order  and  nature  of  things.  All 
other  forms  of  atheism  he  regards  as  vulgar  and  unphil- 
osophic,  and  an  easy  prey  to  the  theist. 

In  opposition  to  this  subtlest  form  of  atheism  we 
hold:  (1)  This  position  is  essentially  skeptical  and 
tends  to  the  overthrow  of  all  science.  (2)  The  attempt 
to  explain  the  intelligible  order  of  the  world  by  re- 
ferring to  an  unintelligent  nature  of  things,  leads  to  the 
necessity  of  denying  mind  in  man  as  well  as  in  nature. 
(3)  Both  physical  and  metaphysical  arguments  make  it 


162  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

impossible  to  regard  the  visible  universe  as  self-depend- 
ent. But  before  going  further  we  shall  find  our  ad- 
vantage in  a  critical  exposition  of  the  system  before  us, 
and  in  a  deduction  of  its  results. 

The  first  thing  which  strikes  the  critic  is,  that  this 
system  properly  explains  nothing,  but  tacitly  assumes 
every  thing.  It  explains  the  visible  order  by  assuming 
it  in  the  nature  of  things.  It  explains  the  forms  of 
matter  by  assuming  that  matter  is  loaded,  so  as  to  fall 
as  it  does.  But  this  loaded  matter  is  eternal,  and  hence 
we  need  not  go  behind  it.  It  further  necessitates  very 
great  changes  in  the  current  notions  of  matter,  and 
puts  to  death  all  those  vulgar  forms  of  atheism  which 
imagine  that  time  alone  can  ever  do  the  work  of  in- 
telligence. For  wherever  we  make  our  cross  section  of 
the  past,  we  find  the  present  order  given,  and  every  other 
order  excluded.  In  determining  the  nature  of  the  cause 
or  causes  of  phenomena,  we  are  forced  to  take  account 
of  the  phenomena,  and  make  provision  for  them  in  the 
nature  and  arrangement  of  those  causes.  The  crude 
materialism  of  the  past,  which  aimed  to  get  the  higher 
out  of  the  lower,  the  living  from  the  dead,  sensibility 
from  the  insensible,  and  thought  from  the  unthinking, 
must  be  abandoned.  The  notion  of  the  ancient  ma- 
terialists, that  matter,  conceived  merely  as  a  collection 
of  little  hard  lumps  or  as  bits  of  solid  extension,  can 
explain  phenomena,  is  spoken  of  by  Professor  Tyndall 
as  "absurd,  monstrous,  and  fit  only  for  the  intellectual 
gibbet"  (" Fragments  of  Science,"  p.  160.)  In  his  an- 
swer to  Mr.  Martineau  (printed  also  as  a  preface  to  the 
second  edition  of  the  "  Fragments  of  Science  ")  he  com- 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  163 

plains  that  people  persist  in  holding  only  those  notions 
of  matter  which  suffice  for  works  on  mechanics.  He 
insists  that  matter  can  be  defined  only  by  observing 
what  it  can  do.  Of  matter  and  force  he  says :  "  If  life 
and  thought  be  the  very  flower  of  both,  any  definition 
which  omits  life  and  thought  must  be  inadequate,  if 
not  untrue,"  (p.  122.)  Again,  in  the  preface  referred 
to,  after  having  recounted  many  marvels  of  the  uni- 
verse, he  says:  "Matter  I  define  as  the  mysterious 
something  by  which  all  this  has  been  accomplished."  * 
Thus  Professor  Tyndall  proves  the  cause  of  things  to  be 
material  by  the  easy  process  of  naming  it  matter. 
Again,  Sir  William  Thomson  says :  "  The  assumption  of 
atoms  can  explain  no  property  of  body  which  has  not 
previously  been  attributed  to  the  atoms  themselves." 

But  there  is  no  need  to  pile  up  authority,  for  a  little 
reflection  will  convince  us  that  it  must  be  so.  The 
problem  is  to  find  a- ground  for  phenomena,  and  the 
cause  must  fit  the  effects.  The  scientist  feels  justified 
in  assuming  a  manifold  of  elements  at  the  base  of 
phenomena;  and  the  nature  of  these  elements  or  atoms 
must  be  determined  from  observation  of  what  they  do. 
First,  there  are  phenomena  of  gravitation.  We  at- 
tribute, therefore,  to  the  atoms  a  general  power  of  at- 
traction. There  are  next  phenomena  of  cohesion,  which 
obey  other  laws  than  those  of  gravitation.  Hence, 

*  It  may  be  pointed  out  that  this  notion  of  a  new  definition  of 
matter,  so  as  to  make  it  something  mystic,  plastic,  wonderful,  which 
is  becoming  so  popular  with  atheistic  speculators,  is  nothing  but  the 
hylozoism  of  the  early  Greeks.  It  has  made  its  appearance  often  in 
speculation,  especially  in  Hobbes  and  the  French  materialists  of  the 
hist  century. 


164  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

we  give  the  atoms  a  new  power  of  cohering  under 
certain  circumstances.  Among  certain  members  of  the 
atomic  group,  and  under  certain  circumstances,  a  new 
class  of  phenomena — the  chemical — appears.  We  en- 
large our  notion  of  the  atom,  therefore,  to  meet  the 
emergency,  and  attribute  to  the  atoms  a  power  of 
chemical  action  under  the  fitting  conditions.  Coming 
higher  up,  we  find  a  new  set  of  phenomena — the  vital; 
and,  as  we  have  determined  to  know  nothing  but  the 
atoms,  we  must  once  more  enlarge  the  notion  of  the 
atoms  and  make  provision  for  vital  action.  Besides,  as 
the  results  of  this  vital  action  are  of  the  most  diverse 
kind,  presenting  great  dividing  lines  of  classes,  species, 
etc.,  we  must  arrange  for  this  too  in  the  nature  of  the 
atoms.  Accordingly,  the  atoms  must  be  of  such  a 
character  that  in  one  plant  or  animal  they  will  regard 
the  peculiar  type  to  which  it  belongs.  If  we  should 
allow  the  atoms  to  be  indifferent  to  organic  forms,  the 
existence  and  diversity  of  forms  would  find  no  explana- 
tion in  the  atoms.  Hence,  we  escape  admitting  species 
outside  of  the  atoms  by  the  easy  device  of  putting  a 
provision  for  them  in  the  atoms  themselves.  Again, 
there  are  harmony  and  adaptation,  and  seeming  purpose, 
in  nature.  These  too  must  be  explained;  and  we  cab 
do  it  only  by  once  more  reconstructing  the  atoms  and 
making  them  of  such  a  nature  that  they  shall  work  to- 
gether as  if  for  the  realization  of  a  common  purpose. 
Finally,  there  are  phenomena  of  sensibility  and  thought. 
There  is  no  possibility  of  getting  these  out.  of  our  atoms 
as  having  only  mechanical  and  chemical  properties; 
but  there  is  no  difficulty  in  reopening  the  atomic  no- 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  165 

tion,  and  stuffing  in  the  new  content.  Accordingly, 
we  cut  the  knot  by  conceiving  certain  of  the  atoms  to 
have  the  power  of  thinking  and  feeling  when  they 
come  into  certain  combinations.  Moreover,  as  some 
phenomena  of  consciousness  are  of  such  a  nature  as  to 
make  it  impossible  to  view  them  as  a  product  of  two  or 
more  agents,  we  must  make  some  one  of  these  atoms 
the  seat  of  the  mental  phenomena  at  any  given  mo- 
ment; and,  as  the  atoms  are  in  constant  flux,  we  must 
suppose  the  receding  atoms  to  transfer  the  whole  of 
consciousness  to  those  which  come  after,  and  that,  too, 
so  deftly  as  to  produce  not  the  slightest  break  in  the 
continuity  of  the  mental  life.  It  is  rather  difficult  to 
see  how  all  this  can  be  done ;  indeed,  some  of  the  de- 
mands made  upon  the  atoms  seem  to  border  on  contra- 
dictions; but  we  let  that  pass. 

The  reader  will  see  the  method  of  the  anti-teleologist. 
We  have  left  the  old  materialism  far  behind.  We  have 
got  life  and  mind  out  of  matter  by  including  them  in 
its  definition.  We  have  proved  our  atoms  quite  capa- 
ble of  conducting  the  universe;  first,  by  assuming  that 
there  is  nothing  but  atoms;  and,  second,  by  distributing 
with  free  hand  to  the  atoms  all  they  may  need  to  enable 
them  to  get  along  with  the  facts.  Now  see  the  point  to 
which  we  have  come.  All  scientific  hypotheses  are  con- 
structed for  the  express  purpose  of  explaining  the  facts. 
The  causes,  or  agents,  assumed,  are  expressly  adapted 
to  produce  the  phenomena  in  question.  To  do  this  we 
have  endowed  them  with  the  most  complex  powers,  and 
put  them  in  the  most  complex  relations.  We  have  pro- 
vided for  the  order  and  diversity  of  the  universe  by 


166  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

assuming  it  in  the  atoms.     We  have  explained  away 
the  need  of  an  intelligent  creator  by  explaining  omnis- 
cience into  things.     We  have  dispensed  with  a  God 
back  of  the  elements  by  making  the  atoms  themselves 
a  host  of  little  gods.     That  this  expression  is  none  too 
strong,  appears  if  we  think  of  the  demands  which  the 
simple  law  of  gravitation  makes  on  the  atoms.      Ac- 
cording to  this  law,  every  atom  acts  upon  every  other, 
and  acts  upon  each  one  as  if  all  the  rest  were  away. 
At  every  instant  it  is  adjusting  itself  to  the  activities 
of  every  other  in  the  universe,  aifd  regulates  its  own 
accordingly.     But  this  demands  the  ceaseless  yet  in- 
stantaneous solution  of  the  practically  infinite  number 
of  equations  which,  at  each  moment,  express  the  rela- 
tion of  one  atom  to  all  the  rest.     If  atoms  exist  at  all, 
there  are  decillions  of  decillions  of  them;  and  hence 
each  atom  must  solve  instantaneously  decillions  of  de- 
cillions of  equations,  and  this  forever.     But  while  all 
human  intelligence  is  palsied   by  the  conception,  the 
atom  is  supposed  to  be  abundantly  able  to  do  it  forever, 
and  without  any  consciousness  of  itself,  or  of  what  it 
is  doing,  or  of  the  existence  of  the  others  to  which  it 
is  forever  responding.     Or,  we  can  put  it  in  another 
way.     Any  and  every  change  of  distance  between  an 
atom  and  any  other,  demands  a  corresponding  change 
of  activity.     When  we  come  to  the  molecules,  a  change 
of  a  millionth  of  an  inch  results  in  the  change  from  at- 
traction to  repulsion.     But  this  change  of  distance  is 
incessant,  and  the  number  of  changes  in  every  instant 
are    practically  infinite.      The  atom,  then,  must  have 
absolute  sensibility  to  these  changes  of  distance,  yet 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  167 

without  consciousness  or  intelligence  of  any  sort.  That 
an  army  of  men  without  reason  or  sensation  should, 
without  external  guidance,  but  solely  from  the  nature 
of  things,  come  together  and  produce  the  most  complex 
and  purpose-like  products,  would  have  only  an  infinites- 
imal part  of  the  wonder  which  the  action  of  the  atoms 
has.  We  need  not  complicate  the  matter  by  referring 
to  the  various  other  laws  of  force  which  the  atom  is 
also  obeying.  The  simple  law  of  gravitation  almost 
forces  us  to  take  refuge  from  the  dizzy  vastness  of  the 
problem  in  the  theory  of  an  omnipotent  and  omniscient 
administrator  of  nature.  Indeed,  the  difficulties  of  the 
nature-of -things  doctrine  are  so  great  when  applied  to 
the  atomic  theory,  that  there  is  always  a  strong  tendency 
among  those  who  hold  it  to  take  refuge  in  some  form 
of  pantheism.  For  where  there  is  a  plurality  of  things, 
there  must  be  a  plurality  of  natures;  and  where  there 
is  a  plurality  of  self-existent  things,  there  must  be  a 
plurality  of  self -existent  natures.  Hence  the  atheistic 
explanation  is  not  properly  based  on  the  nature  of 
things,  but  on  the  natures  of  things.  How  these  indi- 
vidual self -existent  natures  are  brought  into  relations  of 
interaction  and  harmonious  co-working,  it  does  not  ex- 
plain; and  yet  this  is  the  knot  of  the  problem.  Now 
when  we  remember  (1)  that  the  atom  is  not  a  matter  of 
knowledge  but  of  inference  only,  and  (2)  that  the  prob- 
lem of  thought  is  to  find  the  simplest  and  most  rational 
explanation  of  the  facts,  it  can  hardly  be  claimed  that 
the  doctrine  of  a  one  God  who  creates  and  co-ordinates 
all  things,  is  harder  to  comprehend,  or  less  satisfactory 
to  reason,  than  the  notion  we  have  been  considering.  In 


168  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

the  former  view,  all  is  luminous  and  intelligible;  in  the 
latter,  all  is  opaque  and  impenetrable.  The  nature-of- 
things  doctrine  explains  phenomena  by  assuming  a  set 
of  agents  with  just  such  qualities,  and  in  just  such  rela- 
tions, that  they  cannot  but  produce  the  phenomena  in 
question.  Of  course,  this  is  an  explanation.  When  the 
juggler's  hat  is  first  stuffed  with  the  appropriate  mat- 
ter, there  is  no  difficulty  in  explaining  the  astonishing 
fullness  of  material  which  is  drawn  from  it.  When  the 
dice  are  known  to  be  loaded,  it  is  easy  to  understand 
their  peculiar  turns. 

Before  passing  on,  however,  we  may  note  the  position 
which  Darwinism  and  evolution  must  take  in  such  a 
scheme.  We  have  debated  the  question  on  the  ground 
of  the  atomic  theory,  as  that  is  the  conception  most  fa- 
vored by  science  at  present.  The  conclusion,  however, 
is  equally  good  for  any  system  whatever  which  assumes 
that  the  present  is  the  necessary  product  of  the  past. 
Every  such  system  is  forced  by  its  principles  to  involve 
the  phenomena  before  it  can  evolve  them.  Its  data  in- 
variably contain  implicitly  what  afterward  becomes 
explicit.  The  higher  is  never  deduced  from  the  lower: 
but  both  lower  and  higher  are  but  the  several  phases 
of  the  basal  fact  thus  assumed.  The  blade  does  not  ex- 
plain the  ear;  but  both  blade  and  ear  are  but  successive 
phases  of  the  cycle  involved  in  the  original  nature  and 
disposition  of  the  efficient  causes.  The  nebula  does  not 
explain  the  solar  system;  the  dead  does  not  explain  the 
living;  the  non-intelligent  does  not  explain  the  intelli- 
gent; the  brute  does  not  explain  the  man;  but  the  neb- 
ula and  the  system,  the  living  and  the  dead,  the  intelli- 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOL OGY.  169 

gent  and  the  non-intelligent,  the  brute  and  the  man, 
all  are  but  the  various  phases  of  the  one  all-embracing 
cycle  which  is  given  in  the  primal  nature  and  disposi- 
tion of  the  efficient  causes  of  the  universe.  We  must, 
therefore,  lay  aside  the  vulgar  conception  of  Darwin- 
ism and  evolution,  which  gets  the  living  from  that 
which  is  nothing  but  the  dead,  and  man  from  that 
which  is  nothing  but  the  brute.  Every  thing  which  is 
to  mount  above  itself  must  have  in  itself  the  tendency 
to,  and  the  provision  for,  that  higher  plane.  When, 
then,  nature  manifested  nothing  but  mechanical  or 
chemical  phenomena,  it  was  not  merely  mechanical  and 
chemical,  but  more,  and  was  already  on  the  way  to  the 
realization  of  that  more.  When  nature  could  show 
nothing  higher  than  the  brute,  nature  was  not  merely 
brute,  but  more,  and  the  advent  of  that  more  into  ex- 
plicit reality  was  approaching.  Without  this  assump- 
tion no  scheme  of  development  is  for  a  moment  tenable. 
Every  new  increment  would  be  a  creation,  and  some- 
thing would  arise  from  nothing.  But  the  great  god 
Brahm  is  no  less  Brahm  before  he  has  taken  on  form 
and  finiteness  than  he  is  afterward.  He  is  forever  equal 
to  himself;  and  when  he  returns  to  the  "  void  and  harm- 
less infinite  "  we  may  not  call  it  a  descent.  The  ex- 
plicit power  and  wisdom  which  once  went  forth  from 
him  have  been  re-enfolded;  that  is  all.  Both  Darwin- 
ism and  evolution  must  come  within  the  circle  of  the 
universal  mechanism,  and  abandon  those  modes  of  ex- 
pression which  savor  so  strongly  of  chance,  as  contra- 
dicting the  first  principles  of  physical  science.  More- 
over, both  doctrines  must  descend  from  the  rank  of 


170  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

explanations  into  that  of  mere  descriptions  of  sequence. 
They  explain  nothing;  they  assume  every  thing,  and 
merely  describe  to  us  the  successive  phases  of  the  first 
assumption.  The  great  cycle  rolls  on  forever,  mani- 
festing all  the  varied  phenomena  of  the  living  and  the 
lifeless,  of  life  and  death.  What  its  complete  round 
may  disclose  there  is  no  telling.  What  other  possibili- 
ties it  may  reveal  under  new  conditions,  lies  beyond  our 
imagination.  We  can  do  nothing  but  watch  its  succes- 
sive phases  and  record  them.  This  is  the  only  position 
which  the  anti-teleologist  can  take  which  shall  be  in  har- 
mony both  with  the  phenomena  and  with  the  necessary 
principles  of  mechanical  science. 

This  point  is  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  doctrine 
of  natural  selection  is  constantly  appealed  to  as  showing 
how  organic  adaptations  have  been  produced  without 
any  presiding  intelligence,  but  the  success  is  only  appar- 
ent. This  appeal  forgets  that  in  a  mechanical  system, 
or  in  any  system  of  necessity,  there  is  something  back  of 
life  which  determines  it,  and  all  its  unf oldings,  with  ab- 
solute necessity  and  certainty.  The  biological  speculator, 
finding  life  apparently  flexible  and  spontaneous,  forgets 
the  all-embracing  necessity  of  which  it  is  but  a  phase, 
and  makes  a  false  distinction  between  the  determinate- 
ness  of  the  physical  world  and  the  indeterminateness 
of  living  things.  In  this  way,  he  fancies  it  possible  to 
produce  adaptations  of  living  things  to  their  surround- 
ings which  were  not  originally  provided  for  in  the  sys- 
tem. But  this  is  illusion.  No  mechanical  system,  and 
no  system  of  necessity,  can  introduce  any  new  elements 
into  itself,  In  such  a  system,  every  movement  of  every 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  171 

living  thing,  every  variation,  every  survival  and  non- 
survival,  all  life  and  all  its  determining  circumstances, 

ive  always  been  absolutely  determined.  Physics  lies 
>ack  of  biology,  and  reminds  the  speculator  that  every 

laptation  and  harmony  now  in  the  system  have  always 
been  there.  The  explanation  of  organic  adaptations, 
therefore,  by  natural  selection,  or  by  the  conditions  of 
existence,  or  by  the  survival  of  the  fittest,  reduces  at 
last  to  assuming  a  set  of  agents  of  such  a  kind,  and  in 
such  relations,  that  every  thing  must  have  happened  just 
as  it  has.  With  this  assumption  we  see  very  clearly  how 
things  have  been  brought  about;  we  have  done  more, 
we  have  explained  the  organic  world  without  the  un- 
scientific notion  of  a  planning  and  guiding  intelligence. 
When,  then,  the  Spencerians  offer  to  show  how  an  "in- 
definite, incoherent  homogeneity  "  ought  to  develop  into 
a  "  definite,  coherent  heterogeneity,"  we  make  them  a 
present  of  the  demonstration;  first,  because  the  strictly 
indefinite  can  do  nothing  and  is  nothing,  and  more 
particularly  because  such  a  demonstration  can  have  no 
application  to  the  actual  universe.  For  as  any  given 
phase  of  the  nebula,  which  is  what  they  seem  to  mean 
by  the  homogeneous,  was  necessarily  determined  by  its 
antecedent  phase,  there  is  nowhere  any  room  for  inter- 
polating hypotheses  about  origins.  An  undetermined 
nebula  was  never  given;  and  it  is  quite  idle,  therefore, 
to  speculate  on  what  such  a  nebula  would  do.  A  self- 
centered  and  abiding  world-order  moves  on  through 
space  and  time,  manifesting  its  various  phases,  and 
bringing  to  life  and  death.  The  conclusion  would  not 

be  modified  at  all  if  we  allow  the  notion  that  the  atoms 
12 


1V2  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

themselves  are  products.  Wherever  there  is  producing 
there  is  something  which  produces;  and  if  the  atoms 
have  been  developed,  we  can  conceive  the  process  as 
resulting  only  from  the  action  of  some  definite  agent 
or  agents,  with  definite  nature,  laws,  and  relations. 
Many  speculators,  in  their  romantic  passion  for  devel- 
opment, write  as  if  every  thing  might  be  developed 
from  nothing.  Such,  then,  is  the  outcome  of  every 
mechanical  system.  It  does  not  explain  order,  but  as- 
sumes it.  Yet  the  intelligible  order  is  the  thing  to  be 
explained. 

For  the  thinker,  this  point  has  already  been  over  illus- 
trated. The  very  notion  of  mechanism  denies  all  chance 
and  indefiniteness.  An  apparent  progress  from  the  in- 
definite to  the  definite  in  such  a  system  is  a  progress 
from  definiteness  which  only  reason  can  perceive,  to  def- 
initeness  which  the  senses  can  perceive.  In  like  manner, 
an  apparent  progress  from  the  like  to  the  unlike,  is  only 
in  appearance.  It  is  a  progress  from  differences  percep- 
tible only  to  reason,  to  differences  perceptible  by  the 
senses.  This  conclusion  is  but  an  analysis  of  the  notion 
of  mechanism;  and  yet  we  feel  justified  in  offering  an- 
other illustration.  The  nebular  theory  is  often  men- 
tioned as  an  instance  where  blind  matter,  under  the 
simple  law  of  gravitation,  has  built  itself  into  a  stable 
solar  system,  and  has  thus  mimicked  the  work  of  intelli- 
gence. It  is  often  both  claimed  and  allowed  that  the 
doctrine  of  ends,  in  the  solar  system,  has  received  its 
deathblow  from  the  nebular  theory;  and  the  notion  ob- 
tains, that,  given  diffused  nebulous  matter  in  any  form 
whatever,  it  must  build  itself  up  into  the  present  system 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  l7-'3 

of  sun  and  planets.  This  is  a  double  mistake.  It  is  not 
true  that  any  nebula  of  proper  mass  would  form  our 
system;  and  the  notion  that  any  tenable  nebular  theory 
disproves  design,  is  due  to  the  coarse  conception  of  de- 
sign to  which  we  referred  in  the  beginning.  If  we  as- 
sume that  the  solar  system  had  a  nebular  origin,  we 
have  to  assume,  not  a  nebulous  mass  in  general,  but  a 
very  definite  nebula,  of  such  form  and  with  such  pecul- 
iar velocities  and  densities  in  the  different  parts,  that 
the  present  system  must  have  been  produced  to  the  ex- 
clusion of  every  other.  No  other  nebula  could  have 
condensed  into  our  present  stable  system.  Whatever 
of  purpose  the  heavens  once  showed  they  show  it  still, 
in  spite  of  any  tenable  nebular  theory. 

The  demands  we  must  make  upon  the  theory  before 
it  fits  the  facts  are  very  great.  No  theory  is  simpler  to 
the  unmathematical  reader;  none,  upon  examination, 
needs  more  bolstering.  The  popular  statement  is  charm- 
ingly simple:  The  matter  of  our  system  was  once  dis- 
pensed so  as  to  spread  beyond  its  present  bounds.  This 
matter  contracted  on  itself,  and  in  accordance  with  a 
well-known  mechanical  law — the  law  of  equal  areas — it 
began  to  roll  more  rapidly  as  contraction  went  on.  The 
result  was,  that  at  the  equator  of  this  mass  a  centrifugal 
limit  was  at  last  reached;  and  a  ring  of  matter  was  left 
behind.  This  ring  afterward  broke  up  and  collected 
into  the  planet  Neptune.  In  the  same  way  other  rings 
and  other  planets  were  formed.  These  planets  would 
all  lie  in  the  same  plane,  and  would  have  a  common  di- 
rection of  both  orbital  and  axial  motion.  Thus  some  of 
the  more  striking  features  of  the  solar  system  seem  to 


174  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

find  an  easy  and  simple  explanation.  The  notion  of  a 
vast  nebula  revolving  upon  its  axis,  and  throwing  off 
rings,  is  a  simple  one;  and  the  process  seems  easy.  But 
unfortunately,  by  the  time  the  theory  is  adjusted  to  the 
facts,  all  this  simplicity  is  gone.  The  end  to  be  reached 
is  a  stable  solar  system;  and  it  is  well  known  that  if  the 
masses,  or  the  orbital  periods,  or  the  relative  distances, 
or  the  orbital  eccentricities  of  the  planets  differed  much 
from  the  actual  ones,  the  system  would  soon  fall  into 
ruin.  If  Jupiter  had  as  eccentric  an  orbit,  not  as  the 
asteroids,  but  as  Mercury  only,  the  result  would  be  dis- 
astrous. The  present  system  may  not  be  absolutely 
stable;  but  it  would  not  be  stable  at  all  if  the  present 
orbits,  masses,  etc.,  were  much  changed.  Very  slight 
changes  would  make  life  impossible  on  our  planet. 
Here  is  an  end,  and  here  is  adaptation  to  secure  it,  ac- 
cording to  the  theist.  The  nebular  theory,  it  is  said, 
gives  a  simple  explanation  of  the  facts  without  the  aid 
of  intelligence.  Let  us  see  how. 

How  shall  we  think  of  the  nebula  ?  First  of  all,  not 
as  proper  gas,  but  simply  as  diffused  matter;  for  on  any 
theory,  gases  tend  to  indefinite  expansion,  and  are  not 
easily  brought  to  contract.  Was  it  hot  or  cold  ?  The 
authorities  differ.  Some  make  it  contract  from  cooling; 
others  make  it  heat  from  contracting.  But  this  point 
is  unimportant,  and  besides,  the  views  are  not  as  much 
opposed  as  they  seem.  We  must  not  think  of  the  ele- 
ments as  arranged  according  to  their  specific  gravities, 
as  that  would  send  hydrogen  out  to  Neptune,  and  leave 
only  the  metals  for  the  inner  planets  and  the  sun.  No 
more  may  we  regard  them  as  homogeneously  diffused. 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  175 

They  must,  rather,  be  so  mixed  that  the  weights  of  the 
resulting  planets  shall  be  such  as  the  stability  of  the 
system  requires;  and  in  particular,  the  earth  must  be 
well  supplied  with  the  elements  which  condition  life 
and  civilization.  We  must  also  think  of  the  nebula  as 
rotating,  and  with  the  same  amount  of  motion  which  the 
system  has  at  present;  for  the  principle  known  as  the 
conservation,  or  equality,  of  areas,  makes  it  impossible 
for  any  mass  of  material  elements  to  vary  its  amount  of 
rotary  motion,  measured  in  any  direction  whatever. 
If,  then,  the  nebula  were  ever  without  revolution,  it 
would  always  have  remained  so.  Rotary  motion,  in  a 
material  system,  is  either  eternal,  or  it  is  introduced  or 
destroyed  from  without.  But  none  of  these  points  are 
of  much  moment.  The  first  great  difficulty  of  the  the- 
ory is,  to  get  rings  of  any  sort  thrown  off.  The  non- 
mathematical  reader  who  has  seen  the  popular  lecturer 
perform  Plateau's  experiment,  in  which  a  sphere  of  oil 
is  made  to  revolve  and  throw  off  rings,  finds  the  process 
very  simple;  but  the  mathematician  can  do  nothing 
with  the  problem.  The  difficulty  is  this:  By  contrac. 
tion  the  atoms  are  brought  nearer  together,  and  the  at- 
tractions between  them  are  strengthened.  But  by  the 
same  contraction,  the  rate  of  rotation  grows  more  rapid, 
and  the  centrifugal  force  is  increased.*  Now,  it  is 
clear  that  unless  the  centrifugal  force  increase  more  rap- 
idly than  the  attractive  force,  no  ring  can  be  detached. 
*  This  is  not  a  contradiction  of  the  constancy  of  the  amount  of 
rotary  motion,  because  that  amount  for  a  particle  is  measured  by  its 
distance  from  the  axis  into  the  distance  rolled.  Hence,  a  small  body 
rotating  rapidly,  may  have  the  same  amount  of  rotary  motion  as  a 
large  one  rolling  slowly. 


1V6  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

But  if  it  does  increase  more  rapidly,  then  when  the  forces 
are  once  balanced,  matter  will  drop  off  constantly  at  the 
equator  thereafter.  For  each  new  contraction  lifts  the 
centrifugal  above  the  central  forces,  and  new  matter  is 
left  behind.  The  result  is,  not  a  series  of  rings  at  great 
distances  from  one  another,  but  a  lens-shaped  sheet  of 
matter,  in  the  plane  of  the  equator  of  the  revolving 
nebula.  This  result  follows  equally  if  we  adopt  La 
Place's  notion,  according  to  which  the  planets  were 
formed  from  the  sun's  atmosphere,  and  are  much  young- 
er than  the  sun.  Such  an  outcome  can  be  escaped  only 
by  arbitrarily  assuming  equatorial  currents  of  matter  of 
vastly  greater  velocity  than  the  parts  beneath  them; 
and  such  currents  can  be  explained  by  no  action  within 
the  mass.*  Another  great  difficulty  lies  in  the  relation 
of  the  orbital  periods  of  the  planets  to  the  axial  rotation 
of  the  sun.  The  most  natural  supposition  about  the 
nebula  is,  that,  like  a  wheel,  it  all  revolves  together,  01 
all  parts  go  around  the  axis  in  the  same  time.  But  such 
a  supposition  would  be  fatal  to  the  theory;  for  the  orbit 
al  periods  of  the  planets  represent  the  time  of  the  sun's 
rotation  when  it  filled  the  orbits  of  the  planets.  The 
sun  should  have  revolved  once  in  a  year  when  it  filled 
the  orbit  of  the  earth,  and  once  in  about  one  hundred 
and  sixty-five  years,  when  it  filled  the  orbit  of  Neptune. 

-  *  Professor  Newcomb,  ("Popular  Astronomy,"  pp.  514,  515,)  gives 
an  extremely  provisional  assent  to  the  nebular  theory,  and  point.* 
out  its  chief  weaknesses.  The  greatest  difficulty,  lie  thinks,  "is  to 
show  how  a  ring  of  vapor  surrounding  the  sun,  could  condense  into 
a  single  planet,  encircled  by  satellites."  The  entire  work  is  marked 
by  a  careful  distinction  of  fact  from  theory,  and  deserves  the  highest 
praise. 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  177 

But  knowing  the  present  rate  of  the  sun's  revolution  we 
can  reason  back  by  the  principle  of  equal  areas  to  the 
time  of  revolution  it  must  have  had  when  it  filled  these 
orbits.  Unfortunately,  theory  and  fact  differ.  If  the 
theory  be  true,  the  sun,  instead  of  revolving  once  a  year 
when  it  filled  the  orbit  of  the  earth,  should  have  re- 
volved only  once  in  three  thousand  two  hundred  years. 
Instead  of  revolving  once  in  about  one  hundred  and 
sixty-five  years,  when  it  filled  the  orbit  of  Neptune,  it 
should  have  revolved  only  once  in  about  two  million 
eight  hundred  thousand  years.  We  get  similar  diverg- 
ences between  fact  and  theory  if  we  calculate  the  result 
for  the  other  planets  and  the  moons.  Finally,  Mars  has 
displayed  a  set  of  moons  which  revolve  around  the 
planet  in  less  time  than  it  turns  on  its  own  axis.  Here 
contraction  has  resulted  in  retarded,  rather  than  accel- 
erated, motion.  To  lessen  this  divergence,  La  Place 
assumed  that  the  sun  was  older  than  the  planets,  and 
that  the  nebula  was  simply  the  solar  atmosphere.  But 
this  only  diminishes,  without  removing,  the  divergence, 
and  greatly  increases  other  difficulties.  The  thorough- 
goer  wishes  to  have  sun  and  all  explained  as  condensed 
nebula.  But  here,  again,  we  may  relieve  the  difficulty 
by  once  more  assuming  equatorial  currents,  generated 
from  without.  In  no  other  way  can  we  save  the  theory. 
We  must  abandon  the  notion  of  a  common  angular  ve- 
locity, of  a  regular  variation  of  density,  and  of  a  regu- 
lar increase  of  axial  rotation  ;  and  make  the  velocities, 
and  the  densities,  and  the  rotations,  just  such  as  the 
facts  call  for.  To  be  sure,  it  is  mechanically  impossible 
that  all  these  effects  should  be  produced  by  any  action 


1 7  8  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

within  the  mass;  but  we  may  adopt  the  suggestion  el- 
Mr.  Spencer,  that  bodies  are  plunging  in  from  without, 
and  that  they  may  adjust  matters.  There  are  lots  of  rov- 
ing nebulae  which  would  be  willing  to  leap  in  and  spur 
up  the  revolving  nebula  so  as  to  leave  a  ring  of  the  right 
size  at  the  right  place.  But  this  is  a  delicate  operation ; 
for  unless  the  ring  be  of  a  certain  size  and  in  a  certain 
place,  and  have  a  certain  orbit,  the  stability  of  the  sys- 
tem will  be  endangered.  Care  must  also  be  taken  that 
the  new  nebula  fall  in  with  the  direction  of  rotation  in 
the  old;  and  it  must  be  especially  careful  to  hit  near 
the  equator,  and  parallel  with  it:  otherwise  the  revo- 
lution would  be  set  back,  or  the  ball  would  be  knocked 
out  of  its  plane;  and  thus  the  stability  of  the  system 
would  be  once  more  endangered.  If  it  should  occur  to 
any  one  that  this  is  a  hap-hazard  way  of  working,  he 
need  only  think  of  the  nature  of  things,  and  all  difficul- 
ties will  disappear.  Of  course,  this  is  not  meant  as  a 
disproof  of  the  nebular  theory;  it  is  only  intended  to 
show  that  the  simplicity  of  the  theory,  which  is  its 
great  charm,  must  be  given  up  if  it  is  to  fit  the  facts. 
And  we  think  it  clear,  that  by  the  time  the  necessary 
auxiliary  hypotheses  are  made,  the  theory  is  wonderful- 
ly like  a  dough-face,  whose  nose  may  be  put  on-  indif- 
ferently up  or  down.  In  truth,  the  theory  has  largely 
fallen  into  disfavor  with  mathematical  astronomers,  and 
is  held  by  them  chiefly  on  grounds  of  physics.  Its  best 
friends  are  the  magazine  scientists.  We  conclude,  then, 
that  while  the  matter  of  our  system  may  once  have  ex- 
isted in  a  neoulous  state,  the  no-design  argument  makes 
a  sorry  show  in  explaining  its  aggregation  into  present 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOL OGY.  179 

order  as  a  mechanical  necessity.  For  it  explains  the 
stable  system,  and  fits  the  earth  for  life  and  civilization, 
not  by  any  nebula,  but  by  a  nebula  which  shall  be  either 
so  arranged  within  itself,  or  so  beaten  upon  from  with- 
out by  other  nebulae,  that  the  masses,  and  eccentricities, 
and  distances,  and  orbits,  and  times,  and  composition 
of  the  planets,  shall  be  just  what  they  must  be  to  secure 
the  result.  It  may  be  said  that  the  solar  system  displays 
no  marks  of  design.  Opinions  differ.  We  only  claim 
that  if  there  are  such  marks,  there  is  nothing  in  the 
nebular  system  to  explain  them  away.  Once  in  awhile, 
some  one  proposes  to  apply  the  principle  of  natural 
selection  to  astronomy,  and  thus,  by  trial,  reach  a  stable 
system  ;  but  such  a  plan  shows  such  dense  ignorance 
of  the  first  principles  of  mechanics  as  to  call  for  no 
criticism. 

A  second  general  criticism  upon  the  mechanical  the- 
ory is,  that  besides  assuming  every  thing  at  the  start, 
it  can,  at  best,  only  result  in  "  a  drawn  battle  against 
teleology."*  No  theory  can  deny  the  general  adapta- 
tion and  harmonious  interaction  of  things;  and  hence, 
if  they  were  created,  they  must  be  viewed  as  the  prod- 
uct of  transcendent  wisdom.  The  attempt  to  elimi- 
nate or  lessen  these  purpose-like  adaptations,  by  going 
back  in  time,  we  have  seen  to  result  from  mental  con- 

*  A  scrap  of  authority  may  be  welcome  to  those  who  need  it. 
According  to  Professor  Huxley,  "The  teleological  and  mechanical 
views  of  nature  are  not  necessarily  exclusive.  The  teleologist  can 
always  defy  the  evolutionist  to  disprove  that  the  primordial  molec- 
arrangement  was  not  intended  to  evolve  the  phenomena  of  the 
miverse."— Academy,  October,  1869. 


180  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

fusion  and  a  certain  bondage  to  the  senses.  Mechan- 
ism can  introduce  no  harmony  or  adaptation  which  was 
not  always  implicitly  in  the  system.  Hence,  after  the 
atheist  has  referred  every  thing  to  the  atomic  mechan- 
ism, the  theist  may  insist  that  the  mechanism  be  ex- 
plained. He  may  claim  that  it  was  made  to  do  its 
work ;  and,  if  we  should  allow  that  this  cannot  be 
proved,  it  is  plain  that  it  cannot  be  disproved.  The 
theist  insists  that  the  very  thing  to  be  explained — the 
harmonious  interaction  of  things  for  the  production  of 
purpose-like  effects — is  not  explained  at  all,  but  as- 
sumed. The  atomic  mechanism  has  all  the  marks  of  a 
manufactured  article,  and  the  theist  demands  that  we 
go  behind  it  to  a  prearranging  mind,  which  is  the  only 
real  explanation  of  harmony  and  adaptation  in  a  mani- 
fold of  objects  and  effects.  Here  the  atheist  is  com- 
pletely at  his  mercy,  unless  he  show  not  only  that  the 
atomic  system  can  be  conceived  as  standing  alone,  but, 
also,  that  the  various  facts  known  about  it  compel  the 
mind  to  affirm  its  self-existence  and  independence.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  theist  can  show  that  the  known 
facts  forbid  us  to  assume  its  independence,  then  the 
teleological  argument  comes  back  with  absolute  con- 
viction. 

That  the  atheist  can  furnish  no  such  proof,  is  almost 
self-evident.  The  nearest  approach  to  it  would  be  an 
attempt  to  show  that  the  properties  of  matter  could 
not  be  other  than  they  are,  and  that,  therefore,  the  very 
notion  of  matter  carries  the  present  order  with  it.  For 
example,  the  conception  of  matter  seems  to  imply  that 
it  necessarily  fills  space;  and  if  its  activities  and  their 


MECHANISM  AtfD  TELEOLOGY.  181 

laws  resulted  with  the  same  rational  necessity  from  the 
notion  of  matter,  then  it  might  seem  fitted  to  be  a  first 
fact.  The  truths  of  geometry  and  arithmetic  appear 
able  to  stand  alone,  and  we  build  mathematical  and 
logical  systems  without  feeling  any  need  for  a  support, 
because  they  are  self-supporting.  If  the  notion  of  mat- 
ter carried  the  present  order  with  it,  just  as  the  mathe- 
matical axioms  carry  mathematics  with  them,  it  might 
serve  as  a  first  fact.  But  it  is  hardly  necessary  to  point 
out  that  this  is  not  the  case.  If  we  except  the  single 
property  of  extension,  not  a  shadow  of  rational  neces- 
sity can  be  shown  for  a  single  circumstance  connected 
with  the  atoms.  They  have  a  definite  number,  but  no 
reason  can  be  given  why  that  number  should  not  have 
been  more  or  less.  They  fall  into  two  great  classes, 
ponderable  and  imponderable;  but  it  is  quite  conceiva- 
ble that  there  should  have  been  only  one  class,  or  any 
number  of  classes,  and  all  of  them  different  from  what 
they  are  at  present.  The  ponderable  atoms  again  fall 
into  some  sixty  classes;  but  there  is  no  difficulty  in  the 
notion  that  there  should  have  been  n  classes,  and  that 
the  present  classes  should  not  have  been.  The  case  is 
not  altered,  if  we  view  them  as  compounds  of  some 
simpler  unit;  for  this  simpler  unit  must  have  had  defi- 
nite properties  and  relations  in  order  to  form  definite 
classes  with  peculiar  properties.  Certain  of  these 
atoms,  again,  have  a  chemical  attraction  for  certain 
others;  but  it  is  perfectly  conceivable  that  this  attrac- 
tion should  have  extended  to  more  or  less  atoms,  and 
that  the  combining  power  should  have  been  greater  or 
less.  The  elements  have  various  active  properties;  but 


1 82  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

it  is  entirely  conceivable  that  these  should  have  been 
more  or  less,  and  that  they  should  have  followed  other 
laws  than  they  do.  The  ponderable  elements  have  all 
an  attraction  of  gravitation;  but  it  is  quite  conceivable 
that  they  should  not  have  it,  and  that  it  should  vary  as 
some  other  law  than  that  of  the  inverse  square  of  the 
distance.  It  was  a  whim  for  a  time  with  some  specu- 
lators who  thought  mainly  with  their  eyes,  that  the 
inverse  square  is  a  necessary  law  of  all  central  forces. 
They  were  seduced  into  this  by  the  idea  of  some  subtle 
ether  streaming  out  from  a  center;  and,  of  course,  the 
amount  of  this  ether  on  a  given  surface  would  vary  in- 
versely as  the  square  of  the  distance  from  the  center. 
But  they  forgot  to  inquire  where  this  outstreaming 
ether  came  from,  and  how  an  outstreaming  could  cause 
an  attraction  or  an  in-going.  They  further  failed  to 
notice  that  on  this  law  there  could  only  be  one  force, 
either  of  attraction  or  of  repulsion,  or  none  in  the  uni- 
verse. If  the  forces  of  attraction  and  repulsion  were 
balanced  at  any  point,  they  would  be  at  all,  and  they 
would  cancel  each  other.  If  not  balanced,  then  one 
would  keep  the  upper  hand  forever,  and  practically 
annihilate  the  other.  But  the  worst  failure  of  all  was 
the  failure  to  see  that  the  majority  of  central  forces  do 
not  vary  as  the  inverse  square  of  the  distance,  but  as 
inverse  higher  powers  of  the  spaces.  Neither  gravita- 
tion nor  its  law  can  be  viewed  as  necessities  of  thought 
No  more  is  its  extent  necessary.  The  most  forces  act 
only  at  molecular  distances,  and  no  necessity  of  thought 
can  be  shown  why  gravitation  of  all  the  forces  should 
extend  across  the  whole  diameter  of  the  sidereal  system. 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  183 

The  elementary  forces  of  the  universe  vary  only  with 
the  spaces  across  which  they  act;  but  no  necessity  can 
be  shown  why  they  should  not  vary  with  the  time,  or 
with  the  velocity,  or  with  the  mass,  or  with  the  mode 
of  aggregation.  In  most  of  these  cases  a  clear  teleo- 
logical  reason  for  the  present  order  can  be  given,  but 
there  is  not  a  shadow  of  metaphysical  necessity.  If 
there  were  no  universal  force,  the  universe  would  be  a 
straggling  mob  of  unrelated  atoms.  If  gravitation  fol- 
lowed any  other  law  than  it  does,  it  would  introduce 
the  profoundest  changes  into  the  system,  and  threaten 
the  stability  of  the  whole.  If  there  were  no  chemical 
properties,  a  stupid  mass  of  uniform  matter  would  re- 
sult. If  their  combining  powers  were  other  than  they 
are,  we  should  have  dead  immobility  or  titter  instabil- 
ity. If  oxygen  and  nitrogen  combined  like  oxygen  and 
hydrogen,  a  single  spark  would  shatter  the  earth.  If 
the  relation  of  the  air  to  radiant  heat  were  slightly 
modified,  life  would  be  impossible,  because  of  the  re- 
sulting heat  and  cold.  If  water  evaporated  only  at  a 
high  temperature,  vegetation  would  soon  be  parched  off 
of  the  earth.  If  the  air  were  speedily  saturated  with( 
vapor,  or  if  its  absorbent  power  were  much  increased, 
the  result  would  be  disastrous.  There  are  no  water- 
works in  any  of  our  cities  which  display  any  thing  like 
the  contrivance  of  the  water-works  of  the  skies.  But 
these,  and  a  million  other  laws,  are  no  necessities  of 
thought.  They  all  have  the  look  of  contrivance  for  an 
end. 

.but,  even  granting  the  necessity  of  the  present  laws 
of  matter,  the  actual  results  are  not  necessary;  for  ex- 


184  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

ample,  the  present  law  of  gravitation  is  quite  compat- 
ible with  other  orbital  motions  than  those  of  the  plan- 
ets, and  even  with  no  orbital  motions  at  all.  Hyperbolic 
and  parabolic  orbits  are  just  as  possible  as  elliptical 
orbits;  and  dead  rest,  or  a  common  mass,  is  as  possible 
as  orbital  motion.  The  choice  depends  upon  the  orig- 
inal disposition  and  velocities  of  the  elements;  but  here, 
again,  no  necessity  can  be  shown  why  they  should  have 
been  so  arranged  as  to  move  in  an  ellipse,  and  not  in  an 
ellipse  or  hyperbola.  Of  course,  no  life  would  have 
been  possible  otherwise,  as  the  planets  would  have  been 
whirled  out  into  space,  and  cold,  and  darkness,  never  to 
return.  That  this  does  not  happen  now,  is  due  solely 
to  the  great  distance  of  disturbing  bodies;  and  as  it  is, 
comets  occasionally  get  switched  off,  and  never  come 
back.  It  is  a  direct  demand  of  the  law  of  gravitation 
that  the  elements  should  have  arranged  themselves  in 
the  nebula  according  to  their  specific  gravities;  but 
that  would  have  sent  hydrogen  out  to  Neptune,  and 
left  only  the  metals  for  the  earth  and  sun;  and,  again, 
life  would  have  been  impossible.  Such  a  result  could 
be  warded  off  only  by  assuming  such  a  peculiar  dispo- 
sition of  the  elements,  that  this  effect  was  not  produced. 
But  no  one  would  claim  that  such  a  disposition  is  the 
only  conceivable  one.  We  often  delude  ourselves  with 
the  notion  that  the  fixed  laws  of  the  elements  make 
only  one  result  possible;  whereas,  what  those  laws  shall 
produce  depends  entirely  upon  the  conditions  under 
which  they  work.  In  themselves,  they  are  just  as  com- 
patible with  phenomenal  chaos  as  with  phenomenal 
order.  Thus  the  elementary  laws  of  matter,  and  even 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  185 

the  laws  of  motion,  appear  as  contingent,  meaning 
thereby  that  they  might  conceivably  have  been  alto- 
gether different.  Still  more  is  this  the  case  with  the 
arbitrary  conditions  under  which  they  work,  and  which 
determine  the  actual  outcome.  The  theist  might,  then, 
claim  with  some  show  of  justice,  that  the  foundation 
stones  of  the  physical  system  are  stamped  with  the 
marks  of  choice  and  purpose.  If,  now,  we  ask  why, 
out  of  the  myriad  conceivable  possibilities,  the  present 
intelligible  order  has  been  realized,  the  theist  answers 
that  the  nature  of  the  elements,  their  laws  and  mutual 
relations,  were  all  determined  with  reference  to  the  end 
they  were  to  realize.*  The  atheistic  answer  is,  that 
things  exist  as  they  do,  and  that  no  more  need  be  said 
about  it.  At  all  events,  the  atheist  can  give  no  other 
answer  as  long  as  he  remains  true  to  his  mechanical 
principles. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  the  no-design  argument, 
based  on  the  mechanical  view  of  nature,  can  never  se- 
cure a  stronger  verdict  against  theism  than  not  proven. 
It  is,  also,  clear  that  mechanism  and  teleology  can  never 
properly  collide,  for  the  teleologist  seeks  an  explanation 
of  tlio  purpose-like  arrangement  and  working  of  things, 

*In  the  volume  on  Theism,  in  the  English  and  Foreign  Philo- 
sophical Library,  the  chief  argument  is,  that  the  conservation  of 
energy  explains  every  thing.  The  author's  knowledge  is  purely 
verbal.  This  doctrine  no  more  explains  the  design  in  things,  than 
does  the  related  one  of  the  indestructibility  of  matter.  Both  doc- 
trines are  compatible  with  utter  phenomenal  chaos.  The  cause  of 
the  phenomenal  order,  therefore,  must  be  sought  elsewhere.  Tho 
doctrine  in  question  is  a  mere  commonplace,  and  is  utterly  power- 
less to  throw  any  light  on  philosophical  questions. 


186  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

and  mechanism  assumes  it;  or,  rather,  teleology  de- 
mands an  explanation  of  the  mechanism.  The  ques- 
tion, then,  is  not  whether  the  mechanical  view  or  the 
Ideological  view  is  the  correct  one,  for  both  may  be 
true.  The  mechanical  system  may  exist  for  the  reali- 
zation of  preconceived  ends.  Both  theist  and  atheist 
may  quite  agree  as  to  the  existence  of  the  mechanical 
system,  but  the  theist  holds  that  that  system  has  all  the 
evidences  of  manufacture.  Thus  the  question  between 
them  takes  on,  at  last,  this  form  :  Can  purpose-like 
effects  prove  the  existence  of  an  intelligent  cause ;  or 
can  purpose-like  adaptations  in  a  manifold  prove  its 
dependence  on  an  intelligent  cause?  ISTow,  concerning 
this  system,  we  have  seen  that  no  rational  necessity  can 
be  shown  for  any  of  its  determinations,  unless  we  think 
of  it  as  made  for  an  end.  We  have  seen  its  extreme 
complexity,  and  the  impossibility  of  deducing  any  thing 
from  it  which  was  not  contained  in  it.  And  here  are 
some  facts:  (1)  The  only  known  explanation  of  harmo- 
nious co-working  and  adaption  in  a  manifold,  is  a  pre- 
arranging mind  ;  and  if  this  explanation,  which  is  so 
potent  in  our  experience,  be  extended  to  the  natural 
order,  it  makes  the  facts  luminous,  and  satisfies  the 
demands  of  the  mind.  (2)  That  this  atomic  system 
exists  is  not  a  fact  of  knowledge,  but  of  inference  only. 
The  attempt,  therefore,  to  play  off  the  atomic  theory  as 
fact,  against  the  theistic  theory  as  mere  hypothesis, 
betrays  a  remarkable  mental  or  moral  condition. 
(3)  That  nothing  exists  but  atoms  is  sheer  assumption 
and  dogmatism.  (4)  We  have  not  a  shadow  of  me- 
chanical insight  into  most  of  the  inorganic  processes  of 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOL  OGT.  187 

nature,  and  none  whatever  into  the  simplest  organic 
processes.  The  assumption,  therefore,  that  all  action 
is  mechanical,  is  not  based  upon  knowledge,  but  upon  an 
a  priori  metaphysical  theory.  (5)  The  aim  of  all  hy- 
potheses is  to  enable  the  mind  to  comprehend  the  facts. 
(6)  That  hypothesis  has  the  best  claim  to  recognition 
which  is  simplest  and  most  rational.  Now,  in  the  light 
of  these  facts,  which  is  the  more  satisfactory  explana- 
tion, the  theistic  theory  that  nature  has  its  root,  and 
the  explanation  of  its  order,  in  an  eternal,  omnipotent, 
and  omniscient  spirit;  or  the  atheistic  theory  of  an 
eternal  mechanism,  whose  parts,  indeed,  work  together 
as  if  they  had  been  contrived,  but  which,  nevertheless, 
are  unoriginated  and  mutually  independent  ?  Remem- 
ber, always,  that  it  is  not  fact  against  theory,  as  is  so 
often  assumed.  It  is  theory  against  theory,  with  reason 
to  judge  between  them.  Certainly  the  theist  need 
never  feel  ashamed  of  his  faith  in  holding  that  such  a 
mechanism  cannot  be  the  first  fact  of  the  universe,  but 
that,  back  of  it,  there  must  be  a  unitary  and  intelligent 
being. 

A  final  difficulty  with  the  mechanical  theory  is,  its 
explanation  of  human  thought  and  action.  A  common 
fault  with  speculators  is,  to  overlook  the  fact  that  man 
is  a  part  of  the  system.  The  human  mind,  therefore, 
and  its  purposive  activities,  must  be  explained  by  the 
mechanical  theory  if  it  is  to  be  adequate  to  the  facts. 
And  here  it  appears  that  mind  in  general  is  known  only 
by  its  effects.  The  human  mind  is  as  much  hidden 

from  observation  as  is  the  infinite  mind.     We  are  con- 
13 


188  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

scions  of  chought  and  purpose  in  ourselves.  That  they 
exist  elsewhere  is  purely  a  matter  of  inference.  And 
here  we  come  upon  the  difficulty  which  has  always 
pressed  the  mechanical  theory  since  the  time  of  Des- 
cartes. The  same  argument  which  disproves  the  ex- 
istence of  mind  behind  physical  phenomena,  disproves 
the  existence  of  mind  in  any  of  the  human  forms  we 
see.  How  does  one  know  that  the  various  living  forms 
about  him  are  sensitive  and  intelligent?  The  reply 
must  be,  that  they  act  as  if  they  were.  But  here  the 
mechanical  doctrine  comes  in  with  just  as  much  reason 
as  in  the  case  of  the  universe,  and  urges  that  these 
physical  forms  are  so  constituted,  that  when  acted  upon 
they  react,  with  divers  manifestations  which  seem  like 
feeling  and  thought,  but  in  truth  they  are  only  very 
complex  mechanisms,  without  any  inner  life.  The  "  as 
if"  by  which  the  atheist  discredits  mind  in  nature,  is 
even  more  effective  against  mind  in  man.  Certainly, 
if  the  construction  of  the  body  manifests  no  thought 
there  should  be  no  difficulty  in  admitting  that  the  mo- 
tions of  the  body  can  take  place  without  any  guiding 
mind.  One  may  urge  that  others  tell  us  that  they 
think  and  feel,  but  this  telling  is  also  a  mechanical 
effect,  with  a  mechanical  cause,  and  does  not  alter  the 
argument  in  the  least.  If  the  nature  of  things  is  suf- 
ficient to  explain  the  universe  without  intelligence,  it 
is  certainly  capable  of  explaining  the  action  and  reac- 
tion of  the  human  body  without  intelligence.  If  the 
mechanical  explanation  of  nature  is  sufficient,  there  is 
no  ground  for  believing  that  the  forms  about  us  which 
we  call  living  are  really  sensitive  and  intelligent.  But 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  189 

if,  on  the  other  hand,  such  a  notion  is  impossible,  and 
we  may  be  practically  sure  of  our  neighbor's  intelli- 
gence as  we  are  of  our  own,  and  that  because  he  acts 
intelligently,  what  becomes  of  the  doctrine  that  no  ac- 
tion of  natural  causes  can  prove  the  reality  of  mind  ? 
If  a  physical  organism  can  so  act  that  we  are  sure  there 
is  a  mind  controlling  it,  why  may  we  not  conclude,  when 
natural  agents  act  in  the  same  way,  that  there  is  a  mind 
controlling  them?  Both  conclusions  stand  or  fall  to- 
gether. A  few  scratches  on  a  piece  of  flint  convince 
the  archaeologist  that  mind  has  been  there,  although 
the  scratches  are  its  only  trace;  and  the  purpose-like 
miracles  of  nature  are  at  least  as  strong  evidence  of 
mind  as  the  hacked  flint.  It  will  occur  to  the  thought- 
less to  say,  that  we  know  from  experience  that  human 
works  are  contrived,  but  we  have  no  such  experience 
with  regard  to  nature.  In  truth,  however,  no  one 
knows  that  any  work  but  his  own  is  contrived,  except 
by  the  purpose  it  shows;  but  if  purpose-like  action 
proves  the  reality  of  the  finite  mind,  it  can  prove  the 
existence  of  the  infinite  mind  also.  The  only  escape 
from  this  is  to  deny  the  substantial  existence  of  the 
unman  mind,  and  make  all  mental  action  an  outcome  of 
physical  necessity,  and  consciousness  a  delusion.  Mr. 
Huxley  bordered  on  this  position  in  his  lecture,  "  Are 
Animals  Automata?"  but  he  limited  the  doctrine,  with 
regard  to  man,  by  saying*  that  though  man  is  only  a 
conscious  automaton,  still  he  is  "  endowed  with  free- 
will in  the  only  intelligible  sense  of  that  much-abused 
term;  inasmuch  as  in  many  respects  we  are  able  to  do 
*  "  Fortnightly  Review,"  November,  1874. 


190  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

as  we  like."  The  name  is  nothing;  the  meaning  is 
every  thing;  and  though  it  is  somewhat  surprising  to 
hear  man  called  an  automaton,  we  steady  ourselves  by 
remembering  that  this  term,  in  Mr.  Huxley's  mouth,  is 
only  a  pleasing  rhetorical  novelty,  for  the  automaton 
is  admitted  to  be  able  to  do  what  it  likes.  A  device  of 
this  sort,  therefore,  will  not  help  us  out;  but  we  must 
make  men  real  automata  if  we  are  to  save  the  mechan- 
ical theory. 

Even  this  position  is  held  by  some  who  claim  to  be 
advanced;  but  the  denial  is  not  yet  complete.  Autom- 
atism does  not  escape  the  necessity  of  admitting  pur- 
posive action  in  the  system  so  long  as  consciousness 
is  allowed  to  stand.  For  man  is  a  part  of  nature,  and 
he  does  act  with  purpose.  In  human  activity,  purpose 
controls  the  arrangement  and  action  of  efficient  causes. 
But  man's  activity,  on  the  mechanical  theory,  would  be 
only  the  activity  of  nature,  and  hence  it  would  follow 
that  nature  does  act  with  purpose,  at  least  in  living  be- 
ings. In  one  department  of  natural  activity,  it  is  certain 
that  purpose  controls  action;  but  if  this  is  possible  in 
the  department  of  conscious  life,  why  not  possible  in 
the  outer  world?  The  claim  that  purpose  is  nowhere 
controlling  in  the  system,  breaks  down,  and  hence  the 
extent  of  its  control  is  purely  a  matter  of  evidence. 
But,  as  we  have  said,  we  have  just  as  good  ground  for 
believing  in  controlling  purposes  in  nature  as  we  have 
in  human  action.  The  purposive  character  of  huma-n 
action  cannot  be  denied  without  breaking  down  con- 
sciousness. And  some  of  the  more  logical  take  even 
this  step.  Consciousness  is  held  to  be  but  a  delusive 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  191 

and  powerless  attendant  upon  the  mechanical  processes 
which  underlie  it.  All  appearance  of  control  over  our 
activities,  all  sequence  of  thought  upon  thought,  or  of 
act  upon  thought,  is  sheer  illusion.  But  by  this  time 
we  reach,  not  science,  but  utter  skepticism.  Here,  then, 
is  the  dilemma  of  the  mechanical  theory :  either  it  must 
allow  the  testimony  of  consciousness,  or  it  must  disallow 
it.  In  the  former  case  it  cannot  deny  the  reality  of  pur- 
posive action  in  the  system  of  things,  and  the  question 
of  its  extent  is  simply  one  of  evidence.  But  as  natural 
action  exhibits  the  same  marks  of  intellectual  arrange- 
ment, we  cannot  deny  it  in  the  former  without  denying 
it  in  the  latter.  In  the  second  case,  the  repudiation  of 
consciousness,  all  knowledge  vanishes,  and  the  very  data 
of  science  are  destroyed.  In  truth,  the  no-design  argu- 
ment is  thoroughly  skeptical  in  its  tendencies.  If  the 
plain  indications  of  things,  and  the  demands  of- reason, 
are  to  be  explained  away  in  the  interests  of  atheism, 
there  is  no  reason  why  every  thing  should  not  be  ex- 
plained away  in  the  interests  of  skepticism.  The  na- 
ture-of-things  argument,  which  assumes  adaptation 
without  a  designer,  is  abundantly  able  to  explain  every 
thing  else  in  the  same  easy  way.  We  cannot  explain 
the  existence  of  fossils  on  mountain  tops  except  by  as- 
suming that  the  mountains  were  once  under  the  sea, 
and  that  the  fossils  were  once  alive;  but  the  nature 
of  things  needs  no  such  assumption.  If  it  could  bring 
organic  matter  together  to  form  a  living  organism,  it 
must  certainly  be  competent  to  produce  an  imitation. 
The  geologist  thinks  he  detects  traces  of  fire  in  many 
of  the  rocks;  but  if  the  nature  of  things  is  such  as  to 


192  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

produce  the  appearance  of  intelligence  without  its  pres- 
ence, it  certainly  might  produce  the  appearance  of  fire. 
In  short,  no  science  could  stand  for  a  moment  if  the 
principles  of  the  no-design  argument  were  allowed. 
Here,  again,  it  will  occur  to  the  thoughtless  to  say,  that 
we  have  experience  in  these  cases,  but  we  have  no  ex- 
perience of  purpose  in  nature;  but  the  claim  is  false. 
In  the  case  of  fire  rock  we  know  that  heat  could  pro- 
duce such  appearances;  in  the  case  of  intellectual  ar- 
rangement in  nature,  we  know  that  mind  would  pro- 
duce such  order.  The  argument  is  equally  good  or 
equally  worthless  in  both  cases.  In  short,  all  objective 
science  is  based  upon  an  "  as  i£; "  and  if  we  distrust  the 
theistic  "  as  if,"  the  scientific  "  as  if "  must  also  fall  a 
prey  to  skepticism. 

Upon  the  whole,  we  must  conclude  that  the  mechan- 
ical theory  makes,  at  best,  but  a  sorry  showing  when  it 
attempts  to  stand  alone.  We  have  no  war  with  the 
mechanical  doctrine  as  a  partial  and  secondary  fact. 
We  object  to  it  only,  as  an  ultimate  and  universal  ex- 
planation of  things.  Before  it  is  able  to  cope  with  the 
simplest  facts  of  inorganic  nature  it  becomes  so  com- 
plex that  the  mind  finds  little  satisfaction  in  it  as  an 
ultimate  fact.  By  the  time  the  organic  world  is  included 
in  it,  the  theory  becomes  a  simple  wax  nose,  which  can 
be  twisted  in  any  desirable  direction.  As  s  :  ch,  it  is 
held,  not  because  it  affords  a  shadow  of  insight  into 
the  facts,  but  because  of  the  tacit  assumption  that  these 
mechanical  agents  include  all  real  being,  and  that  hence 
they  must  explain  the  facts,  even  if  we  cannot  see. how. 
The  theory  is  purely  a  metaphysical  one,  based  upon 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  193 

the  assumption  that  all  action  is  mechanical,  and  that 
all  being  is  material.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  we  have  in- 
finitely more  insight  into  the  purposes  of  nature  than 
into  the  methods  of  their  realization;  but  if  the  as- 
sumption mentioned  be  allowed,  we  may  be  sure  of  the 
sufficiency  of  the  mechanical  theory.  If  we  grant  that 
once  upon  a  time  there  was  nothing  but  the  physical 
elements,  it  is  easy  to  see  that  they  must  have  produced 
the  order  of  the  visible  system,  and  for  the  simple  rea- 
son that  there  was  nothing  else  to  do  it.  When  thought 
and  action  are  reached,  the  theory  is  forced  to  deny  all 
freedom,  and  finally  to  forsake  its  fundamental  prin- 
ciple, that  natural  activity  knows  nothing  of  expecta- 
tion. Thus,  it  comes  down  finally  to  the  notion  of  a 
mechanism  which  can  form  plans  and  adjust  the  means 
for  their  execution.  But  here,  as  every-where,  the 
name  is  indifferent,  if  the  thing  be  understood.  That 
which  forms  and  executes  plans  may  be  called  a  mech- 
anism, if  the  name  pleases  so  much,  but  it  is  just  what 
most  of  us  mean  by  mind.*  Thus  the  mechanical  the- 
ory, by  an  inner  dialectic,  passes  over  into  its  opposite 
and  cancels  itself.  The  determination  to  explain  every 
thing  by  mechanism  makes  it  necessary  to  give  the 
mechanism  mental  qualities.  Bearing  these  facts  in 
mind,  it  hardly  seems  presumptuous  to  claim,  that,  as 
an  ultimate  and  universal  theory,  the  theistic  doctrine 

*  Since  the  time  of  Locke,  some  speculators  have  busied  them- 
selves with  the  question,  Can  matter  think  ?  It  is  a  simple  matter 
of  definition  that  matter,  as  commonly  conceived,  cannot  think ; 
but  there  is  no  great  gain  in  affirming  that  matter  can  think  if  its 
notion  be  extended  to  include  thinking.  The  question  is  a  verbal 
squabble. 


194  'STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

is  a  more  simple  and  satisfactory  hypothesis.  This 
conclusion  we  reach  from  considering  only  the  teleolog- 
ical  aspect  of  things;  and  it  is  the  one  reached  by  the 
common  sense  of  mankind.  It  cannot  be  questioned 
without  involving  science  itself  in  universal  skepticism. 

In  concluding  this  discussion,  it  may  be  allowed  to 
restate  the  argument  in  another  form.  Hitherto  we 
have  allowed  matter  to  be  a  real  existence,  and  have 
claimed  only  that  it  is  not  self-sufficient.  On  the  basis 
of  this  admission,  the  atheist  argues  as  follows:  Matter 
is  a  real  cause  of  phenomena.  All  the  more  complex 
natural  manifestations  are  explicable  as  results  of  the 
primal  qualities  and  laws  of  matter.  Matter,  then,  ex- 
plains much,  and  is  daily  explaining  more.  The  phys- 
icist cannot  question  that  every  physical  fact,  no  matter 
how  high  its  order,  is  a  necessary  outcome  of  its  phys- 
ical antecedents.  But  by  the  law  of  parsimony  we 
are  forbidden  to  assume  causes  beyond  necessity.  Be- 
fore, then,  we  appeal  to  God,  let  us  find  out  what 
matter  itself  can  do.  We  certainly  have  no  right  to 
assume  a  spiritual  cause  unless  we  know  that  material 
causes  are  inadequate.  But  who  knows  all  the  capac- 
ities of  matter?  Every  day  it  becomes  more  mys- 
tic and  wonderful,  and  who  shall  set  a  limit  to  its 
powers?  By  the  law  of  parsimony,  therefore,  theism 
is  an  unnecessary  hypothesis,  until  it  has  proved  a 
negative. 

This  argument  is  a  very  common  one,  and  there  seems 
to  be  great  force  in  it.  In  truth,  however,  it  rests 
upon  complete  ignorance  of  philosophy.  It  assumes 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOLOGY.  195 

that  matter  is  known  as  a  causal  noumenon;  whereas  it 
is  a  commonplace  of  philosophy,  that  causes  of  any  sort 
an  never  seen,  but  inferred.  Matter  as  noumenon  is  as 
hidden  to  sense-perception  as  God  is;  and  it  is  withal 
just  as  metaphysical  a  conception.  Now  what  the 
theist  wishes  to  know  is,  not  what  we  shall  call  the 
power  behind  phenomena,  but  how  we  shall  think  of  it. 
People  who  really  think  do  not  war  about  names  pro- 
vided the  thing  be  understood.  Hence  propositions  to 
define  matter  anew  fill  a  thinker  with  amazement. 
They  are  totally  irrelevant,  and  denote  an  infantile 
stage  of  thought.  The  theist,  then,  is  quite  indifferent 
as  to  the  name  of  the  ultimate  reality;  and  except  that 
the  word  is  misleading  in  its  implications,  he  is  as  will- 
ing to  call  it  matter  as  mind.  But  what  he  does  view 
as  important  is,  to  form  some  conception  of  its  nature ; 
and  this  question  must  always  be  answered  by  an  in- 
ference from  the  phenomena.  Now  the  alternative  can 
never  be  escaped  of  regarding  the  basal  reality  as  intel- 
ligent or  non-intelligent.  The  notion  of  a  third  some- 
thing, which  is  neither,  is  simply  a  verbal  phrase,  and 
represents  no  thought.  The  atheist  chooses,  for  it  is  a 
choice,  to  regard  it  as  non-intelligent.  Here  the  views 
1  ivide.  We  may  regard  this  non-intelligent  reality  as 
one  or  many.  In  the  first  case,  we  have  a  pantheistic 
atheism;  in  the  second,  we  have  atheistic  atomism.  In 
the  first  case,  the  atheist  explains  the  world  by  a  blind 
power  which  works  at  a  multitude  of  discrete  points 
throughout  infinite  space;  which  also  works  in  each  of 
these  points  with  exact  reference  to  all  other  co-existent 
and  sequent  activities;  and  which  finally  combines  all 


196  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

these  activities  with  infinite  skill  into  infinite  products, 
all  compact  of  seeming  purpose,  yet  without  any  knowl- 
edge of  itself  or  of  what  it  is  doing,  or  of  the  order  it 
founds  or  of  the  plan  it  follows.  In  the  case  of  athe- 
istic atomism,  we  explain  the  world  by  an  indefinite 
swarm  of  self -existent  atoms,  which  nevertheless  are  not 
independent,  but  which  do  constantly  correspond  to 
every  other  throughout  space,  with  the  most  mathemat- 
ical exactness,  and  which  also  work  together  as  if  ani- 
mated by  a  common  purpose;  yet  all  the  time  without 
any  knowledge  of  themselves,  or  of  their  fellows,  or  of 
the  order  which  seems  to  rule  them.  No  talk  of  natural 
law  will  affect  this  alternative ;  for  the  law  is  but  an  ab- 
stract from  the  facts  to  be  explained.  Such,  then,  being 
the  implications  of  atheism,  the  theist  holds  that  theism 
requires  less  faith. 

• 

In  the  previous  chapter  we  saw  that  universal  adap- 
tation among  natural  agents  is  a  postulate  of  all  science, 
and  that  the  principle  of  finality  is  a  postulate  of  the 
organic  sciences.  In  this  chapter  we  have  seen  the 
attempt  to  discredit  finality  by  the  mechanical  theory 
of  nature  to  be  both  a  failure  and  suicidal.  If  there  is 
mind  in  man,  there  is  mind  in  nature.  We  believe,  then, 
the  principle  of  finality  to  be  firmly  established;  it 
only  remains  to  utter  a  word  of  caution  as  to  its  use. 
It  is  often  strangely  held,  that  because  a  thing  is  an 
end  in  nature,  it  cannot  also  be  a  means.  The  word 
final,  in  the  phrase  final  cause,  seems  to  be  at  the  bot- 
tom of  this  misconception.  But  there  is  nothing  in 
the  doctrine  to  forbid  the  thought  that  ends  may  be 


MECHANISM  AND  TELEOL  OGY.  19? 

higher  and  lower,  or  that  a  thing  may  be  an  end  with 
reference  to  the  agents  which  produced  it,  and  yet  a 
means  with  reference  to  higher  ends.  We  may  also 
believe  in  finality  in  the  system,  without  pretending  to 
discern  the  ultimate  purpose  of  the  whole.  The  end 
of  things  is  out  of  sight.  Indeed,  that  the  system 
as  a  whole  has  a  purpose,  is  not  clear  to  observation. 
We  perceive  a  great  multitude  of  minor  ends  which 
indicate  that  an  intelligent  power  is  at  work,  but  it  is 
not  easy  to  make  out  a  definite  drift  for  the  whole. 
That  there  is  such  a  drift  we  conclude  from  the  fact 
that  the  power  is  intelligent  in  its  minor  operations, 
and  especially  from  the  moral  and  religious  nature, 
which  will  never  allow  that  the  physical  system  can  be 
an  ultimate  end  with  an  intelligent  being.  There  must 
be  an  end,  though  we  cannot  see  it ;  and  that  end  must 
be  to  develop  souls,  though  we  do  not  see  how  all  the 
arrangements  of  the  present  life  are  necessary  for  such 
an  end.  To  conclude  that  there  is  no  end  because  we 
do  not  see  any,  is  to  assume  omnipotence.  The  gigantic 
growths  of  the  ancient  forests  seem  wasted  when 
viewed  from  without ;  but  coal  plays  an  important  part 
in  civilization.  The  prodigal  production  of  the  cereal 
grains  seems  wasteful  enough,  if  we  assume  that  repro- 
duction is  the  only  end  aimed  at.  It  does  not  seem 
such  folly  when  we  remember  that  society  could  riot 
exist  without  corn.  Indeed,  some  of  the  greatest  tri- 
umphs of  human  invention  seem  stupid  enough  from 
the  outside.  A  savage  visiting  a  city  and  seeing  the 
unsightly  telegraph  lines,  might  conclude  that  they  had 
no  purpose,  or  at  best  that  they  were  meant  as  perches 


l&S  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

for  sparrows.  But  there  is  nothing  irrational  in  belieV* 
ing  that  a  power  which  is  seen  to  be  intelligent  where 
we  can  comprehend  its  action,  is  also  intelligent  in 
realms  where  we  cannot  detect  any  purpose.  Never- 
theless, it  must  be  allowed  that  the  final  purpose  for 
which  all  lower  ends  exist,  that  "  far-off  divine  event 
to  which  the  whole  creation  moves,"  is  not  revealed  to 
our  knowledge,  but  to  our  faith.  We  would  use  great 
reticence,  therefore,  in  speaking  of  the  divine  purposes, 
for  a  sufficient  insight  is  lacking.  Least  of  all,  would 
we  have  physical  science  diverted  from  its  study  of 
phenomenal  laws  in  order  to  search  for  final  causes. 
Such  a  course  could  result  only  in  religious  and  scien- 
tific scandal.  There  are  two  ideals  toward  which  the 
mind  strives  :  first,  to  know  how  every  thing  is  done; 
and,  second,  to  know  what  it  is  done  for.  Both  ideals 
are  unattainable  at  present;  but  the  study  of  the 
methods  of  nature  is  practically  of  vastly  more  impor- 
tance in  physical  science  than  a  study  of  the  purpose  of 
things.  It  is  with  our  belief  in  purpose,  as  with  our 
faith  in  a  divine  providence.  If  this  faith  be  attacked, 
we  are  ready  to  show  that  there  is  no  reason  for  being 
ashamed  of  it.  And  yet  from  no  feeling  of  shame,  but 
from  reverence  rather,  we  prefer  not  to  have  that  great 
name  too  often  upon  our  lips,  but  content  ourselves 
with  believing  that  our  times  are  in  God's  hand  with- 
out specifying  too  curiously  how  he  is  working  out  his 
will  concerning  us. 


THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  199 


CHAPTER  Y. 

THE    CONSERVATION    OF    ENERGY. 

HHHE  man  who  journeyed  from  Jerusalem  to  Jericho 
fell  among  thieves.  The  doctrine  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  energy  has  been  still  more  unfortunate;  it  has 
fallen  a  prey  to  the  magazine  scientists  and  rhetoricians. 
These  have  stripped  it  of  its  true  meaning,  and  saddled 
false  ones  upon  it,  until  scarcely  any  likeness  to  its  sci- 
entific self  remains.  "  We  read  constantly,"  says  Pro- 
fessor Tait,  "of  the  so-called  ' physical  forces' — heat, 
light,  electricity,  etc. ;  of  the  *  correlation  of  the  phys- 
ical forces,'  the  '  persistence  or  conservation  of  force.' 
To  an  accurate  man  of  science,  all  this  is  simply  error 
and  confusion. "%*  These  misunderstandings  of  the 
doctrine  have  given  great  support  to  materialism  and 
atheism.  Hence  the  need  of  examining  the  subject. 

The  doctrine  in  question  was  first  known  as  the  cor- 
relation and  conservation  of  the  forces.  The  forces 
were  said  to  correlate,  and  hence  force  is  one.  Force 
was  also  said  to  be  conserved,  and  hence  was  presuma- 
bly eternal.  But  this  terminology  was  treacherous ;  for 
force  is  defined  in  text-books  on  physics  and  mechanics 
as  any  thing  which  tends  to  change  the  condition  of  a 
body  whether  in  motion  or  at  rest.  Hence,  gravity,  co- 
hesion, affinity,  repulsion,  pressure,  impact,  etc.,  were  all 
*  "  Recent  Advances  in  Physical  Science,"  p.  389, 


200  STUDIES  JN  THEISM. 

arranged  under  the  head  of  force.  Now,  as  the  forces 
were  said  to  correlate,  it  was  easy  to  blunder  into  the 
notion  that  all  the  attractive  and  repulsive  forces  of 
matter  can  pass  into  one  another.  It  was  not  uncom- 
mon to  hear  it  asserted  that  chemical  affinity,  and  even 
repulsion,  were  but  transformed  gravity.  Even  the 
space-filling  quality  of  matter  depends  upon  force;  and 
since  all  the  forces  correlate,  it  occurred  to  some  specu- 
lators that  solidity  and  inertia  also  must,  in  some  way, 
correlate  with  the  other  forces.  Other  speculators, 
whose  ignorance  was  equally  dense  and  exhaustive, 
urged  that  this  would  never  do;  as  in  such  case  matter 
might  go  off  in  a  puff,  and  thus  nothing  would  be  left. 
This  necessity  of  limiting  the  correlation,  was  felt  as  a 
great  hardship  by  the  more  radical  speculators;  and  was 
regarded  as  a  victory  by  the  .conservatives.  The  dis- 
cussion was  mainly  a  logomachy  without  a  ray  of  in- 
sight into  the  scientific  meaning  of  the  doctrine.  All 
things  are  phenomena  of  force;  and  are  not  gravity  and 
repulsion,  and  life  and  mind  and  matter  and  every 
thing,  forces  ?  How,  then,  can  we  deny  their  correlation? 
With  this  understanding  of  the  doctrine,  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  proceeded  to  prove  a  rich  variety  of  proposi- 
tions, such  as  the  indestructibility  of  matter,  the  con- 
tinuity of  motion,  the  correlation  and  equivalence  of 
physical  and  mental  force,  the  impossibility  of  freedom, 
and  divers  sociological  laws.  Mr.  Bain  found  in  it  the 
reason  why  one  cannot  attend  to  many  things  at  once, 
or  become  great  in  many  directions.  So  terrible  are  the 
ravages  in  physics  of  arguing  from  words  without  at- 
tending to  their  scientific  content. 


THE  CONSER  VA  TION  OF  ENER  GY.  201 

The  doctrine  of  the  constancy  of  force  suffered  no 
less  from  this  verbal  exegesis.  Inasmuch  as  force  is 
constant,  what  shall  we  make  of  the  fact  that  all  the 
attractive  and  repulsive  forces  vary  with  the  distance 
across  which  they  act,  so  that  while  their  law  is  con- 
stant, they  themselves  are  incessantly  varying?  In  the 
case  of  gravity,  a  body  at  half  the  distance  acts  with 
four  times  the  energy;  at  double  the  distance,  it  acts 
with  only  one  fourth  of  the  energy.  Whence  the  gain 
and  loss  of  power?  Since  force  is  constant,  the  idea  of 
creation  or  destruction  is  inadmissible;  whence,  then, 
the  increment,  and  whither  the  decrement  ?  No  less  a 
man  than  Faraday  was  sent  off  on  a  wild-goose  chase  by 
reasoning  of  this  sort;  and  he  concluded  that  it  must 
come  from,  and  return  to,  the  ether — that  limbo  of  sci- 
entific difficulties.  He  argues  at  length  that  without 
some  such  assumption  we  come  in  hopeless  conflict  with 
the  doctrine  of  conservation.*  Strangely  enough,  it 
never  seems  to  have  occurred  to  him  that  this  result 
bordered  on  a  reductio  ad  absurdum  of  the  conservation 
doctrine. 

In  like  manner  the  doctrine  that  work  involves  the 
expenditure  of  force  was  misunderstood.  Inasmuch  as 
an  attracting  body  is  forever  pulling  at  all  the  rest  of 
the  universe,  it  occurred  to  many  speculators  that  the 
.attracting  forces  of  the  elements  must  be  wearing  out. 
Tht,y  have  already  pulled  the  matter  of  our  solar  system 
through  vast  spaces,  and  condensed  it  into  comparative- 
ly very  small  spaces.  Now  as  a  vast  amount  of  work 

*  See  his  paper  in  "  The  Correlation  and  Conservation  of  Forces." 
D.  Appleton  &  Co. 


202  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

has  been  done;  and  as  work  involves  the  expenditure  of 
force,  of  course  the  attractions  are  growing  less  and 
less.  Opposed  to  this  conclusion,  however,  was  the 
awkward  fact,  that,  in  truth,  the  attractions  are  now 
stronger  than  ever  before;  and  thus  the  doctrine  of  con- 
servation was  again  endangered.  To  escape  this  diffi- 
culty, some  speculators  imagined  that  motions  may  be- 
come attractions  or  repulsions,  and  conversely.  That 
motion  implies  something  which  moves,  and  attraction 
something  which  attracts,  and  that  a  moving  thing,  as 
such,  is  not  an  attracting  thing,  was  a  fact  of  which 
they  had  not  the  slightest  suspicion.  This  impossible 
identification  of  motion  and  attractive  or  repulsive  force 
seems  to  underlie  the  following  extraordinary  state- 
ment by  Mr.  Grove,  whose  treatise  upon  the  correla- 
tion of  the  physical  forces  is  popularly  supposed  to  be 
classical:— 

"  Of  absolute  rest  nature  gives  us  no  evidence.  All 
matter,  as  far  as  we  can  ascertain,  is  ever  in  movement, 
not  merely  in  masses,  as  with  the  planetary  spheres,  but 
also  molecularly  or  throughout  its  most  intimate  struct- 
ure, ...  so  that,  as  a  fact,  we  cannot  predicate  of  any 
portion  of  matter  that  it  is  absolutely  at  rest.  Sup- 
posing, however,  that  motion  is  not  an  indispensable 
function  of  matter,  but  that  matter  can  be  at  rest,  mat- 
ter at  rest  would  never  of  itself  cease  to  be  at  rest;  it 
would  not  move,  unless  impelled  to  such  motion  by 
some  other  moving  body  or  body  which  has  moved. 
This  proposition  applies  not  merely  to  impulsive  motion, 
as  when  a  ball  at  rest  is  struck  by  a  moving  body,  or 
pressed,  by  a  spring  which  has  previously  been  moved, 


THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  203 

but  to  motion  caused  by  attractions  such  as  magnetism 
or  gravitation."  * 

If  by  rest  equilibrium  is  meant,  this  passage  is  true 
and  trivial;  otherwise,  it  is  in  such  opposition  to  ele- 
mentary mechanical  physics,  and  even  to  the  true  doc- 
trine of  conservation,  that  it  is  difficult  to  conceive 
how  any  one,  acquainted  with  the  most  rudimentary 
principles  of  physics,  could  make  it.  The  physicist  is 
constantly  considering  cases  of  motion  generated  from 
a  state  of  rest  by  the  mutual  attractions  of  bodies.  All 
that  is  needed  is  mutual  attraction,  with  space  through 
which  to  move.  A  great  proportion  of  mechanical 
problems  are  of  this  kind.  If  Mr.  Grove's  statement 
were  true  as  it  stands,  the  whole  science  of  dynamics 
would  be  at  an  end.  But  it  would  not  pay  to  unravel 
its  possible  meanings.  The  root  of  the  blunder  lies  in 
the  assumed  correlation  of  force  and  motion. 

Yet,  in  truth,  there  was  a  certain  grandeur  in  those 
rhetorical  misunderstandings.  The  notion  of  one  uni- 
versal power,  forever  equal  to  itself  but  of  infinite 
manifestation,  had  great  attraction  for  speculative 
minds;  and,  withal,  it  offered  manifold  opportunities 
for  fine  writing.  Proteus  was  almost  worn  out  by  the 
demands  made  upon  him  for  illustration.  Physics,  it 
was  said,  had  come  to  the  aid  of  metaphysics,  and 
solved  magnificently  the  problem  of  the  beginning  and 
the  end,  over  which  philosophy  had  puzzled  in  vain. 
There  is  neither  beginning  nor  end.  Nature  is  a  cycle 
returning  into  itself,  and  hence  self-centered  and  eter- 
nal. As  such  it  rolls  on  forever,  manifesting  its  various 


*  See  chapter  ou  "  Motion  in  Correlation  of  Physical  Forces." 

14 


204  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

phases,  and  bringing  to  life  and  death.  It  may  be  well 
to  quote  a  few  passages  in  illustration  of  the  correla- 
tionists'  exalted  state  of  mind  at  this  period. 

According  to  Dr.  Bray,  in  his  "  Anthropology,"  "  The 
scientific  idea  of  force  is  the  idea  of  as  pure  and  mys- 
terious a  unity  as  the  one  of  Parmenides.  It  is  a  nou- 
menal  integer,  phenomenally  differentiated  into  the  glit- 
tering universe  of  things."  It  would  be  easy  to  fill 
pages  with  such  dazzling  matter;  but  volumes  of  it 
would  give  no  information,  and  we  content  ourselves 
with  one  overwhelming  glory  from  the  pen  of  Dr. 
Youmans : — 

"  Thus  the  law  characterized  by  Faraday  as  the  high- 
est in  physical  science  which  our  faculties  permit  us  to 
perceive,  has  a  far  more  extended  sway;  it  might  well 
have  been  proclaimed  the  highest  law  of  all  science — 
the  most  far-reaching  principle  that  adventuring  reason 
has  discovered  in  the  universe.  Its  stupendous  reach 
spans  all  orders  of  existence.  Not  only  does  it  govern 
the  movements  of  the  heavenly  bodies,  but  it  presides 
over  the  genesis  of  the  constellations;  not  only  does  it 
control  those  radiant  floods  of  power  which  fill  the 
eternal,  spaces,  bathing,  warming,  illumining,  and  viv- 
ifying our  planet,  but  it  rules  the  actions  and  relations 
of  men,  and  regulates  the  march  of  terrestrial  affairs. 
Nor  is  its  dominion  limited  to  physical  phenomena;  it 
prevails  equally  in  the  world  of  mind,  controlling  all  the 
faculties  and  processes  of  thought  and  feeling.  .  .  . 
Star  and  nerve-tissue  are  parts  of  the  same  system — 
stellar  and  nervous  forces  are  correlated.  Nay,  more; 
sensation  awakens  thought  and  kindles  emotion,  so  that 


THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  205 

this  wondrous  dynamic  chain  binds  into  living  unity 
the  realms  of  matter  and  mind  through  measureless  am- 
plitudes of  space  and  time."  After  this  unspeakable 
flight,  the  writer  continues :  "  And  if  these  high  reali- 
ties are  but  faint  and  fitful  glimpses  which  science  has 
obtained  in  the  dim  dawn  of  discovery,  what  must  be 
the  glories  of  the  coming  day?  If,  indeed,  they  are 
but  '  pebbles '  gathered  from  the  shores  of  the  great 
ocean  of  truth,  what  are  the  mysteries  still  hidden  in 
the  bosom  of  the  mighty  unexplored?"1 

Echo  may  safely  be  left  to  answer  these  questions. 
Pending  such  reply,  the  best  criticism  of  this  rhetorical 
flummery,  will  be  to  develop  the  doctrine  of  conserva- 
tion as  scientists  understand  it. 

By  a  happy  change  of  terminology,  scientists  have 
escaped  the  confusions  attendant  upon  using  the  word 
force.  The  doctrine  is  now  known  as  the  conservation 
of  energy — a  phrase  which  will  be  explained  further  on. 
Meanwhile,  we  remark  that  the  doctrine  says  nothing 
whatever  about  the  inner  nature  of  matter  whereby  it 
is  enabled  to  attract  or  repel;  still  less  does  it  affirm 
any  correlation  between  these  qualities.  It  does  not  pre- 
tend that  chemical  affinity  or  cohesion  is  transformed 
gravitation,  but  all  alike  are  accepted  as  primary  and 
irreducible.  "We  must  not  imagine  the  chemical  at- 
traction destroyed,  or  converted  into  any  thing  else." 
"In  no  case  is  the  force  which  produces  the  motion 
annihilated,  or  changed  into  any  thing  else."  "Of  the 

*  "  Correlation  and  Conservation  of  Forces."  D.  Appleton  &  Co. 
See  Introduction  by  B.  L.  Youraans,  M,D, 


206  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

inner  quality  that  enables  matter  to  attract  matter  we 
know  nothing;  and  the  law  of  conservation  makes  no 
statement  regarding  that  quality.  It  takes  the  facts  of 
attraction  as  they  stand,  and  affirms  only  the  constancy 
of  working-power.  The  convertibility  of  natural  forces 
consists  solely  in  transformations  of  dynamic  into  po- 
tential, and  of  potential  into  dynamic,  energy,  which 
are  incessantly  going  on.  In  no  other  sense  has  the 
convertibility  of  force,  at  present,  any  scientific  mean- 
ing." *  In  order,  however,  to  affirm  a  constancy  of 
working  power,  a  single  affirmation  must  be  made 
about  the  so-called  attractive  and  repulsive  forces  of 
matter,  namely,  they  must  vary  only  with  the  spaces 
through  which  they  work.  Any  other  law  of  variation 
would  overturn  the  true  doctrine  of  conservation.  As 
the  foundation  of  the  doctrine,  then,  science  does  not 
affirm  a  single  unitary  power,  but  an  indefinite  mani- 
fold of  elements  in  the  most  complex  relations  of  action 
and  reaction.  How  such  action  is  possible  the  scien- 
tist does  not  pretend  to  know;  he  simply  accepts  the 
fact  with  its  discovered  laws,  and  says  that  if  we  are 
allowed  to  make  certain  assumptions  about  the  ele- 
ments, then  the  energy  of  the  system  is  a  constant 
quantity.  But  what  is  energy  in  the  scientific  sense  ? 
It  has  two  factors:  (1)  any  attraction  or  repulsion,  or 
other  force,  which  can  initiate  motion;  and  (2)  a  free 
space  in  which  this  motion  can  take  place.  If  a  stone 
lie  on  the  earth,  it  has  no  energy  with  reference  to 
gravitation,  although  the  attraction  between  it  and  the 

*Tyndall's  "Fragments  of   Science,"  paper  on   Constitution   of 
Nature, 


THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  207 

earth  is  then  at  a  maximum.  Two  chemical  elements, 
also,  have  no  chemical  energy  when  once  they  have 
united;  yet  their  attractive  grip  on  each  other  is  more 
than  gigantic.  But  let  the  stone  be  raised  from  the 
earth,  or  the  chemical  elements  be  wrenched  apart,  so 
that  motion  can  take  place;  then  energy  becomes  pos- 
sible. Hence,  there  can  be  no  energy  without  both 
moving  force  and  space  in  which  to  move.  But  this 
energy,  which  is  said  to  be  constant,  turns  out  to  be 
double.  The  scientist  splits  it  into  actual  and  potential 
energy,  or  sometimes  kinetic  and  potential  energy. 
Kinetic  energy  is  the  power  a  moving  body  has  of 
doing  work  ;  and  in  strictness  the  name  of  energy 
belongs  only  to  this  form.  Potential  energy  is  the 
possibility  of  kinetic  energy.  Thus  our  stone  at  any 
point  above  the  earth's  surface  has  potential  energy, 
because  if  left  free  to  fall,  it  would  begin  to  move  and 
thus  develop  actual  energy  of  motion,  or  kinetic  ener- 
gy. But  the  potential  energy  decreases  as  the  kinetic 
increases.  The  energy  of  a  body  just  beginning  to  fall 
would  be  all  potential;  its  energy  at  the  lowest  point 
of  its  course  would  be  all  kinetic;  and  at  all  intermedi- 
ate points,  it  would  be  partly  one,  and  partly  the  other. 
Neither  of  these  forms  is  constant,  but  their  sum  is. 
Hence,  the  notion  of  the  conservation  of  energy.  The 
energy,  then,  of  the  universe,  does  not  consist  merely  in 
the  fact  that  the  elements  attract  and  repel,  but  in  thia 
fact  with  the  additional  one  that  they  have  also  spaces 
to  act  through.  These  same  elements  might  be  so 
arranged  that,  remaining  just  what  they  are,  the  system 
should  be  utterly  powerless.  Such,  indeed,  is  the  future 


208  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

which  this  law  of  conservation  seems  to  be  preparing 
for  our  system.  Placing  ourselves,  then,  in  the  nebu- 
lous time,  we  see  that  the  energy  of  the  universe  was 
then  mainly  potential,  and  consisted  of  the  pushing  and 
pulling  forces  of  the  elements  multiplied  into  some 
function  of  the  spaces  that  separated  them.  Ever  since, 
that  potential  energy  has  been  becoming  kinetic;  and 
this  has  been  developed  by  the  fall  of  the  atoms  through 
a  portion  of  the  space  between  them.  We  see,  then, 
what  the  scientist  means  by  aifirming  that  the  energy  of 
the  universe  is  constant.  If  at  any  moment  we  measure 
the  potential  and  kinetic  energies  of  our  system,  their 
sum  will  be  equal  to  the  similar  sum  obtained  from  any 
other  measurements  at  whatever  time.  Such  is  the 
statement  of  the  law;  it  remains  to  inquire  into  its 
scientific  limitations.  Unless  we  do  this,  the  rhetori- 
cians will  renew  their  ravages  by  interpreting  it 
verbally;  and  then  we  shall  have  another  flood  of  dev- 
astating rhetoric.  We  shall  best  learn  the  limitations, 
by  studying  the  proofs  of  the  doctrine. 

The  well-known  mechanical  theory  of  the  conserva- 
tion of  vis  viva,  when  extended  to  molecular  motions, 
gives  the  general  doctrine  of  conservation.  If  we 
assume  any  finite  system,  say  some  huge  nebula,  and 
suppose  it  to  fulfill  certain  conditions,  such  a  system 
will  be  dynamically  conservative.  The  conditions  are 
as  follows:  (1)  The  system  must  be  free  from  all  ex- 
ternal action.  (2)  The  motions  of  the  system  must  all 
depend  upon  the  forces  of  the  elements ;  an  1  these 
forces  must  vary  only  with  the  spaces  through  which 
they  act.  (3)  The  atoms  must  never  clash  so  as  to  di- 


THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  209 

minish  motion  by  any  inelastic  solidity.  When  these 
conditions  hold,  the  conservation  of  energy  follows  di- 
rectly from  the  third  law  of  motion,  or  the  equality  of 
action  and  reaction.  When  they  do  not  hold,  energy 
is  not  constant.  If  there  be  forces  which  vary  with  ve- 
locity, or  with  time,  or  with  the  mode  of  aggregation, 
the  formula  is  not  exact.  Or  if  there  be  agents  in  the 
system  capable  by  volition  of  originating  any  motion 
whatever,  again  the  law  does  not  hold.  "Now  all  of 
these  suppositions  are  quite  simple,  and  full  as  easy  to 
realize  in  thought  as  the  assumption  that  the  forces 
shall  vary  only  with  the  spaces.  Indeed,  more  or  less 
of  empty  space  seems  of  all  grounds  for  force-varia- 
tion, the  least  rational  and  conceivable.  Of  course,  the 
facts  can  be  determined  only  by  observation  and  ex- 
perience. There  seems  to  be  no  way  of  satisfying  the 
third  condition  except  by  giving  up  the  extension  of 
the  atom  altogether,  and  adopting  Boscovich's  notion 
of  unextended  force-centers.*  The  collision  of  inelastic 
bodies  is  invariably  attended  with  the  loss  of  energy 
unless  they  have  a  molecular  structure,  and  the  mole- 
cules fulfill  the  conditions  mentioned.  But  if  the  atom 
be  a  solid,  and  not  merely  a  force-center,  it  is  impossible 
to  view  it  as  elastic. 

This  general  theorem  of  dynamics  has  been  raised 
into  importance  by  the  mechanical  theory  of  heat  and 
the  other  molecular  energies  of  matter.  The  discovery 
of  their  mechanical  nature  enables  us  to  trace  molar  mo- 
tion into  molecular  motion,  and  conversely;  and  the  de- 

*  See  essay  by  Sir  John  Herschel  on  the  Origin  of  Force,  in 
"  Familiar  Lectures  on  Scientific  Subjects." 


210  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

termination  of  their  mechanical  equivalent  enables  us  to 
say  that  the  seeming  loss  of  energy  in  case  of  molar 
collision  is  only  apparent,  the  same  amount  of  energy 
being  reproduced  in  molecular  forms.  This  discovery 
is  a  matter  for  just  pride  on  the  part  of  physics,  but 
our  exaltation  must  never  lead  us  into  making  extrava- 
gant claims.  The  doctrine  in  question  is  proved  only 
for  a  theoretical  physical  system;  whether  the  actual 
system  fulfills  the  theoretical  conditions,  must  be  de- 
cided by  observation  and  experiment.  Thus  far  experi- 
ment has  given  a  very  high  degree  of  probability  to  the 
doctrine  in  the  physical  realm;  but  even  there  all  ques- 
tions are  not  answered.  In  particular,  electricity  and 
magnetism  furnish  some  troublesome  facts.  Thus  Tait 
and  Thomson  question  Weber's  law  of  electric  currents, 
although  it  is  in  harmony  with  experience,  because  it 
conflicts  with  the  law  of  conservation.  The  dogmatism 
of  this  procedure  is  evident;  for  it  is  by  no  means  a 
first  truth  that  natural  forces  must  vary  only  with  the 
space  ;  indeed,  if  we  ask  ourselves  what  ground  for  force 
variation  there  .is  in  more,  or  less  of  empty  space,  we 
shall  find  ourselves  greatly  puzzled  to  see  any.  The 
truth  is,  it  is  purely  a  question  of  experience,  and  not 
of  conceiv ability  at  all;  and  if  experience  point  to  other 
laws  than  those  which  the  doctrine  of  conservation  con- 
templates, we  must  admit  them,  no  matter  what  the 
theoretical  consequences  may  be.  Still  we  must  allow 
as  highly  probable,  that  for  physical  agents  left  to  them- 
selves, the  law  is  absolute. 

Remaining  still  in  the  physical  realm,  it  must  be  fur- 
ther pointed  out,  that  the  appearance  of  simplicity  which 


TSE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  211 

the  doctrine  lends  to  our  physical  theories  is  mostly 
misleading.  When  the  various  activities  of  the  ele- 
ments are  all  described  as  energy,  we  are  apt  to  fancy 
that  we  have  reduced  the  many  to  one;  but,  in  truth, 
these  forms  remain  as  mysterious  as  ever.  We  have  dis- 
covered that  one  form  of  energy  can  give  rise  to  another 
according  to  the  measure  of  its  own  via  viva,  but  we 
have  no  hint  of  why,  or  how,  one  form  becomes  another. 
We  know  that  heat  has  a  mechanical  equivalent;  but 
heat  remains  as  mysterious  and  as  separate  as  ever. 
We  know  that  the  other  forms  of  energy  also  have 
mechanical  equivalents,  but  still  each  one  remains  as 
peculiar  as  before.  They  are  all  modes  of  motion,  it  is 
said;  but  what  is  the  nature  of  these  motions?  How 
are  they  produced  and  propagated?  In  what  does  a 
heat-motion  differ  from  an  electric  or  magnetic  motion  ? 
If  alike,  the  effects  would  be  alike;  but  if  different, 
what  is  the  difference?  Some  physicists  are  inclined 
to  assume  that  the  heat-motion  is  an  expansion  and  con- 
traction of  the  atom  upon  itself,  and  not  a  vibration. 
Here  is  a  realm  of  mystery,  and  of  almost  total  dark- 
ness. In  short,  why  many  forms  of  energy  and  not 
one?  or  why  so  many  and  not  more?  We  are  shut  up 
to  the  assumption  that  these  differences  must  rest  upon 
a  complex  qualitative  nature  of  the  atoms  themselves, 
whereby  these  diverse  manifestations  are  made  possible. 
Upon  this  inner  mystery  the  doctrine  of  conservation 
throws  no  light.  We  have  to  assume  this  complex 
qualitative  nature;  we  cannot  construe  or  deduce  it. 
We  must  guard  ourselves  from  thinking  that  grouping 
various  forms  of  energy  under  a  common  name  in  any 


212  STUDIES  IN-  THEISM. 

way  abolishes  their  differences.  Sir  John  Herschel  has  a 
word  on  this  point  which  still  deserves  consideration : — 

"  Nor  (while  accepting  with  all  due  admiration  as  ap- 
proximate truths  these  great  revelations  as  to  the  mu- 
tual convertibility  of  these  correlatives  according  to 
the  measure  of  vis  viva  appropriate  to  each)  shall  we 
advance  any  nearer  to  a  rational  theory  of  any  one  of 
them  till  it  shall  be  shown  with  much  more  d.Ltinctness 
than  at  present  appears  in  what  these  molecular  move- 
ments themselves  consist;  by  what  forces  (in  the  dy- 
namic acceptation  of  the  term)  they  are  controlled;  in 
what  manner  or  by  what  mechanism  they  are  propa- 
gated from  one  body  to  another,  and  how  their  mutual 
intercon version  is  effected."  * 

Whether,  in  addition  to  the  mechanical  agents  which 
the  law  assumes,  there  are  also  vital  and  voluntary 
agents  whose  action  is  subject  to  other  laws,  is  a  point 
to  be  settled  by  observation.  It  is  a  vexatiously  com- 
mon error  with  semi-scientific  speculators  to  affirm  the 
doctrine  of  conservation  to  be  absolute,  and  then  to 
conclude  that  there  can  be  no  vital  or  spontaneous 
agents  in  the  system.  The  fallacy  is  evident,  for  it 
consists  in  deducing  the  premises  from  the  conclusion, 
which,  in  turn,  is  true  only  on  the  preassumed  truth  of 
the  premises.  Herbert  Spencer  goes  so  far  in  his  misun- 
derstanding as  to  declare  the  doctrine  to  be  an  a  priori 
truth.  He  says  it  is  "  deeper  than  demonstration — deeper 
even  than  definite  cognition — deep  as  the  very  nature  of 
the  mind."  "Its  authority  transcends  all  other  what- 
ever; for  not  only  is  it  given  in  the  constitution  of  our 
*  "Familiar  Lectures  on  Scientific  Subjects,"  p.  472. 


THE  OONSER  VA  TION  OF  ENER  GY.  2 1 3 

own  consciousness,  but  it  is  impossible  to  imagine  a 
consciousness  so  constituted  as  not  to  give  it."*  The 
absurdity  is  evident  of  calling  that  an  a  priori  truth 
which  is  not  true  at  all  except  upon  certain  con- 
tingent assumptions.  Still  more  amazing  is  it,  to  call 
that  a  necessary  deliverance  of  consciousness,  which  not 
one  consciousness  in  a  thousand  can  formulate.  The 
truth  is,  Spencer  is  here  confounding  a  physical  truth 
with  a  metaphysical  dogma.  This  appears  from  the 
following  statement :  "  Thus  by  the  persistence  of  force 
we  really  mean  the  persistence  of  some  power  which 
transcends  our  knowledge  and  conception.  ...  In  other 
words,  asserting  the  persistence  of  force  is  but  another 
mode  of  asserting  an  unconditioned  reality  without 
beginning  or  end."  Different  things  should  be  kept 
apart.  Yet  Mr.  Spencer  never  seems  to  have  the 
slightest  suspicion  that  he  is  not  on  the  high  road  of 
science ;  and  in  so  far  we  must  allow  his  claim,  that  the 
doctrine  in  question  is  "  deeper  than  definite  cognition," 
at  least  on  his  own  part.  But  old  friends  often  turn  up 
in  odd  places.  Spencer's  doctrine  of  persistence,  which 
he  persists  in  confounding  with  the  physical  doctrine 
of  conservation,  is  identical  with  Hamilton's  doctrine 
of  causation,  namely,  that  the  sum  of  being  is  change- 
less, and  hence  that  the  many  are  but  flowing  states  of 
the  one.  In  fact,  Spencer's  knowledge  of  physics  is 
mainly  verbal;  and  hence  he  understands  scientific  doc- 
trines by  verbal  exegesis.  And  as  force  may  be  ap- 
plied to  any  thing  without  manifest  absurdity,  there  is 
no  difficulty  in  verbally  identifying  every  thing,  from 
*  "  First  Principles."  Chapter  on  Persistence  of  Force. 


214  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

gravitation  and  sunshine  to  the  force  of  prejudice  or  of 
an  illustration.  Unfortunately,  Spencer  is  not  alone  in 
this  verbalism.  Speculators  have  largely  made  the  doc- 
trine of  conservation  to  teach  a  kind  of  pantheism,  or 
all-engulfing  substantialism.  They  have  been  led  into 
this  error  by  the  phrases,  correlation  of  forces,  and 
transformation  of  energy.  To  an  ill-trained  mind  both 
phrases  are  treacherous.  We  have  but  to  hypostasize 
force  or  energy,  and  think  of  it  as  manifesting  itself  in 
different  forms,  and  we  have  the  pantheism  of  Spinoza. 
And  this  is  the  direction  which  the  hybrid  philosophical 
and  scientific  speculator  has  taken.  Energy  is  first 
made  substantial,  and  declared  one,  and  then  the  easy 
conclusion  is  drawn  that  all  things  are  but  manifesta- 
tions of  one  omnipresent  energy.  What  appears  here 
as  matter  appears  yonder  as  mind.  What  here  is  sun- 
shine, is  yonder  life  and  thought.  At  bottom  all  are 
one,  and  one  is  all. 

It  may  be  that  metaphysical  considerations  would 
lead  us  to  a  view  not  unlike  this,  but  it  is  no  deduction 
from  the  physical  doctrine  of  conservation.  This  doc- 
trine is  based  on  the  conception  of  a  manifold  of  ele 
nients  of  a  certain  kind,  each  of  which  is  an  individual. 
To  guard  against  this  interpretation  of  the  doctrine, 
we  must  inquire  into  the  meaning  £  :he  ;ra  usf ormatiori 
of  energy. 

Energy  must  always  be  the  energy  of  something. 
Physical  energy  is  the  energy  of  the  physical  elements; 
and  its  so-called  transformation,  while  practically  allow- 
able, is  only  a  figure  of  speech.  Thus  when  a  moving 
body  puts  another  in  motion  and  conies  to  rest  itself,  we 


THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  215 

do  not  think  of  the  motion  of  the  first  as  transferred  to 
the  second,  and  for  the  reason  that  motion  cannot  exist 
without  a  subject.  The  motion  of  the  first  ceases,  that 
of  the  second  begins;  but  nothing  is  transferred  or 
transformed.  In  like  manner  energy  cannot  exist  with- 
out a  subject.  But  the  elements  are  so  related  to  one 
another,  that  they  mutually  condition  one  another's  ac- 
tion; that  is,  the  activity  of  one  may  furnish  the  con- 
ditions of  another's  activity.  In  such  a  case,  the  activ- 
ity of  the  second  will  be  greater  or  less  according  as  the 
antecedent  activity  was  greater  or  less.  We  may  say  in 
general,  that  the  subsequent  activity  will  vary  with  the 
vis  viva  of  the  preceding  one.  If  the  resultant  activity 
be  not  of  the  same  kind  as  the  antecedent,  still  the  same 
relation  of  intensity  will  hold.  Speaking  loosely,  we 
say  in  such  a  case  that  energy  has  been  transferred  and 
transformed;  but  in  truth  no  such  thing  has  happened. 
Every  element  has  acted  out  of  itself;  but  the  condi- 
tions of  its  action  have  been  furnished  by  antecedent 
action,  ancf  the  intensity  of  the  consequent  depends 
upon  the  vis  viva  of  the  antecedent.  This  is  all  the 
transference  and  transformation  of  energy  mean,  even 
in  physics.  There  is  no  mysterious  and  ethereal  some- 
thing gliding  from  one  thing  to  another.  No  element 
receives  any  thing  from  other  elements,  except  that  they 
furnish  the  conditions  upon  which  it  may  manifest  its 
own  power  of  action.  No  a  priori  reason  can  be  given 
for  such  a  relation,  and  still  less  why  the  activity  of 
one  should  disappear  in  inciting  that  of  another.  To 
be  sure  the  law  of  conservation  would  not  hold  in  that 
case,  but  this  law  is  purely  a  contingent  one, 


2 1 6  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

With  this  understanding  of  the  transformation  of 
energy,  the  question  whether  thought  is  not  trans- 
formed physical  energy,  is  seen  to  involve  mental  con- 
fusion. Whether  simple  mental  subjects  exist  can  be 
determined  only  by  psychological  analysis;  but  if  they 
do,  the  transformation  of  energy  in  the  case  of  thought 
is  at  least  no  greater  than  in  the  case  of  the  physical 
elements  themselves.  The  nerves  would  not  supply 
the  mind  any  thing  but  the  conditions  for  unfolding  its 
own  proper  powers;  just  as  when  a  ball  is  thrown  into 
the  air,  it  does  not  receive  attractive  force  from  the 
motion,  but  is  put  in  a  position  for  manifesting  its  own 
inner  attraction.  In  the  reaction  of  body  and  soul, 
nothing  would  pass  into  the  soul,  and  nothing  would 
come  out  of  it.  Whether  sensation  and  perception  are 
attended  with  any  loss  of  vis  viva  in  the  brain  mole- 
cules, is  unknown.  It  may  be,  that,  if  we  could  trace 
the  nervous  action,  we  should  find  each  physical  -ante- 
cedent completely  exhausted  in  the  physical  consequent, 
and  should  get  no  hint  of  the  thought-series  which  the 
physical  series  summons.  It  may  also  be,  that  phys- 
ical energy  is  expended  in  rousing  the  soul  to  react 
with  sensation  and  thought.  A  positive  decision  is 
impossible  and  needless.  However  it  may  be,  there  is 
no  transformation,  except  in  the  sense  that  nervotia 
action  supplies  the  occasion  upon  which  the  mind  de- 
velops its  own  proper  activity,  for  this  is  all  that 
transformation  means  in  any  case.  The  pretended 
deduction  from  the  doctrine  of  conservation,  that  vi- 
tal, mental,  and  social  forces  are  only  transformed  sun- 
shine, must  be  at  once  dismissed  as  simple  moonshine, 


THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  217 

The  following  word  by  Professor  Tait  is  severe,  but 
just: — 

"  One  herd  of  ignorant  people,  with  the  sole  prestige 
of  rapidly  increasing  numbers,  and  with  the  adhesion 
of  a  few  fanatical  deserters  from  the  ranks  of  science, 
refuse  to  admit  that  all  the  phenomena,  even  of  ordi- 
nary dead  matter,  are  strictly  and  exclusively  within  the 
domain  of  physical  science.  On  the  other  hand,  there 
is  a  numerous  group,  not  in  the  slightest  degree  enti- 
tled to  rank  as  physicists,  (though,  in  general,  they 
assume  the  proud  title  of  philosophers,)  who  assert  that 
not  merely  life,  but  even  volition  and  consciousness,  are 
merely  physical  manifestations.  These  opposite  errors, 
into  neither  of  which  is  it  possible  for  a  genuine  scien- 
tific man  to  fall,  so  long  at  least  as  he  retains  his  reason, 
are  easily  seen  to  be  very  closely  allied.  They  are  both 
to  be  attributed  to  that  credulity  which  is  character- 
istic alike  of  ignorance  and  of  incapacity.  Unfortu- 
nately there  is  no  cure;  the  case  is  hopeless,  for  great 
ignorance  almost  necessarily  presumes  great  incapacity, 
whether  it  show  itself  in  the  comparatively  harmless 
folly  of  the  spiritualist,  or  in  the  pernicious  nonsense  of 
the  materialist."  * 

Of  course,  no  one  imagines  that  vital  and  spontane- 
ous agents,  if  they  exist,  are  likely  to  upset  all  the  laws 
of  energy,  and  put  physics  to  shame.  On  the  contrary, 
we  should  expect  in  a  rational  system  to  find  them  tak- 
ing all  lower  forces  and  energies  into  their  service. 
"Life,"  says  Balfour  Stewart,  "is  not  a  bully  who 
swaggers  out  into  the  open  universe,  upsetting  the  laws 
*  "  Recent  Advances  in  Physical  Science,"  p.  24 


218  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

of  energy  in  all  directions,  but  rather  a  consummate 
strategist,  who,  sitting  in  his  secret  chamber  before  his 
wires,  directs  the  movements  of  a  great  army."  Aris- 
totle denned  life  as  the  cause  of  form  in  organisms,  and 
no  later  definition  has  equaled  his  in  either  simplicity 
or  adequacy.  Certainly,  if  we  hold  that  a  living  agent 
is  any  thing  substantial,  we  shall  have  to  allow  that  its 
main  function  in  the  body  is  directive.  The  same  re- 
mark is  equally  true  for  animal  and  human  volitions; 
for  while  our  wills  must  be  able  to  originate  some  ma- 
terial change,  unless  we  are  pure  automata,  that  change 
mainly  consists  in  changing  the  direction  of  physical 
energies,  which  are  thus  guided  to  the  end  desired. 
Whether  our  wills  can  thus  direct  physical  forces,  is  a 
matter  for  separate  inquiry.  The  doctrine  of  conserva- 
tion is  neutral;  but,  unless  appearances  are  very  deceiv- 
ing, our  volitions  do  count  for  something  in  the  course 
of  events. 

Materialism  finds  no  support  from  this  doctrine;  we 
have  next  to  inquire  into  its  bearings  on  atheism.  From 
its  first  announcement,  it  has  been  the  great  demiurge 
of  all  atheistic  systems.  It  seemed  to  teach  tht  pos- 
sible eternity  and  self -sufficiency  of  the  physical  system, 
and  also  to  exclude  the  design-argument.  Hence  athe- 
ists with  one  accord  pounced  upon  it,  and  as  usual  mis- 
understood it.  Of  course,  it  could  not  be  otherwise 
when  one  is  under  obligation  to  interpret  a  scientific 
theory,  not  by  the  facts,  but  by  the  irreligious  use 
which  can  be  made  of  it.  In  opposition,  however,  to 
verbal  exegesis,  an  intelligent  understanding  of  the 


THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  219 

doctrine  shows  all  such  atheistic  fumbling  to  be  ques- 
tionable, if  not  .entirely  groundless.  Indeed,  as  our 
science  stands  at  present,  the  law  of  conservation  points 
rather  to  a  finite  duration  of  our  system.  As  far  as 
the  meaning  of  the  law  is  concerned,  energy  is  energy, 
no  matter  what  its  form,  while,  in  fact,  energy  has 
many  forms.  Now  the  continuance  of  the  universe,  as 
a  dynamical  agent,  does  not  depend  solely  upon  the  fact 
that  all  these  energies  have  a  constant  sum,  but  also 
upon  the  relations  of  these  various  forms  to  one  an- 
other. And  here  the  surprising  fact  comes  out,  that 
while  it  is  easy  to  pass  from  some  forms  to  some  others, 
it  is  not  so  easy  to  pass  back.  This  is  pre-eminently 
the  case  with  heat.  Other  forms  can  be  entirely  trans- 
formed into  heat,  but  heat  cannot  be  entirely  retrans- 
formed  into  other  forms.  The  descent  to  Avernus  is 
easy,  but  the  return  is  difficult,  and  in  part,  impossible. 
There  is  as  much  energy  as  before,  but  there  is  no  pos- 
sibility of  using  it.  For  heat  can  do  work  only  when 
there  is  an  inequality  of  temperature,  as  water  can  do 
work  only  when  there  is  a  difference  of  elevation.  If 
water  stood  at  the  same  level  all  around  the  world, 
there  would  be  no  loss  of  water,  but  water-power 
would  cease.  Heat  follows  the  same  law,  and  is  power- 
less when  it  has  the  same  level  in  all  bodies.  But  heat 
tends  constantly  to  a  common  level,  and  thus  becomes 
the  great  cesspool  of  energy,  out  of  which  there  is  no 
known  redemption.  This  fact,  that  energy  tends  to 
sink  to  lower  forms,  ending  at  last  as  heat,  has  been 
called  by  Sir  William  Thomson  the  dissipation  of  en- 
ergy ;  a  better  term  is,  the  degradation  of  energy.  But 
15 


220  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

the  continuance  of  the  present  dynamic  system  is  as 
dependent  on  the  differentiation  of  energy  as  upon  its 
conservation.  What,  then,  does  this  law  of  degradation 
mean  ?  It  points  to  a  powerless  homogeneity  of  energy 
as  its  goal.  A  little  relief  may  be  found  for  a  time  in 
the  wreck  and  clash  of  solar  systems,  until  all  the  mat- 
ter within  the  grip  of  gravitation  shall  be  gathered  into 
one  great  effete  lump.  It  and  the  ether  may  be  sup- 
posed to  have  conserved  all  their  energy,  but  to  no 
purpose,  as  transformation  has  become  impossible.  It 
would  be  a  relief  to  our  thought  if  such  a  system  could 
be  buried  out  of  our  sight.  Why  should  it  remain — 
useless,  inert,  effete — a  fit  inhabitant  of  chaos  and  old 
night  ? 

From  this  fact  of  degradation  many  distinguished 
physicists  have  drawn  the  conclusion  that  the  present 
system  is  a  temporary  one,  at  least,  if  the  present  phys- 
ical laws  hold.  Among  these  may  be  mentioned  Thom- 
son, Tait,  Balfour  Stewart,  Helmholtz,  and  Clausius. 
No  names  rank  higher  than  these  in  physics.  For  our- 
self,  we  do  not  wish  to  insist  upon  the  conclusion; 
we  regard  it  rather  as  a  pointing  than  a  demonstration, 
and  are  not  prepared  to  lay  any  stress  upon  it.  The 
fact,  therefore,  that  these  men  have  drawn  this  conclu- 
sion from  the  law  of  conservation,  is  of  less  use  as  a 
positive  argument  for  theism,  than  as  putting  a  stop  to 
atheistic  fumbling  with  it.  At  the  same  time,  it  must 
be  allowed  that  no  satisfactory  answer  has  yet  been 
made  to  their  argument,  although  a  great  many  have 
been  attempted.  Now,  the  gist  of  the  argument  for 
the  temporary  character  of  the  present  system  is,  that 


THE  CONSER  VA TION  OF  ENERG  Y.  221 

a  process  of  degradation  cannot  be  eternal,  and  hence 
that  what  ends  in  time  must  also  have  a  beginning  in 
time.  Many  of  the  replies  assume  that  the  question  is, 
whether  the  laws  of  heat  directly  prove  the  system  to 
have  had  a  beginning;  and  it  is  said,  rightly  enough, 
that  they  do  not.  But  this  is  not  the  question.  The 
claim  is,  that  they  point  to  an  end  of  the  dynamic  sys- 
tem, and  the  beginning  is  an  inference  from  the  end. 
We  give  one  or  two  quotations: 

"  It  will  be  seen  that  in  this  chapter  we  have  regarded 
the  universe,  not  as  a  collection  of  matter,  but  rather 
as  an  energetic  agent — in  fact,  as  a  lamp.  Now,  it 
has  well  been  pointed  by  Thomson,  that,  looked  at  in 
this  light,  the  universe  is  a  system  that  had  a  begin- 
ning, and  must  have  an  end,  for  a  process  of  degrada- 
tion cannot  be  eternal.  If  we  could  regard  the  universe 
as  a  candle  not  lit,  then  it  is,  perhaps,  conceivable  to 
regard  it  as  having  always  been  in  existence;  but  if  we 
regard  it  rather  as  a  candle  that  has  been  lit,  we  be- 
come absolutely  certain  that  it  cannot  have  been  burn- 
ing from  eternity,  and  that  a  time  will  come  when  it 
will  cease  to  burn."  * 

"The  very  fact,  therefore,  that  the  large  masses  of 
the  visible  universe  are  of  finite  size,  is  sufficient  to  as- 
sure us  that  the  process  cannot  have  b.een  going  011  for- 
ever; or,  in  other  words,  that  the  visible  universe  must 
have  had  its  origin  in  time;  and  we  may  conclude,  with 
equal  certainty,  that  the  process  will  ultimately  come  to 
an  end.  All  this  is  what  would  take  place  provided  we 
allow  the  indestructibility  of  ordinary  matter;  but  we 
*  "  Conservation  of  Energy,"  by  Balfour  Stewart. 


222  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

may,  perhaps,  suppose  that  the  very  material  of  the 
visible  universe  will  iltimately  vanish  into  the  invis- 
ible." * 

Most  of  the  replies,  however,  consist  in  appealing  to 
the  unknown.  We  cannot  tell  what  new  laws  may  ap- 
pear under  new  conditions;  and  hence  it  is  unspeakably 
rash  to  conclude  that  the  visible  system  is  temporary. 
One  prominent  atheistic  writer,  in  his  zeal  against  the 
conclusion,  questions  the  absoluteness  of  the  law  of  con- 
servation, and  even  the  principles  of  mechanics  them- 
selves. His  idea  of  the  law  seems  to  be,  that  it  is  true 
so  far  as  it  serves  atheism,  and  false  for  the  rest.  This 
standard  of  truth  is  most  ingenious  and  instructive. 
But  all  of  these  objections  are  irrelevant.  No  one  ever 
dreamed  that  the  doctrine  in  question  admits  of  abso- 
lute demonstration.  The  proof  is  based  011  the  assump- 
tion that  the  present  mechanical  and  physical  laws  shall 
continue  valid.  Of  course,  any  one  can  question  this 
assumption,  and  suggest  ineffable  possibilities;  and  as 
long  as  he  remembers  that  he  is  dealing  with  his  own 
vagaries  and  fancies  there  is  no  objection  to  it.  We 
do  not  know  that  some  awful  dragon  will  not  appear 
to  overturn  the  dead  equilibrium,  and  set  nature  to 
work  again.  Such  a  suggestion  is  possible,  but  it  can 
hardly  be  called  scientific.  We  must,  however,  confess 
our  surprise  that  no  speculator  has  suggested  as  a  way 
of  escape  a  periodic  change  from  attraction  to  repulsion ; 
so  that  when  attraction  has  gathered  all  matter  to- 
gether, repulsion  shall  set  in  and  scatter  it  again,  and 

*  "  Unseen  Universe,"  p.  127.     See  also  Tait's  "  Recent  Advances 
of  Physical  Science." 


THE  CONSE3 VA TION  Of  ENEtt GT  223 

thus  in  eternal  oscillation.  Of  course  this  would  be  a 
mere  fancy,  but  it  would  not  be  the  first  fancy  which 
has  been  mistaken  for  science.  But  as  long  as  we  con- 
fine ourselves  to  the  knpwn  laws  of  physics  and  me- 
chanics we  make  a  sorry  show  in  escaping  Thomson's 
conclusion.  Some  invoke  the  notion  of  a  space  of  n 
dimensions  to  save  the  system.  Zollner,  the  German 
astronomer,  uses  this  conception  to  explain  the  feats  of 
tied  conjurors,  as  a  knot  cannot  really  be  tied  in  such 
a  space.  What  more  natural  than  that  he  should  ap- 
peal to  it  here?  Others,  again,  think  that  Thomson's 
theory  is  due  to  theological  prepossessions.  This  is 
true,  if  the  laws  of  mechanical  physics  are  theological 
prepossessions.  It  is  further  urged  that  we  cannot 
allow  the  conclusion,  for  that  would  deny  the  self- 
sufficiency  of  the  system,  and  necessitate  the  notion  of 
miracle.  Oddly  enough,  those  who  use  this  argument 
seem  never  to  suspect  that  their  objection  is  based,  not 
on  science,  but  on  an  atheistic  prepossession.  Whether 
men  like  Tait  and  Thomson,  Helmholtz  and  Clausius, 
are  liable  to  theological  prepossessions  the  reader  must 
judge  for  himself;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  atheistic 
prepossessions  are  full  as  prominent  in  speculation  as 
theological  prepossessions.  Of  course,  the  former  are 
far  more  scientific  and  respectable.  And  speaking  of 
prepossessions,  it  is  rather  odd  that  every  one  may  be 
suspected  of  them,  except  the  atheist.  We  allow  for 
prejudice  in  judging  the  politician,  the  statesman,  the  his- 
torian, the  philosopher,  and  the  theologian;  but  we  are 
expected  to  believe  that  the  atheist,  of  all  men,  is  abso- 
lutely impartial.  Hence,  also,  he  claims  the  largest 


224  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

right  of  twitting  his  opponents  with  prejudice^  bigotry, 
and  general  incapacity;  while  for  himself  he  claims  the 
profoundest  insight  and  the  most  immaculate  mental 
integrity.  There  are  some  things  which  transcend 
even  a  mountain-removing  faith,  and  this  is  one  of 
them.  Being  still,  for  all  slips  of  his,  one  of  Eve's  fam- 
ily, the  atheist  has  no  a  priori  claim  to  exemption  from 
the  frailties  of  human  nature,  and  he  certainly  has  no 
claim  in  experience.  It  is  a  hard  saying,  but  we  cannot 
avoid  a  secret  conviction  that  if  the  known  laws  of 
mechanical  physics  pointed  to  the  eternity  of  the  system 
with  half  the  clearness  with  which  they  indicate  its 
temporary  character,  the  theist  would  not  be  allowed 
to  lose  sight  of  the  fact.  Much  would  be  said  about 
the  uniformity  of  nature,  and  about  the  folly  of  ap- 
pealing to  the  unknown  against  the  known;  but  the 
atheist,  like  poor  Yorick,  is  commonly  "a  fellow  of  infi- 
nite jest."  The  zeal  with  which  Darwin's  speculations 
have  been  taken  up,  and  the  coolness  with  which  the 
theory  in  question  has  been  received,  are  facts  not 
without  interest  and  instruction. 

But,  as  we  have  said,  we  do  not  wish  to  insist  upon 
the  conclusion.  It  is  a  pointing  of  the  fundamental 
known  laws  of  matter.  That  there  are  no  compensa- 
tions in  the  system  we  affirm  not.  We  adduce  the  ar- 
gument, less  for  its  positive  than  for  its  negative  effect. 
It  is  something  to  have  the  doctrine  rescued  from  athe- 
ism and  materialism.  And  yet  it  is  almost  a  disappoint- 
ment to  reach  a  result  so  different  from  what  the 
rhetoricians  lead  us  to  expect.  All  those  beautiful 
solutions  of  philosophic  questions  vanish,  and  leave  not 


THE  CONSERVATION  OF  ENERGY.  225 

a  rack  behind.  We  point  out,  in  closing,  that  if  the 
universe  were  dynamically  conservative,  so  that  trans- 
formation could  go  on  endlessly  if  not  interfered  with, 
the  atheistic  conclusion  would  still  not  follow.  Leib- 
nitz, as  is  well  known,  taught  just  such  a  doctrine  of 
conservation,  and  held,  also,  that  such  a  universe  would 
be  the  highest  possible  proof  of  creative  wisdom.  Indeed, 
both  he  and  Descartes  held  that  it  would  be  derogatory 
to  God  to  suppose  that  the  system  tends  to  run  down. 
The  design-argument  is  left  untouched  by  it;  for  the 
conservation  of  energy  no  more  explains  the  teleolog- 
ical  aspect  of  things  than  does  the  allied  doctrine  of  the 
indestructibility  of  matter.  As  the  latter  doctrine  is 
consistent  with  all  kinds  of  meaningless  and  chaotic 
combinations,  so  the  former  is  consistent  with  all  kinds 
of  meaningless  applications  of  energy.  Neither  doc- 
trine accounts  for  form.  Why  there  should  be  as 
many  forms  of  energy  as  exist;  why  these  should  be 
related  as  they  are;  why  things  should  work  together 
to  produce  an  orderly  system  and  one  replete  with 
marks  of  intelligence — these  questions  find  no  answer 
in  the  conservation  of  energy.  Upon  the  whole,  we 
cannot  see  that  the  theist  has  any  reason  to  be  much 
afraid  of  this  doctrine. 


226  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

SUBSTANCES    AND    THEIR    INTERACTION. 

TT7HEN"  discussing  the  relations  of  mechanism  and 
teleology,  we  came  upon  the  claim  that  the  phys- 
ical system  bears  no  marks  of  dependence  except  the 
traces  of  design  seen  in  it;  and  these,  it  was  said,  were 
far  from  proving  such  dependence.  The  latter  part  of 
this  claim  was  found  to  result  in  utter  skepticism;  for 
there  is  as  much  proof  of  mind  in  nature  as  in  man. 
In  the  last  chapter  we  saw  that  many  of  the  ablest 
physicists  are  agreed  that  the  best-known  laws  of  the 
physical  system  point  to  a  beginning  and  an  end.  We 
do  not  care,  however,  to  insist  too  strongly  upon  this 
point,  and  leave  the  reader  to  give  it  such  weight  as 
he  chooses.  But  now  we  claim,  that,  apart  from  the 
design-argument,  and  apart  from  the  indications  of 
physics,  it  is  strictly  impossible,  without  insoluble  con- 
tradiction, to  regard  a  plurality  of  interacting  things 
as  independent.  An  interacting  manifold  is  impossible 
without  a  co-ordinating  and  unifying  one.  This  argu- 
ment serves  to  supplement  the  design-argument,  which 
does  not  strictly  exclude  polytheism.  Indeed,  if  w« 
should  set  out  to  prove  the  unity  of  God  solely  from 
the  unity  of  design  in  nature,  it  is  not  clear  that  wt 
should  succeed.  The  prominent  facts  of  nature  and 
life  agree  only  too  well  with  the  notion  of  a  dual,  or 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.  22  Y 

plural,  origin  of  things.  We  are  so  accustomed  to 
monotheism,  through  the  teachings  of  Christianity,  that 
we  fail  to  appreciate  the  facts  which  led  the  old  phi- 
losophers into  dualism.  For  us  any  argument  which 
points  to  mind  in  nature  is  monotheistic,  as  a  matter  of 
course.  But  in  strictness  this  conclusion  is,  at  least, 
hasty.  The  world  is  a  battle-field,  and  though  the 
universal  strife  is  consistent  with  the  unity  of  God,  it 
would  be  somewhat  difficult  to  prove  that  unity,  if  we 
had  no  other  facts  on  which  to  build.  It  is  well,  there- 
fore, to  show  upon  other  grounds  that  the  fundamental 
reality  of  the  universe  is  one,  and  that  the  mechanical 
system  cannot  be  regarded  as  ultimate.  This  brings 
us  to  consider  the  nature  of  substances  and  their  inter- 
action. We  shall  deal  chiefly  with  so-called  material 
substance. 

The  phenomenal  world  reveals  to  us  incessant  change 
and  motion;  and  the  law  of  causation  forces  to  supple- 
ment these  facts  with  the  notion  of  a  subject.  An  act 
or  change,  without  a  subject  which  acts  or  changes,  is  a 
phrase  which  cannot  be  translated  into  thought.  Now 
these  subjects  are  what  we  mean  by  substances;  and  the 
question  is,  how  we  must  conceive  them  in  order  to 
make  them  the  sufficient  explanation  of  phenomena. 
Substance  is  often  conceived  as  substratum,  and  various 
formal  distinctions  are  made  between  it  and  being.  It 
is  easy  to  account  for  this  notion,  but,  as  we  shall  see, 
it  cannot  be  allowed.  Metaphysically,  substance  and 
being  are  identical;  and  both  denote  those  real  subjects 
from  which  change  and  activity  proceed.  But  while 
their  formal  position  in  thought  is  plain,  their  content 


228  8WDXBS  /#  THEISM. 


lacks  definiteness.  What  content,  then,  must  we  put 
into  the  notion  of  substance  in  order  to  make  it  har- 
monize both  with  the  laws  of  thought  and  with  the 
facts  which  it  is  to  explain  ?  The  problem  is  one  of  in- 
ductive speculation.  We  hope  by  criticism  to  clear  up 
the  notion,  and  make  its  content  more  definite. 

The  spontaneous  thinking  of  men  brings  forth  a  sys- 
tem of  natural  metaphysics;  to  which  belong  such  no- 
tions as  cause  and  effect,  matter  and  force,  space  and 
time,  etc.  But  as  this  system  is  born  of  practical  life, 
we  should  not  be  surprised  at  finding  many  of  its  defini- 
tions and  logical  junctions  open  to  criticism.  Practical 
thinking  is  molded  by  practical  needs,  and  never  stops 
to  inquire  whether  the  results  are  theoretically  consist- 
ent. It  is  enough  if  they  serve  the  purposes  of  our 
every-day  mental  life.  And  what  we  should  thus  ex- 
pect, we  find.  The  notions  of  natural  metaphysics  are 
always  loosely,  and  often  contradictorily,  conceived. 
As  specimens  of  this  looseness  take  the  common  state- 
ment of  the  law  of  causation  :  every  thing  must  have  a 
cause.  This  statement,  taken  literally,  would  deny  the 
law  of  causation  entirely.  Or  take  the  current  concep- 
tion of  matter  and  force,  according  to  which  matter  is 
at  once  inert,  and  the  source  of  all  activity  —  a  kind  of 
philosophical  mermaid.  Or  take  the  doctrine  of  a  past 
eternity  and  a  future  eternity;  as  if  eternity  were  not 
necessarily  one.  Or  take  the  common  notion  of  the  re- 
lation of  the  attribute  to  the  thing;  according  to  which 
the  attribute  is  as  external  and  as  indifferent  to  the 
thing  as  a  pin  is  to  the  pincushion  into  which  it  is 
thrust.  Pre-eminent  among  these  notions,  which  are 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.          229 

full  of  implicit  contradictions,  is  that  of  substance. 
This  comes  from  the  double  root  of  the  idea.  The 
senses  give  us  many  things  apparently  inert  and  dead. 
The  rock,  the  wall,  the  solid  earth,  seem  inactive,  and 
yet  are  manifestly  real.  Hence  we  conceive  of  substance 
as  something  inert  and  changeless.  This  is  the  root  of 
the  substratum  conception.  But  by  and  by  it  occurs  to 
us  that  there  are  activities  in  the  world;  and  these  must 
have  some  subject.  Then,  without  a  thought  of  the 
contradiction,  we  ascribe  them  to  the  same  subjects 
which  we  before  defined  as  inert  and  dead.  Thus  we 
see  that  practical  metaphysics  are  burdened  with  many 
implicit  contradictions.  This  fact,  indeed,  does  not 
furnish  a  ground  for  their  rejection;  but  it  does  lay 
upon  the  mind  the  necessity  of  attempting  their  rectifi- 
cation. The  great  common  sense  of  mankind  outlines  a 
system  of  metaphysics,  which  speculation  can  neither 
improve  upon  nor  ignore;  in  fact,  the  true  and  only 
function  of  speculation  is  to  elaborate,  rectify,  and  de- 
fend the  metaphysics  of  common  sense.  But  as  long  as 
the  law  of  non-contradiction  is  recognized,  this  rectifi- 
cation will  be  necessary;  and  to  perform  it  will  be  not 
only  the  duty,  but  the  inalienable  right,  of  philosophical 
speculation.  If  such  rectification  should  show  many 
assumed  principles  to  be  only  prejudice  and  uncritical 
dogmatism,  it  will  be  the  place  of  common  sense  to  ac- 
cept the  results,  if  the  showing  be  complete.  Sound 
philosophy  does  not  attempt  to  overawe  common  sense, 
but  to  correct  its  uncritical  mistakes.  At  the  same 
time,  philosophy  will  not  allow  common  sense  dogmat- 
ically to  settle  questions  beyond  its  province. 


230  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

But  as  the  senses  are  the  great  source  of  error  upon 
this  point,  the  first  thing  is  to  throw  off  their  bondage. 
The  general  theory  of  perception  shows  that  external 
things  can  be  perceived  only  as  they  affect  us;  and  in 
Chapter  III  we  saw  that  the  object  is  not  so  much  per- 
ceived as  posited  or  affirmed.  Being  or  substance,  we 
saw,  is  primarily  a  regulative  notion  in  the  mind;  and 
its  content,  when  affirmed  in  objectivity,  is  not  imme- 
diately apparent.  This  is  a  question  for  speculation. 
In  addition,  the  elementary  teachings  of  physics  furnish 
absolute  demonstration  that  this  is  not  a  question  which 
can  be  settled  by  the  eyes  in  any  case.  According  to 
those  teachings,  the  inaction  of  things  is  only  in  seem- 
ing. Underneath  the  dead  rest  which  the  unaided 
senses  show,  science  discerns  the  most  complex  and 
constant  activity.  Every  thing,  even  the  dead  stone 
and  resting  clod,  is  seen  to  stand  in  the  most  manifold 
relations  of  action  and  reaction  to  every  other  thing. 
Science  knows  of  nothing  which  just  exists,  and  nothing 
more.  Further,  physics  makes  it  plain  that  things  as 
they  appear  are  not  the  true  subjects  of  natural  activi- 
ties. Every  appearing  thing  is  a  function  of  things 
which  do  not  appear;  and  these  non- appearing  things 
are  the  true  subjects.  Even  extension,  so  far  as  we 
experience  it,  is  purely  phenomenal,  depending  upon 
sundry  attractions  and  repulsions  among  the  elements. 
If  extension  be  affirmed  of  the  elements  themselves,  it 
can  only  be  on  the  authority  of  some  necessity  of 
thought,  real  or  pretended,  and  never  from  experience. 
Physics  further  teaches  that  solidity  also  is  not  an  ul- 
timate quality  of  the  elements,  but  is  the  outcome  of 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.          231 

their  attractions  and  repulsions.  We  often  think  of  the 
atoms  as  little  cubes  or  spheres  which  are  very  hard, 
and  which  are  piled  up  to  make  visible  things,  just  as 
bricks  are  piled  up  in  a  heap.  But  this  is  the  gravest 
mistake.  The  connection  of  the  atoms  is  dynamic,  and 
not  that  of  mere  juxtaposition;  and  if  it  be  allowed 
that  the  atoms  themselves  are  solid,  it  has  to  be  allowed 
that  that  absolute  solidity  never  comes  in  play;  for  the 
atoms  are  not  in  contact.  Hence  the  only  solidity  of 
which  we  know  any  thing  is  based  upon  a  dynamism 
back  of  it;  and  there  is  no  warrant  for  affirming  any 
other  solidity.  Thus  physics  seems  bent  on  overturning 
all  our  current  ideas  of  matter,  by  declaring  that  all 
materiality  is  phenomenal,  and  has  a  dynamic  basis. 
But  as  soon  as  these  elements  of  physics  are  grasped,  it 
becomes  clear  that  we  can  never  hope  to  determine  the 
nature,  or  definition  even,  of  material  substance  by  rea- 
soning with  our  eyes.  It  is  purely  a  question  of  meta- 
physics, or  of  consistent  thinking. 

In  the  second  place,  we  observe  that  every  defi- 
nition of  substance  must  attend  to  the  conditions  of  the 
problem.  We  are  looking  for  the  subjects  of  a  group 
of  complex  activities,  and  whatever  substances  we  postu- 
late must  be  capable  of  being  such  subjects.  It  is  not, 
then,  sufficient  that  the  definition  be  logically  consist- 
ent; it  must  be  further  capable  of  explaining  the  facts. 
Failure  to  notice  this  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  error  of 
the  Eleatics,  and  of  the  Greek  atomists.  The  Eleatics 
defined  being  as  excluding  all  change,  all  motion,  and 
all  manif  oldness.  The  definition  is  logically  consistent ; 
but  it  is  philosophically  worthless.  For  clearly  such  a 


232  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

being  will  not  explain  the  phenomenal  world  of  change 
and  plurality.  There  was  only  one  alternative:  either 
the  definition  must  be  changed,  or  the  phenomenal 
world  must  be  denied.  The  Eleatics,  who  were  not 
wanting  in  the  courage  of  their  opinions,  took  the  latter 
course,  and  declared  the  phenomenal  world  to  be  a 
delusion.  The  Greek  atomists  also  committed  a  similar 
error.  They  defined  their  atoms  as  self -centered  and 
independent.  All  element  of  relation  was  denied.  This 
notion,  again,  is  logically  consistent;  but  they  failed  to 
notice  that  such  atoms  are  worthless  for  scientific  pur- 
poses. If  truly  independent  and  self-centered,  they 
would  be  indifferent  to  one  another;  and  hence  quite 
incapable  of  explaining  the  solidarity  of  the  actual 
world.  Not  atoms  in  general,  but  only  inter-acting,  in- 
ter-dependent atoms,  will  serve  the  purposes  of  science. 
And  so  we  repeat  once  more,  it  is  not  sufficient  that  the 
notion  of  substance  be  logically  consistent,  it  must  fur- 
ther be  such  as  to  fit  into  and  explain  the  facts. 

Two  doubts  come  up  just  here;  the  one  a  prejudice, 
the  other  a  misapprehension.  The  former  urges  that 
we  have  no  right  to  attribute  force  to  matter,  as  mat- 
ter has  always  been  defined  as  passive.  The  reply  is, 
that  the  physicist  is  supremely  indifferent  to  prescriptive 
definitions.  He  aims  to  explain  phenomena;  and  if  he 
can  do  it  by  a  dynamic  theory  of  matter,  he  will  not 
hesitate  to  attribute  to  matter  just  such  active  proper- 
ties as  may  be  necessary  for  his  purpose.  Certainly 
the  dynamic  theory  of  matter  need  not  fear,  if  nothing 
more  weighty  than  a  traditional  and  arbitrary  definition 
of  matter  can  be  urged  against  it.  The  misapprehen- 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.          233 

sioii  consists  in  charging  that  the  dynamic  theory  of 
matter  contradicts  the  law  of  inertia,  which  is  at  least 
as  well  established  as  any  other  fact  of  science.  This 
misapprehension  arises  from  ignoring  the  facts  upon 
which  the  doctrine  of  inertia  is  based,  and  then  analyz- 
ing the  word  inertia.  If  matter  be  inert,  of  course  it 
is  a  contradiction  to  call  it  active;  but  if  we  attend  to 
the  meaning,  and  let  the  dictionary  go,  this  contradic- 
tion disappears.  Scientifically,  the  doctrine  is  that  no 
element  spontaneously  changes  its  own  state,  whether 
of  rest  or  motion;  and  further,  every  element  opposes 
a  certain  resistance  to  any  external  attempt  to  change 
its  state.  It  does  not  deny  activity  with  regard  to 
other  elements,  but  denies  spontaneity  with  regard  to 
itself;  and  instead  of  affirming  absolute  passivity  to  ex- 
ternal action,  it  affirms  a  positive  reaction  and  resist- 
ance. This  is  the  only  conception  of  inertia  which  has 
any  scientific  value;  all  others  are  but  vain  etymolog- 
ical imaginings.  In  like  manner,  the  space-filling  prop- 
erty both  of  the  elements  and  of  their  combinations  is 
at  bottom  dynamic.  It  is  only  as  an  element  has  the 
power  to  resist  and  drive  back  other  elements,  and  thus 
assert  for  itself  a  position  and  volume  in  space,  that  we 
can  talk  even  of  matter  as  filling  space.  To  call  the 
gigantic  force  with  which  each  element  resists  the  ap- 
proach, within  certain  limits,  of  any  other,  a  "mere 
passivLy,"  involves  the  very  depths  of  bondage  to  the 
senses.  When  closely  examined,  even  the  statical  phe- 
nomena of  matter  rest  on  an  inner  dynamism. 

It  is  clear,  then,  that  the  lump  notion  of  substance, 
which  is  borrowed  from  the  senses,  must  be  given  up; 


234  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

for  physics  teaches  us  that  lumpiness  is  not  ultimate. 
The  problem  being  to  find  the  subject  of  a  group  of 
activities,  nothing  can  be  plainer  than  that  we  cannot 
regard  that  subject  as  dead  inertness.  On  the  contrary, 
it  must  b.e  conceived  as  an  individualized  force  or 
power,  and  active  through  and  through.  Push  our  an- 
alysis as  far  as  we  will,  still,  in  the  very  deepest  depths 
of  metaphysic  fog  and  night,  it  yet  remains  clear  that 
only  the  active  will  explain  action,  and  that  we  get  no 
help  in  understanding  action  by  postulating  a  hard  core 
of  inactive  and  dead  materiality  upon  which  the  living 
activity  may  sit  down  and  rest.  The  tyranny  of  the 
senses  is  very  strong  at  this  point;  and  we  can  escape 
it  only  by  remembering  that  this  is  not  a  question  of 
eye-sight  but  of  consistency  in  reasoning.  The  dead- 
lump  notion  of  substance  has  its  origin  in  sense-delu- 
sions, and  is  plainly  of  no  use.  If  such  substances  did 
exist,  as  doing  nothing,  they  would  be  mere  metaphys- 
ical loafers  in  every  scientific  system,  and  there  could 
be  no  reason  for  affirming  them.  For  we  reason  from 
effects  to  causes,  and  where  there  is  no  effect,  there  is 
no  ground  for  affirming  a  cause.  The  only  definition  of 
substance  which  will  meet  the  conditions  of  the  prob- 
lem is,  that  substance  is  an  individualized  force  or  pow- 
er. How  a  thing  is  made  we  do  not  pretend  to  know, 
but  when  it  is  made,  its  most  general  definition  is  as 
we  have  given  it.  The  notion  of  real  being  is  impos- 
sible without  the  two  factors  of  power  and  individual- 
ity; and  by  our  definition  we  mean  only  that  every 
real  thing  is  an  individual  unit,  and  that  its  essence  is 
power  or  force.  Being  without  force  is  nothing;  force 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.  235 

without  being  is  also  nothing;  both  must  be  united  in 
reality.  One  or  the  other  of  these  elements  is  com- 
monly overlooked  by  speculators.  Thus,  matter  is  often 
spoken  of  as  a  function  of  opposing  forces,  as  attrac- 
tion and  repulsion.  This  view  is  utterly  untenable, 
as  attraction  and  repulsion  are  abstractions  from  the 
activity  of  something  which  attracts  and  repels.  Again, 
things  are  often  spoken  of  as  made  out  of  force,  as  if 
force  existed  before  reality.  In  scientific  speculations 
nothing  is  more  common  than  to  hear  of  "  cosmic 
forces  "  which  play  on  matter;  but  we  nowhere  get 
any  hint  as  to  the  subject  of  these  forces.  They  seem 
to  drift  around  about  half  way  between  being  and  noth- 
ing. We  repeat  our  definition:  Substance  is  individ- 
ualized force  or  power. 

What  a  host  of  objections  come  up  !  The  first  and 
most  natural  is  this:  Substance  is  not  power,  but  has 
power.  The  substance  is  one  thing,  its  power  is  quite 
another.  This  objection  rests,  first,  upon  the  possibility 
of  conceiving  matter  without  any  power  of  attraction; 
and  this  is  mistaken  for  a  proof  that  matter  can  be  con- 
ceived as  without  power  of  any  kind.  It  is  plain  that 
if  this  conception  were  possible  it  would  be  equivalent 
to  the  denial  of  matter;  as  that  which  can  in  no  way 
act,  can  never  come  into  knowledge. 

For  the  rest,  the  objection  is  based  partly  on  sense- 
illusion  and  partly  on  mistaking  a  logical  and  gram- 
matical distinction  for  a  metaphysical  one.  The  sense- 
illusion  is,  that  we  seem  to  see  things  perfectly  inactive 
and  yet  manifestly  real;  but  the  most  elementary 

knowledge    of   physics   serves   to    dispel   this   notion. 
16 


236  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

Further,  the  distinction  between  a  thing  and  its  power 
of  action  is  a  purely  logical  one.  All  of  our  attributive 
logical  judgments  express  only  subjective  distinctions; 
or  rather,  they  express  what  the  thing  itself  is  in  cer- 
tain relations  or  from  a  certain  point  of  view.  We 
say  a  triangle  has  three  sides;  yet  a  triangle  without 
sides  is  nothing.  We  say  substance  has  properties; 
but  a  substance  without  properties  is  merely  a  hypos- 
tasized  nonentity.  So  we  say  a  thing  has  power;  yet 
without  that  power  it  would  not  be  a  thing.  If  we 
ask  the  objector  what  he  means  by  a  thing  which  has 
no  power,  we  get  no  answer.  How  do  we  distinguish 
something  from  nothing  ?  Solely  by  the  fact  that  some- 
thing acts  and  resists  us,  and  nothing  does  not.  And 
even  if  we  should  grant  the  distinction,  we  have  to 
cancel  it  in  the  next  breath;  for  either  this  substance 
is  indifferent  to  its  activity,  now  assumed  to  be  sepa- 
rable from  it,  or  it  is  not.  If  it  is  indifferent,  then 
the  changing  activity  finds  no  ground  either  for  its 
existence  or  its  changes  in  the  substance;  in  which  case 
the  substance  becomes  a  worthless  metaphysical  ghost. 
If  not  indifferent,  then  it  must  in  some  way  control 
this  power.  But  to  do  so,  it  must  have  a  power  of  con- 
trolling it.  And  now  arises  a  difficulty.  Either  this 
power  of  controlling  the  power  is  the  substance  or  it  is 
not.  In  the  first  case  we  may  as  well  stop  with  the  first 
power  of  action;  as  a  power  of  controlling  a  power  is  no 
more  capable  of  standing  alone  than  a  simple  power. 
But  if  this  second  power  is  not  the  substance,  and  de- 
mands a  third  something  for  its  support,  we  are  shut  up 
to  an  infinite  series.  In  fact,  being  and  power  are  but 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.          237 

different  names  for  reality  from  different  stand-points. 
Regarded  as  the  abiding  source  of  activity,  we  call  it 
being;  regarded  as  the  possibility  of  activity,  we  call 
it  power.  Or,  regarded  as  the  subject  of  various  acts, 
we  call  it  being;  regarded  as  the  ground  of  those  acts, 
we  call  it  power.  The  name  is  indifferent.  We  may 
call  it  being  if  we  choose,  but  the  content  of  the  notion 
must  always  be  an  individualized  power;  we  only  con- 
tradict ourselves  when  we  regard  being  as  a  core  of 
dead  impassivity.  We  conclude,  then,  that  though  we 
can  never  penetrate  the  mystery  of  being  so  as  to  cre- 
ate any  thing,  still,  after  a  thing  is  created,  it  must  be 
viewed  as  a  power  and  not  as  a  lump.  A  power  of  ac- 
tion in  some  way  is  the  only  assignable  difference  be- 
tween something  and  nothing.  This  result  is  valid  for 
all  substance,  whether  spiritual  or  material.  Whatever 
difference  there  may  be  must  consist  in  the  nature  of 
the  activity,  and  never  in  the  presence  or  absence  of 
power.  Only  absolute  philosophical  incapacity  can  find 
any  help  in  comprehending  the  possibility  of  action  by 
postulating  a  central  core  of  passive  materiality;  to  say 
nothing  of  the  annihilating  self-contradiction  of  the 
notion. 

But  skepticism  still  remains,  and  expresses  itself  as 
follows:  An  atom  has  various  forces — a  force  of  gravi- 
tation, one  of  cohesion,  one  of  chemical  affinity,  etc. 
Now,  it  is  absurd  to  speak  of  any  or  all  of  these  as 
constituting  the  atom.  They  belong  to  it,  or  inhere  in 
it,  but  can  never  be  thought  of  as  being  the  atom.  We 
quite  agree  with  this  skepticism,  but  regard  it  as  no  ob- 
jection to  our  view.  For  this  objection  rests  entirely 


238  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

upon  a  personification  of  abstractions.  An  atom  is  not 
a  composite  of  independent  forces  which  are  held  to- 
gether, like  a  boy's  kite-sticks,  by  a  tack  or  a  string; 
but,  if  real  at  all,  it  is  a  single  unitary  power,  which  is 
so  related  to  other  powers  that  now  it  acts  in  one  way, 
and  now  in  another.  Its  activity  falls,  therefore,  in 
several  classes;  it  attracts,  it  coheres,  it  enters  into 
chemical  combination.  We  observe  these  general 
classes,  and  then,  misled  by  a  persistent  tendency  to 
porsonification,  we  attribute  them  to  separate  powers 
in  the  atoms.  Accordingly,  it  is  not  the  atom  which 
attracts,  but  the  force  of  gravitation.  It  is  not  the 
atom  which  coheres,  but  cohesion  itself.  It  is  not  the 
atom  which  acts  chemically;  chemical  affinity  is  the 
great  demiurge  of  the  laboratory.  In  physics,  too, 
heat,  electricity,  and  magnetism  are  the  great  actors, 
and  not  things  in  the  condition  we  call  heated,  electric, 
or  magnetic.  One  can  hardly  open  a  -scientific  text- 
book without  wondering  whether  the  old  scholastics 
and  gnostics  have  not  returned  to  earth  in  the  guise  of 
modern  scientists,  so  freely  do  the  airiest  abstractions 
parade  themselves  before  us  as  the  most  solid  realities. 
Now  all  this  is  a  mistake.  Chemical  affinity,  cohesion, 
gravitation,  etc.,  are  not  agents,  but  abstractions  from 
certain  classes  of  atomic  action.  The  real  agent  is  the 
atom;  and  it  does  not  have  a  stock  of  powers  concealed 
within  it,  so  that  when  it  wants  to  enter  into  a  chem- 
ical combination  it  uses  its  chemical  power,  or  when  it 
wants  to  cohere  it  uses  its  cohering  power.  If  this 
were  our  conception  of  the  atom,  Martinus  Scribblerus's 
doctrine  of  the  meat-roasting  quality  of  the  spit  would 


ACTION. 


AND  THEIR  INTER. 

be  not  one  whit  more  ludicrous.  But,  in  fact,  the  atom 
must  be  conceived  as  one,  as  a  relatively  self -centered 
power,  which  reacts  against  external  things  in  various 
ways  under  different  conditions;  and  thus  gives  rise  to 
the  shallow  notion  of  various  forces  which  inhere  in  the 
atom  like  pegs  in  a  board,  and  which  it  is  equally  pos- 
sible to  pull  out  or  stick  in.  It  is  tne  single  unitary 
sttom  which  acts  in  all  its  manifestation,  just  as  it  is  the 
unitary  soul  which  acts  in  all  the  mental  life.  These 
scholastic  personifications  being  reduced  to  their  true 
dimensions,  we  reaffirm  our  conclusion  that  the  essence 
of  all  reality,  whether  material  or  spiritual,  is  power; 
and  that  the  presence  of  power  of  some  kind  is  the 
only  thing  which  distinguishes  something  from  noth- 
ing. It  is  not  meant  that  the  atom  is  chemical  affinity 
or  cohesion,  etc.,  but  only  that  to  manifest  itself  in  these 
ways  it  must  be  essentially  forceful.  The  objection  we 
are  considering  rests  upon  the  false  notion  of  inherence. 
We  hear  of  forces  "  implanted,"  "  imparted,"  "  inher- 
ent," etc.,  as  if  forces  were  external  to  the  active  sub- 
ject. We  hear  of  forces  which  "  dwell  "  in  things,  as 
if  things  were  little  hollow  boxes  for  forces  which  sally 
out  upon  occasion  and  perform  divers  feats.  Upon  oc- 
casion things  are  spoken  of  as  the  "  fulcra  "  of  forces, 
as  if  forces  needed  a  kind  of  perch  on  which  to  roost. 
The  way  in  which  things  are  made,  in  this  scheme, 
seems  to  be  as  follows:  First,  a  proper  amount  of  "  pure 
being  "  is  provided.  This  is  absolutely  inert,  and  with- 
out any  positive  quality  or  determination  whatever  ; 
but  it  furnishes  a  fulcrum  for  power.  All  qualities 
and  determinations  are  next  produced  by  bringing 


240  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

forces  from  no  one  knows  where,  and  sticking  them  into 
this  indefiniteness.  Thereby  the  being  is  enabled'  to  do 
something,  and  the  forces  gain  a  fulcrum.  But  this 
process  rests  entirely  upon  a  hypostasis  of  abstractions, 
and  a  mistake  of  subjective  distinctions  for  objective 
fact.  It  further  destroys  itself,  as  it  denies  its  own  po- 
sition, that  force  cannot  exist  apart  from  being.  But, 
in  sound  philosophy,  the  so-called  forces  of  a  thing  are 
never  external  to  it,  but  only  express  the  way  in  which 
the  relatively  self -centered  power,  or  subject,  reacts 
against  other  things.  The  vulgar  notion  that  a  thing 
can  be  divided,  except  in  unreal  abstraction,  into  a  pas- 
sive lump  which  represents  the  being  of  the  thing  and 
certain  active  properties,  is  impossible  in  philosophy. 

We  may,  however,  make  the  following  concession  to 
some  current  views:  It  is  conceivable  that  there  should 
be  material  elements  having  only  a  simple  force  of  ex- 
istence and  space-filling,  whereby  each  should  assert 
itself  against  all  others,  but  without  any  moving  forces. 
That  is,  we  might  conceive  of  atoms  with  only  a  static 
force,  and  without  any  relation  to  dynamics.  This 
appears  to  be  the  current  conception  among  the  specu- 
lators on  this  subject.  It  follows  at  once  that  such 
atoms,  though  still  having  force  of  a  kind  as  their 
essence,  would  be  quite  incapable  of  accounting  for  the 
actual  dynamic  universe.  It  would  be  necessary  by 
the  sheer  force  of  the  definition,  to  assume  some  agent 
or  agents  outside  of  the  atoms  to  account  for  their 
changes.  In  this  case,  however,  it  would  not  be  allowed 
to  speak  of  these  external  forces  as  inhering  or  residing 
in  the  atoms,  or  as  in  any  way  belonging  to  them.  The 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.  241 

only  tenable  conception  would  be  that  of  an  external 
agent  acting  upon  the  atoms,  and  causing  and  co-ordinat- 
ing all  their  movements.  This  view  is  logically  possible 
and  may  be  true;  but  its  logical  possibility  is  not  enough 
to  prove  that  such  atoms  exist.  Moreover,  the  atheist 
who  seeks  to  include  all  phenomena  under  atomic 
action,  denies  the  existence  of  such  atoms.  His  atoms 
are  dynamic  as  well  as  static;  and  unless  the  conception 
be  shown  to  contradict  the  fact,  it  must  be  allowed, 
and  the  question  debated  upon  this  basis.  We  allow, 
then,  that  the  dynamic  view  of  matter  can  be  replaced 
by  the  static  view  in  the  sense  explained,  and  the  dy- 
namics of  the  universe  can  be  accounted  for  by  an  extra 
atomic  agent;  but  as  we  wish  to  hear  the  worst  thing 
which  can  be  said,  we  decide  at  present  for  the  dy- 
namic theory,  according  to  which  the  moving  forces  of 
the  elements  are  not  external  to  them.  But  if  we 
adopt  the  dynamic  notion,  we  must  not  mistake  the 
possibility  of  conceiving  merely  statical  atoms  for  a 
proof  that  the  actual  atoms  possess  their  power  only  in 
an  external  fashion;  on  the  contrary,  that  power  con- 
stitutes the  central  being  of  the  atom;  and  its  so-called 
forces  are  but  abstractions  from  the  various  reactions 
of  that  power  against  external  agents.  If,  then,  any 
one  say  that  every  act  must  have  a  subject,  we  are 
quite  agreed;  we  affirm  the  same  with  all  possible  em- 
phasis. It  is  the  atom  which  acts  in  all  atomic  activi- 
ties, and  nothing  else.  If  it  be  further  said,  that  power 
cannot  stand  alone,  we  are  agreed  again,  if  by  power 
be  meant  only  the  personified  abstractions  to  which  we 
have  been  objecting.  If  it  be  taken  in  any  other 


242  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

sense,  we  are  so  far  from  admitting  that  it  cannot  stand 
alone,  that  we  rather  affirm  that  nothing  but  a  power 
can  stand  alone.  We  certainly  get  little  help  in  this 
respect  by  postulating  a  passive  inertness,  as  it  is  quite 
impossible  to  see  how  such  a  thing  could  enable  any 
thing  to  stand  or  even  to  sit.  If  it  be  said,  that  all 
power  must  have  a  source  back  of  itself,  we  agree  once 
more,  if  this  means  that  every  act  implies  an  agent. 
If  it  have  any  other  meaning,  we  reply  that  it  is  a 
strange  blindness  which  can  imagine  that  any  thing 
but  power  can  be  that  ultimate  source.  In  truth,  we 
have  here  that  wretched  personification  of  a  word  again. 
Active  agents  are  the  only  realities,  and  such  an  agent 
is  an  individualized  force.  It  may  be  indifferently 
called  being,  or  self -centered  power,  as  one  chooses,  for 
these  are  but  different  names  for  the  same  thing. 

Let  us,  then,  adopt  the  dynamic  theory  of  matter, 
and  see  where  it  leads  us.  We  have  seen  that  the  ele- 
ments must  be  regarded  as  active  agents,  and  never  as 
little  lumps  of  passive  materiality:  but  more  must  be 
said.  The  element  of  relativity  in  the  atoms  must 
next  be  considered,  and  we  shall  find  that  that  element 
makes  it  impossible  to  regard  them  as  independent. 
A  superficial  view  of  things  leads  to  the  view  that  ma- 
terial things  are  strictly  self-centered  and  changeless, 
and  that  their  properties  inhere  in  them  independently 
of  every  other  thing :  but  a  scarcely  less  superficial 
observation,  serves  to  show  that  no  attribute  or  quality 
belongs  to  a  thing  absolutely,  but  only  under  certain 
conditions  or  in  connection  with  other  things.  A  thing 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.  243 

has  color  only  in  the  light.  Water  is  liquid  only  at  cer- 
tain temperatures.  Weight,  one  of  the  ultimate  tests  of 
the  quantity  of  matter,  depends  on  the  presence  of  an  at- 
tracting body,  and  varies  with  its  distance.  Volume  is 
never  the  same  for  any  two  consecutive  instants.  The 
activities  of  matter  are  even  more  clearly  conditioned. 
Take  the  chemical  activities  of  oxygen  and  hydrogen. 
Neither  can  act  alone,  but  only  in  connection  with  the 
other,  and  under  certain  definite  conditions.  Under  any 
other  circumstances  they  cannot  act;  and  hence  the 
chemical  activity  of  each  is  a  function  of  both,  and  the 
disappearance  of  either  would  be  the  disappearance  of 
both  as  chemical  agents.  If  there  were  only  one  kind 
of  element,  there  would  be  no  chemistry.  The  ordinary 
way  out  of  this  difficulty  is  to  say :  The  elements  real- 
ly have  chemical  forces  at  all  times,  but  they  cannot  act 
until  certain  conditions  are  fulfilled.  That  is,  the  so- 
called  forces  are  forceless,  that  is,  are  not  forces,  except 
at  the  moment  of  combination.  Of  course,  every  thing 
must  be  such  that  when  certain  other  things  act  upon 
it  it  will  manifest  the  new  activities  which  actually 
appear;  but  it  no  more  follows  from  this  fact  that  it 
has  the  power  when  the  conditions  are  not  fulfilled, 
than  it  follows  that  an  egg  has  the  power  of  cackling 
or  crowing  because,  under  appropriate  circumstances, 
such  a  result  may  be  reached.  The  simple  fact  is,  that 
under  certain  conditions  the  elements  combine;  and,  of 
course,  they  have  at  that  moment  the  power  of  com- 
bination; but  there  is  no  need  to  stultify  ourselves  by 
saying  that  they  have  the  power  at  other  times,  only 
they  cannot  use  it.  What  is  thus  true  of  the  chemical 


244  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

activities,  is  equally  true  of  the  physical  ones.  Gravi- 
tation, cohesion,  repulsion,  et  ccetera,  are  not  absolute 
attributes  of  any  atom,  but  only  of  the  atoms  in  rela- 
tions. We  express  this  result  by  saying  that  all  atomic 
activities  are  conditioned.  There  is  not  one  activity 
which  can  be  viewed  as  belonging  absolutely  to  any 
element.  Any  given  atom  is  what  it  is,  and  does  what 
it  does,  because  all  others  are  what  they  are  and  do 
what  they  do.  Hence,  atomic  activities  are  functions 
only  of  the  manifold;  or  of  the  atoms  in  mutual  rela- 
tions. This,  however,  does  not  say  that  relations  only 
are  real,  but  it  does  say  that  the  atoms  are  real  only  in 
relations.  This  conclusion  flows  directly  from  the  un- 
doubted fact  that  all  atomic  activities  are  conditioned. 

To  this  it  is  urged,  in  rebuttal,  that  at  most  only 
the  activities  of  the  atoms  depend  upon  their  relations. 
Their  being  would  remain  the  same  under  all  changes 
of  activity.  This  objection  is  due  to  sense-delusion, 
•which  gives  rise  to  the  delusion  that  being  is  simply 
static  instead  of  dynamic.  We  have  implicitly  answered 
it  in  our  criticism  of  the  notion  that  qualities  and  ac- 
tivities are  external  to  the  thing  instead  of  being  the 
necessary  results  of  the  innermost  nature  of  the  thing. 
We  content  ourselves,  therefore,  with  the  following 
considerations:  The  every-day  notion,  that  a  thing  re- 
mains unchanged  while  its  activity  changes,  though 
allowable  in  daily  life,  is  metaphysically  untenable. 
The  changing  activity  of  any  subject  must  have  some 
ground,  and  an  unchanging,  inactive  substratum  fur- 
nishes no  foundation  whatever.  If  the  subject  a  re- 
mains forever  unchanged,  there  is  not  the  shadow  of  a 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.  245 

reason  why  its  action  should  change,  and  still  less 
reason  why  its  action  should  take  one  form  rather  than 
another.  In  fact,  the  activity  of  any  thing  is  but  the 
external  expression  of  its  internal  state;  and  a  change 
of  activity  is  the  outward  expression  of  an  inward 
change.  Before  any  thing  can  happen  outside  of 
things,  something  must  happen  inside  of  them.  The 
mechanical  system  of  motions  among  things  is  but  the 
spatial  expression  of  a  metaphysical  system  of  changes 
in  things.  A  definite  form  of  action  must  correspond 
to  a  definite  state  of  being;  and  a  change  of  activity  is 
impossible  without  a  corresponding  change  of  being. 
If  the  law  of  causation  is  worth  any  thing  it  is  wortli 
this.  Hence  we  say,  that  the  very  essence  of  a  thing  is 
implicated  in  its  activity;  that  the  notion  of  a  changeless 
substratum  must  be  abandoned,  and  the  very  substances 
of  the  physical  universe  must  be  brought  into  the  circle 
of  change.  But  the  activity  of  the  atoms  varies  with 
their  relations;  and  hence  the  very  being  or  essence  of 
the  atoms  is  implicated  in  those  relations,  and  varies 
with  them.  It  may  be  that  these  considerations  will 
make  it  impossible  to  rest  in  these  atoms  as  the  ultimate 
facts  of  the  universe;  but  the  results  reached  rest  upon 
the  most  undoubted  teachings  of  physical  science  and 
the  simplest  kind  of  reasoning.  The  argument  may  be 
summed  up  as  follows:  In  opposition  to  the  theories  of 
matter  which  are  taught  by  the  senses,  or  which  are 
held  by  unreflecting  common  sense,  science  and  phi- 
losophy know  nothing  of  mere  passivity.  On  the  con- 
trary, they  regard  all  natural  phenomena  as  the  result 
of  action  of  some  sort.  There  are,  then,  active  sub- 


246  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

jects  or  an  active  subject.  But  that  which  distinguishes 
these  subjects  from  non-existence — that  which  makes 
them  subjects — is  just  their  power  of  action;  so  that  the 
ossence  of  being  is  not  static  but  dynamic.  Further,  the 
activity  of  a  thing  is  never  separable  in  fact  from  its 
essence,  but  is  rather  the  manifestation  of  its  essence, 
so  that  both  must  vary  together.  Now  if  we  postulate 
atoms  as  the  subjects  of  natural  activities,  we  are 
forced  by  the  facts  to  postulate  them  as  so  interrelated 
and  interdependent  that  out  of  these  relations,  or 
standing  alone,  they  would  be  indistinguishable  from 
zero.  The  atoms,  then,  must  be  thought  of  as  con- 
ditioned in  their  very  being. 

If  we  are  not  greatly  mistaken,  this  conclusion  will 
be  met,  not  so  much  with  skepticism,  as  with  dogmatic 
denial.  For  has  not  the  indestructibility  of  matter 
been  demonstrated?  and  is  not  substance  necessarily 
unchangeable?  If  we  deny  this,  the  universe  has  no 
constant  factor;  and  we  return  at  once  to  the  doctrine 
of  Heraclitus,  that  all  things  flow  and  nothing  stands. 
Here,  again,  we  have  partly  ignorance  and  partly  dog- 
matic prejudice.  The  first  mistake  is,  in  confounding 
the  scientific  meaning  of  unchangeable  when  applied  to 
substance  with  the  etymology  of  the  word.  The  ety- 
mology, indeed,  excludes  all  change  of  any  kind;  but 
the  scientific  meaning  is  this:  A  given  subject,  a,  under 
different  conditions  x,  y,  z,  may  pass  into  the  various 
states  Oj,  #2>  ^3)  etc.;  by  reversing  these  conditions,  we 
may  pass  from  «3  to  a^  «„  and  finally  to  a  again.  An- 
other subject,  b,  has  a  series  peculiar  to  itself,  b^  b9j  #3, 
etc.;  c  has  the  series  c1?  c2,  c3,  etc.  Now  the  indestruc- 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.  247 

tibility  and  unchangeability  of  matter,  so  far  as  they 
have  any  scientific  meaning,  do  not  affirm  that  the  mate- 
rial substance  remains  unchanged  throughout  the  series; 
but  only  the  reversibility  and  numerical  equivalence  of 
the  series  when  reversed;  for  example,  oxygen  and  hy- 
drogen combine  to  form  vapor;  vapor  condenses  into 
water,  and  water  becomes  ice.  These  are  the  a^  a2,  #3? 
of  our  series.  By  reversing  the  conditions,  we  may  re- 
verse the  series;  and  obtain  precisely  the  same  amount 
of  water,  vapor,  and  gas  which  previously  disappeared, 
provided  always  that  the  conditions  which  affect  weight 
remain  the  same.  Now  practical  science  is  under  no 
obligation  to  affirm  that  the  substance  remains  abso- 
lutely unchanged  in  the  passage  from  gas  to  ice  and 
back  again.  It  is  not  even  under  obligation  to  affirm 
that  the  restored  gas  is  the  same  as  that  with  which  the 
experiment  began.  There  is  an  equivalent  amount  as 
tested  by  weight,  but  equivalence  and  similarity  are 
not  identity.  Of  course,  we  do  not  mean  to  deny  that 
it  may  be  the  same  gas  restored  to  its  former  state;  we 
only  point  out  that  physics  neither  knows  nor  needs  to 
know  any  thing  upon  this  subject,  beyond  the  fact  of 
reversibility  and  numerical  equivalence  under  the  same 
conditions.  The  series,  a,  alt  a2,  etc.,  can  be  worked 
either  way  without  loss;  this  constitutes  the  indestruct- 
ibility of  matter,  so  far  as  it  has  any  scientific  meaning. 
The  series,  a,  alt  a2,  etc.,  is  a  closed  one  and  does  not 
pass  into  the  other  equally  closed  series,  b,  b^  Z>2,  etc., 
c,  cl9  c2,  etc.  This  constitutes  the  identity  and  un- 
changeability of  matter.  Within  the  series  which  ex- 
presses the  nature  of  the  thing,  every  thing  is  changeable 


248  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

to  its  inmost  center.  It  never  passes  outside  of  this 
series,  so  that  every  thing  could  become  every  other 
thing;  and  in  this  sense  only  is  it  unchangeable.  In- 
deed, a  thing  is  simply  such  a  series  concreted,  or  made 
substantial.  It  is  a  flowing  formula  made  real,  and 
not  rigid  duration. 

This  conception  of  substance  as  changeable  within 
certain  limits,  is  forced  upon  us  by  the  law  of  causa- 
tion, and  by  every  fact  of  observation.  But  several 
objections  reappear,  and  we  give  them  a  parting  word. 
It  is  urged  that  a,,  a2,  a3,  etc.,  are  only  states  of  a  /  and 
that  the  substance  remains  the  same  in  all  its  states. 
To  this  we  reply,  that  al9  a2,  as,  are  no  more  states  of  «, 
than  a  is  a  state  of  each  of  these.  Each  may  be  taken 
indifferently  as  the  base.  Ice  is  no  more  a  state  of 
water  than  water  is  a  state  of  ice.  If  it  be  said  that  the 
substance  is  the  same  in  both ;  this  is  true  only  in  the 
sense  that  the  ice  is  such  that  if  heated  sufficiently  it 
will  become  water;  and  conversely  water  is  such  that, 
if  cooled  sufficiently,  it  will  become  ice  again.  But 
what  is  a  state  ?  Is  it  any  thing  but  a  result  of  what 
the  subject  is  for  the  time?  and  can  a  changing  state 
be  thought  of  as  any  thing  but  the  outward  expression 
of  an  inward  change?  Finally,  it  is  said:  You  say  of 
the  substance,  "  it  changes,"  and  you  are  constantly 
speaking  of  this  "  it "  which  abides  across  all  the 
changes.  Now  we  want  to  know  what  this  "  it "  is, 
which  abides.  We  reply  that  "  it "  is  the  changing 
thing,  and  that  there  is  no  "  abiding "  except  in  the 
sense  explained.  How  a  thing  can  have  different 
states,  we  know  not;  but  since  the 'time  of  the 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.  249 

it  has  been  clear  that  the  notion  of  a  strictly  change- 
less thing  with  changing  states  is  an  intolerable  con- 
tradiction. It  must  be  added,  that  complete  reversi- 
bility is  true  only  for  material  things;  indeed,  we  do 
not  know  it  to  be  strictly  true  there.  The  changes  of 
the  elements  leave  no  traces  in  their  external  action,  so 
far  as  we  can  discern;  but  whether  they  may  not  leave 
inward  traces,  so  that  the  atom  has  a  record  of  its  his- 
tory within  itself,  we  know  not.  In  the  case  of  the  soul 
there  is  only  a  limited  possibility  of  recovering  a  past 
state.  Here  unchangeability  consists,  not  in  any  change- 
lessness  of  essence,  but  solely  in  the  power  of  memory 
whereby  the  soul  gathers  up  its  past,  and  carries  it  with 
it  as  it  advances  from  state  to  state.  It  is  the  same 
soul  at  different  times  only  in  the  sense  that  the  soul  at 
any  point  contains  the  ground  of  its  future  develop- 
ment, and  not  in  the  sense  of  a  metaphysical  sameness. 
If  asked  what  is  the  "I "  which  endures,  we  reply  that 
it  is  the  developing,  changing  soul.  If  this  is  not 
enough,  we  can  only  add  that  "  I  "  is  the  personal  pro- 
noun of  the  first  person. 

We  kave  dwelt  upon  some  points  in  the  preceding 
paragraphs  which  are  not  necesssary  to  our  argument. 
We  have  done  this  to  bring  the  dynamic  character  of 
all  being  more  fully  into  view.  We  think  it  possible 
further  to  show,  that  personality  only  fills  out  the  true 
notion  of  being,  and  reconciles  the  identity  of  the  Ele- 
atics  with  the  flow  of  Heraclitus.  Change  and  iden- 
tity can  be  combined  only  in  the  personal.  But  we 
omit  this  point.  We  gather  up  for  further  use  the 


250  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

following  results:  If  we  are  to  retain  the  atom  in  our 
science,  we  must  cease  to  regard  it  as  an  indifferent 
lump,  secure  forever  in  solid  singleness,  but  must  rather 
postulate  it  as  an  active  something,  or  as  an  individual- 
ized force  which  is  so  related  to  every  other  as  to  be 
sensitive  to  every  change  throughout  the  universe. 
No  other  conception  will  satisfy  both  the  facts  and 
the  laws  of  thought.  This  necessitates  a  double  sys- 
tem: first,  a  system  of  spatial  changes  among  the  ele- 
ments, which  as  dealing  with  space,  time,  and  motion, 
may  be  called  the  mechanical  system;  and,  second,  a 
system  of  changes  in  things  which  the  law  of  causa- 
tion forces  us  to  assume,  and  of  which  the  mechan- 
ical system  is  but  the  spatial  expression.  This  may  be 
called  the  metaphysical  system.  As  such,  it  is  the 
fundamental  condition  of  the  mechanical  system,  and 
can  never  be  explained  by  it.  Beneath  all  mechanism 
there  is  a  universal  dynamism.  But  how  is  this  met- 
aphysical system  possible  ?  May  we  stop  with  its  af- 
firmation, or  must  we  go  further  ?  This  brings  us  to 
the  second  question  concerning  the  atoms,  that  of  in- 
teraction. The  atoms  are  postulated  as  separate  indi- 
viduals, and  yet  the  universe  is  one.  The  solidarity  of 
the  physical  system  is  the  capital,  or  rathei\the  basal, 
fact  of  science;  and  yet  the  agents  are  viewed  as  an  in- 
definite plurality  of  independent  things.  How  can 
these  two  facts  be  reconciled  ?  How  can  self-dependent 
agents  be  brought  into  mutual  relations  of  dependent 
action?  The  atomic  notion  seems  to  contain  contra- 
dictory elements.  We  regard  the  atom  as  self-existent, 
and  as  conditioned  by  others  external  to  itself.  We 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.          251 

regard  it  as  self-centered,  and  as  having  its  properties 
only  as  a  member  of  a  community.  These  are  contra- 
dictory determinations.  How  can  mutually  independ- 
ent things  be  brought  into  interaction? 

The  difficulties  of  this  notion  of  interaction  have  led 
many  philosophers  to  try  to  eliminate  it  from  philos- 
ophy and  science.  The  occasionalism  of  the  Cartesians, 
and  the  positivism  of  Comte,  are  distinguished  attempts 
of  this  kind.  The  former  sprang  more  especially  from 
the  theoretical  difficulty  in  understanding  the  connection 
of  soul  and  body;  and  the  latter  sprang  from  a  con- 
viction of  the  emptiness  of  the  search  after  causes  in 
general.  According  to  the  former,  a  change  in  the 
body  is  the  occasion  of  a  change  in  the  soul,  and  con- 
versely ;  but  in  no  case  is  either  the  cause  of  the  other. 
According  to  positivism,  phenomena  follow  one  another, 
but  without  causal  connection.  Both  of  these  theories 
are  valuable  as  practical  methods  of  investigation;  and 
practical  science  should  never  forsake  this  stand-point. 
When  we  have  the  order  of  succession  among  changes, 
we  have  absolutely  all  that  is  valuable  in  practical  sci- 
ence ;  and  we  should  not  be  able  to  reap  one  jot  more 
of  practical  advantage  if  we  could  see  through  and 
through  phenomena.  Science,  therefore,  ought  not  to 
be  diverted  from  practical  pursuits  by  metaphysical 
inquiries.  But  while  valuable  as  methods  of  practical 
research,  they  are  metaphysically  worthless.  For  in 
order  that  changes  in  one  being  shall  be  the  occasion  of 
changes  in  another  it  must  act  upon  it.  If,  with  the 
positivists,  we  say  that  phenomena  only  follow  one  an- 
other, we  must  still  allow  that  if  a  and  b  are  to  be  fol- 


252  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

lowed  by  c,  and  not  by  x,  then  a  and  b  must  determine 
the  consequent  c.  Without  this  assumption  any  thing 
might  be  followed  by  every  thing  or  by  nothing;  in- 
deed without  this  assumption  each  new  phenomenon 
would  be  a  self-creation. 

Another  most  renowned  effort  to  escape  the  difficul- 
ties of  interaction  is  Leibnitz's  theory  of  a  pre-estab- 
lished harmony;  according  to  which,  no  atom,  or  monad, 
as  he  called  them,  really  affects  any  other  ;  but  all  the 
monads  are  so  constructed  with  reference  to  all  others, 
that  they  shall  act  harmoniously  together  yet  without 
any  real  interaction.  There  is  no  logical  contradiction 
in  this  theory,  but  when  applied  to  the  actual  universe, 
its  complexity  is  so  great  that  no  one  has  ever  been 
able  to  rest  in  it  for  any  time.  The  mind  is  so  bewil- 
dered in  the  attempt  to  comprehend  the  possibility  of 
such  a  harmony,  that  the  theory  breaks  down  through 
sheer  excess  of  complexity.  It  also  comes  into  hopeless 
collision  with  the  fact  of  freedom,  and  is  essentially 
fatalistic. 

The  notion  of  interaction,  then,  is  necessary  in  science; 
and  its  possibility  must  be  explained.  The  practical  sci- 
entist may  of  course  decline  the  problem,  but  theory  must 
recognize  it.  The  only  attempt  at  solution  which  de- 
serves mention,  is  that  which  regards  the  atoms  as  en- 
dowed with  sundry  forces  working  between  them,  and 
producing  manifold  effects.  This  theory  is  born  mainly 
of  the  senses,  and  has  only  a  certain  value  for  the  imagi- 
nation. If  we  figure  these  forces  as  a  system  of  length- 
ening  or  shortening  lines  or  threads ;  or  if  we  think  of 
force  as  a  subtle  ether  raying  out  from  a  point — the  im- 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTER  ACTION.  253 

agination  seems  to  have  a  bridge  whereby  to  cross  from 
one  to  the  other.  But  when  we  come  to  take  this  theory 
in  earnest,  it  appears  at  once  as  an  imaginative  make- 
shift which  cannot  be  realized  in  thought.  In  the  first 
place,  we  have  seen  that  these  forces  are  only  hyposta- 
sized  abstractions  in  any  case.  Observe  now  the  exact 
nature  of  the  problem.  The  fact  of  interaction,  when 
reduced  to  its  lowest  terms,  is  this :  When  a  changes  6, 
c,  d,  etc.,  all  change  in  definite  order  and  degree ;  or  any 
change  in  one  involves  a  change  in  all.  To  explain  this, 
the  scientist  says  that  forces  pass  from  a  to  the  others 
and  produce  the  effect.  But  this  notion  of  a  causa  tran- 
siens  represents  at  bottom  a  mental  void  rather  than  a 
thought.  To  explain  any  thing,  it  must  tell  us  what 
this  is  which  goes  over  and  produces  an  effect.  To  say 
that  action,  or  an  influence,  goes  over,  is  only  to  restate 
the  problem  in  another  form;  for  an  action  or  an  influ- 
ence is  not  any  thing  which  can  float  about  in  the  void 
without  a  subject.  We  must  keep  constantly  in  mind 
that  this  is  not  a  question  of  observation  in  any  way, 
but  only  of  consistent  thinking.  No  one  ever  saw  any  in- 
fluences passing  and  repassing.  All  that  can  ever  be  seen 
is,  that  mutual  changes  take  place.  Now  we  can  think 
nothing  under  this  notion  of  a  passing  influence  unless 
we  suppose  the  influence  to  be  a  real  thing.  But  this 
supposition  is  doubly  untenable.  (1)  If  we  suppose 
that  an  atom  is  constantly  throwing  off  things,  x,  by 
which  it  affects  other  things,  the  difficult  and  delicate 
question  arises:  whence  has  the  atom  its  infinite  store 
of  ammunition  ?  (2)  If  this  question  were  satisfactorily 
answered,  the  question  remains  where  it  was  before. 


254  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

Suppose  that  a  throws  off  x\  and  that  these  finally 
reach  the  neighborhood  of  b,  why  should  b,  in  conse- 
quence of  this  fact,  take  on  quite  new  properties  ?  If 
b  and  a  are  independent,  why  should  they  not  be  as 
indifferent  when  side  by  side  as  when  separated  by 
empty  space.  Contiguity  in  space  helps  the  imagina- 
tion, but  not  the  understanding.  Not  action  at  a  dis- 
tance, but  interaction  at  all  between  independent  things, 
is  what  the  reason  finds  so  difficult. 

We  have  all  heard  much  of  forces  which  play  be- 
tween things;  but  this  conception  is  only  an  hypothesis 
to  explain  certain  facts.  Its  value  for  the  imagination, 
and  hence  its  practical  admissibility,  we  do  not  deny. 
But  when  taken  in  earnest,  we  find  it  quite  impossible 
to  think  it  through.  We  only  involve  ourselves  in  the 
gravest  difficulties,  and  gain  no  insight  after  all.  Still 
worse  is  the  notion  that  one  thing  transfers  its  condi- 
tion to  another,  and  thus  acts  upon  it.  No  condition 
can  exist  independently,  hence  cannot  be  transferred. 
The  pretended  transference  rests  upon  this  fact :  a 
body,  a,  in  the  condition  m,  may  become  in  some  as 
yet  unexplained  way  the  cause  why  another  body,  b,  may 
take  on  the  same  condition;  as  where  a  magnet  induces 
magnetism.  But  nothing  passes  over;  no  magnetic 
states  hang  for  a  time  between  a  and  />,  and,  finally, 
enter  into  b  ;  but  a,  by  its  action  on  b,  however  brought 
about,  enables  b  to  become  magnetic.  This  notion  of 
a  transferred  condition  k;  further  untenable  because  the 
great  mass  of  interaction  does  not  imply  that  a  produces 
a  similar  condition  in  b,  but  only  a  change  of  some 
kind.  There  is  in  no  case  a  transference  of  any  thing, 


AND  TBtilR  INTERACTION.          255 

but  each  develops  the  new  condition  out  of  itself,  upon 
occasion  of  the  other's  action.  The  proof  is,  that  any 
other  conception  breaks  down  upon  analysis,  and  turns 
out  to  be  a  phrase  which  cannot  be  put  into  thought. 
When  one  man  speaks  to  another,  no  ideas  pass  from 
one  to  the  other,  but  upon  occasion  each  constructs  in 
himself  the  proper  thoughts  and  feelings. 

Ultimate  facts  may  be  mysterious,  but  they  must 
never  contain  contradictions;  hence  while  the  interac- 
tion of  things  may  be  mysterious,  we  may  never  admit 
contradiction  into  it.  Observe  once  more  the  fact  to 
be  explained.  Physical  science  forces  upon  us  the  rela- 
tivity and  conditioned  character  of  the  atoms,  even  in 
their  very  being.  Its  most  fundamental  fact  is,  that 
every  atom  is  sensitive  to  the  changes  in  every  other, 
and  conducts  itself  accordingly.  But  there  is  a  distinct 
contradiction  in  declaring,  not  atoms  in  general,  but 
atoms  of  this  kind,  to  be  self-centered  and  independent. 
To  declare  in  one  breath  that  every  atom  must  vary 
with  every  other,  and  yet  has  its  sufficient  ground  in 
itself,  is  to  fly  in  the  face  of  all  logic.  We  have  seen 
that  every  attempt  to  fill  up  the  gap  between  two  inde- 
pendent things  by  any  passage  of  influences  or  forces 
is  utterly  fruitless,  and  even  meaningless.  There  is 
only  one  course  left:  we  cannot  deny  the  relativity  of 
the  atoms;  we  must,  therefore,  deny  that  they  have 
their  reason  and  ground  in  themselves,  and  reduce  them 
to  constant  dependence  on  some  one  being  who  em- 
braces them  all  in  the  unity  of  its  existence — something 
as  the  mind  embraces  all  its  thoughts,  feelings,  and 
other  mental  states,  in  the  unity  of  its  existence.  In 


256  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

this  way  only  is  it  possible  to  remove,  not  the  mystery 
of  interaction,  but  the  contradiction  of  the  notion.  The 
infinite  may  freely  posit  the  finite,  and  may,  with  equal 
freedom,  posit  an  interaction  between  itself  and  the 
finite,  but  all  interaction  between  mutually  independent 
beings  is  impossible  in  thought,  and  hence  unaffirmable 
in  fact,  except  through  some  ultimate  being  who  em- 
braces them  all  in  the  unity  of  itself.  Below  all  mech- 
anism, and  all  plurality,  there  must  be  an  all-embracing 
one.  The  proof  is,  that  clear  thinking  finds  any  other 
conception  irreconcilable  with  the  facts  of  nature  and 
the  laws  of  thought.  This  is  the  conclusion  to  which 
all  the  great  thinkers  of  the  world  have  come,  without 
exception.  If  thoughtless  believers  in  the  five  senses 
are  bewildered  by  it,  they  must  remember,  (1)  that  this 
is  not  a  question  of  observation,  but  of  consistent  rea- 
soning; and,  (2)  that  this  conclusion  is  not  a  whit  more 
metaphysical  than  the  atomic  theory  itself.  Both  views 
claim  to  be  inferences  from  the  phenomena.  The  jus- 
tice of  the  inference  must  be  decided  by  each  for 
himself. 

The  demands  we  have  made  upon  the  atoms  thus  far 
are  purely  formal,  and  result  at  once  from  the  attempt 
to  think  of  them  as  the  subjects  of  natural  activities. 
We  have  said  nothing  of  the  subjective  side  of  atomic 
action.  Our  own  action,  which  is  all  that  we  immedi- 
ately know,  is  conditioned  by  consciousness  and  a  sense 
of  effort.  But  we  cannot  say  that  all  action  must  be  so 
conditioned.  Still,  if  we  are- to  think  of  the  atoms  as 
acting,  we  must  allow  their  action  to  be  conditioned  by 
inner  states  of  some  sort;  and  we  must  either  content 


SUBSTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.          257 

ourselves  with  affirming  an  inner  ground,  without  at- 
tempting to  conceive  it,  or  we  must  assimilate  those 
inner  states  to  our  own  sense  of  conscious  effort.  We 
merely  mention  the  point,  without  offering  any  opinion 
upon  atomic  psychology. 

Now  see  the  point  to  which  we  have  come.  The 
atheist  rested  his  denial,  not  on  the  absence  of  adapta- 
tion and  harmony  in  things,  but  on  the  possible  inde- 
pendence of  the  atoms,  and  he  claimed  that  their 
dependence  cannot  be  proved.  In  opposition,  we  found 
that  his  no-design  argument  was  essential  skepticism, 
and  was,  besides,  self-destructive.  Now  we  find  the 
undoubted  facts  concerning  them  to  be  such,  that  the 
atoms  which  science  must  postulate  if  it  will  explain 
the  facts,  cannot  be  conceived  as  self-existent.  Allow- 
ing the  dynamic  theory  of  matter,  we  can  do  nothing 
with  the  atoms  without  assuming  a  unitary  and  spon- 
taneous ground  which  embraces  and  determines  them 
all.  And  now  the  various  teleological  arguments  come 
back  with  increased  force.  The  possibility  of  science 
depends  upon  an  objective  reason,  and  a  universal  adap- 
tation of  part  to  part.  The  teleological  view  is  the 
only  one  which  satisfies  the  human  mind,  and  the  me- 
chanical objections  turn  out  to  be  quite  irrelevant. 
Now  what  shall  we  say  of  this  power  which  produces 
and  maintains  all  things  according  to  the  laws  of 
reason?  Is  it  rational?  Is  it  conscious  intelligence? 
Nay  rather,  is  it  not  the  highest  reason  and  the  uncon- 
ditioned intelligence?  It  is  possible  to  deny  it  still, 
and  to  maintain  that  this  power  does  not  know  what  it 


258  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

is  doing,  and  hits  upon  all  these  harmonies,  no  one 
knows  how.  But  this  is  not  reason;  it  is  volition,  and 
is  not  amenable  to  argument.  If  we  hold  the  atomic 
theory,  the  only  conception  which  can  offer  any  reasons 
for  itself  is,  that  the  physical  mechanism  depends  upon 
a  free  and  rational  creator.  Thus  we  supplement  the 
design-argument,  and  escape  its  polytheistic  difficulties 
by  studying,  not  the  adaptations  of  things,  but  a  much 
simpler  and  more  unquestioned  fact,  the  interaction  of 
things.  Our  method  has  been  critical  and  dialectic. 
We  set  off  with  the  formal  conception  of  being,  or  sub- 
stance, as  the  subject  of  activities  and  changes,  and  we 
found  that  this  simple  conception  led,  by  the  simplest 
kind  of  reasoning,  to  the  conclusion  that  all  finite  things 
must  depend  upon  an  infinite  being.  And  the  order  of 
nature  is  utterly  opaque  without  conceiving  this  being 
as  intelligent. 

But  our  doctrine  of  the  atoms  hints  at  another  con- 
ception of  nature,  according  to  which  the  atoms  appear, 
not  as  substantial  things,  but  only  as  modes  of  the  ac- 
tivity of  this  all-embracing  power.  As  such  they  are 
convenient  practical  fictions,  but  without  external  real- 
ity. This,  too,  is  a  possible  and  consistent  conception. 
Our  aim  hitherto  has  not  been  to  prove  that  atoms 
exist,  but  only  to  determine  the  way  in  which  we  must 
think  them,  if  we  assume  them  to  exist.  We  have 
marked  out  the  formal  conditions  which  they  must  ful- 
fill if  they  are  to  be  adequate  to  the  facts.  But  there 
is  no  proof  that  atoms  exist,  and  all  the  facts  upon 
which  the  theory  is  based  are  capable  of  other  explana- 
tions. The  capital  fact  upon  which  the  theory  is  found- 


StTESTANCES  AND  THEIR  INTERACTION.          25  & 

ed  is,  that  the  agent  or  agents  which  produce  material 
phenomena  work  from  points  outward,  and  not  contin- 
uously throughout  the  mass.  Now  shall  we  locate  a 
separate  subject  at  each  of  these  points  from  which 
activity  proceeds?  or  shall  we  regard  these  discrete 
points  as  the  places  where  one  universal  agent  acts  or 
manifests  itself  in  producing  material  phenomena  ?  The 
first  is  the  atomic  view.  The  second  is  the  view  which 
is  daily  becoming  more  common,  and  which  represents 
nature  as  the  product  of  a  constant  and  orderly  activity 
on  the  part  of  one  infinite  and  omnipresent  being. 
Neither  view  violates  any  law  of  thought,  as  both  pro- 
vide a  subject  for  all  activities.  Both  views  make 
science  possible,  as  the  chief  value  of  science  consists 
in  getting  the  law  of  phenomena,  rather  than  in  any 
insight  into  essences.  It  is  doubtful  if  a  decisive  solu- 
tion can  be  reached  upon  this  point.  The  practical 
scientist  will  generally  incline,  from  custom,  to  the  real- 
ity of  the  atoms,  while  the  theoretical  speculator  will 
commonly  prefer  to  make  matter  a  form  of  the  infinite's 
activity.  The  atomic  system  cannot  be  worked  without 
the  omnipresent  and  ceaseless  action  of  the  infinite; 
and  it  seems  simpler,  therefore,  and  in  every  way  more 
satisfactory,  to  resolve  the  physical  system  at  once  into 
the  immediate  activity  of  the  infinite.  The  tendency 
to  some  such  view  is  more  patent  in  irreligious  than  in 
religious  quarters.  What  has  been  materialism  is  rap- 
idly passing  into  pantheism,  and  many  of  the  evolution- 
ists build  expressly  on  the  conception  of  one  all-embrac- 
ing force.  In  scientific  speculations,  we  find  the  atomic 
and  pantheistic  view  side  by  side  in  the  same  work; 


&60  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

and  the  author  shifts  from  one  to  the  other  without  any 
suspicion  of  the  change  of  base.  Accordingly,  we  find 
matter  conceived  of  as  a  collection  of  atoms,  and  also 
as  a  mysterious  unity.  The  pantheistic  view,  then,  is 
possible;  and  this  possibility  brings  up  a  new  series  of 
dangers.  We  have  seen  that  the  atomic  theory  cannot 
be  held  atheistically;  but  have  we  not,  at  the  same 
time,  dissolved  the  theory  in  pantheism?  And  this, 
though  theoretically  the  antipodes  of  atheism,  is  prac- 
tically the  same  thing..  We  shall  see  in  the  next 
chapter. 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  26 i 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THEISM    AND    PANTHEISM. 

AUR  'argument  hitherto  has  been  on  the  basis  of  the 
M  atomic  theory,  and  we  have  seen  that  the  atoms 
cannot  be  regarded  as  independent.  Along  with  this 
conclusion  has  arisen  a  doubt  of  their  reality,  for  there 
is  no  sufficient  proof  of  their  existence.  The  question 
is  raised,  whether  a  single  unitary  agent,  whose  activ- 
ity follows  certain  laws,  be  not  a  better  explanation  of 
nature.  The  defenders  of  this  view  divide  into  two 
schools:  (1)  idealists  with  regard  to  nature;  and 
(2)  thorough-going  pantheists.  For  the  first  class  there 
are  created  spirits  and  the  uncreated  spirit;  and  besides 
these  there  is  no  other.  The  whole  material  world  is 
but  a  divine  energizing  under  the  forms  of  space  and 
time.  For  the  second  class  there  is  the  one  uncreated 
substance,  and  nothing  else.  This  substance  assumes 
various  modes,  but  remains  all  and  in  all.  With  the 
first  view  we  have  no  debate.  We  regard  the  question 
as  incapable  of  decisive  solution,  though  we  think  the 
probabilities  all  point  to  this  alternative  :  either  the 
atoms  must  be  endowed  with  an  inner  life,  after  the 
fashion  of  Leibnitz's  monads,  or  else  they  must  be  re- 
solved into  flowing  products  of  the  one  infinite  agent. 
The  thorough-going  pantheistic  view,  which  resolves 
all  things,  matter  and  spirit  alike,  into  unsubstantial 


262  'STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

modes  of  the  infinite,  without  proper  power  and  per- 
sonality, seems  to  us  a  most  poverty-stricken  view. 
The  infinite  chokes  up  the  universe,  and  instead  of  pro- 
ducing a  universe  of  living  spirits  to  rejoice  in  its  full- 
ness and  life,  it  can  do  nothing  better  than  repeat  itself 
to  itself  in  a  dreary,  stupid,  meaningless  round  of  un- 
folding and  infolding.  Whatever  of  poetry  there  may 
be  in  pantheism  lies  entirely  in  idealism,  ancT  not  in 
pantheism  proper.  The  former  view  removes  the  hard 
angularity  of  mechanism,  and  brings  the  created  and 
uncreated  spirit  in  immediate  communion.  The  latter 
view  we  cannot  but  regard  as  uninspiring  and  exces- 
sively dreary.  We  believe  that  examination  will  show 
it  to  be  equally  obnoxious  to  philosophical  criticism. 

It  has  always  been  a  favorite  device  of  pantheistic 
reasoners,  and  especially  of  the  later  German  pantheists, 
to  boast  of  the  great  philosophical  superiority  of  pan- 
theism over  all  other  systems;  Atheism  is  regarded  as 
antiquated,  and  theism  as  anthropomorphic  and  super- 
stitious. Nevertheless,  pantheism  has  always  been  in 
unstable  equilibrium  over  against  atheism.  The  prob- 
lem here  is,  to  determine  the  relations  of  the  finite  and 
infinite,  and  pantheism  has  always  tended  to  reduce 
the  infinite  to  the  sum  of  the  finite,  which  is  simple 
atheism.  Nor  does  it  appear  to  any  greater  advan- 
tage on  the  score  of  anthropomorphism  and  supersti- 
tion. ,On  the  contrary,  we  shall  find  it  perpetrating 
the  vilest  anthropomorphisms  and  the  most  abject  su- 
perstitions. As  to  its  arguments,  we  shall  find  them 
to  be  mainly  a  play  on  words,  so  that  strict  panthe- 
ism might  not  improperly  be  styled  a  disease  of  Ian- 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  263 

guage.     We  consider  its  theory,  (1)  of  the  infinite,  and 
(2)  of  the  finite. 

But  to  guard  ourselves  against  logical  jugglery,  we 
must  first  ask  what  we  mean  by  the  infinite  and  the 
finite.  A  little  definition  of  these  terms  would  have 
saved  philosophy  great  disgrace.  We  experience  our- 
selves as  conditioned  by  something  not  ourselves.  Phe- 
nomena also  appear  as  determined  and  dependent.  We 
call  ourselves  and  these  phenomena,  therefore,  finite  and 
dependent.  But  the  momentum  of  thought  carries  us 
over  to  the  affirmation  of  some  being  which  limits  and 
determines  us  and  the  phenomenal  world;  and  this  being 
we  call  unlimited  and  independent.  Now  this  being  is 
not  infinite  in  the  sense  of  being  the  all;  for  we  expressly 
recognize  the  finite  in  order  to  affirm  the  infinite.  Great 
glory  has  been  won  by  philosophical  sophists  by  defining , 
the  infinite  to  be  the  all.  In  this  way  many  dishearten- 
ing puzzles  have  been  invented.  For  example,  how  can 
the  finite  and  the  infinite  co-exist,  since  the  all  must  be 
all-embracing?  How  can  evil  be  excluded  from  the 
infinite  without  canceling  its  infinity  ?  How  can  folly 
and  impotence  be  denied  to  the  infinite?  These  are 
possible  modes  of  existence,  and  the  infinite  must  in- 
clude all  modes.  How  can  the  infinite  be  known  ?  for 
to  know  is  to  distinguish,  and  this  is  to  limit.  How 
can  the  infinite  be  positive  ?  for  the  positive  is  definite 
and  determined,  and  hence  limited.  The  infinite,  then, 
is  the  void,  the  negation,  the  non-existent,  the  unknow- 
able. These  and  many  other  equally  mortifying  soph- 
isms rest  upon  the  attempt  to  define  the  infinite  by  the 
etymology  of  the  word,  instead  of  attending  to  its  psy- 


264  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

chological  genesis  and  content.  But,  as  we  pointed  out 
in  the  first  chapter,  the  true  infinite  is  not  the  all,  but 
the  self-dependent  source  of  the  finite.  As  such  it  is 
the  most  positive  of  beings.  It  is  both  distinct  from 
the  finite,  and  related  to  it.  It  is  not  absolute  in  the 
sense  of  being  out  of  relation  to  other  things,  for  we 
have  expressly  assumed  it  in  causal  relation  to  the  finite. 
It  is  absolute  only  in  the  sense  that  it  alone  is  self -suffi- 
cient, and  that  all  the  relations  between  it  and  the  finite 
are  posited  by  itself,  and  are  not  restrictions  imposed 
from  without.  The  terms  infinite,  independent,  and 
absolute,  have  all  the  same  meaning  as  applied  to  this 
being;  and  the  terms  finite,  relative,  and  dependent, 
have  all  the  same  meaning  as  applied  to  things.  Care 
must  be  taken  to  keep  the  psychological  content  of 
these  terms  in  mind,  in  order  to  guard  against  inter- 
preting them  by  their  etymologies. 

The  infinite,  then,  in  sound  philosophy,  is  not  the  all, 
but  the  independent  being  on  whom  the  finite  depends. 
If  it  should  turn  out  to  be  the  all,  it  would  not  be  by 
the  force  of  definition,  but  because  the  known  facts 
about  the  finite  force  us  to  deny  the  substantiality  of  the 
finite,  and  reduce  it  to  a  mode  of  the  infinite  activity. 

To  return  to  the  pantheistic  theory  of  the  infinite,  we 
inquire :  Has  the  infinite  consciousness  and  intelligence  ? 
The  pantheists  generally  deny  this  on  two  grounds: 
(J)  That  intelligence  and  consciousness  are  not  needed 
to  explain  the  phenomena;  and  (2)  That  these  terms 
involve  contradiction  when  applied  to  the  infinite.  The 
argument  on  the  first  point  is  something  like  the  me- 
chanical objections  to  teleology,  except  that  instead  of 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  265 

mechanism,  the  pantheist  speaks  of  automatism.  Mech- 
anism is  an  impossible  notion  where  there  is  not  a 
spatial  aggregation  of  discrete  parts;  and  of  course  it 
cannot  be  applied  to  the  one.  Herbert  Spencer  does 
attempt  to  apply  mechanical  laws  to  the  "  fundamental 
reality;"  but  the  entire  argument  assumes  an  original 
plurality  in  the  one,  and  almost  every-where  assumes 
the  atomic  theory.  Mechanism,  therefore,  must  be 
replaced  by  an  inner  automatism  whereby  the  infinite 
necessarily  brings  forth  the  present  order;  and  that,  too, 
apart  from  any  original  conscious  intelligence  or  pur- 
pose. The  infinite  comes  to  consciousness  only  in  man ; 
apart  from  man,  the  infinite  is  blind  necessity,  and  such 
necessity  is  the  first  fact  of  the  universe.  Intelligent 
spontaneity  nowhere  exists. 

Considered  simply  as  an  hypothesis,  which  best  ex- 
plains the  facts — a  conscious  and  free  intelligence,  or 
a  blind,  automatic  power?  If  we  deny  the  atomic 
theory,  the  facts  upon  which  the  atomic  theory  is 
based  still  remain;  namely,  the  activity  of  some  agent 
at  myriads  of  discrete  points.  The  pantheist  denies 
that  there  is  an  individual  agent  at  each  of  these 
points;  but  claims  that  it  is  the  sam,e  agent  which  acts 
in  all.  Let  us  grant  it;  and  still  we  have  the  discrete 
activities  for  explanation.  Now  each  one  of  these  ac- 
tivities is  so  related  to  every  one  of  an  infinite  number 
of  others,  that  a  change  in  any  one  necessitates  a  change 
in  all  the  rest;  and  each  .one  is  determined  constantly 
with  reference  to  all  the  rest.  This  harmonious  adjust- 
ment of  the  activity  in  any  one  place  to  the  infinite 
other  activities  in  infinite  other  places  is  a  fact  which 


266  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

pantheism  has  to  explain.  A]  *rt  from  any  considera- 
tion of  design  in  the  organic  world,  the  elementary  facts 
of  physics  are  a  tremendous  problem  for  the  pantheist. 
The  pretense  that  some  automatic  necessity  forces  the 
infinite  to  act  at  an  infinity  of  discrete  points,  and  to 
act  at  each  with  perfect  adaptation  to  all  the  rest;  and 
further,  so  to  combine  these  discrete  activities  that 
myriad  products  should  arise  all  luminous  with  intelli- 
gence and  purpose,  while  all  the  time  this  power  does 
not  know  what  it  is  doing — is  to  abandon  all  rationality, 
and  take  refuge  in  arbitrary  volition  and  caprice.  The 
only  analogy  which  can  ever  be  offered  in  support  of 
this  astounding  article  of  faith,  is  that  of  instinct.  It 
is  said  that  in  instinct  we  see  agents  working  with  con- 
summate intelligence,  yet  without  conscious  purpose; 
and  we  may  well  conceive  the  infinite  ground  of  things 
as  an  instinctive  power,  unconsciously  realizing  the  high- 
est ends.  This  doctrine  has  drifted  about  in  human 
thought  since  the  earliest  times.  It  appears  especially 
in  the  teachings  of  some  of  the  Stoics;  and  has  lately 
made  a  new  appearance  in  Hartmann's  "  Philosophy  of 
the  Unconscious."  This  theory  attempts  to  mediate  be- 
tween the  mechanical  and  teleological  views  of  nature; 
and,  like  all  compromises,  it  satisfies  neither  party.  It 
will  never  be  popular  with  working  scientists,  as  it  fur- 
nishes no  stand-point  for  mechanics.  It  will  never  find 
favor  with  theists,  as  its  unconscious  reason  differs  in 
nothing  from  ordinary  atheism.  The  doctrine  is  also 
barely  intelligible  in  what  it  affirms,  as  the  phrase,  "  un- 
conscious intelligence,"  is  only  saved  from  being  self- 
contradictory  by  giving  to  intelligence  a  meaning  quite 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  267 

out  of  the  common.  It  is  in  any  case  much  easier  to 
use  the  phrase  than  to  understand  any  thing  by  it.  In 
e very-day  speech  intelligence  is  a  power  of  knowing; 
and  an  unconscious  intelligence  would  only  mean  a 
power  of  knowing  which  cannot  know.  To  ascribe  in- 
telligence and  reason  to  a  being,  and  withhold  conscious- 
ness, the  most  essential  factor  of  both,  will  appear  to 
most  minds  afc  a  highly  irrational  procedure.  Again, 
the  objection  assumes  a  knowledge  of  what  instinct  is, 
whereas,  it  is  one  of  the  darkest  and  most  confused  no- 
tions of  natural  science.  In  truth,  it  is  a  kind  of  scien- 
tific limbx),  into  which  all  the  dark  problems  of  animal 
psychology  are  thrust;  so  that  explanation  by  instinct 
is  simply  an  abandonment  of  the  problem.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  instinct  finds  a  full  explanation  in  the  law 
of  heredity,  as  all  evolutionists  teach,  the  impropriety 
of  applying  this  notion  to  the  infinite  is  evident;  for 
that  would  make  the  infinite  itself  a  product  of  evolu- 
tion. Finally,  which  is  the  more  rational  hypothesis — 
the  blind  instinct,  which  is  in  sad  need  of  definition,  to 
say  nothing  of  explanation,  or  the  intelligent  creator? 
Certainly  the  pantheist  who  holds  instinct  to  be  a  better 
origin  of  the  order  of  nature  than  conscious  reason,  has 
little  warrant  for  boasting  against  any  irrationality 
which  superstition  ever  invented.  He  is  the  true  here 
tic,  the  snatcher  of  what  his  will,  rather  than  his  reason, 
dictates.  In  addition  to  these  objections,  drawn  from 
the  side  of  the  facts,  we  have  our  previous  conclusion 
drawn  from  the  needs  of  scientific  theory,  that  science 
must  assume  that  the  basal  factor  of  the  universe  is  in- 
telligent. 
18 


268  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

But  the  chief  difficulty  of  this  form  of  pantheism  is, 
that  it  teaches  a  temporal  development  of  the  infinite. 
By  its  position  as  the  source  and  cause  of  all  dependent 
being,  and  of  all  reason  and  knowledge,  the  infinite  can 
never  transcend  itself  without  contradiction,  and  can  nev- 
er receive  any  thing  from  without.  As  independent  and 
unconditioned,  it  must  always  be  equal  to  itself.  In  its 
nature  potentiality  must  be  actuality.  Still,  the  panthe- 
ism with  which  we  are  dealing  teaches  that  the  infinite 
itself  grows  to  consciousness,  knowledge,  etc. ;  and  has 
not  advanced  very  far  yet,  although  it  has  had  from 
everlasting  to  work  in.  Further,  these  conscious  de- 
velopments of  the  infinite  are  in  very  unstable  equilib- 
rium, and  tend  constantly  to  fall  back  into  the  uncon- 
scious and  irrational.  Thus  an  element  of  weakness 
and  imperfection  is  introduced  into  that  which,  by  its 
position,  is  the  perfect  and  complete.  Thus,  also,  the 
infinite  is  made  subject  to  the  law  of  time,  which  is 
essentially  the  law  of  the  dependent  and  conditioned. 
Against  both  procedures  reason  protest  with  all  its 
might.  When  the  theist  regards  the  first  cause  as  ab- 
solutely free  and  wise  and  good,  and  as  dwelling  in  the 
unapproachable  light  of  perfect  holiness  and  wisdom, 
the  pantheist  protests  against  the  anthropomorphic  deg- 
radation. We  look,  therefore,  for  some  transcendent 
glory  in  his  theory  of  the  infinite;  and  it  turns  out  to 
be  this  beggarly  notion  of  a  developing  god,  who,  when 
he  does  his  best,  can  reach  no  higher  consciousness  and 
knowledge  than  those  of  imperfect  men.  The  panthe- 
ist twits  the  theist  with  making  God  imperfect;  and  we 
turn  to  his  own  worship  only  to  find  him  adoring  the 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  269 

most  abject  superstition.  When  the  theist  urges  that 
God  is  infinitely  holy  and  wise  and  good,  the  pantheist 
charges  that  this  is  anthropomorphism;  but  when  we 
look  to  see  how  he  himself  escapes  from  it,  we  find  him 
committing  the  vilest  anthropomorphism  by  declaring 
our  narrow,  limited,  and  often  evil,  mental  life  the  sum- 
mit of  a  divine  development.  The  god  of  this  type  of 
pantheist  is  simply  the  deification  of  all  the  imperfec- 
tions and  limitations  of  men.  It  is  hardly  becoming, 
we  think,  for  the  disciples  of  this  school  to  rail  even 
at  the  abjectness  of  fetichism;  indeed,  fetichism  and 
devil-worship  are  only  two  forms  in  which  his  deity 
worships  himself.  The  pantheist  further  makes  much 
of  the  charge  that  the  God  of  theism  can  never  be  per- 
fect, and  then  comments  on  his  own  notions  of  perfec- 
tion by  showing  us  a  blind  god  which  has  striven  from 
all  eternity  to  become  something,  and  has  at  last  got  as 
high  as  a  man.  This  is  delicious  criticism  on  the  part 
of  a  pantheist.  No  class  of  thinkers  have  ever  been  so 
loud  in  asserting  their  own  power;  and  none  have  ever 
fallen  so  low.  We  hold  in  opposition  to  these  fetich- 
isms  that  only  the  finite  and  dependent  can  be  subject 
to  a  law  of  successive  development.  The  self-depend 
ent,  by  its  definition,  contains  the  ground  of  all  its  de- 
terminations in  itself,  and  can  never  be  subjected  to  any 
law  of  development  without  self-contradiction.  It  is 
the  source  of  law,  not  its  subject.  It  founds  necessity, 
instead  of  being  ruled  by  it.  Hence  the  infinite,  or  the 
independent,  must  always  be  regarded  as  the  highest 
term  of  the  universe  in  every  respect.  It  is  the  com- 
plete and  perfect  fullness  of  life,  power,  wisdom^  and 


270  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

goodness,  of  which  the  highest  finite  is  but  the  imper- 
fect image. 

The  pantheist  has  been  betrayed  into  these  philosoph- 
ical and  religious  fetichisms  by  an  old  logical  saw  and 
a  pure  abstraction.  The  saw  is,  that  all  determination 
is  negation,  and  hence  limitation.  To  be  something 
is  not  to  be  something  else.  Hence  the  infinite, 
which  is  the  all,  excludes  all  determination.  Only 
on  condition  of  being  nothing  in  particular  can  it 
be  every  thing  in  general.  The  infinite,  therefore, 
is  pure  being,  without  difference  and  without  determi- 
nation. We  shall  examine  hereafter  the  saw  in  question; 
for  the  present  we  point  out  that  this  argument  applies 
only  to  the  etymological  infinite,  and  not  the  real  infi- 
nite. The  infinite  with  which  philosophy  has  to  deal,  is 
neither  the  sum  of  things  nor  the  "  being  "  which  is  sup- 
posed to  be  common  to  them  all.  It  is  the  being  upon 
which  the  finite  depends;  and  as  such,  it  is  the  most 
determined  of  beings.  Whatever  is,  must  be  something, 
and  must  have  definite  powers  or  attributes;  and  what- 
ever has  no  definite  attributes  of  any  kind,  is  simply 
and  solely  nothing.  The  strictly  indefinite  is  the  void. 
This  is  as  true  for  the  infinite  as  for  the  finite.  Only 
the  definite  can  exist  and  act.  This  "pure  being" 
which  plays  such  a  part  in  pantheistic  systems  is  ob- 
jectively nothing,  and  subjectively  it  is  only  the  last 
term  of  a  self -destroying  abstraction.  The  pantheist 
takes  this  blank  nothingness,  and  then  figures  qualities 
as  stuck  into  it  in  some  way,  or  rather  figures  this  pure 
being  as  giving  itself  determinations.  This  intolerable 
hypostasis  of  an  empty  logical  notion,  with  the  addecl 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  271 

absurdity  of  its  action,  is  then  paraded  as  the  develop- 
ment of  the  infinite  and  the  method  of  creation.  This 
form  of  the  pantheistic  argument  vanishes  at  once  when 
we  remember  that  pure  being  is  nothing,  and  that  the 
philosophical  infinite  is  not  the  all.  We  conclude, 
therefore,  that  in  any  theory  the  infinite  must  be  re- 
garded as  the  perfect  and  complete,  beyond  all  law  of 
development  and  forever  equal  to  itself. 

This  brings  to  the  second  objection,  that  we  have 
joined  together  contradictory  terms  in  ascribing  intelli- 
gence and  consciousness  to  the  infinite.  We  have  part- 
ly anticipated  this  objection,  and  add  the  following  con- 
siderations. The  claim  that  intelligence  is  a  limitation, 
is  based  on  the  doctrine  that  all  determination  is  nega- 
tion. This  doctrine  is  only  true  in  disjunctive  judg- 
ments. If  a  must  be  either  b  or  c,  then  to  affirm  b  is  to 
deny  c.  But  such  disjunction  only  applies  to  the  mem- 
bers of  a  genus  which  consists  of  several  species.  Else- 
where the  doctrine  in  question  is  utterly  false.  The 
affirmation  of  a  neither  affirms  nor  denies  £>,  c,  or  any 
other  positive  attribute;  it  only  excludes  non-a,  which, 
as  a  negative  attribute,  is  nothing.  An  essential  quali- 
ty or  power,  like  intelligence,  is  not  a  limitation,  and  it 
excludes  nothing  but  non-intelligence.  The  power  to 
know  is  not  a  weakness,  but  a  power;  and  it  excludes 
nothing  but  the  lack  of  such  a  power.  Infinite  wisdom 
is  compatible  with  infinite  goodness,  and  with  an  infin- 
ity of  other  positive  attributes.  No  one  would  pretend 
that  a  human  being  would  be  more  perfect  if  he  lost 
his  intelligence.  Human  perfection  lies  altogether,  not 


2*72  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

in  escaping  from  intelligence,  but  in  escaping  from  its 
limits.  The  discursive  reason,  indeed,  is  fettered  by 
limitations;  but  the  essence  of  intelligence  does  not 
consist  in  methods,  but  in  rational  insight.  In  fact,  the 
development  of  human  intelligence  is  always  away  from 
discursive  processes,  and  toward  immediate  intuition. 
The  great  mathematician  is  not  the  man  who  must 
reach  his  conclusions  by  tedious  discursive  reasoning, 
but  he  who  lightens  at  once  to  them.  It  is  entirely 
conceivable  that  there  should  be  an  intuitive  intelli- 
gence which  should  not  need  to  reason,  but  which  should 
immediately  apprehend  all  truth.  Such  is  the  idea 
which  theists  have  of  the  divine  intelligence.  It  is  the 
absolute  intuition  of  all  reality  and  of  all  truth.  To 
call  such  a  power  a  limitation  and  imperfection  involves 
the  very  depths  of  mental  confusion.  Moreover,  if  it 
be  an  imperfection  to  have  this  power,  would  it  be  any 
better,  not  to  have  it?  Is  the  intelligent  lower  than  the 
unintelligent?  The  only  escape  here  is  to  deny  that 
intelligence  and  non-intelligence  form  a  complete  dis- 
junction; and  hold  that  besides  these,  there  is  a  third 
something  which  is  neither.  The  difficulty  with  this 
doctrine  is,  that  while  it  pretends  to  say  something,  it 
really  says  nothing.  What  this  third  something  is, 
there  is  no  telling.  It  is  a  pure  blank  in  thought,  and 
there  never  can  be  any  rational  ground  for  affirming  it 
in  external  fact.  Those  who  defend  it  commonly  just- 
tify  themselves  by  saying  that  the  limits  of  thought  are 
not  the  limits  of  being,  and,  hence,  there  may  well  be 
orders  of  existence  of  which  we  can  at  present  form  no 
conception.  Of  all  misunderstandings  of  the  functions 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  273 

©f  philosophy,  this  is,  without  doubt,  one  of  the  worst. 
The  aim  of  philosophy  is  not  to  speculate  on  possibili- 
ties, but  to  explain  facts.  The  inner  and  outer  world 
offer  a  great  body  of  phenomena  for  which  we  are  seek- 
ing an  explanation.  All  causes  of  which  we  can  form 
any  conception  fall  under  the  head  of  intelligent  or  non- 
intelligent.  If,  then,  the  world  is  to  be  explained,  it 
must  be  by  one  of  these  two  classes;  for  it  is  Jio  expla- 
nation of  a  thing  to  refer  it  to  a  phrase  under  which 
nothing  can  be  thought.  Theism  explains  the  visible 
order  by  referring  it  to  an  intelligent  cause.  Atheism 
explains  it  by  non-intelligent  causes.  Both  views  are 
intelligible ;  and  there  can  be  no  doubt  of  the  adequacy 
of  the  theistic  explanation.  But  it  is  no  explanation  to 
refer  the  world  to  something  which  is  a  pure  blank  in 
thought.  Moreover,  there  is  no  need  of  it  because  of 
the  admitted  adequacy  of  the  theistic  theory.  We 
allow,  then,  the  speculator  to  vapor  at  pleasure  about 
the  possibilities  of  being,  and  to  coin  phrases  which 
represent  sounds  rather  than  thoughts;  but  we  will  not 
allow  him  to  forget  that  in  the  present  case  the  problem 
is  to  explain  a  definite  set  of  facts;  and  we  point  out  to 
him  that  there  is  some  difference  between  coining  a 
phrase  and  offering  a  true  explanation.  The  hypothesis 
of  the  third  something  does  not  fulfill  the  first  duty  of 
a  theory — that  of  being  intelligible. 

But  it  is  further  urged,  that  all  consciousness,  and 
hence  all  intelligence,  involves  a  distinction  of  subject 
and  object ;  and,  therefore,  the  infinite  cannot  be  con- 
ceived as  conscious  without  positing  something  of  which 
it  is  conscious,  thereby  annulling  once  more  its  infinity. 


274  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

The  infinite  of  the  speculators  must  have  a  sorry  time. 
They  will  not  allow  it  to  know  itself  or  any  thing  else, 
for  fear  of  damaging  its  infinity;  and  yet  it  seems,  that 
to  deny  it  a  power  of  knowing  must  be  equally  fatal. 
Their  assertion  is  supported  by  a  certain  amount  of 
misread  psychology  and  an  appeal  to  that  metaphysical 
abortion,  the  etymological  infinite.  The  only  point 
which  calls  for  attention  is  the  psychology  of  conscious- 
ness. ISTot  even  in  man  does  consciousness  involve  a 
distinction  of  subject  and  object  in  the  sense  of  two 
distinct  things.  Self-consciousness  involves  only  the 
distinction  of  thinker  and  thought,  and  never  of  self 
and  not-self.  Moreover,  there  are  two  factors  in  hu- 
man self-knowledge:  (1)  a  direct  feeling  of  self;  and 
(2)  a  conception  of  self,  or  of  the  properties  and  powers 
of  self.  This  conception  of  self  is  developed;  but  the 
feeling  of  self  is  present  from  the  beginning.  The  child 
has  little  or  no  conception  of  itself,  but  it  has  the  live- 
liest experience  of  itself.  This  experience  of  self  is 
quite  independent  of  all  antitheses  of  subject  and  ob- 
ject, and  is  underived.  But  allowing  all  that  can  be 
claimed  for  the  development  of  our  self -consciousness, 
it  does  not  lie  in  the  notion  of  self -consciousness  that  it 
must  be  developed.  An  eternal  self  is  metaphysically 
as  possible  as  an  eternal  not-self.  To  say  that  because 
our  self-consciousness  is  developed  all  self-conscious- 
ness must  be  developed,  is  just  as  rational  as  to  say  that 
all  being  must  have  a  beginning  because  we  have.  It 
is  to  transfer  to  the  independent  all  the  limitations  of 
the  finite,  which  is  the  very  thing  the  pantheist  claims 
to  abhor.  It  is  said  of  some  free-thinkers  with  regard 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  276 

to  Christianity,  that  they  are  always  on  the  point  of 
setting  up  a  Buddhist  prayer-mill,  or  hanging  up  a 
fetich.  It  is  certain  that  the  contemners  of  anthropo- 
morphism have  an  irresistible  tendency  to  anthropo- 
morphic idolatry.  Now  see  what  this  affirmation  of 
consciousness  and  personality  on  the  part  of  the  infinite 
means.  It  simply  says  that  the  infinite  source  of  all 
activity,  life,  and  intelligence,  exists  for  itself,  and 
knows  what  it  is  thinking  and  doing;  and  the  astound- 
ing claim  is  made  that  this  is  to  make  it  finite,  and 
degrade  it  into  imperfection.  To  such  a  pass  has  phi- 
losophy been  brought  by  a  mere  play  on  words.  Since 
the  time  of  the  elder  Fichte,  it  has  been  a  settled 
dogma  with  the  majority  of  philosophers  that  the  in- 
finite cannot  be  personal  without  limitation.  Never- 
theless, we  must  say  with  Lotze  that  full  personality  is 
possible  only  to  the  infinite.  It  alone  is  in  full  posses- 
sion and  knowledge  of  itself.  We  are  rather  acted 
upon  than  actors  in  many  things,  and  whole  depart- 
ments of  our  nature  are  dark  to  us.  Full  personality 
exists  only  where  the  nature  is  transparent  to  self,  and 
where  all  the  powers  are  under  absolute  control.  Such 
personality  is  not  ours;  it  can  belong  only  to  the  in- 
finite, while  ours  is  but  its  faint  and  imperfect  image. 
When  thought  is  clear,  reason  will  tolerate  no  other 
conception  of  the  infinite  than  that  it  is  the  perfection 
of  power,  and  wisdom,  and  selfhood. 

We  have  insisted  upon  design  and  adaptation  in  na- 
ture. This  claim,  also,  is  seized  upon  by  the  pantheist 
as  incompatible  with  the  infinity  of  the  infinite.  Here 
is  another  antinomy,  which,  according  to  him,  wrecks 


276  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

our  notion  of  an  intelligent  creator.  This  is  so  extra- 
ordinary a  charge  that  it  may  be  well  to  quote.  Mr. 
J.  S.  Mill,  though  not  a  pantheist,  has  put  this  objection 
as  follows: — 

"It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  every  indication  of 
design  in  the  cosmos  is  so  much  evidence  against  the 
omnipotence  of  the  designer.  For  what  is  meant  by 
design?  Contrivance — the  adaptation  of  means  to  an 
end.  But  the  necessity  for  contrivance — the  need  of 
employing  means — is  a  consequence  of  the  limitation  of 
power.  Who  would  have  recourse  to  means,  if,  to  at- 
tain his  end,  his  mere  word  was  sufficient?  The  very 
idea  of  means  implies  that  the  means  have  an  efficacy 
which  the  direct  action  of  the  being  who  employs  them 
has  not.  Otherwise,  they  are  not  means,  but  an  incum- 
brance.  A  man  does  not  use  machinery  to  move  his 
arms.  If  he  did,  it  could  only  be  when  paralysis  had 
deprived  him  of  the  power  of  moving  them  by  volition. 
But  if  the  employment  of  contrivance  is  in  itself  a  sign 
of  limited  power,  how  much  more  so  is  the  careful  and 
skillful  choice  of  contrivances?  Can  any  wisdom  be 
shown  in  the  selection  of  means,  when  the  means  have 
no  efficacy  but  what  is  given  them  by  the  will  of  him 
who  employs  them,  and  when  his  will  could  have  be- 
stowed the  same  efficacy  on  any  other  means  ?  Wisdom 
and  contrivance  are  shown  in  overcoming  difficulties, 
and  there  is  no  room  for  them  in  a  being  for  whom  no 
difficulties  exist.  The  evidences,  therefore,  of  natural 
theology  distinctly  imply  that  the  author  of  the  cosmos 
worked  under  limitations ;  that  he  was  obliged  to  adapt 
himself  to  conditions  independent  of  his  will,  and  to 


VBEISM  AND  PANTHEISM. 

attain  his  ends  by  such  arrangements  as  those  conditions 
admitted  of."  *  Hence,  it  is  concluded,  a  designing  in- 
telligence and  infinity,  or  absoluteness,  will  not  go  to- 
gether. 

This  argument  is  so  extraordinary  in  its  misconcep- 
tions as  to  suggest  that  there  must  be  some  spell  in  the 
design -argument  which  puts  its  critics  in  an  abnormal 
state  of  mind.  No  believer  in  design  questions  the 
power  of  God  to  produce  by  simple  fiat  all  finite  exist- 
ence; indeed,  that  is  the  way  in  which  he  conceives  the 
creation  of  the  elemental  realities  of  things.  He  spake, 
and  it  was  done.  He  commanded,  and  it  stood  fast. 
But  the  work  must  have  some  qualities;  and  in  the 
arcl  i  of  being  thus  sprung  by  a  word,  we  find  harmony 
and  rational  relation,  the  fitting  in  of  part  to  part,  and 
universal  adaptation.  The  finite  work,  as  such,  is  lim- 
ited ;  but  how  its  rational  and  purposive  character 
should  prove  the  creator  limited  is  past  all  finding  out. 
One  may  claim  that  the  infinite  cannot  produce  a  finite 
creation,  but  certainly  the  inner  consistency  and  adap- 
tations of  the  system  cannot  be  urged  in  proof  of  the 
weakness  of  the  creator.  It  sounds  well  to  talk  of 
securing  ends  without  means,  but  the  talk  is  largely 
meaningless,  because  the  mass  of  ends  either  logically 
imply  the  means  of  their  realization,  or  they  are  certain 
states  or  relations  of  things,  and  as  such  imply  the 
things.  Suppose  happiness  is  an  end;  it  implies  the 
existence  of  sensitive  beings,  and  without  them  is  ut- 
terly meaningless.  Or  let  knowledge  be  an  end;  this 
end  implies  the  existence  of  intelligent  beings,  and 
*  "  Three  Essays  on  Religion,'1  pp.  176,  177. 


278  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

without  them  is  empty  of  the  slightest  significance. 
Now,  most  ends  in  nature  are  of  this  class,  and  the 
means  which  realize  them  are  but  expressions  of  what 
is  contained  in  the  notion  of  the  end.  Birth  cannot  be 
the  law  of  life  without  logically  implying  agents  of 
some  sort  for  the  realization  of  the  law.  Nutrition  can- 
not be  the  law  of  the  organism  without  implying  some 
sort  of  a  nutritive  apparatus.  It  is  always  open  to  the 
objector  to  fall  back  upon  ignorance,  and  suggest  that 
the  means  actually  adopted  are  not  the  best  possible; 
but  his  claim  that  any  use  of  ends  implies  the  weakness 
of  the  creator  overlooks  the  fact  that  most  ends  exist 
only  through  means,  and  that  apart  from  those  means 
they  not  only  do  not  exist,  but  have  no  assignable 
meaning  whatever.  When  ends  are  not  of  this  kind, 
but  might  be  reached  in  various  ways,  we  are  not  to 
think  of  God  as  in  a  difficulty  and  using  certain  means 
to  extricate  himself,  but  we  are  rather  to  think  of  the 
relation  of  the  means  to  the  end  as  expressing  the  inner 
consistency  and  -rationality  of  the  divine  activity.  But 
contrivance  in  this  sense  of  logical  consistency  and  in- 
ner harmony  of  part  with  part  certainly  implies  no 
weakness  on  the  part  of  the  creator.  This  implication 
could  be  allowed  only  if  contrivance  denoted  weakness 
and  puzzle-headedness. 

We  pass  now  to  the  pantheistic  doctrine  of  the  finite, 
and  its  relation  to  the  infinite.  Upon  this  point  there 
are  theories  and  theories.  The  vulgar  pantheistic  no- 
tion is,  that  things  are  a  part  of  God.  This  view  rests 
upon  the  vilest  sense-delusion.  It  applies  the  notion  of 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  279 

quantity  to  the  infinite  one,  and  conceives  that  quantity 
after  the  analogy  of  a  clay-bank,  which  can  be  used  in- 
differently to  make  many  things.  Or  it  conceives  of 
the  infinite  as  an  elastic  or  plastic  substance,  which  can 
take  on  many  forms.  This  is  the  conception  which  un- 
derlies most  forms  of  philosophic  evolution.  But  this 
notion  is  merely  a  picture  borrowed  from  sense-experi- 
ence. It  is  the  apotheosis  of  thoughtlessness.  Still  it 
is  not  surprising  that  a  philosophy  which  is  as  crude  as 
this,  should  fancy  that  it  has  sounded  the  secret  of  the 
universe,  since  arrogance  commonly  varies  inversely 
as  insight.  Our  discussion  of  being  has  led  us  to  the 
conviction  that  every  true  subject  is  an  individualized 
force,  to  which  the  idea  of  divisibility  has  no  applica- 
tion. Every  true  substance  must  be  conceived  as  a 
strict  unit,  which,  as  such,  excludes  all  division.  We 
cannot,  without  annihilating  self-contradiction,  speak 
of  the  one  as  dividing  itself  into  the  many,  for  thereby 
we  deny  that  it  is  the  one.  It  is  still  worse  when  we 
speak  of  it  as  remaining  the  one  after  the  division,  for 
thereby  we  deny  the  division.  Most  pantheistic  systems 
break  down  at  this  point.  They  explain  the  phenome- 
nal plurality  by  assuming  that  the  one  divides  itself 
into  the  many  —  a  phrase  which  can  be  realized  in 
thought  only  as  we  assume  that  the  one  was  not  one, 
but  an  aggregate.  That  the  truly  one  should  divide 
itself  into  a  manifold  of  things-  is  an  impossible  concep- 
tion, a  phrase  and  not  a  thought.  It  is  as  if  we  should 
speak  of  the  mathematical  unit  as  producing  number 
by  a  process  of  self-diremption.  There  is  no  thought 
which  corresponds  to  the  phrase,  Moreover,  if  such  a 


280  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

conception  were  possible,  such  division  must  cancel  the 
one,  and  the  plurality  would  be  all.  The  result  is,  that 
pantheism  at  this  point  has  always  tended  toward  athe- 
ism; and,  when  it  reaches  this  point,  it  is  atheism.  We 
have  seen  in  the  last  chapter  that  an  interacting  plural- 
ity cannot  be  conceived  without  a  strictly  unitary  being. 
The  one,  then,  exists;  how  shall  we  account  for  the 
many  ?  To  speak  of  the  one  as  dividing  itself  into  the 
many  is  self -contradictory.  We  can  only  conclude  that 
if  a  plurality  exists,  it  must  be  created.  It  must  b^ 
external  to  the  one;  that  is,  it  is  not  derived  from  the 
one  in  the  sense  that  the  one  is  any  less  than  before,  or 
that  God  plus  world  since  creation  only  equals  God 
before  creation.  In  brief,  the  notion  that  the  infinite 
creates  by  taking  a  part  of  himself,  and  making  some- 
thing of  it,  is  as  coarse  and  gross  a  conception  as  ever 
vandalized  philosophy.  All  emanation  theories  come 
under  this  condemnation.  They  regard  the  infinite  as 
a  juggler's  hat  stuffed  with  all  that  is  to  be  Brought  out 
of  it.  Thus  the  unity  of  the  one  is  again  cancelled,  and 
in  its  place  we  have  merely  an  aggregate.  Creation  is 
the  only  tenable  solution  of  the  problem  of  the  one  and 
the  many. 

Hereupon  the  pantheist  brings  out  his  Medusa  head 
— from  nothing,  nothing  comes;  and  looks  complacently 
that  the  theist  should  fall  down  dead  at  the  sight.  But 
if  the  theist  only  steadies  himself  a  moment,  there  will 
be  no  difficulty  in  staring  the  monster  out  of  countenance. 
For  this  wonderful  sentence  only  says  that  nothing  can 
never  produce  any  thing;  it  is  far  enough  from  saying 
that  something,  an  active  agent,  cannot  by  its  causal 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  281 

efficiency  produce  something.  Now  theism  does  not 
affirm  that  nothing  produces  something;  but  rather  that 
God,  the  all-powerful,  has  caused  the  world  to  exist,  and 
has  done  this  in  such  a  way  that  God  is  no  less  after 
creation  than  before.  This  is  the  only  meaning  of  the 
doctrine  of  creation.  It  denies  that  the  created  is  in 
any  sense  a  part  of  the  creator;  it  is  rather  the  product 
of  his  activity.  God  posits  the  world,  and  remains 
equal  to  himself.  How  this  is  done,  is  indeed  a  mys- 
tery ;  but  it  is  no  contradiction.  But  we  need  not  be 
much  concerned  at  the  mystery,  so  long  as  every  blade 
of  grass,  or  even  the  transference  of  the  simplest  me- 
chanical motion,  contains  oceans  of  riddles  for  which 
our  profoundest  science  has  not  the  shadow  of  a  solu- 
tion. The  pantheistic  theory,  however,  which  regards 
the  world  as  a  part  of  God,  or  as  in  any  way  made  from 
the  divine  essence,  or  as  in  any  way  connected  with  it 
except  as  effect  and  cause,  is  saddled  with  invincible 
contradictions.  It  is  based  upon  the  coarsest  and  most 
untenable  notion  of  substance.  It  further  denies  and 
cancels  the  unity  of  the  one;  and  at  last,  instead  of 
the  unitary  infinite,  it  gives  us  merely  the  sum  of  the 
finite,  thus  vanishing  into  atheism. 

The  same  gross  conception  appears  in  the  common 
pantheistic  expression  that  finite  things  are  modes  of 
the  infinite.  The  underlying  notion  here  is  that  of  a 
plastic  or  elastic  substance  which  can  be  pressed  into 
various  shapes  and  molds;  and  this  notion,  again,  rests 
upon  the  static  conception  of  being.  We  strike  out  this 
imagination,  and  the  statement  takes  on  this  form :  The 
finite  is  in  no  intelligible  sense  a  mode  of  the  infinite  j 


282  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

but  all  finite  things  are  products  of  the  activity  of  the 
infinite.  The  only  pantheistic  conception  which  does 
not  involve  insuperable  contradiction  is,  that  which  re- 
gards all  finite  things  as  having  no  ground  of  action 
whatever  in  themselves,  but  as  being  the  products  of  a 
constant  divine  activity.  In  this  case  the  relation  of  the 
finite  to  the  infinite  would  be  like  that  of  our  thoughts 
to  the  thinking  mind.  The  thought  is  in  no  way 
a  part,  or  a  mode,  of  the  thinking  subject;  it  is  an  act 
of  that  subject.  At  the  same  time,  the  thought  has  no 
substantiality  in  itself ;  but  exists  only  as  it  is  thought. 
This  conception  is  logically  consistent;  it  remains  to  in-  I 
quire  whether  it  fits  the  facts. 

Thus  far  we  have  only  sought  to  develop  a  pantheis- 
tic conception  of  the  finite,  and  its  relation  to  the  infi- 
nite, which  should  be  formally  tenable  or  self -consistent.   I 
That  conception  turns  out  to  be  one  which  denies  the 
finite  all  substantiality  and  all  activity,  and  reduces  it 
to  a  flowing  form  of  the  activity  of  the  infinite.     The 
finite  is  simply  a  divine  energizing  according  to  cer-  .| 
tain  methods.      When  we  come  to  apply  this  -theory  j 
to  the  facts  of  experience,  we  find  that  in  the  case 
of  so-called  material  things  which  have  no  selfhood,    \ 
there   are   no   strong  objections   to  this  view.     It  all 
comes  to  a  question  of  probabilities  and   of   ease   of 
conception.     We  will  restate  the  alternative  mentioned  .-! 
in  the  beginning  of  the  chapter:   Either  the  elements 
must  be  endowed  with  an  inner  life,  and  thus  made 
homogeneous  with  spirit,  though  probably  on  a  lower 
plane   than  the  human   spirit;    or,  they  must  be   re- 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  283 

garded  as  forms  of  the  universal  activity.  Selfhood 
and  freedom  are  the  only  marks  which  can  distinguish 
the  finite  from  the  infinite.  Neither  view  could  dis- 
turb phenomena,  or  things  as  they  appear;  and  hence 
common  sense  cannot  properly  be  invoked  to  decide 
the  question.  That  material  elements  exist  at  all, 
is  an  hypothesis  formed  to  provide  an  objective  cause 
for  our  sensations  and  for  their  peculiar  syntheses. 
Allowing  them  to  exist,  we  have  at  once  to  supplement 
them  by  another  being  which  conditions  and  mediates 
all  their  activities.  If,  then,  beings  are  not  to  be  mul- 
tiplied beyond  necessity,  and  if  the  simplest  hypothesis 
is  the  best;  then  it  is  plain  to  us,  that  the  theory  of 
material  elements  is  operose  and  needless,  and  should 
be  replaced  by  the  theory  that  all  lifeless  existence  is 
simply  a  form  of  the  activity  of  the  infinite.  Indeed, 
the  conception  of  impersonal  existence  cannot  be  dis- 
tinguished from  that  of  a  flowing  activity.  But  when 
we  come  to  spiritual  beings,  who  have  consciousness  and 
personality,  the  theory  fails  to  fit,  except  with  important 
modifications.  The  thoughtless  will  hastily  conclude 
that  we  have  just  as  good  reason  for  believing  in  the 
substantiality  of  the  elements  as  in  the  substantiality 
of  ourselves;  but  this  will  only  prove  that  the  term 
thoughtless  is  rightly  applied.  We  do  know  that  a 
sufficient  cause  of  the  phenomenal  world  exists;  but  we 
do  not  know,  and  have  nothing  like  proof,  that  material 
elements  exist.  We  do  know  that  we  ourselves  exist. 
No  one  denies  an  objective  reality;  but  the  nature  of 
that  reality  is  entirely  a  matter  of  speculation.  To 

decide  the  question  by  appeals  to  sense-perception  ia 
19 


284  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

like    attacking   the    Copernican   theory   on    the    same 
basis. 

Again,  the  thoughtless  will  urge  that  if  nature  is  re- 
signed to  pantheism,  there  is  no  reason  for  withholding 
the  petty  realm  of  the  human  spirit;  but  this  objection 
totally  misconceives  the  function  of  philosophy.  It  is 
akin  to  the  claim,  often  heard,  that  because  mechanical 
laws  explain  physical  phenomena,  they  must  also  explain 
vital  and  mental  phenomena;  or  that  because  necessity 
rules  in  the  physical  world,  it  must  also  rule  in  volition. 
One  must  always  be  on  his  guard  against  the  imposition 
of  extending  a  law  from  one  realm  into  another  without 
independent  proof  of  its  validity  in  that  realm.  Bear 
i"  mind  all  the  while  that  the  duty  of  every  philosophy 
is  to  explain  the  facts  of  consciousness,  and  not  to  explain 
them  away.  When  this  is  remembered,  the  impossibil- 
ity of  absolute  pantheism  is  clearly  seen.  For  the  facts 
of  personality,  and  volition,  and  individual  conscious- 
ness, are  the  most  fundamental  facts  of  our  mental  life. 
Nothing  is  more  indubitable,  nothing  is  so  indubitable, 
as  these  facts.  How  we  are  persons,  how  we  can  act, 
how  we  can  be  conscious,  we  know  not;  that  we  are 
persons,  that  we  act,  and  that  our  volition  counts  for 
something  in  the  course  of  events,  we  are  absolutely 
sure.  One  can  break  down  consciousness  if  he  will; 
but  pantheism  cannot  be  built  up  by  denying  conscious- 
ness. Total  skepticism  must  result  from  such  heroic 
treatment.  Now  every  pantheistic  theory  must  recog- 
nize these  facts,  and  modify  itself  accordingly.  Hence 
if  the  pantheist  insist  that  we  are  unsubstantial  products 
of  the  divine  activity,  he  must  still  allow  that  that 


THEISM  AND  PANTHEISM.  285 

activity  is  such  as  to  make  and  leave  us  persons.  If 
the  pantheist  insists  that  God  acts  in  all  our  willing,  we 
know  that  we  act  too.  However  unsubstantial,  then,  he 
may  declare  the  human  spirit,  it  is  still  something  which 
can  act  and  be  acted  upon;  can  think,  and  feel,  and  will; 
but  that  which  can  act  and  be  acted  upon,  is  just  what 
we  mean  by  substance.  No  pantheistic  theory  can  deny 
these  conclusions  and  remain  loyal  to  the  facts  or  the 
data  of  the  problem.  He  may  form  what  theory  he 
chooses  of  the  way  in  which  these  facts  are  possible; 
they  still  remain  as  facts.  But  the  theist  claims  no 
more  than  this.  He  does  not  pretend  to  know  how  our 
personality  is  made;  or  how  our  activity  is  related  to 
the  divine  activity;  or  how  the  finite  can  have  a  relative 
independence  over  against  the  infinite:  he  only  insists 
that  our  will  and  consciousness  are  our  own.  If  the 
pantheist  attempts  to  get  behind  these  facts,  the  theist 
is  justly  incredulous  of  his  results;  but  as  long  as  the 
facts  are  undisturbed,  the  theist  is  indifferent  to  the 
theory.  If  we  keep  in  mind  that  the  aim  of  philosophy 
is  not  to  deny  the  facts,  but  to  explain  them  without 
in  any  way  distorting  them,  we  see  that  any  tenable 
pantheism  must  leave  just  those  facts  which  the 
theist  regards  as  distinguishing  the  creature  from  the 
creator.  Thus  pantheism,  when  purged  of  its  anthro- 
pomorphisms and  philosophical  crudeness,  and  when 
brought  into  harmony  with  the  facts,  appears  not  as 
pantheism,  but  as  idealistic  theism.  In  it  all  is  life. 
There  are  no  fixed  points  of  dead  inertness;  but  per- 
sonality and  consciousness  are  every -where.  The  inef- 
fable tides  of  the  infinite  are  poured  round  all,  and 


286  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

flow  through  all,  and  upbear  all.  The  vulgar  attempt 
to  identify  God  and  the  world,  which  degrades  God 
without  exalting  the  world,  must  be  abandoned  as  vile- 
ly anthropomorphic,  unphilosophic,  and  contradictory; 
and  in  its  place  must  be  put  the  conception  of  the  liv- 
ing God  and  Father  of  our  spirits,  who  is  never  far 
from  any  one  of  us. 

The  only  tenable  pantheism,  we  said,  reduces  to  ideal- 
istic theism.  But  as  we  did  not  decide  absolutely  for 
idealism,  no  more  do  we  decide  absolutely  for  idealistic 
theism.  We  have  rather  aimed  to  criticise  the  panthe- 
istic doctrine  so  as  to  show  the  only  form  in  which  it 
can  rationally  be  held.  All  theism  must  teach  the  im- 
manency of  God;  so  that  religiously  there  is  no  differ- 
ence between  idealistic  theism  and  immanent  theism. 
It  is  also  a  mistake  to  decide  positively  where  there  are 
not  sufficient  data  for  a  positive  decision. 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  287 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

RELATION    OF    GOD    TO    THE   WORLD. 

"\T7"E  have  reached  the  conclusion  that  all  finite  exist 
ence  depends  upon  a  personal  and  intelligent  be 
ing.     We  have  next  to  inquire  how  we  shall  think  of 
his  relation  to  the  world,  and  its  on-going.     What  we 
shall  have  to  say  will  apply  equally  to  realism  and  to 
rational  idealism.    There  is  no  need,  therefore,  to  decide 
for  either. 

The  philosophic  thought  of  both  England  and  Amer- 
ica has  been  ruled  from  time  immemorial  by  the  deistic 
conception  of  a  mechanical  world  and  an  outside  God. 
According  to  this  conception,  the  world  was  made  once 
for  all,  and  thereafter  it  was  able  to  take  care  of  itself. 
To  such  an  extent  was  this  independence  of  the  finite  car- 
ried, that  it  seemed  to  be  held  that  the  finite  would  be 
undisturbed,  even  if  the  infinite  should  entirely  vanish. 
Accordingly,  the  theistic  argument  turned  largely  on 
such  questions  as  that  of  a  prime  mover,  the  only  recog- 
nized use  for  God  being  to  set  the  world  a-going.  On 
this  account,  very  many  still  regard  a  dynamic  theory 
of  matter  as  fraught  with  atheism.  God  was  not  only 
apart  from  the  world,  but  it  almost  seems  as  if  he 
were  to  be  conceived  as  spatially  external.  This  deistic 
theory  was  simply  the  apotheosis  of  the  crudest  notions 
of  common  sense,  in  itself  it  belongs  to  the  pre-critical 


288  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

stage  of  thought.  It  is  also  intelligible  as  a  reaction 
against  the  insanities  of  extreme  pantheism;  but  it  is 
scarcely  less  mischievous,  and  is^  equally  obnoxious  to 
criticism.  It  contains  the  germs  of  materialism  and 
theological  rationalism.  Its  rigid  mechanism  allows  no 
modification  except  by  an  irruption  from  without;  and 
hence  the  vehement  opposition  to  the  supernatural  of 
those  who  hold  this  view.  Its  further  assumption,  that 
the  system  contains  all  its  factors  unchanged  from  the 
beginning,  makes  it  necessary  to  regard  all  outcome  as 
the  result  of  shifting  the  pieces  in  the  great  kaleido- 
scope. Hence,  also,  the  necessity  of  regarding  life 
and  the  soul  as  but  peculiar  phases  of  the  ever-shifting 
constants  of  the  system.  The  great  kaleidoscope  rolls, 
and  the  pieces  assume  new  combinations,  but  there  is 
nothing  substantial  in  the  products.  They  are  phases 
only,  and  pass  as  the  combination  changes.  No  other 
view  can  be  taken  without  allowing  the  introduction  of 
new  agents  into  the  system;  and  this  would  be  an  aban- 
donment of  its  fundamental  assumption.  In  this  respect 
our  theology  has  generally  been  in  advance  of  our  phi- 
losophy. With  the  Bible  in  his  hand,  the  theologian 
could  hardly  help  seeing  that  the  natural  and  supernat- 
ural interpenetrate,  so  that  nature  is  but  the  manifesta- 
tion of  the  supernatural,  and  the  supernatural  is  but  the 
omnipresent  cause  of  the  natural.  Still  our  theology 
has  not  entirely  escaped  the  influence  of  the  deistic  con- 
ception; as  is  shown  by  its  failure  to  steadily  affirm  the 
doctrine  of  an  immanent  God.  Even  now  it  is  not  un- 
common to  hear  miracles  and  answers  to  prayer  defend- 
ed on  the  ground  that  God  made  provision  for  them  all 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  289 

in  the  original  mechanism.  Babbage  wrote  a  treatise 
to  show  by  the  aid  of  his  calculating  machine  that  the 
mechanism  of  nature  might  have  been  so  adjusted  at 
the^  beginning  as  to  produce  the  wonder  at  the  right 
time.  When  the  hands  pointed  the  hour  the  bell  struck. 
The  pointers  and  the  bell  were  kept  together  by  an  in- 
ner automatism  which  made  mind  as  predicable  as  mat- 
ter. In  this  way  the  miracles  were  provided  for,  and 
above  all,  the  laws  of  nature  were  preserved.  This 
was  esteemed  a  triumph  for  the  theologians,  as  it 
saved  them  from  the  reproach  of  violating  natural 
laws.  That  the  logical  outcome  of  this  view  is  fatal- 
ism in  no  way  diminished  their  satisfaction.  In  truth, 
it  was  only  a  striking  illustration  of  the  ease  with  which 
an  uncritical  habit  of  thinking  is  mistaken  for  a  law  of 
thought. 

The  prominent  part  played  by  the  deistic  notion  in 
scientific  speculations  need  only  be  mentioned  to  be 
recognized.  The  arguments  for  evolution  and  material- 
ism in  life  and  mind  are  feeble  enough  when  viewed 
from  the  side  of  the  facts.  The  positive  evidence  gives 
but  the  smallest  support  to  the  great  conclusion;  but  if 
we  may  assume  that  our  system  has  received  no  new 
factors  from  the  beginning,  these  doctrines  follow  as  a 
matter  of  definition.  In  a  given  system,  which  receives 
no  additions  and  suffers  no  loss,  all  phenomena  of  what- 
ever character  must  be  due  to  varying  combinations  of 
the  constant  factors.  We  may  be  unable  to  see  how 
the  phenomena  result,  but  the  conclusion  is  in  no  way 
disturbed,  for,  by  hypothesis,  the  primal  elements  are 
the  only  things  concerned.  No  amount  of  breaks  in  the 


290  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

genealogical  series,  and  no  inability  to  understand  the 
method  of  evolution  or  the  development  of  mind  from 
matter,  can  have  the  least  weight  as  an  argument  so 
long  as  this  basal  assumption  is  allowed  to  stand.  Un- 
less the  opponents  of  these  views  have  the  courage  to 
deny  the  mechanical  self-sufficiency  of  the  system,  and 
to  affirm  the  introduction  of  new  factors  into  it,  their 
opposition  even  to  the  most  materialistic  form  cf  evo- 
lution might  as  well  cease.  The  importance  of  .  this 
question  will  best  appear  from  some  illustrations. 

The  nature  of  life  is  one  of  the  great  battle  grounds 
of  materialism.  The  materialistic,  orv mechanical,  theory 
is  commonly  misunderstood.  In  its  best  form  it  does 
not  teach  that  physics  or  chemistry  can  explain  life,  or 
that  we  have  any  mechanical  insight  into  the  origin  of 
life.  It  only  asserts  that  just  as  the  elements  when 
brought  together  in  certain  relations,  manifest  chemical, 
magnetic,  and  other  properties,  so  when  brought  togeth- 
er in  certain  other  relations,  they  manifest  vital  quali- 
ties. It  may  be  that  they  manifest  them  only  in  con- 
nection with  living  things,  but  however  manifested,  the 
activities  of  every  organism  are  but  the  resultants  of 
the  activities  of  the  component  elements.  The  doc- 
trine is  often  coarsely  held  as  if  electricity  or  chemistry 
are  able  to  give  us  some  insight  into  life;  but  in  its 
best  form,  it  claims  only  that  in  any  atomic  complex 
the  properties  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  atoms,  which 
nature,  however,  may  be  as  mysterious  as  we  please. 
This  is  what  is  meant  by  the  current  propositions  to  in- 
clude life  in  the  definition  of  matter.  Of  course  this 
view  assumes,  in  the  atoms,  all  that  afterward  appears, 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  291 

and  in  one  sense  explains  nothing;  but  it  does,  at  least, 
furnish  a  landing-place  for  our  thought,  in  that  it  pro- 
vides some  subject  for  the  organic  activities.  Formally, 
at  least,  the  thought  is  complete.  The  agents  which 
produce  organisms  are  specified;  and,  in  addition,  the 
thought  of  any  irruption  or  meddling  from  without  is 
warded  oif.  The  non-mechanical  view,  on  the  other 
hand,  is  not  so  clear  on  this  point.  Frequently  the 
mechanical  view  of  life  is  misconceived,  as  if  it  were 
taught  that  mechanical  processes,  in  the  common  mean- 
ing of  the  term,  could  explain  life.  Moreover,  we  hear 
much  of  vital  properties  and  activities  in  the  body,  but 
we  are  not  told  to  what  subject  they  belong.  To  at- 
tribute them  to  the  body  is  mere  thoughtlessness,  for 
the  body  is  only  an  aggregate.  Here,  then,  are  activi- 
ties in  the  body:  what  acts?  If  we  say  that  the  ele- 
ments act,  we  have  not  escaped  the  mechanical  theory. 
If  we  attribute  the  vital  qualities  to  the  elements,  again 
we  have  not  escaped  the  mechanical  theory.  But  if 
there  be  any  thing  beyond  the  elements,  what  is  it? 
And  above  all,  whence  is  it  ?  If  we  say  that  life  acts, 
we  have  not  simplified  the  problem,  for  while  the  name 
life  is  one,  the  thing  is  many.  The  fact  is  not  univers- 
al and  singular  life,  but  discrete,  individual  lives,  and 
these  often  of  the  most  diverse  nature.  We  can  escape 
the  mechanical  theory  only  by  affirming  a  separate  vital 
subject  for  each  living  thing.  But  in  that  case,  whence 
has  this  swarm  of  lives  their  origin  ?  Shall  we  say  that 
the  original  vital  element  has  indefinitely  reproduced 
itself  ?  That  would  make  it  creative ;  for  we  have  seen 
that  every  true  subject  must  be  a  unit.  Shall  we  say 


292  STUDIES  IN  TSEISM. 

that  it  has  re-enforced  itself  from  the  unorganic  world? 
So  far  as  such  a  statement  would  have  any  meaning,  it 
would  be  the  very  essence  of  the  mechanical  theory. 
Shall  we,  then,  affirm  a  separate  creation  for  every  liv- 
ing thing  ?  These  questions  express  the  real  difficulty 
of  the  non-mechanical  doctrine;  and  it  is  these  objec- 
tions which  make  converts  to  the  opposite  view,  rather 
than  any  insight  or  demonstration  which  that  view  can 
give.  It  is  also  plain,  that  on  any  theory  of  a  mechan- 
ical world  and  an  outside  God,  the  non-mechanical  view 
cannot  make  headway  against  these  considerations. 
The  holder  of  this  theory  is  shut  up  to  one  of  three 
views:  (1)  The  pre-existence  of  all  organic  germs  from 
the  beginning;  (2)  the  creation  of  a  vital  element  for 
each  organism;  or  (3)  that  the  directive  or  unifying 
agent  in  all  organisms  is  the  omnipresent  God,  who  pro- 
ceeds in  each  according  to  his  own  chosen  and  orderly 
methods.  The  choice  is  practically  between  the  last 
two  views;  and  it  must  be  clear  that  one  who  has  not 
the  courage  to  choose  one  of  them  and  maintain  it  con- 
sistently is  powerless  against  the  mechanical  doctrine. 
Vacillation  on  this  point  gives  the  victory  to  mechanism. 
Mechanism,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  based  upon  fact 
and  knowledge,  but  on  an  assumed  metaphysical  theory. 
At  bottom,  this  is  a  battle  of  metaphysics. 

For  the  present,  we  decide  for  neither  of  these  views, 
but  pass  to  a  more  important  question.  From  the  ear- 
liest times,  the  origin  of  the  human  soul  has  been  a 
vexed  question;  and  here,  too,  the  deistic  conception  of 
an  absentee  God  has  had  great  influence.  Only  three 
views  are  self -consistent :  (1)  The  pre-existence  of  all 


DELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TEE  WORLD.  2  £3 

souls;  (2)  their  creation  in  connection  with  the  organ- 
ism; and  (3)  mental  phenomena  inhere  in  no  substantial 
subject,  but  result  entirely  from  material  combinations. 
The  doctrine  of  pre-existence  found  favor  with  some  of 
the  early  Indian  and  Greek  philosophers;  and  an  occa- 
sional theologian  holds  it  still;  but  it  involves  us  in  so 
many  gratuitous  difficulties  that  it  will  never  have  any 
general  acceptance.  Practically,  the  only  theories  are 
materialism  and  creationism.  In  unclear  thought  an 
attempt  is  sometimes  made  to  steer  between  these  views, 
and  represent  the  soul  of  the  child  as  in  some  way  pro- 
duced by  those  of  the  parents.  This  view  has  its  origin 
in  the  deistic  notion;  and  its  outcome  is  materialism. 
It  is  defended  only  by  a  large  use  of  vague  phrases  and 
half  thoughts.  It  is  said,  for  instance,  that  there  is  a 
law,  or  a  world- order,  according  to  which  souls  are  pro- 
duced, yet  without  being  created.  Unfortunately,  a 
world-order,  or  a  law,  is  only  a  conception,  and  always 
needs  some  agent  or  agents  to  realize  it.  In  order,  then, 
to  make  this  theory  intelligible,  we  must  know  what  the 
agents  are  which  realize  this  order.  If  it  be  said,  that 
God  has  made  the  elements  such  that  when  combined  in 
certain  ways  mental  phenomena  result,  this  is  simple 
materialism.  The  mind  is  the  unsubstantial  outcome  of 
organization.  If  it  be  said,  that  when  the  elements  are 
combined  in  certain  ways  a  substantial  soul  results,  this 
is  to  allow  creation.  The  only  difference  between  this 
and  creationism  proper  is,  that  it  does  not  say  what 
creates.  But  the  notion  that  the  elements,  or  that  the 
souls  of  the  parents,  give  off  something  out  of  which 
new  souls  can  be  made,  is  utterly  untenable.  We  are, 


STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

then,  shut  up  either  to  an  acceptance  of  materialism,  or 
we  must  admit  the  direct  creation  of  human  souls,  the 
doctrine  of  pre-existence  being  practically  obsolete. 
But  creation  cannot  be  maintained  upon  any  theory 
which  regards  God  as  an  absentee,  or  as  any  thing  but- 
immanent  in  the  natural,  as  its  bond  and  upholder. 
Failure  to  see  this  lies  at  the  bottom  of  a  great  deal  of 
theoretic  materialism.  The  spiritualists  have  been  nei- 
ther clear  nor  consistent  in  their  doctrine  concerning 
the  origin  of  souls;  and  most  commonly  have  adopted  a 
theory  of  the  relation  of  God  and  the  world,  which  is 
essential  materialism.  Thus  the  case  has  gone  against 
them  by  default,  rather  than  by  any  force  of  opposing 
evidence. 

Again,  when  we  take  up  the  question  of  the  evolution 
of  higher  from  lower  forms,  and  of  the  organic  from  the 
inorganic,  we  find  the  grip  of  the  affirmative  argument 
to  consist  in  the  deistic  theory  of  an  outside  and  absent 
God.  And  it  is  plain  that,  if  we  accept  this  theory,  we 
must  adopt  at  once  the  most  thorough-going  form  of 
materialistic  evolution.  Tyndall  may  explode  all  the 
experiments  which  claim  to  prove  spontaneous  genera- 
tion. Virchow  may  declare  that  anthropology  discred- 
its more  and  more  the  notion  of  our  ape-like  origin. 
He  may  also  denounce  the  materialists  as  pernicious 
dogmatists  of  the  firm  of  Carbon  &  Co.,  and  he  may 
assail  Darwinism  as  a  huge  bubble  company.  Darwin, 
too,  may  admit  the  insufficiency  of  natural  selection  as 
a  complete  account  of  the  origin  of  species;  and  a  mul- 
titude of  naturalists  may  point  out  genealogical  breaks 
of  greater  or  less  extent.  But  these  considerations 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  295 

weigh  nothing  unless  we  deny  the  basal  assumption  of 
a  universe  ontologically  complete  from  the  beginning. 
Accordingly,  a  favorite  procedure  with  evolutionists  is 
to  deduce  the  results  of  the  opposite  view.  That  view, 
it  is  said,  denies  the  continuity  of  nature,  and  intro- 
duces miracle — a  notion  which  is  the  death  of  all  science. 
The  cause  of  evolution  is  declared,  with  endless  itera- 
tion, to  be  a  belief  in  continuity  against  miracle,  and  in 
law  against  -arbitrariness.  The  emphasis  with  which 
this  statement  is  made  shows  how  little  of  positive  evi- 
dence can  be  adduced.  Meanwhile  the  opponents  of 
evolution  continue  to  insist  upon  breaks,  as  if  they  had 
the  slightest  significance  so  long  as  the  underlying  con- 
ception of  continuity  is  allowed.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  non-evolutionists  would  break,  not  with  the  facts 
but  with  the  metaphysics  of  the  evolutionists,  the  facts 
upon  which  the  latter  rely  would  lose  very  much  of 
their  significance.  Ontological  continuity  is  compatible 
with  a  lack  of  phenomenal  continuity,  and  conversely 
phenomenal  continuity  does  not  prove  ontological  con- 
tinuity. 

The  bearing  of  the  last  clause  will  become  clearer  if 
we  inquire  what  is  meant  by  evolution.  The  very  no- 
tion is  often  surrounded  by  a  nebulous  haze  not  unlike 
the  primeval  fog  itself.  The  root  idea  is  an  unfolding 
or  unrolling,  and  this,  by  an  easy  transition,  is  applied 
to  denote  the  several  stages  of  an  individual,  or  of  a 
changing  system,  In  both  cases  there  is  the  thought  of 
hidden  powers  which  come  gradually  to  manifestation. 
But  the  idea  has  no  application  to  the  production  of  the 
substantial.  This  must  be  either  eternal  or  created. 


296  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

A  process  of  creation  is  meaningless  except  as  it  de- 
notes successive  creations.  But  a  thing  must  either  be 
or  not  be;  there  is  no  half-way  possible.  Hence  crea- 
tion and  evolution  are  not  properly  opposed.  The  op- 
posite of  creation  is  eternal  existence.  In  speculation, 
however,  evolution  is  commonly  applied  to  the  succes- 
sive stages  of  the  system;  and  here  the  conception  im- 
plies at  least  two  factors:  (1)  an  agent  or  agents;  and, 
(2)  a  product.  It  is  hard,  indeed,  to  conceive  an  evolu- 
tion without  a  third  thought  of  a  goal  toward  which 
the  process  tends,  and  by  reference  to  which  its  prog- 
ress is  measured.  Without  this  thought  evolution  is 
only  a  meaningless  stir,  from  which  all  thought  of  prog- 
ress must  be  excluded.  In  that  case,  evolution  would 
be  neither  progress  nor  regress,  but  simply  change. 
It  would  be  only  a  new  form  of  Heraclitus's  doctrine, 
that  all  things  flow.  What,  then,  is  the  agent  or 
agents  in  evolution?  Every  process  demands  some 
definite  agent,  or  set  of  agents,  for  its  realization.  It 
is  not  uncommon  to  find  evolutionists  ignoring  this 
simple  consideration.  This  may  be  due  to  the  exalted 
state  of  mind  in  which  many  of  them  are.  The  bare 
word  is  a  talisman  which  nothing  can  withstand;  and 
indeed  it  seems  to  be  a  synonym,  not  only  for  all  that 
is  profound,  but  for  all  that  is  holy  and  reverend. 
Hence  a  certain  emphasis,  and  even  unction,  may  be 
noticed  in  their  pronunciation  of  the  sacred  name. 
Having  thus  got  used  to  evolving  things,  many  are 
prepared  to  evolve  every  thing  without  any  hint  of 
what  conducts  the  process.  Accordingly,  they  are  no 
longer  content  to  evolve  life  from  the  lifeless,  and 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  297 

higher  from  lower  forms;  but  they  insist  on  evolving 
the  chemical  elements,  and  even  the  ultimate  atoms 
themselves.  This  tendency  is  easily  understood  as  the 
outcome  of  a  blind  passion  for  construing  and  explain- 
ing which  often  seizes  upon  minds  which  are  not  in  full 
possession  of  themselves.  It  overlooks  the  fact  that 
explanation  cannot  go  on  forever,  but  always  supposes 
some  definite  reality  more  ultimate  than  the  thing  ex- 
plained. In  this  way  the  crude  notion  often  obtains 
with  the  thoughtless,  that  evolution  is  able  to  explain 
both  the  being  and  forms  of  the  universe,  all  alike  being 
evolved  from  nothing.  But  this  attempt  to  compre- 
hend the  realities  of  the  universe  as  the  result  of  proc- 
esses which  they  themselves  make  possible,  must  be 
passed  over  as  the  outcome  of  a  misplaced  and  inverted 
curiosity,  which  fancies  that  every  thing  is  product  and 
nothing  is  producer.  The  proposition  to  evolve  matter 
implies  that  matter  is  not  substantial,  but  only  a  pass- 
ing phase  of  some  universal  activity.  To  the  question, 
then,  What  is  the  agent  or  agents  in  evolution  ?  we  may 
say :  (l)  God  is  the  active  agent  in  all  evolution. 
(2)  An  omnipresent,  but  blind,  mechanical  power  is  the 
agent.  (3)  God  has  created  things  so  that  they  unfold 
by  their  own  inherent  energy.  (4)  The  physical  ele- 
ments are  the  sole  agents  in  evolution.  (5)  We  may 
combine  (1)  and  (3),  and  regard  God  as  an  omnipresent, 
but  not  the  only,  factor  in  evolution.  In  the  first  view, 
evolution  is  but  the  continuous  activity  of  God  realizing 
an  unfolding  plan.  In  the  second,  it  is  the  continuous 
activity  of  a  blind  power,  according  to  an  order  of 
which  it  knows  nothing.  In  the  third,  evolution  is  the 


298  STUDIES  IN  THEISM 

unfolding  of  possibilities  originally  given  in  germ.  In 
the  fourth,  it  is  the  successive  phenomena  and  com- 
binations of  the  physical  elements  in  their  ceaseless 
striving  after  equilibrium.  As  such  it  is  purely  phe- 
nomenal, and  exists  only  for  the  perceiving  mind. 
The  elements  themselves  know  nothing  of  the  process, 
and  are  indifferent  to  it.  It  is  all  the  same  to  a  mole- 
cule of  iron,  whether  it  is  coursing  in  the  veins  of  a 
man  or  blazing  in  the  fires  of  the  sun.  The  current 
evolutionist  speculations  are  an  odd  compound  of  mate- 
rialism, hylozoism,  and  Spinozism;  and  Spinozism,  in 
turn,  is  a  contradiction  made  up  of  the  Eleatic  and 
Heraclitic  philosophies.  But  where  there  is  great  ig- 
norance of  the  history  of  philosophy,  antique  whims 
and  superstitions  are  easily  mistaken  for  new  discover- 
ies. The  same  ignorance  conditions  their  acceptance. 
That  such  a  theory  is  fatal  to  science  we  have  pointed 
out  in  chapter  iii. 

We  have  next  to  inquire  what  is  evolved.  To  this 
question,  also,  there  are  various  answers.  Some  of  the 
more  enthusiastic,  as  pointed  out,  fancy  that  every  thing 
is  evolved;  but  this  view  needs  no  further  notice.  And 
as  the  organic  world  is  the  great  field  of  evolution,  we 
confine  our  attention  to  that  for  a  moment.  In  discuss- 
ing organic  evolution,  the  great  question  is,  not  what  is 
a  species,  but  what  is  an  individual.  If  the  individual 
is  a  substantial  subject,  it  cannot  be  regarded  as  a 
product  of  evolution,  but  as  a  new  factor  introduced 
into  the  system;  in  short,  a  creation.  It  is,  indeed,  pos- 
sible to  assume  that  it  has  existed  in  germ  from  the 
beginning,  but  this  view  is  practically  obsolete.  But 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  299 

whether  we  view  it  as  a  new  germ  dropped  into  the 
stream  of  things,  or  as  the  development  of  a  pre-exist- 
ing germ,  it  is  equally  improper  to  speak  of  it  as  evolved 
as  to  its  existence.  Evolution  applies  only  to  its  un- 
folding, and  assumes  that  the  germ  and  its  potentialities 
are  already  there.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  indi- 
vidual is  nothing  substantial,  but  only  in  a  combination 
of  the  elements,  or  a  passing  phase  of  the  universal 
activity,  then  both  individuals  and  species  are  mere  phe- 
nomena; and  the  difference  between  one  species  and  an- 
other, or  between  the  organic  and  the  inorganic,  is  purely 
phenomenal.  This  conclusion  applies  to  any  theory, 
theistic,  atheistic,  and  pantheistic  alike,  which  denies 
creation  in  connection  with  every  living  thing,  and  the 
pre-existence  of  all  germs  from  the  beginning.  On  the 
theory  of  idealistic  theism,  or  of  atheistic  pantheism, 
such  a  denial  would  reduce  all  things  to  unsubstantial 
forms  of  the  omnipresent  activity.  An  individual  would 
be  but  the  locus  of  a  particular  activity,  and  nature 
would  be  the  locus  of  the  sum  of  the  activities :  or,  since 
a  locus  in  mathematics  denotes  the  path  of  a  point  mov- 
ing under  a  certain  law,  we  may  call  a  thing  the  law  of  a 
particular  activity  determining  a  certain  locus;  and  we 
may  call  nature  the  law  of  the  sum  of  the  activities, 
determining  the  general  locus  of  the  universal  activity. 
In  this  case  both  individuals  and  species  would  be  phe- 
nomenal, and  could  be  neither  derived  nor  transformed. 
These  terms  apply  only  to  the  substantial.  Individuals 
would  be  phenomenal  phases  succeeding  one  another  ac- 
cording to  a  certain  law,  but  without  any  essential  con- 
nection. Species  would  be,  externally,  phenomenal 
20 


300  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

groups  of  phenomena ;  internally,  they  would  be  the 
norms  according  to  which  the  universal  power  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously  proceeds  in  producing  the 
phenomenal  individual,  and  the  transformation  of  spe- 
cies would  mean  only  the  variation  of  these  norms  of 
production.  But  whether  the  norm  changed  or  re- 
mained constant,  the  only  relation  between  the  individ- 
ual combinations  would  be  that  of  sequence. 

If  we  adopt  the  materialistic  view,  which  regards 
life  as  the  result  of  mechanical  combination,  we  reach 
similar  conclusions.  On  that  theory  the  universe  is  a 
great  self-rolling  kaleidoscope,  whose  pieces  are  for- 
ever shifting.  We  do  not  speak  of  the  figures  in 
a  kaleidoscope  as  evolved  from  the  preceding  ones, 
or  as  transformations  of  them.  There  is  a  succession 
of  phases  and  forms,  but  no  proper  evolution  and  no 
transformation.  So  when  we  look  into  the  great  world- 
kaleidoscope  which  materialism  posits,  we  see  only  a 
succession  of  phases  and  forms.  The  elements  abide 
unchanged  through  all,  and  are  indifferent  to  the 
outcome.  As  the  mist  knows  nothing  of  the  rainbow 
which  it  reflects,  so  the  dark  mechanism  of  the  universe 
knows  nothing  of  the  phantom  of  evolution  which  it 
founds.  The  underlying  realities  do,  indeed,  contain 
the  ground  why  one  phase  should  succeed  another,  but 
the  phases  and  forms  themselves,  as  purely  phenomenal, 
could  have  no  relation  but  that  of  sequence  or  co-exist- 
ence, and  could  not  exist  at  all  except  in  the  mind  of  an 
observer.  It  would  not  alter  the  case  in  the  least  if  an 
unbroken  genealogical  sequence  existed  between  the 
highest  and  lowest  forms.  It  would  still  be  unmeaning 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  301 

to  speak  of  the  higher  as  derived  from  the  lower,  or  as 
transformations  of  the  lower,  for  only  the  substantial 
can  be  derived  or  transformed.  A  transformed  phe- 
nomenon is  another  phenomenon,  and  for  the  reason 
that  the  essence  of  a  phenomenon  is  a  certain  manner 
of  appearance.  Suppose,  then,  we  allow  an  unbroken 
genealogical  sequence  between  man  and  the  monkey, 
we  are  still  not  allowed,  upon  this  theory,  to  speak  of 
man  as  a  transformed  monkey,  or  as  derived  from  the 
monkey.  For  both  man  and  monkey  are  but  unsub- 
stantial phases  of  the  eternal  flow,  and  hence  there  is 
strictly  nothing  either  to  derive  or  transform.  The 
monkey  is  one  form  in  the  kaleidoscope,  man  is  another; 
there  can  be  no  other  connection.  In  short,  the  evolu- 
tion, derivation,  and  transformation  of  species  are  in- 
exact expressions  on  any  theory  except  that  of  mediaeval 
realism.  The  individual,  we  repeat,  is  the  great  mys- 
tery, and  there  is  no  more  difficulty  in  passing  from  one 
species  to  another  than  in  passing  from  one  individual 
to  another.  If  the  individual  is  any  thing  substantial, 
we  can  only  view  it  as  a  new  beginning,  having  no 
more  ontological  connection  with  its  ancestors  than  one 
atom  has  with  another.  The  impossibility  of  viewing 
it  as  made  of  some  universal  substance  has  been  shown 
in  the  previous  chapter.  If  the  individual  is  real,  spe- 
cies are,  externally,  groups  of  similar  individuals,  and, 
internally,  they  are  the  norms  according  to  which  crea- 
tive power  proceeds  in  positing  individuals.  The  con- 
stancy of  species  would  mean  the  constancy  of  these 
norms.  The  transformation  and  derivation  of  species 
would  mean  the  variation  of  these  norms.  The  evolu- 


302  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

tion  of  species  would  mean  the  passage  from  simple  to 
more  complex  and  differentiated  norms.  But  in  any 
case,  the  individual  would  be  something  for  itself,  not 
an  old  thing  made  over,  and  afterward  to  pass  into 
something  else,  but  an  abiding  unit  of  being  with  a 
fixed  law  in  itself.  No  theory  contemplates  the  trans- 
formation of  the  individual,  but  only  of  the  species. 
A  flowing  curve  consists  of  fixed  points;  and  if  we  re- 
gard the  organic  world  as  composed  of  such  flowing 
curves,  we  have  still  to  regard  the  individual  as,  at 
least  *^latively  fixed. 

At  this  point  the  old  realism  rules  our  thoughts  to 
an  unbecoming  degree  ;  and  we  fancy  that  there  is 
an  essential  something  which  glides  unchanged  from 
individual  to  individual.  Hence  when  man  is  said  to 
be  a  transformed  monkey,  we  overlook  the  force  of 
the  adjective,  and  regard  man  as  a  monkey  still.  The 
realistic  fancy  which  underlies  this  notion  is  evident. 
It  overlooks  the  element  of  individuality,  and  dreams 
of  an  abiding  essence  in  the  species.  Theism,  how- 
ever, cannot  regard  species  as  any  thing  more  than 
the  norms  of  the  creative  activity;  and  if  these  norms 
grow  in  complexity  and  diversity,  so  that  individuals 
become  more  and  more  differentiated,  and  organic  his- 
tory show  a  passage  from  the  simple  to  the  complex, 
there  is  nothing  in  the  fact  at  which  a  sound  mind 
should  take  offense.  It  merely  describes  the  way  in 
which  the  basal  reality  acts,  and  decides  nothing  as  to 
the  character  either  of  the  producer  or  of  the  product. 
To  the  question,  What  evolves  ?  we  found  several  an- 
swers given.  In  like  manner  there  is  no  agreement  as 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD  303 

to  the  product  of  evolution.  It  may  be  an  unfolding 
plan  constantly  passing  into  reality.  It  may  be  a  se- 
ries of  blind  activities  without  any  substantial  product. 
It  may  be  an  unsubstantial  succession  of  material  com- 
binations which  have  no  existence  for  the  realities  which 
conduct  the  process.  It  may  be  only  the  latent  capa- 
cities of  germs  originally  given  or  dropped  upon  occa- 
sion into  the  stream  of  things. 

It  is  becoming  clear  that  the  facts  on  which  the  de- 
fenders of  either  view  depend  are  quite  ambiguous 
without  an  underlying  metaphysical  conception.  We 
have  previously  pointed  out  that  the  fact  of  breaks  is 
powerless  against  even  materialistic  evolution,  so  long 
as  its  assumption  of  the  completeness  of  the  system 
from  the  beginning  is  denied.  Moreover,  there  is  noth- 
ing in  the  doctrine  of  evolution  which  makes  it  neces- 
sary to  maintain  the  continuity  of  organic  forms,  or  that 
nature  never  makes  a  leap.  Great  phenomenal  unlike- 
ness,  as  in  the  case  of  the  butterfly  and  the  caterpillar, 
is  compatible  with  genealogical  connection.  We  point 
out,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  facts  of  observation, 
though  they  were  a  thousand-fold  more  pertinent,  are 
powerless  to  prove  the  metaphysical  conception  on 
which  atheistic  and  pantheistic  evolution  rests.  That 
conception  denies  freedom,  creation,  purpose,  control  of 
any  kind,  and  reduces  all  change  to  an  aimless  shuffle 
of  material  elements,  or  a  necessary  motion  in  the  uni- 
versal substance.  Now,  if  it  were  possible  to  arrange 
all  organic  forms  in  linear  genealogical  order,  the  denier 
of  such  evolution  need  not  be  in  the  least  dismayed; 
for  such  a  fact  in  no  way  decides  what  the  individual 


304  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

is,  or  what  the  power  is  which  underlies  the  process. 
He  can  claim  that  the  history  of  things  is  not  mere 
shuffling  of  the  same  elements,  but  is  underlaid  by  a 
personal  and  creative  power  which  introduces  new  fac- 
tors according  to  a  certain  order.  Such  a  conception 
would  undoubtedly  be  greeted  with  a  cry  of  "fiddle- 
sticks," and  the  fiddle-sticks  would  be  brandished  all  the 
more  lustily  that  this  conception  cannot  be  discredited 
in  any  other  way.  It  rarely  happens  that  an  advocate  is 
willing  to  allow  his  adversary  to  state  his  own  case,  and 
the  average  evolutionist  is  no  exception.  He  delights  in 
charging  his  opponent  with  denying  the  continuity  of 
nature,  and  styles  his  theory  a  doctrine  of  "breaks"  and 
"supernatural  irruptions."  In  order  to  increase  the 
opprobium,  he  conceives  a  "break"  as  equivalent  to  a 
smash,  and  pictures  an  "irruption"  in  the  most  scenic 
manner  possible.  Where  mental  ossification  has  set  in 
early,  or  has  reached  an  advanced  stage,  these  consider- 
ations will  be  conclusive.  But  the  rational  non-evolu- 
tionist does  not  deny  the  phenomenal  continuity  and 
intellectual  consistency  of  nature,  and  he  does  not  deny 
the  metaphysical  continuity  of  the  ultimate  ground  of 
nature.  He  repudiates  only  that  most  empty  and  unnat- 
ural notion  of  continuity  which  makes  it  consist  in  a 
ceaseless  and  purposeless  shuffling  of  the  same  elements. 
The  only  continuity  which  has  any  value  is  no  such  dice- 
box  continuity,  but  a  continuity  and  unity  of  thought  or 
plan,  and  the  consistent  guidance  of  all  activities  and 
of  all  agencies,  whether  one  or  many,  whether  new  or 
old,  toward  its  realization.  It  is  the  continuity  of  an 
argument  in  which  all  the  facts  and  reasonings  look 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  305 

toward  the  conclusion.  It  is  the  continuity  of  the  ora- 
torio, in  which  all  the  performers  are  bound  by  a  com- 
mon law.  It  is  entirely  open  to  the  non-evolutionist, 
who  is  also  a  theist,  to  declare  that  belief  in  an  intelli- 
gent power  back  of  nature  necessitates  the  admission  of 
intellectual  continuity  and  unity  in  his  works,  so  that 
every  antecedent  is  a  preparation  for  every  consequent, 
and  makes  the  advent  of  that  consequent  a  logical  ne- 
cessity. He  might  even  hold  that  certain  inorganic 
antecedents  imply  the  appearance  of  organic  conse- 
quents; not  as  if  life  were  the  product  of  inorganic 
agents,  but  that  such  is  the  intellectual  continuity  of 
the  system  that  when  certain  states  of  the  inorganic 
are  reached,  the  inner  consistency  of  the  system  de- 
mands the  appearance  of  living  things.  In  short,  he 
may  hold  with  Leibnitz  that  there  is  a  logic  in  nature, 
and  that  the  system  is  so  truly  one  that  every  part  of 
it  is  conditioned  by  every  other  part,  and  at  the  same 
time  is  necessary  to  every  other,  every  thing  and  every 
change  being  the  necessary  logical  supplement  to  every 
other  thing  and  change.  In  such  a  system  there  would 
be  the  strictest  unity  and  phenomenal  continuity.  All 
things  would  unfold  with  absolute  logic,  but  God  would 
be  the  logician.  All  these  assertions  are  quite  compat- 
ible with  complete  denial  of  materialistic  or  philosophic 
evolution.  That  phenomenal  science  could  have  no  ob- 
jection to  such  a  view  is  almost  self-evident.  So,  then, 
we  see  that  the  great  case  of  evolution  vs.  creationism 
is  not  so  much  fact  against  fact,  as  it  is  one  metaphys- 
ical theory  against  another.  The  notion  that  any  pos- 
sible observation  can  decide  the  case,  indicates  a  state 


306  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

of  mind  which  is  almost  hopeless.  No  careful  student 
of  the  debate  can  have  failed  to  notice  that  the  argu- 
ment for  evolution  has  become  almost  entirelv  meta- 
physical, and  rests  upon  a  denial  of  freedom  and  cre- 
ation. 

Our  aim,  thus  far,  has  been  to  suggest  questions  and 
possibilities,  rather  than  to  make  positive  affirmations. 
We  have  not  decided  for  any  of  the  views  presented  as 
possible.  Our  chief  aim,  perhaps,  has  been  to  show 
how  largely  metaphysics  enters  into  this  and  kindred 
questions.  Nevertheless,  this  long  digression  will  not 
be  without  value  for  the  development  of  our  own  views. 

The  discussion  of  the  last  two  chapters  has  con- 
vinced us  that  nature  is  in  constant  dependence  upon  an 
omnipresent  power,  and  that  this  power  is  both  personal 
and  intelligent.  In  so  far,  we  have  repudiated  the 
deistic  conception  in  advance.  We  have  also  seen  that 
the  world  is  not  to  be  viewed  as  in  any  way  a  part  of 
God,  but  rather  as  a  product  of  his  activity.  This  de- 
nies the  substantialism  of  the  pantheistic  evolutionists. 
Finally,  we  have  rejected  the  view  which  would  make 
the  Infinite  subject  to  a  necessary  and  unconscious  de- 
velopment, but  regard  it  as  self-determining.  We  have 
now  to  develop  the  consequences  of  this  view.  And, 
first,  we  must  view  the  world  as  having  its  existence 
only  through  the  divine  will  and  purpose.  It  has  in 
itself  no  ground  of  being,  but  exists  only  because  of  its 
place  in  the  general  plan.  Of  course,  this  view  is  inca- 
pable of  demonstration;  but  it  flows  as  a  consequence 
from  theism  itself,  and  is  a  necessary  postulate  of 


DELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  307 

theoretical  science.  The  theist  is  forced  to  hold  that 
every  thing  has  its  properties  and  place  in  the  system, 
not  because  of  some  fathomless  necessity,  but  because 
of  the  plan  which  the  system  exists  to  realize.  Hence 
the  system  and  its  members  can  be  properly  understood 
only  through  the  end  for  which  they  exist.  That  end 
may  be  to  us  inscrutable,  or  may  be  known  only  in  the 
faintest  outlines;  but  none  the  less  must  both  the  theist 
and  the  scientist  hold  that  there  is  an  end  which  condi- 
tions all  the  means  of  its  realization.  That  the  plan  of 
the  infinite  demands  the  existence  of  every  finite  thing 
from  the  beginning,  is  sheer  assumption.  The  concep- 
tion is  equally  possible  that  that  plan  includes  the  in- 
troduction of  new  factors  into  the  system  along  the  line 
of  development.  Creation  is  no  less  conceivable  as  suc- 
cessive than  as  single.  Which  of  these  two  possible 
conceptions  represents  the  facts,  can  be  determined  only 
by  observation;  but  neither  of  them  has  any  a  priori 
right  above  the  other.  The  facts  of  physics,  taken 
alone,  would  incline  us  to  the  former  view;  but  if  we 
hold  to  the  reality  of  the  soul,  we  must  adopt  the  latter 
view.  The  indications  of  the  facts  must  decide  this 
question.  But  in  judging  this  case,  we  must  not  regard 
the  introduction  of  new  factors  as  breaks  in  the  order 
of  nature,  or  as  something  for  which  there  was  no  pre- 
vious preparation.  The  theist  is  bound  to  protest 
against  any  such  conception.  He  must  assert  the 
unity  of  the  system,  both  in  its  co-existences  and  in 
its  sequences;  and  hence  he  must  assert  that  given 
antecedents  demand  certain  consequents,  not,  indeed, 
as  a  materialistic  necessity,  but  as  a  logical  necessity. 


308  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

If  the  sequence  failed,  the   system  would   contradict 
itself. 

Concerning  a  divine  guidance  and  providence  we  shall 
speak  hereafter;  for  the  present  we  confine  ourselves 
to  the  general  features  of  the  system;  and  here  the 
theist  must  hold  that  there  is  a  logic  in  the  system 
which  absolutely  determines  all  co-existences  and  se- 
quences. Thus  there  arises  the  thought  of  a  phenom- 
enal order  which  is  consistent  and  unbroken,  but  which 
is,  nevertheless,  only  the  outcome  of  the  consistent 
activity  of  the  all-embracing  God.  The  continuity 
and  unity  of  this  system  would  not  consist  in  a  rigid 
duration  of  the  same  factors,  but  in  the  subjection  of  all 
factors,  new  and  old,  to  a  common  thought  and  a  com- 
mon law.  Ontologically,  a  river  is  not  the  same  for 
any  two  consecutive  instants;  phenomenally,  it  is  always 
the  same,  for  the  new  water  is  subject  to  the  old  condi- 
tions. This  subjection  of  every  thing  in  the  system  to 
what  the  plan  of  the  system  requires,  constitutes  its  only 
unity  and  continuity.  This  unity  would  not  be  in  the 
least  disturbed  if  we  adopted  the  pantheistic  theory  of 
nature.  The  divine  activity  would  be  consistent  in  its 
contemporaneous  and  in  its  successive  acts;  that  is,  the 
thought  or  plan  of  the  whole  would  condition  all  the 
discrete  activities,  whether  discrete  in  space  or  time,  so 
as  to  bind  them  all  into  a  unity  of  result.  Now  it  is 
utterly  gratuitous  to  claim  that  the  conception  of  com- 
ing and  going  factors  involves  disturbance  of  the  phe- 
nomenal order,  or  is  in  any  way  inconsistent  with  phe- 
nomenal science.  It  is  equally  gratuitous  to  claim  that 
such  new  products  are  the  results  of  mere  arbitrariness, 


DELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  309 

and  without  connection  with  their  antecedents.  On  the 
contrary,  they  are  always  demanded  by  the  laws  and 
logic  of  the  system.  But  from  this  point  of  view,  the 
question  of  spontaneous  generation,  or  of  the  origin  and 
transformation  of  species,  would  lose  all  significance 
for  the  theist.  An  apparent  instance  of  spontaneous 
generation  would  only  mean  to  him,  that  the  invisible 
God  produces  living  things  under  other  than  the  ordi- 
nary circumstances;  but  the  divine  action  would  be  no 
less  and  no  more  real  in  such  a  case,  than  it  is  in  all 
reproduction.  If  the  highest  forms  could  be  genealog- 
ically connected  with  the  lowest,  the  theist  would  find 
in  it  only  a  successive  'appearing  of  individuals,  each  of 
which  is  only  a  phenomenon,  or  else  is  ontologically 
distinct  from  every  other.  In  the  former  case,  the  in- 
dividual is  properly  nothing;  in  the  latter,  it  is  a  new 
factor.  In  truth,  a  reflective  theist  can  hardly  help  ad- 
mitting just  such  a  sequence  of  phenomena  as  the  evo- 
lutionist postulates.  He  must  allow  the  intellectual 
unity  of  the  system;  and  he  must  allow  that  the  purpose 
of  the  system  conditions  all  its  details,  whether  of  co- 
existence or  of  succession.  He  must,  therefore,  allow 
that  any  given  state  of .  the  system  logically  conditions 
its  subsequent  states,  so  that  a  complete  knowledge  of 
the  antecedents  would  involve  an  equally  complete 
knowledge  of  the  consequents,  provided,  always,  that 
the  conditioning  purpose  is  unchanged  in  all  respects. 
He  would  differ  from  the  materialistic  evolutionist  only 
in  denying  that  these  several  states  do  of  themselves 
dynamically  condition  succeeding  states.  The  logic  of 
the  system  is  of  itself  only  a  conception,  and  cannot 


310  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

realize  itself.  There  must  be  some  agent  or  agents  to 
whom  this  logic  is  law.  The  materialist  holds  that  the 
physical  elements  are  these  agents.  The  theist  teaches 
that  the  realizer  of  this  logic  is  the  all-embracing  God. 
The  development  of  the  system  is  but  the  unfolding  of 
a  divine  argument,  every  step  of  which  conditions  suc- 
ceeding steps.  But  as  premises  and  conclusion  fall 
hopelessly  asunder  without  the  unity  of  the  thinking 
mind,  so  premises  and  conclusion  in  the  world-process 
are  united  only  in  and  through  the  unity  of  the  divine 
activity.  We  decide  for  this  general  view  of  the  rela- 
tion of  God  and  the  world.  Whether  all  organic  forms 
have  a  common  genealogy  we  are  content  to  leave  to  the 
naturalists  to  decide.  The  question  is  entirely  without 
religious  or  philosophical  significance.  Hitherto  it  has 
been  so  infested  with  irreligious  implications,  and  by 
consequence  has  been  so  befumbled  by  the  irreligious 
rabble  who  were  more  anxious  to  be  disagreeable  to 
religion  than  to  find  the  truth,  that  it  has  been  well 
nigh  impossible  to  discuss  the  question  on  its  merits. 
Whether  new  factors  have  been  introduced  into  the 
system  in  connection  with  animal  life  depends  upon  the 
view  we  take  of  physical  life.  If  we  regard  it  as  a  func- 
tion of  the  elements,  or  as  a  peculiar  phase  of  divine 
activity,  there  is  no  such  introduction.  If  we  view  a 
living  thing  as  being  a  substantial  and  individual  agent 
which  is  the  ground  of  the  form  and  unity  of  the  organ- 
ism, then  we  must  hold  that  all  reproduction  is  attended 
by  creation.  In  only  one  case  can  we  get  behind  phe- 
nomena so  as  to  be  sure  that  there  is  any  thing  truly 
individual  and  abiding  behind  the  appearance.  This 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  311 

is  the  case  of  the  soul.  We  are  abiding  persons. 
Every  attempt  to  explain  mental  phenomena  as  the  re- 
sult of  a  plurality  of  elements,  fails  utterly.  The  con- 
ception of  a  unitary  and  abiding  soul,  is  the  only  one 
which  is  not  hopelessly  shattered  by  the  most  patent 
facts  of  consciousness.  In  the  other  cases  mentioned, 
the  known  facts  do  not  allow  a  positive  decision;  but  in 
this  case,  the  known  facts  compel  us  to  regard  the  soul 
as  a  new  factor  in  the  system.  It  is  not  introduced, 
however,  without  antecedents,  nor  without  regard  to  the 
character  of  the  antecedents.  On  the  contrary,  because 
of  the  unity  of  the  system,  the  antecedent  logically  de- 
termines both  the  consequent  and  its  character.  Hence 
the  facts  of  heredity.  To  the  question  whether  such 
new  factors  are  immortal  when  once  introduced,  only  a 
formal  answer  is  possible.  The  finite  begins  to  exist 
only  because  the  general  plan  of  the  system  calls  for  it. 
It  follows  that  its  existence  would  cease,  if  at  any  time 
its  significance  were  lost.  No  finite  thing  has  any  claim 
to  immortality  simply  in  its  right  as  substance. 

A  first  impression  will  doubtless  be  that  we  are  claim- 
ing a  large  and  intimate  knowledge  of  that  which  is 
essentially  unknowable;  but  this  impression,  though 
natural,  is  entirely  mistaken.  The  question  which  con- 
cerns every  theorist  is,  how  to  conceive  the  ground  of 
phenomena.  The  human  mind  cannot  help  forming 
-some  conception;  it  only  remains,  therefore,  that  the 
conception  be  adequate  and  self-consistent.  When  such 
a  conception  is  reached,  the  mind  has  done  all  that  it 
can  do  in  its  effort  to  grasp  reality.  Now,  as  we 


312  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

before  pointed  out,  every  scientific  hypothesis  is  but  an 
attempt  to  form  a  sufficient  conception  of  the  cause  of 
certain  facts.  The  chemist  displays  an  intimate  ac- 
quaintance with  the  composition  of  chemical  molecules, 
and  is  ready  to  write  the  most  elaborate  diagrams  of 
their  inner  constitution.  The  physicist  who  holds  the 
mechanical  theory  of  gases,  sees  amazing  atomic  storms 
with  his  mind's  eye.  But  these  and  similar  views  are 
only  the  conceptions  which  these  men  form  of  that 
which  lies  behind  phenomena;  and  we  might  say  of 
them,  as  well  as  of  the  theist,  that  they  display  a  pro- 
digious amount  of  knowledge  about  that  which  is  essen- 
tially unknowable.  The  theistic  conception,  therefore, 
cannot  be  discredited  by  any  such  suggestion  as  this. 
It  is  no  more  metaphysical  than  the  atheistic  conception. 
It  is  no  more  unscientific  than  the  atomic  theory.  It  is 
no  more  mysterious  than  the  materialistic  doctrine. 
The  theist's  only  claim  is,  that  no  other  conception  is 
adequate  to  the  facts.  He  admits  the  mystery  of  the 
divine  method  and  the  unsearchability  of  these  secret 
ways  of  God.  He  admits,  also,  that  the  all-conditioning 
purpose  of  the  system  can  at  present  be  only  faintly 
dreamed  of>  and  that  it  is  quite  impossible  to  see  how 
many  of  the  details  of  the  system  have  any  significance 
for  the  whole.  His  belief  that  they  have,  rests  upon 
his  faith  in  the  divine  intelligence;  and  inability  to  see 
a  meaning  does  not  prove  that  there  is  none.  But  on 
all  these  accounts  he  prefers  that  daily  science  should 
use  the  language  of  daily  life,  as  being  at  once  more 
compatible  with  reverence  arid  with  the  needs  of  phe- 
nomenal science.  But  when  he  leaves  the  phenomenal 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  313 

and  asks  for  an  ultimate  conception,  he  hesitates  not  to 
confess  his  belief  that  all  finite  being,  and  change,  and 
progress,  depend  upon  the  immanent  God. 

This  position  will  not  commend  itself  to  the  ossified 
mind.  After  all  deductions  are  made  from  the  empir- 
ical philosophy  as  a  complete  philosophy  of  mind,  it 
must  still  be  allowed,  that  as  a  philosophy  of  prejudice 
it  is  a  most  valuable  section  of  philosophical  study. 
The  ease  with  which  habits  of  thinking  are  mistaken 
for  laws  of  thought;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  com- 
plete opacity  of  the  sluggish  mind  to  a  new  idea,  re- 
ceive from  the  philosophy  of  prejudice  a  complete  ex- 
planation. The  habit  of  associating  being  and  matter 
leads  to  the  notion  that  all  being  must  be  material;  and 
such  mental  paralysis  is  even  paraded  as  proof  that 
spiritual  being  is  impossible,  even  in  conception.  And 
though  both  physics  and  metaphysics  unite  to  discredit 
the  vulgar  notion  of  substance,  still  the  typical  concep- 
tion of  being  is  that  of  a  lump.  The  tendency  of  most 
scientific  speculation  is  toward  a  pantheistic  conception, 
in  which  all  phenomena  are  but  passing  phases  of  the 
one;  but  still  our  conception,  though  similar  in  many 
points,  will  not  appear  any  less  objectionable  even  to  those 
who  hold  the  pantheistic  view.  In  particular,  it  will  be 
urged  th'it  we  have  made  a  wholesale  use  of  miracle, 
and  have  thereby  struck  at  the  root  of  all  science.  To 
the  latter  part  of  this  claim  we  reply  that  science  is  only 
one  of  many  interests,  and  must  never  assume  that  the 

* 

world  exists  solely  for  scientific  purposes.  The  men- 
tally one-eyed  scientist  perpetually  forgets  that  the  world 
may  have  a  higher  destiny  than  to  justify  his  calcula- 


314  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

tions.  It  is  conceivable,  without  any  great  mental 
strain,  that  it  should  exist  as  a  means  for  the  instruc- 
tion and  development  and  service  of  free  beings.  The 
objection  has  no  greater  force  here  than  against  the  doc- 
trine of  freedom.  Some  speculators  have  felt  justified 
in  denying  human  freedom  on  the  ground  that  it  would 
make  science  impossible.  The  order  of  things  would 
be  incessantly  modified,  and  the  calculations  would  be 
discredited.  But  this  is  sheer  cant,  which  has  mistaken 
itself  for  science.  A  general  phenomenal  constancy 
must  exist  to  make  a  rational  life  possible.  Any  thing 
beyond  this  the  scientist  must  regard  as  a  fortunate  cir- 
cumstance, not  as  a  necessity  of  any  sort.  Or  rather, 
we  may  say  that  the  uniformity  of  nature  which  science 
assumes  means  only  that  the  same  events  always  happen 
under  the  same  circumstances  ;  but  there  is  nothing 
in  this  principle  to  forbid  the  notion  that  human  and 
divine  will  may  be  of  the  determining  circumstances. 

Moreover,  science  need  only  assume  the  constancy  of 
phenomenal  laws.  As  soon  as  it  inquires  into  the  pro- 
duction of  phenomena,  it  becomes  speculation  and  not 
science.  As  to  the  charge  of  assuming  miracle,  the 
chief  difficulty  lies  in  the  coarse  deistic  conception  of 
miracle,  according  to  which  some  awful  figure  suddenly 
takes  shape  from  the  empty  air,  and  having  overturned 
all  the  laws  of  nature  within  reach,  retires  again  to 
some  supernal  region.  An  interference  is  represented  as 
taking  place  from  without,  as  if  some  terrible  hand  sud- 
denly appeared  and  wrenched  nature  out  of  its  course. 
But  when  these  vulgar  notions  are  abandoned,  there  is 
little  in  the  notion  of  miracle,  or  interference,  to  call 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  315 

for  opposition.  For  ourselves  we  do  not  hesitate  to 
allow  that  the  natural  is  a  constant  miracle,  and  that  all 
things  stand,  and  all  events  come  to  pass,  only  because 
}f  the  omnipresent  power  of  God.  But  this  notion  of 
miracle  demands  further  explanation.  A  man's  action 
can  be  modified  in  two  ways — either  by  external  force 
or  by  changing  his  mind.  In  like  manner,  social  forms 
may  be  changed,  either  by  violence  or  by  discussion  re- 
sulting in  opinions  other  than  those  on  which  the  given 
forms  rest.  The  modification  would  be  as  real  in  the 
latter  case  as  in  the  former,  and  vastly  more  abiding.  But 
there  would  be  the  great  difference,  that  in  the  one 
case  the  change  would  be  forced  upon  men  from  with- 
out, while  in  the  other  it  would  be  reached  through  the 
laws  of  the  mind  itself,  and  in  such  a  way  as  to  seem 
but  an  unfolding  of  the  mind's  own  nature.  Now  the 
current  conception  of  miracle  contemplates  only  the 
method  of  violence— a  working  against  nature  instead 
of  working  through  nature.  But  we  have  seen  that 
the  mechanism  of  the  universe  is  not  the  ultimate  fact, 
but  is  merely  the  expression  of  the  inner  nature  of 
things.  A  mechanical  system  of  changes  among  things 
is  but  the  translation  of  a  metaphysical  system  of 
changes  in  things.  The  latter  conditions  the  former 
and  determines  its  outcome.  But  this  inner  nature  of 
things  can  only  be  viewed  as  the  expression  of  the 
world-plan.  The  theist  must  hold  that  the  divine  pur- 
pose in  creation  contains  the  true  reason  why  anything 
is  as  it  is  in  any  of  its  relations,  and  why  events  occur  as 
they  do.  Below  the  realm  of  mechanical  necessity, 

there  is  a  realm  of  ends  which  condition  and  control 
21 


316  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

that  necessity.  Here  nature  is  fluid.  Here  are  the  roots 
of  nature.  Here  nature  appears,  not  as  an  independent 
something,  but  as  a  constant  flowing  forth  of  divine 
energy.  It  has  no  laws  of  its  own  which  oppose  a  bar  to 
the  divine  purpose,  but  all  its  laws  and  all  its  on-goings 
are  but  the  expressions  of  that  purpose.  In  our  dealings 
with  nature,  we  have  to  accommodate  ourselves  to  its 
laws;  but  we  are  not  to  think  of  such  a  relation  be- 
tween God  and  nature.  With  him  the  purpose  is  orig- 
inal, the  law  is  but  its  consequence.  Hence  even  the 
rigid  system  of  mechanical  necessity  is  itself  absolute- 
ly sensitive  to  the  divine  purpose,  so  that  what  the  di- 
vine purpose  demands,  finds  immediate  expression  and 
realization,  not  in  spite  of  the  system,  but  in  and 
through  the  system.  We  repeat,  that  nature  is  no  in- 
dependent power  over  against  God,  which  must  first 
be  conquered  before  it  can  be  modified ;  it  is  only  the 
divine  purpose  flowing  forth  into  realization.  The 
constancy  of  nature,  also,  must  be  viewed  as  founded 
not  in  some  mysterious  necessity,  but  solely  in  the  con- 
stancy of  the  divine  purposes.  We  do  not,  then,  re- 
gard the  supernatural  in  its  ordinary  working  as  break- 
ing through  phenomenal  laws  or  through  the  chain  of 
mechanical  necessity,  which  is  supposed  to  rule  in 
nature;  but  we  regard  it  as  founding  and  maintaining 
that  necessity  by  which  the  phenomenal  order  is  real- 
ized. While,  then,  we  maintain  in  its  strongest  form 
the  doctrine  of  a  divine  guidance  and  control  both  of 
the  world  and  of  the  individual  life,  we  also  regard  the 
common  conception  of  this  doctrine  as  very  crude  and 
superficial.  Both  those  who  assert  and  those  who  deny 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WOULD.  317 

are  equally  obnoxious  to  such  a  criticism;  their  con- 
ception of  control  and  ^  interference  being  that  of  ex- 
ternal violence  offered  to  a  self-dependent  system.  On 
the  contrary,  we  teach  no  breaks  in  the  phenomenal 
order,  or  in  the  mechanism  of  nature,  but  rather  that 
that  mechanism,  in  all  its  phases,  is  pliant  to  the  divine 
purpose,  and  is  but  an  expression  of  the  divine  purpose. 
We  have  a  faint  illustration  of  this  susceptibility 
in  our  human  modifications  of  nature.  The  concep- 
tion of  an  end,  accompanied  by  the  mental  state  called 
volition,  at  once  impresses  itself  upon  the  body,  so 
that  it  realizes  that  end.  We  cannot '  really  think 
that  any  thing  flows  out  of  the  soul  and  grasps  the 
nervous  system.  Even  the  sense  of  effort  and  strain 
attendant  upon  action,  is  in  fact  only  the  result  of  our 
volition  upon  the  organism.  The  will,  in  itself,  is  as 
boundless  as  the  conception;  and  if  there  were  no  re- 
flex action  from  the  body,  the  will  would  quickly  shat- 
ter it.  All  we  can  say  of  this  action  of  the  soul  on  the 
body  is,  that  the  system  .is,  such  that  volition  cannot 
exist  in  the  soul  without  finding  an  immediate  echo  in 
the  organism,  and  through  that,  in  external  nature  also, 
In  this  way,  the  face  of  the  earth  is  changed.  Mr. 
Marsh,  in  his  work,  "Man  and  Nature,"  has  shown 
that  human  volition  has  been  one  of  the  great  modi- 
fiers of  physical  events  in  our  earth.  If  we  should  read 
ba  "k  the  history  of  our  globe,  we  should  find,  of  course, 
th*  leading  features  quite  independent  of  human  voli- 
tion; but  we  should  also  find  a  multitude  of  details 
which  had  their  origin  in  human  thought  and  will. 
They  would  have  a  mechanical  explanation,  so  far  as 


318  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

mechanism  can  explain  any  thing;  and  at  the  same 
time  they  would  have  their  roots  below  mechanism. 
This  serves  to  illustrate  what  we  mean  by  speaking  of 
nature  as  absolutely  sensitive  to  the  divine  purpose.  It 
also  illustrates  how  "interferences"  and  new  begin- 
nings are  quite  compatible  with  unbroken  phenomenal 
order.  Every  believer  in  freedom  is  forced  to  hold 
that  the  physical  system  is  constantly  modified  from 
without,  and  that  it  was  intended  to  be  the  pliant, 
subtle  servant  of  mind.  There  are  many  details  which 
cannot  be  traced  back  to  the  nebula,  but  find  an  abso- 
lute beginning  in  man's  volition.  Beyond  that  point 
they  are  not  represented  by  any  thing.  We  believe 
in  a  similar  divine  working  in  the  world,  so  that  the 
system  of  things  is  constantly  taking  up  new  threads 
and  new  factors  which  enter  into  the  general  plan  of  the 
web  without  disturbance,  and  without  strangeness,  for 
each  such  new  factor  is  fitted  for  the  place  it  is  to  fill. 
In  the  same  way  we  think  of  a  constant  divine  guid- 
ance and  providence  which  descends  to  the  smallest 
details  of  the  individual  life  and  well-being.  Of  the 
truth  or  falsehood  of  such  a  belief  science  can  say 
nothing.  We  frequently  hear  it  announced  with  a 
great  flourish,  that  science  knows  nothing  of  a  divine 
control  in  nature;  that  every  thing  takes  place  by  in- 
variable sequence;  and  there  seems  to  be  a  general 
notion  that  such  a  remark  is  very  important,  both  in 
its  affirmation  and  in  its  denial.  In  fact  it  is  a  truism, 
and  owes  its  significance  entirely  to  mental  confusion. 
The  roots  of  phenomena  do  not  lie  behind  them  but 
beneath  them;  and  no  observation  can  ever  reveal 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  319 

how  phenomena  are  produced.  Unbroken  phenomenal 
order,  or  invariable  phenomenal  sequence,  is  entirely 
consistent  with  incessant  modification.  The  notion  that 
science  conflicts  with  the  doctrine  of  a  divine  providence 
is  sufficient  to  convict  one  of  hopeless  philosophical 
incompetency.  It  is  the  outcome  of  thoughtlessness 
which  has  degenerated,  into  cant.  No  observation  of 
human  action  would  reveal  a  controlling  mind.  So  far  as 
we  can  see,  the  antecedents  are  all  mechanical,  and  the 
sequence  is  invariable.  There  are  nerves,  and  bones, 
and  contracting  muscles,  whose  action  is  purely  mechan- 
ical, and  reveals  to  observation  no  trace  of  a  directing 
mind.  Now  if  one  should  get  so  confused  by  this  phys- 
ical mechanism  as  to  deny  the  existence  of  a  controlling 
mind,  he  would  do.  just  what  the  man  does  who,  from 
fumbling  among  the  invariable  phenomenal  sequences  of 
nature,  concludes  that  there  is  no  "interference,"  and 
that  prayer  is  useless.  Argument  of  this  kind  has 
become  very  common  of  late;  and  it  serves  to  mark 
the  philosophical  degeneracy  which  has  resulted  from 
an  exclusive  study  of  physical  science.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  belief  in  prayer  and  providence  can  never 
justify  itself  by  any  study  of  nature,  any  more  than  a 
belief  in  the  human  mind  can  justify  itself  by  an  in- 
spection of  nerves  and  muscles.  Nature  is  indifferent 
to  both  the  belief  arid  the  denial.  The  belief  must 
ba,ie  itself  on  general  inference  from  the  character  of 
God  and  from  the  general  drift  of  national  and  per- 
sonal history,  and  especially  on  revelation.  If  there  be 
any  facts  which  justify  such  a  belief,  there  is  abso- 
lutely nothing  to  discredit  it. 


320  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

But  it  may  be  urged  that  the  very  notion  of  mechan- 
ism is  hostile  to  interjections,  since  every  state  must 
determine  the  succeeding  state.  We  have  ourselves 
insisted  upon  this  factor  in  the  chapter  on  Mechanism 
and  Teleology,  and  have  drawn  divers  conclusions  from 
it.  But  this  position  is  true  only  for  an  absolute  or 
independent  mechanism;  and  the  drift  of  all  our  argu- 
ment has  been  to  show  that  the  mechanism  of  nature  is 
of  no  such  sort.  Neither  its  existence,  nor  its  laws,  nor 
any  of  its  circumstances- what  ever,  are  founded  in  any 
necessity,  but  solely  in  the  divine  purpose.  It  advances, 
also,  from  stage  to  stage  by  no  inherent  necessity,  but 
solely  as  the  unfolding  purposes  of  God  require  it.  In 
strictness,  then,  we  should  say  that  no  one  stage  condi- 
tions its  consequent,  but  all  stages  are  immediately  con- 
ditioned by  the  requirements  of  the  divine  plan.  Or  we 
may  reply  to  the  objection  from  another  stand-point. 
The  science  of  mechanics  assumes  its  forces,  and  the 
whole  of  theoretical  mechanics  consists  entirely  in  get- 
ting the  resultant  of  the  forces  assumed.  It  points  out 
that  giv*en  forces  must  have  a  certain  resultant,  but  the 
necessity  lies  not  in  the  forces  themselves,  but  in  their 
outcome  when  given.  Celestial  mechanics  assumes  at- 
traction and  the  constancy  of  its  law,  and  with  this 
outfit  it  can  demonstrate  that  certain  orbital  and  other 
motions  are  necessary  results  under  given  conditions. 
But  gravity  itself,  as  a  simple  fact,  is  quite  without  the 
range  of  this  necessity.  Yet  so  subtle  is  the  work  of  as- 
sociation, that  by  and  by  the  necessity  which  attaches  to 
the  conclusion  only  upon  the  assumed  truth  of  the  prem- 
ises, is  carried  over  to  the  premises  themselves,  and  then 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  321 

nature  is  said  to  be  bound  by  an  adamantine  fate.  But 
in  truth  this  "adamantine  fate"  is  based  much  more 
upon  blockheadism  than  upon  any  thing  else.  Indeed, 
necessity  has  a  clear  meaning  only  when  applied  to  the 
conclusions  from  given  premises,  or  to  the  results  from 
assumed  causes.  At  all  events,  it  has  only  this  meaning 
in  mechanics.  There  we  assume  forces  which  might 
conceivably  be  altogether  different  in  every  respect 
from  what  they  are,  and  then  we  determine  their  nec- 
essary resultant.  We  conclude  then,  (1)  that  the  viola- 
tion of  mechanical  necessity  can  only  mean  the  causing 
of  given  forces  to  have  a  different  resultant  from  their 
proper  one,  and  that  without  the  addition  of  any  new 
force.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  no  'believer  in  miracles  and 
providence  contemplates  any  such  performance.  We 
conclude,  (2)  that  it  is  erroneous  to  speak  of  mechanical 
necessity  as  ruling  in  nature.  The  forces  of  nature 
being  what  they  are,  the  results  must  be  what  they  are; 
in  any  other  sense  the  notion  is  without  foundation. 
Thus  once  again  it  appears  that  reality  of  things  is 
below  mechanism,  and  conditions  it.  But  this  condi- 
tioning reality  the  theist  must  regard  as  itself  con- 
ditioned by  the  divine  purpose.  Mechanism  belongs 
only  to  the  phenomenal,  and  can  never  conflict  with  the 
real.  There  is  nothing  whatever  in  the  true  notion  of 
mechanical  necessity  which  contradicts  the  absolute 
sensibility  of  the  system  to  the  divine  purpose.  For 
ourselves,  we  believe  in  both. 

With  regard  to  the  introduction  of  new  factors  into 
the  system  only  a  word  need  be  said.  We  regard  the 
universe  as  existing  in  God,  not  as  a  given  volume  in  a 


322  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

larger  volume,  but  as  constantly  depending  on  him,  and 
in  such  a  way  that  God  is  present  with  every  part.  We 
deny  that  space  is  for  him  a  limit  or  a  condition,  so  that 
to  reach  a  given  point  he  must  cross  over  an  intervening 
space.  Even  this  crude  notion  rules  popular  concep- 
tions. God  is  supposed  to  be  in  an  outside  region,  and 
the  existence  of  the  finite  is  not  only  figured  as  some- 
thing spatially  external,  but  is  supposed  to  be  secured 
only  by  being  outside  of  God.  But  our  discussions 
have  led  to  the  conclusion  that  the  infinite  is  truly  om- 
nipresent. Hence,  when  we  speak  of  new  factors  as 
being  introduced  into  the  system,  we  have  no  such 
coarse  imagination  as  if  God  had  first  made  a  soul  in 
some  extra-siderial  region,  and  then  carried  it  to  a  cer- 
tain point  and  put  it  into  a  body,  as  a  bird  is  put  into  a 
cage;  but  we  mean  that  where  and  when  the  order  of 
things  which  God  has  adopted  as  the  rule  of  his  action 
calls  for  it,  there  and  then  a  soul  begins  its  existence. 
If  other  factors  besides  souls  are  introduced  along  the 
line  of  events,  we  think  of  their  introduction  in  the 
same  general  way.  They  are  not  arbitrary.  They  are 
not  unrelated  to  their  surroundings,  but  are  in  every 
respect  what  the  laws  of  the  system  call  for. 

The  influence  of  association  in  our  daily  thinking  is 
so  much  greater  than  that  of  reason,  that  to  many  minds 
this  conception  will  seem  irredeemably  absurd.  Some 
who  have  been  accustomed  to  associate  being  only  with 
matter  will  appeal  to  the  five  senses  against  the  divine 
omnipresence.  That  this  view,  like  the  Copernican  as- 
tronomy, is  a  matter  of  reasoning  with  which  the  five 
senses  have  nothing  to  do,  will  be  an  impossible  insight 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.  323 

to  them.  Others,  again,  who  have  advanced  beyond 
this  crudest  stage,  and  who  have  been  accustomed  to 
talk  about  atoms  and  ethers,  will  still  find  this  concep- 
tion difficult,  because  they  have  not  been  used  to  think- 
ing of  the  divine  omnipresence.  They  will  talk  with 
the  greatest  ease  and  fluency  about  their  views  as  facts, 
and  discard  our  view  as  a  metaphysical  dream.  It  will 
certainly  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  to  convince  them 
that  one  theory  is  no  more  metaphysical  or  unscientific 
than  the  other,  and  that  it  is  purely  a  question  of  con- 
sistent thinking.  Others  again,  like  the  Spencerians, 
who  have  got  used  to  the  notion  of  an  omnipresent 
force,  will  find  grave  difficulty  in  conceiving  that  force 
as  intelligent;  and  having  totally  misconceived  what 
they  are  pleased  to  call  the  "  persistence  of  force,"  the 
notion  of  creation  will  be  especially  obnoxious.  Still 
others  will  appeal  to  common  sense  against  a  doctrine 
so  bizarre;  and  this  appeal  to  a  judge  without  jurisdic- 
tion will  pass  for  a  final  settlement.  To  all  such  the 
customary  is  the  clear,  and  clear  because  customary. 
Finally,  some  will  make  merry  over  some  aspects  of  the 
doctrine,  and  ask  of  what  great  value  many  of  these 
new  souls  are.  To  which  it  may  be  enough  to  say,  that 
none  of  us  have  such  supreme  worth  .as  to  make  it  safe 
to  press  this  question.  But  while  allowing  the  unsearch- 
ability  of  these  ways  of  God,  and  also  the  many  diffi- 
culties before  which  human  wisdom  is  dumb,  we  still 
claim  that  the  conception  we  have  presented  is  the  only 
one  adequat  e  to  the  facts.  Here  philosophy  must  adopt 
thi  apostle's  words,  and  say,  "  In  him  we  live,  and  move, 
and  have  our  being."  If  we  reject  this  view,  we  must 


524  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

adopt  some  form  of  deism,  or  materialism,  or  atheism, 
or  pantheism;  and  when  we  remember  the  difficulties 
and  implications  of  these  views,  we  decide  for  the  one 
we  have  presented  as  the  most  rational,  and  as  attended 
with  fewest  difficulties. 

We  may  sum  up  the  results  of  this  discussion  as  fol- 
lows: Creation  is  successive  rather  than  single.  The 
divine  plan  contains  the  reason  why  any  thing  is  as  it 
is,  and  the  divine  will  is  the  source  of  all  finite  exist- 
ence. The  finite  has  no  ground  of  being  in  itself,  but 
is  absolutely  and  always  dependent  upon  the  divine  will 
and  purpose.  With  the  exception,  therefore,  of  the 
free  will,  it  is  not  to  be  thought  of  as  offering  in  any 
way  a  barrier  to  the  divine  working,  since  it  is  but  a 
form  of  the  divine  working.  It  cannot  be  our  purpose, 
however,  to  represent  this  conception  to  the  fancy,  or 
in  any  way  to  construe  the  methods  of  the  divine  mind. 
Has  God  always  created?  How  comes  he  to  create? 
To  these  and  similar  questions  there  is  no  satisfactory 
answer.  Here  all  human  wisdom  is  at  an  end,  and 
silence  rather  than  speech  is  true  wisdom.  ISTo  more  is 
it  our  purpose  to  picture  the  relation  of  the  human  and 
the  divine  personality.  There  is  great  fascination  in 
this  problem  for  mystical  minds.  Is  God  a  person  over 
against  us,  as  a  finite  person  is  over  against  us  ?  Or  is 
there  a  unity  and  identity  in  the  former  case  which 
does  not  exist  in  the  latter?  Is  our  thought  a  condi- 
tioned divine  thought?  Is  our  love  for  God,  as  Spi- 
noza said,  but  the  love  with  which  God  loves  himself  ? 
Such  questions  have  a  value  for  devout  feeling;  and  as 


DELATION  OF  GOD  TO  THE  WORLD.         .      325 

long  as  the  New  Testament  declares  that  we  are  the 
temples  of  the  Holy  Spirit,  and  heirs  with  Christ  of 
God,  they  cannot  be  charged  with  irreverence.  But 
they  admit  of  no  theoretical  answer.  Such  a  feeling  of 
union  with  the  divine,  or  such  a  longing  after  commun- 
ion with  the  divine,  will  always  serve  to  stimulate 
thought,  but  it  can  never  do  the  work  of  thought;  and 
thought  is  obliged  to  rest  content  with  affirming  the 
human  and  the  divine  personality  as  two  facts,  whose 
connection  is  lost  in  mystery. 


326  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

THE   RELATION   OF   GOD   TO   TRUTH  AND   RIGHTEOUSNESS. 


/^VlJR  previous  discussions  have  led  us  to  the  convic- 
tion that  God  is  one,  personal,  omnipresent,  eternal, 
and  independent.  The  meaning  of  the  first  two  attri- 
butes is  clear;  that  of  the  third  and  fourth  needs  a 
word  of  explanation.  The  notion  of  the  divine  omni- 
presence has  two  factors.  The  first  is  the  thought  of 
the  immediate  presence  of  God  with  all  finite  reality. 
The  second  is  negative.  We  finite  beings  are  limited 
in  our  immediate  presence,  so  that  to  reach  most  things 
we  have  to  pass  over  more  or  less  of  intervening  space, 
or  to  use  some  medium  of  influence.  This  necessity  we 
feel  as  a  limitation.  Now  when  we  teach  the  divine 
omnipresence,  there  is  the  double  purpose,  (1)  to  affirm 
the  immediate  presence  of  God  with  all  things,  and, 
(2)  to  deny  totally  this  limitation.  God  has  not  to 
cross  a  space  to  reach  a  given  point,  or  to  employ  any 
foreign  means  of  connection;  but  at  every  point  he  is 
present  as  the  living  God.  It  is  not  in  our  thought  to 
affirm  a  bulk  of  God,  as  if  he  filled  infinite  space  with 
an  infinite  volume.  Such  a  conception  of  omnipresence 
is  only  the  crude  attempt  of  the  imagination,  and  has 
no  value  for  reflective  thought.  In  like  manner  the 
doctrine  of  the  divine  eternity  is  as  much  negative  as 
positive.  We  feel  time,  also,  as  a  limitation.  We  are 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  327 

not  sufficient  to  ourselves.  We  weary,  grow  old,  and 
pass  away.  The  chief  aim  in  ascribing  eternity  to  God 
is  the  negation  of  these  limits  which  we  find  in  time. 
The  thought  of  eternity  as  simply  filling  out  infinite 
time  by  an  infinite  duration  is  a  product  of  the  fantasy 
rather  than  of  the  reason.  But  it  is  not  our  purpose  f  o 
dwell  upon  these  points.  The  other  attribute,  that  of 
independence,  contains  a  question  of  much  speculative 
interest — the  relation  of  God  to  truth.  He  is  Independ- 
ent of  things,  but  is  he  independent  of  truth?  He 
founds  and  creates  the  world  of  things?  does  he  also 
create  the  system  of  rational  principles  ?  What  is  the 
meaning  of  the  divine  independence,  or  absoluteness? 
The  same  question  also  appears  in  the  theological  dis- 
cussions concerning  the  divine  omnipotence.  Is  om- 
nipotence only  the  greatest  of  possible  powers,  or  is  it 
truly  unconditioned  power?  Can  it  do  all  things,  or 
only  the  doable?  Can  it  make  the  impossible  possible, 
and  conversely?  or  are  the  bounds  of  the  possible  de- 
termined by  some  bottomless  necessity,  to  which  even 
God  must  submit?  The  same  question  appears  in 
moral  discussions.  Does  God  make  the  right,  or  only 
recognize  it  ?  If  he  makes  the  right,  then  he  is  himself 
above  right;  but  in  the  other  case  we  seem  to  trespass 
on  the  divine  independence,  in  that  we  set  up  a  stand- 
ard which  is  independent  of  him,  and  which  he  must 
recognize.  Indeed,  to  think  about  God  at  all  seems  a 
limitation;  for  that  implies  that  the  laws  of  thought 
and  the  forms  of  our  conception  are  valid  for  the  abso- 
lute. Without  this  assumption,  all  possibility  of  con- 
ceiving any  thing  whatever  about  the  absolute  falls 


328  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

away;  but  with  it,  we  seem  to  imply  that  logical  and 
rational  necessity  binds  even  God  himself.  The  prob- 
lem in  this  discussion  is  to  find  the  most  satisfactory 
conception  on  this  point,  or  the  conception  which,  while 
satisfying  the  laws  of  thought,  shall  conserve  at  once 
the  independence  of  God,  and  the  absolute  character  of 
truth  and  righteousness. 

Our  experience  can  hardly  fail  to  mislead  us  on  this 
point.  We  have  previously  spoken  of  our  minds  as 
recognizing  truth,  not  making  it.  Certainly  truth  pre- 
sents itself  in  our  experience  as  independent  of  our- 
selves. It  is  impersonal  and  universal.  It  has  no  past 
and  no  future,  but  simply  is.  It  is  neither  yours  nor 
mine.  We  discover  it  or  admit  it,  but  undiscovered  or 
unadmitted  it  is  none  the  less  true.  When  a  new  fact 
or  law  is  discovered,  truth  is  not  extended,  but  knowl- 
edge is  increased.  To  us,  therefore,  it  seems  like  a 
self-centered  kingdom,  secure  against  all  attack  and 
overthrow.  It  suffers  no  dictation;  on  the  contrary,  it 
is  law-giving  for  reality  itself.  Righteousness,  also,  has 
equal  independence  in  our  experience.  It  is  an  absolute 
imperative  which  may  be  ignored  or  resisted,  but  can- 
not be  changed.  The  suggestion  that  it  can  be  made,  or 
even  tampered  with,  is  sure  to  arouse  the  indignation 
of  the  common  conscience.  The  laws  of  righteousness 
must  be  the  same  for  God  as  for  man;  and  if  his  gov- 
ernment can  be  vindicated  only  by  claiming  that  the 
divine  righteousness  is  different  in  principle  from  hu- 
man righteousness,  why,  then,  his  government  is  not 
righteous  in  the  only  intelligible  sense  of  the  word. 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  329 

To  call  it  righteous,  meaning  by  that  word  x,  and  not 
what  men  understand  by  it  in  daily  life,  is  weakness  or 
knavery.  This  character  of  truth  and  righteousness  in 
our  experience  is  well  fitted  to  make  us  overlook  the 
fact  that  their  relation  to  God  cannot  be  the  same  as  it 
is  to  us.  If  they  Were  really  creatures,  they  would  still 
have  the  same  objective  character  to  the  finite  mind 
which  they  have  in  our  experience. 

Still  more  misleading  is  the  persistent  tendency  to 
take  abstractions  for  things,  which  is  so  marked  a  feat- 
ure of  the  human  mind.  We  need  not  go  back  to  the 
scholastics  for  illustrations.  Such  phrases  as  natural 
law,  or  the  reign  of  law,  are  excellent  examples.  The 
bulk  of  the  statements  into  which  such  phrases  enter, 
assume  that  law  is  a  real  sovereign,  enthroned  no  one 
knows  exactly  where,  probably  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Plato's  ideas,  but  at  all  events  actually  regnant  over 
reality.  If  any  thing  happens,  it  is  in  obedience  to  law. 
If  any  thing  is  to  be  explained,  law  is  the  magic  word 
which  makes  all  clear.  Many  who  would  guard  them- 
selves against  this  hypostasis  of  an  abstraction  in  the 
case  of  derived  phenomenal  laws,  would  still  fall  a  prey 
to  it  in  the  case  of  the  laws  of  motion.  They  must  cer- 
tainly be  held  as  determining  all  space-changes  by  an 
inherent  necessity  which  cannot  be  infringed.  Nothing 
is  easier,  as  nothing  is  more  common,  than  to  regard 
these  laws  as  primal  necessities  which  material  things, 
at  least,  cannot  but  obey.  And  just  as  these  laws  are 
hypostatized,  and  reality  is  made  subject  to  them,  so 
also  rational  and  ethical  truths  are  erected  into  a  realm 
of  necessity  which  would  exist  if  all  reality  were  away. 


330  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

Nevertheless,  a  little  reflection  will  convince  us,  at  least 
in  the  case  of  natural  laws,  that  we  here  fall  a  prey  to 
our  own  abstractions.     No  law  of  nature  is  the  ante- 
cedent, but  the  consequent,  of  reality.     The  so-called 
laws  of  attraction  and  repulsion  are  but  results  of  the 
inner  nature  of  things.     Their  rate  of  variation,  also,  is 
but  a  result  of  what  the  things  are.     Even  the  laws  of 
motion  are  far  enough  from  being  either  rational  or 
ontological  necessities.     They  are  but  the  outcome  of 
the  nature  of  material  things,  which  might  conceivably 
have  been  altogether  different.     This  is  palpably  the 
case  with  the  more  complex  derived  laws.     Instead  of 
expressing  what  things  must  be,  they  only  reveal  what 
things  are.     All  natural  laws,  then,  must  be  regarded 
as  consequences  of  reality,  and  never  as  its  foundation. 
Still,  so  easily  do  we  mistake  abstractions  for  things, 
that  after  we  have  abstracted  the  law  from  the  action 
of  things,  we  next  regard  the  things  as  the  subjects,  if 
not  the  products,  of  the  laws  which  they  themselves 
underlie.     It  is  only  one  step  more  on  the  same  road  to 
regard  these  laws  as  existing  before  all  reality  as  the 
expressions  of  some  all-controlling  necessity.     When 
reality  appears,  it  has  nothing  to  do  but  to  fall  into  the 
forms  which  these  sovereign  laws  prescribe.     Thus  the 
cause  is  made  subject  to  the  effect,  and  reality  is  ex- 
plained as  the  result  of  its  own  consequences. 

Many  would  allow  this  criticism  with  regard  to  natu- 
ral law,  who  would  still  insist  that  truth  is  independent 
of  reality,  and  law-giving  for  it.  Nevertheless,  we  hold 
that  the  notion  of  a  realm  of  truth  independent  of  real- 
ity, is  just  as  empty  as  the  notion  of  a  realm  of  law  in 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  331 

the  void.     Both  notions  are  abstractions  mistaken  for 
facts.     For  what  is  truth  in  this  connection  ?     It  can- 
not mean  a  truth  of  fact,  for  such  truth  depends  upon 
the  fact  itself,  and  comes  and  goes  with  it.     By  truth, 
then,  we  can  only  mean  rational  and  formal  truth,  that 
is,  the  laws  of  thought  and  the  formal  sciences  of  logic 
and  mathematics.     So,  also,  by  right  we  cannot  mean 
any  specific  form  of  action,  because  particular  duties 
depend  entirely  upon  the  particular  circumstances.     We 
can  only  mean  the  ethical  principles  of  love  and  justice 
which  underlie  all  specific  action.     Truth,  then,  as  we 
now  use  it,  is  sometimes  called  eternal  truth,  to  indicate 
its  unchangeability  and  independence;  and  the  claim  is 
ventured  that  if  God  and  the  world  were  both  away,  this 
truth  would  continue  to  exist.     But  the  eternal  truths 
express  only  fundamental  laws  of  mental  action  or  for- 
mal relations  between  ideas;  and  to  affirm  their  univer- 
sality can  only  mean  that  these  laws  are  valid  for  all 
mental  action,  and  that  these  relations  always  exist  be- 
tween the  appropriate  ideas.    But  these  truths  are  utter- 
ly meaningless,  apart  from  a  mind  whose  law  they  ex- 
press.   For  example,  truths  of  number  do  not  exist  apart 
from-  the  mind.    They  express  the  methods  of  the  mind 
in  grasping  a  multitude  of  units.     Apart  from  mind, 
number  and  series  cannot  exist ;  both  break  up  into  unre- 
lated units.    When  one  speaks  of  truth  as  valid,  even  in 
the  void,  he  curiously  fails  to  see  that  his  conception  of 
the  void  is  only  a  conception,  and  that  he  is  himself  pres- 
ent with  all  his  ideas  and  laws  of  thought.     And  when 
along  with  his  conception  of  the  void  he  also  has  other 

conceptions,  and  finds  that  the  customary  relations  be- 
22 


332  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

tween  them  continue  to  exist,  he  fancies  that  he  has  tru- 
ly conceived  the  void,  and  has  found  that  the  laws  of 
thought  would  be  valid,  if  all  reality  should  vanish.  But 
in  every  such  case,  the  void  is  only  a  thought;  and  the 
mysterious  necessity  reached  is  only  the  necessity  of 
thought.  The  whole  art  of  finding  out  what  would  be 
true  in  the  void,  consists  in  asking  what  is  now  true  for 
the  thinking  mind.  The  true  void  would  be  the  indis- 
tinguishable nothing;  and  the  ideal  distinctions  of  truth 
and  error,  right  and  wrong,  possible  and  impossible, 
would  have  no  meaning,  to  say  nothing  of  application. 
But  as  a  realm  of  truth  apart  from  reality  is  only  an 
empty  abstraction,  we  must  allow  that  all  truth,  both 
speculative  and  ethical,  is  but  a  consequence  of  funda- 
mental being.  The  true,  the  right,  the  possible,  are 
founded  in  the  nature  of  things.  The  converse  propo- 
sition is  an  attempt  to  comprehend  reality  as  the  prod- 
uct of  its  own  consequences. 

Here  the  defender  of  the  absolute  independence  of 
truth  may  say  that  he  does  not  insist  upon  a  realm  of 
truth  and  necessity  apart  from  being,  but  in  being;  but 
this  changes  the  expression  more  than  the  meaning. 
For  these  necessary  truths  must  either  found  the  nature 
of  being,  or  be  founded  in  it.  The  former  conception 
is  empty;  the  latter  must  be  adopted.  We  cannot,  then, 
subject  the  being  to  the  necessity  which  it  founds.  The 
attempt  to  find  something  more  fundamental  than  the 
real,  and  to  subject  the  real  to  the  necessary,  is  not 
based  upon  clear  thought.  It  finds  one  of  its  most 
striking  illustrations  in  the  old  cosmological  argument 
for  the  divine  existence.  This  argument  concluded  from 


EEL  ATI  ON  OF  GOL  TO  TRUTH.  333 

contingent  being  to  necessary  being;  and  the  doctrine 
was,  that  fundamental  being  is  necessary  being.  The 
scanty  truth  in  this  argument  is  simply  an  analytical 
judgment.  It  is  the  conclusion  from  dependent  being 
to  independent  being;  but  as  these  are  strictly  correla- 
tive notions,  the  one  implies  the  other.  For  the  rest, 
the  argument  is  untenable.  In  speaking  of  mechanical 
necessity,  we  pointed  out  that  the  necessity  lies  in  the 
resultant  of  given  forces,  but  not  in  the  forces  them- 
selves; and  that  the  necessity  attributed  to  the  forces 
is  but  the  result  of  habit  uncorrected  by  criticism.  So 
here  from  the  notion  of  dependent  being,  we  necessarily 
conclude  to  the  notion  of  independent  being;  and  then 
by  a  transposition  very  easy  to  make,  we  pass  from  the 
necessity  of  affirming  such  being,  to  consider  the  neces- 
sity as  an  attribute  of  the  being  itself.  The  necessary 
affirmation  of  existence  is  changed  into  the  affirmation 
of  necessary  existence.  That  this  conclusion  is  in  ex- 
cess of  the  premises,  is  plain;  for  the  reality  of  the  de- 
pendent can  only  justify  the  conclusion  of  the  reality  of 
the  independent.  Moreover,  it  is  hard  to  say  what 
necessity  would  mean  in  this  case,  beyond  the  self -suf- 
ficiency of  the  real.  As  we  pointed  out  in  the  previous 
chapter,  necessity  has  a  clear  meaning  only  when  ap- 
plied to  the  conclusions  from  assumed  premises,  or  to 
the  resultants  of  assumed  causes.  When  applied  to 
being,  it  is  hard  to  see  in  what  it  increases  the  notion 
of  the  fundamental  reality.  The  ground  of  this  doc- 
trine, however,  is  evident.  Speculators,  misled  by  the 
changes  of  phenomena,  and  probably  also  by  their  own 
feelings  of  weariness,  have  thought  that  the  simply  real 


334  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

might  not  be  able  to  maintain  itself,  and  thus  might  go 
off  in  a  puff,  or  might  fade  and  flicker  out.  It  would, 
therefore,  be  a  great  relief  to  our  feelings  if  we  fancy 
some  inexorable  necessity  in  the  real  against  which  real- 
ity may  lean.  Hence  the  notion  of  God  as  the  necessary 
being;  and  hence,  also,  the  attempt  to  introduce  de- 
grees of  comparison  into  the  notion  of  being,  such  as 
the  ens  realissimum  of  the  earlier  speculators.  But 
while  the  attempt  is  easily  explained,  it  is  perfectly 
futile.  No  momentum  of  thought  will  ever  logically 
carry  us  beyond  the  affirmation  of  the  independent  and 
the  real.  The  bottom  fact  of  the  universe  is  not  a  ne- 
cessity of  any  sort,  but  an  unconditioned,  self -centered 
reality,  which  by  its  existence  founds  necessity  and 
truth,  and  gives  them  all  their  meaning. 

Here  it  may  occur  to  some  that  this  position  is  like 
that  of  Mr.  Mill  about  other  worlds,  where  two  and  two 
make  five.  If  we  make  truth  and  right  the  consequences 
of  being,  instead  of  its  foundation,  then  it  follows  that 
both  would  be  different  if  being  were  changed.  Thus 
the  absoluteness  of  truth  and  right  is  destroyed  as  much 
as  by  Mill's  doctrine.  We  reply:  Mill's  doctrine  based 
truth  solely  on  individual  experience,  and  denied,  there- 
fore, any  universal  rationality.  We,  on  the  contrary, 
base  truth  not  on  the  nature  or  experience  of  the 
finite  individual,  but  on  the  nature  of  the  one  all-em- 
bracing reality;  and  hence  we  affirm  a  universal  and 
consistent  rationality  for  all  beings.  The  claim  that  if 
fundamental  being  were  different  from  what  it  is  truth 
would  be  different,  is  quite  empty;  for  it  merely  says 
that  if  every  thing  were  absolutely  otherwise  nothing 


EEL  A TION  OF  GOD  TO  TR UTH.  335 

Would  be  as  it  is.  It  is  a  purely  formal  statement  with 
no  thought  corresponding  to  it.  Our  conception  of 
reality  is  built  up  from  rational  elements;  and  without 
them,  the  notion  is  a  pure  negation.  But  reality  exists, 
and  the  laws  of  rationality  which  it  founds.  It  is,  then, 
needless  to  ask  what  would  be  true  if,  unfortunately, 
reality  did  not  exist,  or  did  not  exist  as  it  does. 

We  regard  God,  then,  as  the  foundation  of  truth  and 
right.  This  view  must  be  carefully  distinguished  from 
the  notion  that  God  can  either  make  or  unmake  truth 
and  right.  The  latter  view  is  speculatively  as  erroneous 
as  the  view  which  makes  truth  independent  of  God, 
while  morally  it  is  unutterably  pernicious.  We  shall, 
perhaps,  make  our  own  conception  clearer  by  an  exami- 
nation of  these  opposing  views.  The  one  asserts  the 
divine  absoluteness  with  regard  to  both  speculative  and 
ethical  truth;  the  other  affirms  that  the  laws  of  truth 
and  right  are  sovereign,  even  over  God.  As  two  dis- 
tinguished philosophical  representatives  of  the  respect- 
ive views  we  name  Descartes  and  Leibnitz. 

According  to  Descartes,  all  truth  and  right  depends 
upon  the  arbitrary  will  of  God.  God  is  absolute,  and 
makes  truth  and  right.  In  this  affirmation  he  has  been 
joined  by  many  philosophers  and  theologians.  The  de- 
fenders of  this  view,  however,  are  far  from  making  com- 
mon  cause  with  the  skeptics  who  declare  truth  and  just- 
ice to  be  matters  of  custom  and  prejudice.  The  Greek 
sophists  held  this  view;*  and  at  a  comparatively  recent 
period,  Hobbes  taught  that  positive  law  was  the  source 

*  See  Plato's  "  Thesetetus  and  Gorgias  "  for  an  exposition  of  this 
doctrine. 


336  STUDIES  JN  THEISM. 

of  all  right  and  justice.  But  the  Cartesians  and  others 
who  have  viewed  truth  as  created  by  God,  held  no  such 
doctrines.  Their  chief  aim,  of  course,  was  to  assert  the 
absolute  independence  of  God;  although  the  view  has 
sometimes  been  held  from  polemical  reasons.  Sundry 
obnoxious  theological  dogmas  have  sometimes  been  de- 
fended on  the  ground  that  justice  in  God  is  not  what  it 
is  in  man,  but  is  purely  the  creature  of  the  divine  will. 
This  doctrine  of  divine  arbitrariness  is  often  held  by 
the  unthinking,  because  arbitrary,  lawless  power  is  the 
highest  conception  they  can  form.  Finding  both  reason 
and  right  irksome  in  their  own  experience,  they  take  a 
kind  of  revenge  by  placing  God  above  them.  But 
these  cases  are  of  value  only  to  the  mental  and  moral 
pathologist.  We  confine  our  attention  to  the  philo- 
sophical aspects  of  the  question. 

Curiously  enough,  Descartes,  at  the  very  beginning  of 
his  system,  employs  an  argument  for  the  divine  exist- 
ence which  directly  contradicts  his  own  position.  That 
argument  is  made  to  turn  upon  the  divine  veracity,  which, 
it  is  said,  would  be  compromised  if  our  faculties  should 
deceive  us;  and  this,  in  turn,  would  compromise  the 
divine  perfection.  But  if  any  thing  which  God  wills  is 
right  on  that  account,  it  is  plain  that  this  argument  falls 
to  the  ground.  The  theologian  who  holds  the  same 
view,  commits  a  like  inconsistency  when  he  attempts  to 
justify  the  ways  of  God;  for  such  justification  can  only 
take  the  form  of  showing  that  God  is  just  as  we  con- 
ceive justice.  But  by  hypothesis  God  is  not  just  as  we 
conceive  justice,  and  further,  whatever  he  does  is  just 
on  that  account.  A  justification,  then,  is  both  unneces- 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  337 

sary  and  impossible.  Moreover,  even  the  positive  state- 
ment that  God  can  make  truth  and  right  fails  to  say 
what  is  meant,  but  rather  results  in  just  the  opposite. 
To  affirm  God's  independence  of  truth  is  equally  to  af- 
firm that  truth  is  independent  of  God.  The  statement 
that  God  is  perfectly  arbitrary  with  regard  to  truth, 
assumes  that  truth  exists  apart  from  the  divine  volition ; 
for  if  truth  had  not  a  fixed  meaning  on  its  own  account, 
the  arbitrary  will  which  is  supposed  to  act  upon  it 
would  have  no  object.  So,  too,  the  statement  that  God 
makes  truth  is  equally  unintelligible  without  assuming 
that  truth  has  a  meaning  apart  from  the  act  which  cre- 
ated it.  For  why  should  the  product  of  that  act  be 
called  truth  rather  than  error,  unless  it  agree  with  cer- 
tain standards  of  truth,  with  which  error  disagrees? 
To  object  to  this  test,  is  to  declare  both  truth  and  error 
to  be  only  subjective  distinctions  without  any  validity  in 
fact;  but  this  would  be  an  utter  abandonment  of  the 
absoluteness  of  truth  with  which  we  set  out.  The  ques- 
tion, then,  Can  God  make  the  false  true  ?  assumes  that 
true  and  false  already  have  a  definite  meaning  and 
measure.  If  the  two  notions  were  not  sharply  and 
clearly  distinguished,  there  could  be  no  question  about 
changing  one  into  the  other.  Hence,  all  such  statements 
as  that  God  can  make  the  false  true  or  the  impossible 
possible,  imply  that  the  standard  of  truth  and  possibili- 
ty exists  independently  of  God.  Thus  they  affirm  the 
very  thing  they  were  meant  to  deny,  namely,  that  truth 
is  not  a  creature  of  the  divine  will.  Without  some 
valid  standard  of  truth  and  possibility,  we  cannot  dis- 
tinguish between  true  and  false,  possible  and  impos- 


338  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

sible;  and  hence  the  affirmation  that  God  is  independent 
of  truth,  cancels  itself. 

The  view  which  we  have  been  considering  is  often 
put  negatively,  in  the  claim  that  God  can  unmake  or 
break  truth,  but  it  is  just  as  inconsistent  as  the  positive 
form  of  the  doctrine.  For  in  order  that  truth  shall  be 
broken,  it  must  first  exist  as  truth.  If  any  proposition 
which  is  to  be  overturned,  say  the  law  of  identity  or  a 
mathematical  equation,  were  not  in  itself  true,  there 
would  be  no  truth  to  break.  For  example,  we  say  that 
a  straight  line  is  the  shortest  distance  between  two 
points;  and  we  think  that  we  have  therein  a  truth 
which  is  self-supporting  and  infrangible.  Now,  if  we 
suppose  God  overturning  this  proposition,  he  cannot  be 
said  to  make  it  false  unless  it  were  first  true.  The 
proposition  that  a  curved  line  is  the  shortest  distance 
between  two  points  cannot  be  made  false,  for  it  is  false. 
Or,  suppose  the  •  purpose  is  to  overthrow  the  law  of 
causation;  can  God  make  events  come  to  pass  without 
a  cause?  Here,  again,  the  inner  contradiction  is  evi- 
dent; for  we  are  forced  to  assume  God  as  causing 
events  to  come  to  pass  without  a  cause.  Thus  we  come 
back  again  to  the  point  that  to  make  truth  a  creature 
of  the  divine  volition  is  not  only  an  impossible  concep- 
tion, but  it  breaks  down  through  its  self-contradiction. 
It  does  not  escape  the  dualism  of  referring  truth  to 
some  other  source  than  reality;  and  in  this  respect  it 
becomes  identical  with  the  opposite  view.  This  dual- 
ism can  be  escaped  only  by  declaring  that  for  God 
there  is  no  truth  and  no  error. '  He  is  absolute  arbitra- 
riness, for  which  thought  has  no  laws  and  consistency 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  339 

no  obligation.  In  that  case,  truth  and  error  would  be 
only  the  fictions  of  our  own  minds.  But  this  -view, 
again,  overshoots  its  mark;  for  the  aim  of  those  who 
insist  upon  the  divine  independence  is  not  to  make  God 
without  truth  or  righteousness,  but  to  make  him  their 
creator.  Thereby  they  think  to  exalt  even  more  his 
absolute  truth  and  goodness ;  for  as  truth  and  goodness 
are  the  most  august  and  reverend  facts  of  the  universe, 
their  creator  must  be  all  the  more  glorious.  Unfortu- 
nately this  view,  by  its  inner  dialectic,  passes  over  into 
a  denial  of  both  truth  and  goodness.  While,  then,  we 
are  in  full  sympathy,  with  the  motive  which  underlies 
the  attempt  to  make  God  independent  of  truth,  we  are 
forced  to  admit  that  the  common  statement,  instead  of 
reaching  its  end,  overthrows  itself. 

The  claim,  on  the  other  hand,  that  truth  and  right 
are  independent  of  God,  saves,  indeed,  their  absolute- 
ness, but  only  at  the  expense  of  the  divine  independ- 
ence. Here,  also,  the  motive  is  good,  but  the  thought 
is  unclear.  We  have  already  considered  the  abstract 
form  of  this  doctrine,  and  content  ourselves  with  exam- 
ining a  concrete  illustration  of  it.  According  to  Leib- 
nitz, truth  does  not  exist  as  a  necessity  outside  of  God, 
but  it  exists  as  a  necessity  within  the  divine  mind.  To 
the  divine  intelligence  all  truth  is  present  as  a  series  of 
eternal  possibilities.  As  such  they  are  recognized  by 
God,  but  not  created.  They  have  their  foundation  in  the 
eternal  nature  of  reason,  and  can  be  neither  made  nor 
unmade.  Logical  sequence  is  unbreakable  even  by  om- 
nipotence. To  the  charge  that  this  is  an  encroachment 
upon  omnipotence,  the  answer  is,  that  power  has  no  re- 


340  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

lation  to  truth.  They  belong  to  totally  different  realms, 
and  can  never  collide.  Accordingly,  in  discussing  the 
origin  of  the  world  and  the  problem  of  evil,  Leibnitz 
claimed  that  all  possible  systems  existed  in  the  divine 
mind,  each  of  which  must  logically  lead  to  one  certain 
outcome.  It  was  not,  then,  in  the  divine  choice  to  de- 
termine the  results  of  a  given  system;  this,  as  a  matter 
of  logic,  was  independent  of  the  divine  volition.  In  a 
given  system  every  thing  results  with  strict  logical  ne- 
cessity, and  nothing  could  be  changed  without  contra- 
dicting the  system.  Thus,  in  mathematics  every  detail 
flows  with  necessity  from  the  axioms  and  intuitions  at 
the  base;  and  not  even  the  most  unimportant  corollary 
in  the  remotest  regions  of  mathematics  could  be  denied, 
provided  it  were  rightly  deduced,  without  dragging  the 
whole  science  down  into  ruin.  Leibnitz  conceived  a 
similar  relation  to  exist  between  all  the  parts  of  the 
real  system.  The  whole  conditions  the  parts  no  more 
than  the  parts  condition  the  whole.  God,  then,  has 
nothing  to  do  with  determining  the  consequences  of  a 
system,  or  with  the  logical  possibility  of  a  system.  An 
infinite  number  of  systems  are  possible,  and  their  con- 
sequences are  all  determined.  All  that  God  can  do  is  to 
determine  which  of  these  possible  systems  he  will  real- 
ize. It  belongs  not  to  him  to  set  the  bounds  of  possi- 
bility, but  only  to  realize  that  which,  apart  from  him- 
self, is  eternally  possible.  In  choosing  between  the 
possibles,  God  is  guided  by  the  conception  of  a  good; 
and  that  system  will  be  realized  whose  outcome  is  the 
best  possible.  Where  there  is  infinite  goodness  to 
prompt,  infinite  wisdom  to  foresee,  and  infinite  power 


DELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  341 

to  execute,  the  best  course  must  be  taken.  Optimism 
is  an  a  priori  necessity  of  Leibnitz's  system — a  fact 
which  critics  have  commonly  failed  to  notice.  They 
have  thought  it  relevant  to  insist  upon  the  evil  in  the 
world,  as  if  Leibnitz  ever  dreamed  of  denying  it.  He 
claimed  only  that  the  system,  taken  as  a  whole,  both  in 
its  co-existences  and  sequences,  is  the  best  possible. 

This  system  seems  unquestionable  at  first  sight,  but, 
upon  reflection,  it  is  most  obnoxious  to  criticism.  This 
doctrine  of  a  divine  fantasy  which  forever  produces  pict- 
ures of  all  possible  worlds,  seems  a  gratuitous  anthropo- 
morphism. The  notion  of  a  best  possible  system,  also, 
is  a  distinct  contradiction,  like  that  of  a  largest  possible 
space  or  number.  Every  finite  must  be  definite  both 
in  intensity  and  degree  of  perfection.  It  will,  there- 
fore, be  always  possible  to  imagine  something  higher 
still.  God  alone  is  the  best  possible.  For  any  finite 
system  we  must  be  content  with  saying  that  it  is  good. 
Moreover,  the  Leibnitzean  system  falls  into  the  dualism 
of  which  we  have  complained.  It  regards  reason  as 
imposed  on  reality,  instead  of  being  founded  in  it,  or  as 
being  reality.  In  this  way  we  once  more  fall  a  prey  to 
abstractions.  We  have  seen  repeatedly  that  a  realm  of 
necessity  and  reason,  apart  from  actuality,  is  only  an  ab- 
straction mistaken  for  a  fact.  Moreover,  if  a  realm  of 
reason  could  exist  apart  from  reality,  it  could  never  be 
known  except  as  a  second  and  parallel  realm  existed  in 
reality  as  its  essential  law.  The  rational  can  be  known 
only  by  the  rational.  But  this  realm  of  reason  in  things 
would  make  it  unnecessary  to  postulate  a  realm  apart 
from  things.  Hence  the  ground  for  the  distinction  be- 


342  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

tween  truth  and  error,  right  and  wrong,  the  possible  and 
the  impossible,  must  be  found  in  God  himself;  and  we 
must  repudiate  the  notion  that  these  distinctions  exist 
as  objective  norms  and  limits  for  God.  They  are  but 
the  consequences  of  what  God  is. 

So,  then,  we  object  to  the  statement,  either  that  God 
makes  truth  and  right,  or  that  he  only  recognizes  them. 
He  is  rather  their  source  and  foundation;  and  they,  in 
turn,  are  the  fixed  modes  of  his  manifestation.  We 
may,  then,  regard  them  as  consequences  or  expressions 
of  the  divine  nature,  or  as  the  laws  of  the  divine  activ- 
ity, or  as  the  constant  modes  of  the  divine  manifesta- 
tion. The  first  form  is,  perhaps,  the  least  satisfactory; 
but,  when  reduced  to  its  true  meaning,  it  is  identical 
with  the  other  two.  We  devote  a  paragraph  to  its  ex- 
position. 

Objections  have  long  been  urged  against  making  the 
divine  activity  and  manifestation  dependent  on  the  di- 
vine nature.  It  is  claimed  that  this  view  must  lead  to 
a  complete  determinism,  and  thus  destroy  the  divine 
freedom.  This  thought  of  God  as  superessential  ap- 
pears in  the  various  trinities  of  the  Greek  philosophy, 
and  has  often  re-appeared  in  modern  speculation.  The 
unoriginated  God  is  regarded  as  above  mind,  and  rea- 
son, and  essence — ineffable  and  incomprehensible.  The 
Cartesians  tended  to  place  God,  as  perfect  being,  above 
both  matter  and  mind.  Schelling,  also,  in  his  later 
philosophy,  regards  the  divine  nature  as  something  de- 
rived. The  central  factor  of  the  absolute  is  will;  and 
all  the  mental  and  moral  attributes  are  viewed  as  self- 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  343 

determinations.  They  are  in  no  respect  what  we  might 
call  constitutional  with  God,  but  are  the  product  of  the 
absolute  will.  The  same  view  has  been  elaborated  at 
length  by  M.  Secretan  in  his  work  on  Absolute  Liberty, 
(De  la  Liberte  absolue.)  Both  writers  make  will  the  es- 
sence of  fundamental  being.  This  central  and  essential 
will  is  the  foundation  of  the  divine  nature.  It  has  no 
constitutional  determinations  of  any  sort,  but  makes  it- 
self all  that  it  is  by  its  own  absolute  self-determination. 
Any  other  view  is  regarded  as  fatal  to  the  independence 
of  the  absolute,  by  making  it  subject  to  its  own  nature. 
There  seems  to  be  here  an  overstraining  of  the  notion 
of  nature,  and  a  misunderstanding  of  it  founded  on  the 
limitations  of  our  own  experience.  Our  experience  is 
well  fitted  to  mislead  us  upon  this  point.  Our  mental 
life  has  a  successive  unfolding;  and,  indeed,  the  finite  in 
general  is  subject  to  the  same  law.  When,  then,  new 
faculties  or  properties  appear,  they  are  said  to  be  an  un- 
folding of  the  nature.  Thus  there  arises  the  thought  of 
some  unconscious  antecedent  energy,  which,  by  a  myste- 
rious necessity,  unfolds  itself  into  manifestation.  The  na- 
ture is  forthwith  hypostasized,  and  is  thereafter  regard- 
ed as  the  source,  if  not  of  the  being  itself,  at  least  of  all 
its  outgo.  Then,  by  the  force  of  habit,  we  think  of  the 
divine  nature  as  having  similar  antecedence  in  the  di- 
vine life  and  manifestation.  Again,  our  mental  life  is 
not  self -sufficient,  and  we  cannot  reach  its  roots.  The 
mental  streams  rise  in  an  undiscovered  country,  and 
consciousness  lights  up  but  a  small  part  of  the  soul. 
We  explain  this,  also,  by  referring  to  our  nature.  Thus 
the  nature  comes  to  mean  a  mysterious  and  impenetra- 


344  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

ble  power  ruling  in  us,  and  making  us  what  we  are. 
When  we  add  to  this  the  thought  of  necessity  as  the 
law  of  that  power,  we  have  already  reached  complete 
determinism,  and  have  justified  the  repugnance  to 
speaking  of  the  divine  nature.  For  thereby  we  reduce 
the  divine  life  and  character  to  products  of  a  blind  con- 
stitutional necessity.  But  here  we  commit  a  twofold 
error:  (1)  we  transfer  to  the  divine  the  limitations  of 
the  human,  and  (2)  we  fall  a  prey  to  an  abstraction. 
No  one,  upon  reflection,  would  think  of  the  divine  na- 
ture as  temporally  antecedent  to  the  divine  wisdom  and 
goodness.  It  only  remains,  then,  to  think  of  it  as  the 
mysterious  source  from  which  the  divine  life  springs. 
But  this  mysterious  source  is  only  a  myth;  for  the  na- 
ture of  a  being,  except  in  unreal  abstraction,  is  indis- 
tinguishable from  the  being-  itself.  All  that  we  can 
mean  by  a  being's  nature  is  just  the  law  of  its  essential 
activities.  Thus,  the  soul  knows,  feels,  and  wills.  We 
explain  these  activities  by  referring  them  to  the  soul's 
nature;  but  that  nature,  in  turn,  is  merely  to  do  these 
things.  Again,  we  say  that  the  atoms  attract,  and  ex- 
plain it  by  their  nature;  but  when  asked  what  the  na- 
ture of  the  atoms  is,  we  reply,  to  attract.  Thus  we  ex- 
plain the  outcome  by  the  nature,  and  define  the  nature 
by  the  outcome.  We  may  say  that  the  nature  of  a 
thing  is  not  the  law  of  its  essential  activities,  but  is  that 
factor  in  the  thing  which  founds  both  the  law  and  the 
activities.  But  here,  again,  we  are  the  victims  of  a 
persistent  delusion.  The  thing  itself  founds  its  own 
law  and  outgo.  A  thing  is  not  a  hollow  something  in 
which  natures  and  forces  are  stowed  like  springs  in  a 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TR 

box.  A  true  thing  is  an  indivisible  unit 
activity  has  a  certain  law;  and  this  law  is  its  nature. 
Yet,  misled  by  a  pernicious  tendency  to  personify  ab- 
stractions, we  make  this  law  a  thing,  and  then  put  it 
back  of  itself  to  explain  itself.  The  unsatisfied  imagina- 
tion will  urge  that  there  must  be  something  in  a  thing 
which  makes  it  what  it  is;  but  this  is  either  a  false 
claim  or  else  it  is  an  attempt  to  conceive  how  a  thing  is 
made.  The  truth  is,  that  this  itch  of  the  imagination  is 
the  real  source  of  the  idle  mystery  of  the  thing  in  it- 
self, and  also  of  the  bulk  of  the  objections  to  freedom. 
The  nature  is  hypostasized  and  put  behind  the  thing; 
and  then  we  lament  that  we  cannot  know  something, 
when,  in  truth,  there  is  nothing  to  know.  However  far 
we  may  push  our  analysis,  we  can  always  fancy  a  mys- 
terious nature  which  will  forever  elude  us,  and  at  the 
same  time  will  forever  rule  us.  But  this  mystery  is 
only  a  philosophical  will-o'-the-wisp.  Instead  of  hunt- 
ing this  delusion,  we  should  be  much  nearer  the  truth 
if  we  declared  the  law  of  a  thing  to  be  the  thing  in  it- 
self. Being  without  essential  law  is  nothing.  Law 
apart  from  being  is  also  nothing.  Both  must  be  united 
in  reality.  Being,  then,  is  substantial  law,  and  law  is 
the  expression  of  being.  The  substantial  law  is  the 
being,  and  back  of  it  there  is  nothing.  This  is  the  true 
and  only  thing  in  itself;  and  the  only  insoluble  question 
concerning  it  is,  how  is  it  made  ?  In  a  previous  chapter 
we  condemned  the  attempt  to  separate  reality  into  two 
independent  factors,  being  and  force,  as  mistaking  log- 
ical distinctions  for  real  ones.  The  separation  of  real- 
ity into  the  two  factors  of  being  and  law  rests  upon  the 


346  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

same  confusion.  How  a  soul  is  able  to  think,  feel,  and 
will  we  cannot  know.  It  is  an  ultimate  fact  of  the  soul's 
life.  The  thinking,  feeling,  and  willing  soul  is  given  in 
experience.  We  get  no  insight  from  hypostasizing 
faculties  or  natures  which  are  only  abstractions  from  the 
facts  to  be  explained.  The  ultimate  fact  of  the  universe 
is  an  unconditioned  reality.  This  reality  is  as  it  is,  and 
the  law  of  its  activity  is  as  it  is;  but  neither  admits  of 
any  deduction.  Hence  we  can  never  get  behind  the 
fact  that  the  principles  of  reason  and  right  are  the  laws 
of  the  essential  divine  activity.  To  refer  to  the  divine 
nature  as  something  more  ultimate,  is  only  to  delude 
ourselves  with  a  figment  of  the  imagination.  But  in 
calling  these  principles  the  laws  of  the  divine  activity 
we  do  not  think  of  them  as  external  norms,  but  as  es- 
sential expressions  of  God  himself. 

The  other  part  of  the  claim,  that  the  nature  even  of 
fundamental  being  must  be  mysterious  to  itself,  is  also 
groundless.  This  claim,  also,  transfers  to  the  infinite 
the  limitations  of  the  finite.  In  treating  of  the  divine 
personality,  we  said  that  full  personality  exists  only 
where  the  nature  is  transparent  to  itself,  and  where  con- 
sciousness grasps  with  perfect  insight  the  being  and  all 
its  activities.  What  is  meant  by  this  insight  and  trans- 
parency may  be  faintly  illustrated  by  reference  to  the 
discursive  activity  of  our  minds.  The  mind,  in  reason- 
ing, is  not  the  prey  of  some  inner  nature  ;  but  finds  its 
processes  transparent  to  itself.  There  is  in  this  case  no 
back-lying  mystery  which  the  mind  cannot  penetrate, 
and  out  of  which  the  activity  proceeds  ;  but  the  mind 
is  conscious  of  itself  as  self-determined  and  regnant  in 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  347 

its  activity.  This  which  is  measurably  true  for  us  in 
our  reasoning,  we  regard  as  absolutely  true  for  God  in 
all  his  activities. 

We  conclude,  then,  that  the  divine  nature  can  only 
mean  the  law  of  the  divine  activity,  or  manifestation. 
To  base  truth  and  right  upon  the  divine  nature  is  the 
same  as  declaring  them  to  be  the  laws  of  God's  essen- 
tial activity.  To  some  this  view,  also,  will  seem  a  lim- 
itation of  the  divine  absoluteness;  and  they  will  claim 
that  God,  to  be  absolute,  must  give  himself  a  law.  If  he 
is  subject  to  a  law  which  he  does  not  give  himself,  then 
he  is  not  properly  independent.  Opposite  errors  min- 
gle here.  One  is  a  hypostasis  of  law;  the  other  is  an 
overstraining  of  the  meaning  of  absolute.  The  former 
error  we  have  sufficiently  considered;  the  latter  calls 
for  a  word  of  criticism.  All  reality  must  be  definite, 
and  all  activity  must  have  a  certain  form  or  law. 
Without  this  element  of  definiteness,  the  notion  even 
of  the  absolute  and  the  omnipotent  becomes  perfectly 
void,  and  indistinguishable  from  zero.  To  demand  that 
the  absolute  be  utter  indefiniteness  and  emptiness,  in 
order  that  it  may  be  the  source  of  all  definiteness  and 
fullness,  is  to  make  even  its  existence  a  limitation. 
This  overstraining  of  the  term  defeats  itself.  It  cancels 
the  absolute  as  a  reality,  and  leads  to  the  attempt  to 
construct  both  the  living  God  and  the  created  universe 
out  of  nothing.  The  claim  that  definiteness  is  a  limita- 
tion, is  based  on  that  etymological  conception  of  the 
infinite  to  which  we  have  so  often  referred.  Logically, 
even  existence  is  a  limitation;  for,  instead  of  embracing, 

it  excludes  non-existence,  and  thus  fails  to  fill  up  the 
23 


348  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

whole  sphere  of  the  thinkable.  But  such  logical  limita- 
tion is  no  real  limitation.  In  discussing  pantheism,  we 
found  that  the  claim  that  all  determination  is  negation 
and  limitation  is  entirely  false,  except  where  a  true  dis- 
junctive judgment  applies.  But  in  any  other  case,  this 
claim  is  true  only  in  a  purely  formal  sense.  Thus  we 
can  always  affirm  of  a  either  b  or  uon-b;  and  to  affirm  b 
is  equivalent  to  denying  non-J.  But  non-5  is  no  positive 
predicate;  it  is  only  the  absence  of  the  positive  predi- 
cate, b.  Thus  to  affirm  knowledge  of  God  is  to  deny 
non-knowledge;  to  affirm  power  is  to  deny  non-power. 
In  this  sense  only  is  it  universally  true  that  all  predica- 
tion is  negation.  But  these  negations  are  such  only  in 
form.  They  exclude  nothing  real  from  the  subject.  In 
truth,  they  are  but  the  double  negatives  which  make  an 
affirmative. 

Perhaps  the  emptiness  of  this  claim,  that  a  definite 
mode  or  law  is  incompatible  with  the  essential  activity 
of  the  absolute,  may  be  best  seen  in  a  concrete  case. 
Thinking  is  governed  by  the  laws  of  thought.  These 
laws  are  nothing  which  is  external  to  the  mind,  or  which 
exercises  any  compulsion  upon  the  mind.  The  mind 
does  not  feel  them  as  a  yoke  or  a  limitation.  Our  lack 
of  insight,  and  our  inability  to  trace  all  the  results  even 
of  our  simplest  intuitions,  we  do  feel  as  a  limitation; 
but  the  laws  of  thought  themselves  are  never  felt  as 
such.  The  reason  is,  that  they  are  essentially  only  the 
forms  of  the  thought-activity,  and  are  reached  as  formal 
laws  only  by  abstraction  from  the  results  of  thinking. 
The  basal  fact  here  is  a  thought-activity;  and  reflection 
shows  us  that  it  has  certain  forms.  These  forms  are 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  349 

next  abstracted  as  laws  of  thinking;  and  finally,  these 
laws  are  imposed  upon  the  mind  as  a  kind  of  external 
sovereign.  The*n  the  mind  is  said  to  be  subject  to  the 
laws  of  thought;  and  thus  the  fancy  arises  that  possibly 
these  laws  are  hinderances  and  limitations  to  knowl- 
edge. But  in  this  entire  process  we  are  merely  the 
dupes  of  our  own  abstractions.  No  one  upon  reflection 
can  regard  the  laws  of  thought  as  in  any  true  sense 
limitations  of  the  mind.  They  are  simply  the  essential 
modes  of  all  mental  manifestation.  They  are  not  pow- 
ers of  any  sort  which  rule  the  intellect;  they  simply 
express  what  the  intellect  is.  Probably  habit  has  much 
to  do  with  our  confusion  at  this  point.  We  are  used 
to  thinking  of  law  as  implying  external  compulsion;  and 
thus  we  unconsciously  import  this  thought  into  our  con- 
ception of  a  being's  essential  law,  which  is  never  any 
thing  but  an  expression  of  what  the  being  is.  In  this 
way  the  fancy  arises  that  essential  law  is  a  limitation. 
The  implications  of  words  are  a  constant  source  of  error. 
As  the  notion  of  a  nature  commonly  carries  with  it  the 
thought  of  a  mysterious  background,  so  the  nature  of 
law  is  generally  connected  with  the  thought  of  necessity 
and  compulsion.  Both  implications  are  misleading  in 
the  present  case,  and  we  must  guard  against  them. 

The  positive  outcome  of  this  discussion  is,  indeed, 
very  small.  The  aim  was  to  secure  the  best  expression 
for  the  relation  of  God  to  mankind  and  ethical  princi- 
ples. All  propositions  which  view  them  as  in  any  way 
a  product  of  volition,  human  or  divine,  we  have  rejected 
as  not  merely  absurd,  but  contradictory.  The  opposite 
doctrines,  which  view  these  principles  as  having  an 


350  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

existence  independent  of  God,  we  have  also  rejected. 
The  view  which  founds  them  on  the  nature  of  God, 
transforms  itself,  upon  examination,  into  the  statement 
that  they  are  properly  the  fundamental  laws  or  modes 
of  the  divine  activity  and  manifestation.  As  such  they 
are  as  changeless  as  God  himself.  We  deny,  then,  that 
God  can  either  make  or  unmake  truth  and  right;  not, 
however,  because  they  exist  independently  of  him,  but 
because  he  cannot  deny  or  contradict  himself.  The 
notion  is  essentially  absurd;  for  a  contradiction  is  noth- 
ing. The  expression  of  a  contradictory  phrase  is  not 
the  expression  of  a  thought,  but  of  its  absence.  The 
notion  that  such  a  phrase  may  be  made  to  represent  a 
fact  rests  entirely  upon  a  play  upon  the  word  omnipo- 
tent, or  almighty;  and  is  sufficient  to  convict  one  of 
mental  flabbiness.  To  the  question  whether  God  may 
not  have  other  and  ineffable  modes  of  manifestation,  we 
reply  that  the  ineffable  is  no  subject  for  discussion. 
Both  affirmation  and  denial  would  be  empty.  For  us 
God  is  a  spirit  who  is  essentially  righteousness  and 
wisdom;  and  all  laws  of  his  activity,  which  are  essen- 
tially unrelated  to  these  factors,  are  only  words  without 
any  corresponding  thought.  Spinoza,  in  the  beginning 
of  his  speculations,  affirmed  that  the  infinite  has  an  in- 
finity of  essential  attributes,  of  which,  however,  we  can 
conceive  only  thought  and  extension.  But  before  long  it 
became  clear  that  all  these  attributes  were  only  words, 
and,  therefore,  empty  of  any  real  affirmation.  We 
should  reach  the  same  result  here,  if  we  attempted  to 
speak  of  ineffable  laws  of  the  divine  activity,  other  than 
those  of  reason  and  right.  To  the  question  whether 


RELATION  Of  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  351 

God  may  not  change  even  the  fundamental  laws  of 
his  being,  we  reply  that  this  is  (1)  to  ask  whether  God 
can  contradict  himself;  and  (2)  to  reaffirm  in  a  new 
form  that  truth  and  right  are  products  of  the  divine 
volition.  We  have  to  content  ourselves  with  saying 
that  God  is  the  foundation  of  truth  and  righteousness, 
in  that  rational  and  ethical  principles  are  the  essential 
laws  of  his  action.  Further  than  this  we  cannot  go; 
and  the  attempt  would  only  result  in  deceiving  our- 
selves with  logical  distinctions  mistaken  for  things. 
Questions  concerning  the  order  of  rank  among  the  fac- 
ulties are  insoluble  even  for  human  psychology.  Fichte 
made  a  great  effort  to  deduce  the  intellect  and  the  will 
from  a  moral  root.  The  destiny  of  man  is  to  be  moral; 
and  to  be  moral,  he  must  have  intelligence.  Fichte 
positively  thought  any  thing  deduced  when  he  had 
shown  that  without  it  a  moral  system  would  be  impos- 
sible. The  mystic  may,  also,  believe  that  the  essence 
of  God  is  love,  and  that  all  which  God  is  in  attribute  or 
action,  flows  necessarily  from  love  as  the  divine  essence. 
But  this  is  not  a  deduction  of  the  divine  wisdom,  for 
the  love  which  does  this  is  already  a  seeing,  knowing 
love.  It  perceives  its  goal  and  the  means  of  realiza- 
tion. Nevertheless,  we  must  be  careful  not  to  make 
our  mental  experience  too  exact  a  standard  for  the  di- 
vine mind.  With  us,  for  example,  volition  often  comes 
only  at  the  end  of  a  long  debate  between  opposing 
possibilities;  and  action  must  wait  for  opportunity. 
Thus  the  will  and  intelligence  are  made  to  seem  sepa- 
rable; and  the  being  is  split  up  into  independent  faculties. 
But  in  no  case  are  the  faculties  more  than  modes  of 


352  STUDIES  IN  TSEISM. 

the  being's  manifestation.  An  intelligence  without  will 
or  feeling  is  as  impossible  as  a  will  without  intelli- 
gence. They  are  inseparable  manifestations  of  the  one 
living  spirit.  It  is  also  plain  that  those  features  of  our 
experience  which  we  have  just  mentioned,  cannot  be 
thought  of  in  connection  with  God.  With  infinite 
goodness  to  prompt,  infinite  wisdom  to  perform,  there 
can  be  no  hesitation  in  choice,  and  no  delay  in  execu- 
tion. Thought  and  act  are  contemporaneous,  and 
move  on  together  in  indivisible  unity.  The  living 
God  is  supreme  reason  and  righteousness  in  eternal  aet 
and  self-realization. 

Our  claim  that  God  does  not  make  reason  nor  obey 
reason,  but  is  substantial  reason,  will,  perhaps,  be  al- 
lowed; but  the  claim  that  he  is  substantial  goodness 
and  righteousness  is  open  to  two  objections.  One  is  a 
difficulty  of  moral  theory;  the  other  is  drawn  from  the 
existence  of  evil.  We  consider  them  in  their  order. 

After  all,  it  will  be  urged,  we  have  made  righteous- 
ness constitutional  with  God,  which  is  a  moral  contra- 
diction. Righteousness  and  unrighteousness  are  purely 
matters  of  the  will,  and  lose  their  essential  characters 
when  viewed  as  an  outcome  of  the  nature.  Yet  we 
have  declared  ethical  principles  to  be  the  laws  of  the 
divine  activity,  and  have  further  declared  that  God 
cannot  reverse  them.  They  are,  then,  necessary;  or  if 
we  dislike  that  word,  they  are  unconditional  and  un- 
changeable facts.  Hence  God  is  bound  by  himself. 
He  is,  then,  righteous  not  by  an  act  of  will,  but  by 
nature;  yet  natural  righteousness  is  a  contradiction  in 
moral  science.  We  have  reached  utter  determinism. 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  353 

If  we  are  to  talk  at  all  upon  this  subject,  it  can  only  be 
in  terms  of  our  own  experience;  and  it  is  hard  to  avoid 
a  feeling  that  this  matter  lies  beyond  human  knowledge. 
Still,  as  the  objection  is  raised,  we  may  point  out  that 
the  statement  just  made  is  not  entirely  free  from  con- 
fusion. In  the  first  place,  it  confounds  right  action  with 
ethical  principles;  and  it  also  confounds  essential,  with 
volitional,  activity.  In  speaking  of  a  being's  law,  we 
were  careful  to  define  it  as  the  order  of  its  essential 
activities.  In  a  free  being  there  is  one  series  of  mani- 
festations and  activities  which  express  what  the  being 
is;  and  there  is  another  series  which  expresses  what 
the  being  chooses  to  be.  The  order  of  the  first  series 
we  call  its  nature,  its  constitution,  its  essential  law. 
Now  in  declaring  ethical  principles  to  be  the  laws  of 
the  divine  activity  we  had  this  series  in  mind;  and 
hence  we  declare  them  to  be  unchangeable  expressions 
of  what  God  is.  But  the  will,  also,  has  a  work;  and 
the  question  of  regarding  these  principles  in  volitional 
activity  is  not  decided  by  the  nature,  but  remains  a 
subject  of  choice.  Certainly,  the  notion  of  an  un- 
changeable nature,  or  essential  law,  cannot  be  more 
deterministic  in  the  case  of  God  than  in  the  case  of  man. 
Man,  as  well  as  God,  is  bound  by  himself.  In  the 
human  mind,  also,  rational  and  ethical  principles  are 
primarily  not  truths,  but  laws  of  the  spirit's  activity. 
They  are  beyond  the  reach  of  our  volition;  and  in  so 
far,  we  are  absolutely  determined.  The  determination, 
indeed,  is  not  by  external  agents,  but  in  our  own  being. 
Yet  this  realm  of  changeless  fact,  or  of  necessity,  if  one 
prefer  it,  is  not  incompatible  with  another  realm  of  free- 


354  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

dom.  The  laws  of  reason  are  absolute,  but  it  is  in  our 
power  to  reject  them  and  choose  the  irrational.  They 
do  not  control  us  completely,  unless  the  will,  or  rather 
the  soul,  accepts  and  ratifies  them.  Ethical  principles, 
too,  are  forever  secure  against  all  overthrow;  but  that 
does  not  compel  obedience.  It  is  in  our  power,  not 
indeed  to  unmake  them,  but  certainly  to  flout  and  re- 
ject them.  Here,  again,  an  act  of  freedom  is  necessary 
— an  acceptance  and  ratification — in  order  to  give  these 
principles  the  sovereignty  which  is  their  due.  The 
highest  form  of  human  freedom  is  not  to  be  found 
in  our  subordinate  acts  whereby  we  change  or  resist 
external  nature,  and  least  of  all  is  it  to  be  found  in  act- 
ing against  reason  and  right.  The  highest  act  of  the 
free  soul  is  the  acceptance  of  our  true  nature,  or  the 
choice  of  right  reason  to  be  the  law  of  our  entire  being. 
It  is  sometimes  urged  that  God  cannot  be  free,  because 
with  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness  there  can  be  but  one 
outcome;  but  this  objection  strangely  fancies  that  free- 
dom consists  in  doing  the  unrighteous  and  irrational, 
instead  of  in  freely  accepting  and  realizing  what  ra- 
tional and  ethical  principles  demand.  Schleiermacher 
defined  moral  action  to  be  the  imposing  of  reason  upon 
nature;  we  regard  it  rather  as  the  imposing  of  reason 
upon  one's  self.  But  what  is  thus  a  fact  with  man  must 
be  allowed  as  possible  with  God.  We  view  the  divine 
righteousness,  therefore,  as  no  constitutional  necessity, 
but  as  the  ceaseless  ratification,  by  the  divine  will,  of 
those  rational  and  ethical  principles  which  are  founded 
in  the  divine  nature.  The  divine  nature  expresses  what 
God  essentially  is;  the  divine  character  expresses  what 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  355 

God  chooses  to  be.     The  claim,  then,  that  our  doctrine 
leads  to  determinism  we  regard  as  untenable. 

The  objection  based  on  the  existence  of  evil  is  a  more 
serious  one,  for  the  problem  of  evil  admits  at  present  of 
no  complete  speculative  solution.  That  there  is  a  per- 
fect solution  is  a  matter  of  faith,  and  not  of  knowledge. 
Nevertheless  it  may  be  well  to  point  out  that  the  denial 
of  the  divine  benevolence  is  not  so  absolutely  necessary 
as  is  often  taught.  The  belief  in  the  divine  goodness 
and  love  is  not  born  of  a  study  of  physical  nature;  it  is 
based  on  conscience  and  the  heart.  Love  and  justice 
are  the  most  reverend  qualities  in  the  universe,  and  the 
human  mind,  haunted  by  the  idea  of  the  perfect,  has 
never  been  able  to  believe  but  that  these  principles 
must  exist  in  their  highest  form  in  that  infinite  being 
from  whom  all  realities  and  all  principles,  whether  of 
truth,  or  right,  or  beauty,  have  flowed.  The  empiricist, 
who  fancies  that  we  learn  every  thing  from  external 
nature,  is  at  a  loss  to  understand  this,  and  he  loses  pa- 
tience that  men  should  have  such  absolute  faith  in  the 
divine  love  and  justice  in  the  face  of  a  world  like  ours. 
But  as  he  never  loses  confidence  in  his  own  philosophy, 
he  next  proceeds  to  explain  the  common  faith  as  mental 
abjectness  produced  by  a  worship  of  mingled  fear  and 
fawning.  No  one  has  had  the  courage  to  question  this 
belief,  and  at  last  it  has  settled  into  an  article  of  faith 
that  God  is  good;  while  all  the  time  the  whole  creation 
groans  in  horrid  pain  and  torture,  such  as  a  devil  would 
hardly  have  the  heart  to  inflict.  To  a  diatribe  of  this 
sort,  the  philosophical  theist  listens  with  great  interest, 


STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

both  because  of  the  innocence  and  because  of  the  ear- 
nestness of  the  speaker.  When  it  is  done,  he  replies  that 
in  the  face  of  all  these  facts  he  has  taken  up  his  faith, 
and  in  their  face  he  will  hold  it  fast.  He  does  not  go 
to  external  nature  to  be  taught  that  God  is  love.  The 
only  claim  he  will  allow  is,  that  while  the  world  cannot 
prove  the  divine  goodness,  possibly  it  may  disprove  it. 
The  question,  then,  is  this:  Are  the  facts  of  nature  and 
life  inconsistent  with  the  belief  that  God  is  good. 

The  early  philosophies  and  extra-Christian  theologies 
generally  explained  the  problem  of  evil  by  the  doctrine 
of  a  good,  and  an  evil  principle  in  ceaseless  conflict. 
In  accordance  with  the  moral  and  rational  instincts  of 
the  soul,  the  good  principle  was  always  viewed  as  the 
stronger  of  the  two,  and  sometimes  it  was  viewed  as 
sure  of  ultimate  triumph;  but  thus  far,  the  evil  princi- 
ple has  opposed  a  successful  resistance  to  its  universal 
sway.  Even  in  very  recent  periods  this  ancient  dual- 
ism has  found  favor  with  some  speculators  who  have 
abandoned  Christianity.  But  in  general,  Christian  mon- 
otheism has  overturned  this  view,  except  so  far  as  a 
rebellious  will  in  a  created  being  is  a  dualism.  The 
result  has  been  that  the  ancient  war  between  the  good 
and  the  evil  principle  has  been  displaced  in  theory  by 
the  notion  of  an  antimony  between  the  divine  power 
and  the  divine  benevolence.  We  cannot  maintain,  it  is 
commonly  said,  that  God  is  both  almighty  and  good. 
Whichever  attribute  we  choose,  the  other  must  be  aban- 
doned. As  a  result  of  this  conviction,  it  has  been  the 
fashion  since  the  time  of  Leibnitz  to  explain  evil  by 
saying  that  God  could  not  help  it.  A  government  by 


DELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  35*? 

geheral  laws  necessarily  implies  individual  hardship; 
yet  the  system  is  not  only  good  on  the  whole — it  is  also 
the  best  possible.  The  eternal  truths  of  reason,  and  the 
invincible  might  of  logical  sequence,  forbid  the  system's 
being  other  than  it  is.  In  our  shortsightedness  we  fancy 
that  some  particular  feature  could  be  improved;  and  so 
it  could,  as  an  isolated  thing,  but  not  as  a  part  of  the 
whole.  Nothing  is  single,  and  nothing  exists  for  itself 
alone.  Every  thing  is  bound  up  in  infinite  relations  to 
all  co-existences  and  sequences,  so  that  its  conditions 
could  not  be  changed  without  injuriously  affecting  the 
good  of  the  whole.  The  petty  present  gain,  then,  must 
be  paid  for  by  a  greater  loss  elsewhere  in  space  or  time. 
It  would  be  losing  both  vessel  and  crew  to  save  a  single 
cabin-boy  or  scullion. 

In  criticising  this  view,  one  must  sympathize  with  its 
protest  against  overstraining  the  meaning  of  omnipo- 
tence. The  meaning  of  this  word  cannot  be  determined 
by  its  etymology,  but  by  reason  only;  and  reason  de- 
clares that  contradiction  and  absurdity  cannot  be  real- 
ized in  existence  by  any  power  whatever,  and  for  the 
simple  reason  that  they  express  nothing  but  the  condi- 
tions of  mental  palsy.  The  one  who  utters  them  has 
said,  and  straight  unsaid,  and  thus  has  canceled  all 
meaning.  It  is  the  irrational  imagination  only  which  is 
disturbed  with  the  notion  that  proper  contradictions 
express  some  possible  existence.  So  far,  then,  as  the 
non-existence  of  evil  can  be  shown  to  involve  a  contra- 
diction, in  so  far  is  it  justified.  Unfortunately  this 
solution  is  clearly  applicable  only  to  the  problem  of  moral 
evil,  considered  as  a  necessary  possibility  of  a  free  sys- 


358  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

tern.  That  the  non-existence  of  pain  in  its  present  de- 
gree, or  even  its  utter  absence,  involves  a  contradiction, 
or  runs  counter  to  some  eternal  truth,  is  a  proposition 
which  is  in  sad  need  of  proof.  So  far  as  we  can  see, 
pain  in  the  animal  world  is  the  outcome  of  purely  con- 
tingent arrangements.  Whatever  good  purposes  tooth- 
ache, and  neuralgia,  and  pestilence,  and  fang,  and 
venom,  and  parasites  may  serve,  it  is  certainly  sheer 
assumption  to  say  that  any  eternal  truth  is  to  blame  for 
their  presence,  or  would  be  damaged  by  their  absence. 
There  is  no  relief  in  this  direction.  These  facts  have 
all  the  marks  of  purpose,  and  it  only  remains  to  look  for 
some  justification  in  their  consequences. 

But  before  passing  on,  we  must  protest  once  more 
against  that  contradictory  notion  of  a  best  possible  sys- 
tem. We  have  before  pointed  out  that  the  notion  of  a 
best  possible  finite  system  is  as  absurd  as  the  notion  of 
a  largest  possible  number,  or  a  largest  possible  bounded 
space.  Leibnitz  has  certainly  led  speculative  thought 
astray  by  his  adoption  of  this  untenable  conception. 
No  theist,  therefore,  is  under  obligation  to  prove  that 
the  present  system  is  the  best  possible,  and  for  the  sim- 
ple reason  that  there  is  no  best  possible  finite.  As 
Plato  taught,  there  is  but  one  best  possible,  and  that  is 
God  himself.  Of  any  finite  system  whatever  the  ques- 
tions would  be  possible,  Why  thus,  and  not  otherwise  ? 
Why  now,  and  not  then  ?  Why  on  this  plane,  and  not 
some  other?  Why  so  much,  and  not  more  or  less? 
With  regard  to  our  own  system,  we  can  ask,  Why  be- 
gin in  the  germ,  and  not  full  grown  in  every  faculty  ? 
Why  live  sixty  years,  and  not  six  hundred  ?  Why  not 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  359 

have  ribs  and  nerves  of  steel,  instead  of  the  fragile  ones 
we  have  ?  Why  is  any  thing  as  it  is  ?  All  questions 
of  this  kind  are  utterly  insoluble,  and  should  be  left  to 
debating  youths  and  philosophers  of  the  phrenological 
type.  To  ask  them  betrays  a  certain  mental  immatur- 
ity. Certainly  no  grown-up  thinker  of  average  reflect- 
ive powder  will  long  consent  to  busy  himself  with  such 
problems.  We  may,  however,  expound  this  notion  of 
a  best  possible  system  in  another  way.  In  itself  the 
phrase  is  essentially  ambiguous.  We  may  judge  a  sys- 
tem by  its  outcome,  and  this  outcome  may  be  either 
quantitatively  or  qualitatively  different  from  that  of 
other  systems.  In  the  former  case,  the  system  with  the 
largest  outcome  is  the  best.  In  the  latter  case,  the  sys- 
tem with  the  highest  kind  of  outcome  is  the  best.  Yet 
this  qualitative  best  is  also  quantitative  in  that  it  may 
vary  in  intensity,  and  also  in  extent;  and  hence  the  no- 
tion of  a  best  possible  finite  system,  even  when  taken 
qualitatively,  is  a  contradiction.  In  addition  to  this 
ambiguity,  another  is  found  in  the  fact  that  a  system 
may  be  called  good  or  bad,  not  with  reference  to  the 
quality  of  the  end,  but  with  reference  only  to  the  way 
of  reaching  the  end.  We  may  regard  the  system  as  an 
instrument,  and  leave  ends  out  of  sight.  There  is  no 
contradiction  in  the  notion  of  a  best  possible  instru- 
mental system,  for  the  perfection  of  such  a  system  is 
determined  solely  by  its  fitness  for  its  proper  work. 
When  an  instrument  exactly  corresponds  to  its  purpose, 
it  is  perfect.  In  this  sense  a  very  imperfect  system, 
absolutely  considered,  may  be  perfectly  adapted  to  the 
work  assigned  it.  Even  defects  may  be  perfections j  aa 


360  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

in  the  case  of  the  eye,  the  shortcomings  of  the  normal 
eye  as  an  optical  instrument,  are  positive  advantages  in 
it,  considered  as  an  eye.  Thus  we  see  that  the  phrase, 
best  possible  system,  is  essentially  ambiguous,  and  in 
its  obvious  meaning  is  contradictory.  All,  then,  that 
can  be  required  of  the  theist  is,  to  show  that  the  actual 
system  is  not  incompatible  with  a  rational  belief  in  the 
divine  goodness.  Finally,  we  do  not  recognize  the  need 
of  limiting  either  the  divine  power  or  benevolence  to 
account  for  unmoral  evil.  We  believe  it  much  more 
rational  to  confess  that  we  have  no  sufficient  data  for 
the  speculative  solution  of  this  problem.  When,  then, 
belief  in  the  divine  benevolence  seems  to  conflict  with 
belief  in  the  divine  omnipotence,  except  always  in  the 
case  of  contradiction,  we  limit  neither,  but  decide  that 
the  solution  of  the  problem  lies  at  present  beyond  the 
horizon  of  the  human  mind.  Meanwhile,  though  clouds 
and  darkness  are  round  about  Him,  we  think  it  rational 
to  hold  that  righteousness  and  judgment  are  still  the 
habitation  of  his  throne. 

Having  thus  admitted  the  impossibility  of  a  theoret- 
ical demonstration  of  optimism,  we  cannot  be  suspected 
of  being  blind  to  the  shortcomings  of  the  optimistic 
argument.  We  next  proceed  to  examine  the  pessimist's 
attack  upon  the  goodness  of  the  actual  world.  The 
pessimistic  argument,  like  the  optimistic,  is  very  apt  to 
drag  in  considerations  drawn  from  the  notion  of  a  best 
possible  system.  All  these  we  rule  out  as  indecisive, 
even  when  not  absurd.  Further,  the  pessimist  is  always 
tempted  to  overstrain  the  notion  of  omnipotence,  so  as 
to  make  it  able  to  accomplish  the  impossible  and  the 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  361 

contradictory,  as  well  as  the  possible  and  the  consistent. 
We  find  this  tendency  in  his  unwillingness  to  allow  the 
claim  that  evil  may  be  a  necessary  means  for  securing 
the  good.  He  says  that  the  necessity  of  employing 
means  of  any  sort,  especially  of  a  severe  and  painful 
kind,  only  proves  that  the  Creator  is  limited,  and  can- 
not have  what  he  wants  by  direct  exercise  of  power. 
Another  grave  fault  of  the  average  pessimist  is,  to  deal 
with  pain  in  the  abstract.  He  heaps  up  all  the  misery 
of  all  beings,  past,  present,  and  future,  and  forthwith 
makes  a  sum  so  great  as  to  hide  all  well-being  from  his 
vision.  Thus  he  resembles  the  man  who  should  heap 
up  in  one  thought  all  the  sickness  of  the  world,  and 
should  become  so  confused  thereby  as  to  conclude  that 
health  and  soundness  nowhere  exist.  The  very  large 
sum-total  of  sickness  does  not  prove  that  the  earth  is 
only  a  great  hospital,  or  a  festering  lazar-house.  On 
the  contrary,  the  race  has  always  been  in  tolerable 
health.  The  pessimist  is  apt  to  forget  that  pain  in  the 
abstract  is  nothing,  and  has  existence  only  as  felt  by 
sensitive  beings.  If,  then,  the  universe  is  a  miserable 
universe,  it  can  be  so  only  as  the  beings  living  in  it  are 
consciously  miserable.  This  point  can  be  decided  only 
by  appeal  to  consciousness.  We  have  in  this  abstract 
dealing  with  the  question  a  parallel  of  the  mistake  com- 
mon in  discussions  of  future  punishment.  There  we 
ask  ourselves,  Could  God  be  justified  in  creating  a  be- 
ing who  he  foreknew  would  persist  in  sin,  and  thus  fall 
into  endless  punishment?  Is  he  not  bound  to  restore 
every  one  to  happiness  before  the  great  cycle  of  eternity 
shall  have  rolled  away  ?  From  this  abstract  stand-point, 


362  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

the  case  seems  entirely  clear;  and  we  even  advance  at 
times  to  declamation  against  the  blasphemy  of  the  oppo- 
site thought.  But  when  we  take  another  stand-point, 
the  certainty  grows  less.  If  one  should  say.  I  am  a 
mature,  rational,  and  free  being.  The  divine  love  lor 
me  has  been  manifested  in  the  most  affecting  ways. 
The  divine  pardon  has  been  offered  me  on  the  sole 
condition  of  forsaking  sin.  Nevertheless,  I  choose  to 
disregard  the  laws  of  God  and  of  my  own  soul.  For 
God  is  under  absolute  obligation  to  save  me  from  my- 
self, and  there  can  be  no  vindication  of  God's  love  and 
righteousness  unless  I  am  finally  saved.  If  I  throw 
myself  away,  even  with  my  eyes  open,  God  is  a  mon- 
ster and  an  omnipotent  devil.  He  had  no  right  to 
make  me  free,  unless  he  intended  afterward  cunningly 
or  secretly  to  cancel  my  freedom,  and  make  me  at  least 
an  automatic  saint.  If  one  should  speak  thus,  he  prob- 
ably would  not  find  a  single  conscience  to  agree  with 
him.  It  is  doubtful,  indeed,  if  any  one  to  whom  years 
and  light  have  come,  would  dare  to  make  this  claim  for 
himself.  It  is  strange  that  the  claim  which  seems  so 
tenable  when  made  in  the  interests  of  an  abstract  no- 
body, is  one  which  none  of  us  would  have  the  face  to 
make  for  ourselves.  But  if  we  cannot  maintain  the 
claim  in  the  first  person,  and  if  we  should  hardly  care 
to  make  it  for  the  second  person,  what  becomes  of  it  as 
applied  only  to  the  third  person  ?  Life  and  death  are 
both  in  the  first  person.  But  just  as  the  abstract  per- 
son must  be  dismissed  in  this  case,  and  in  his  stead  the 
first  person  must  be  dealt  with,  so  in  the  case  of  the 
misery  of  being  we  must  cease  reflecting  upon  the  ab- 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  363 

stract  integral  of  pains,  and  ask  for  living  beings  to 
come  forward  and  testify.  The  abstract  man  cannot 
be  miserable,  but  only  concrete,  conscious  men.  Now 
how  many  are  there  who,  apart  from  their  own  folly 
and  sin,  have  found  life  an  evil  rather  than  a  good? 
How  many,  apart  from  all  consideration  of  good  or  evil 
to  come,  would  gladly  abandon  even  this  life?  How 
many  are  there  whose  natural  lot  has  been  such  that 
they  would  prefer  non-existence?  Yet  such,  if  such 
there  be,  are  the  only  proper  pessimists.  Others  may 
fancy  that  God  should  have  done  more  for  them  than 
\Q  has,  but  these  are  egoists  rather  than  pessimists,  and 
what  they  need  is  not  so  much  argument  as  a  keener 
sense  of  shame. 

We  consider,  next,  some  specific  objections.  The 
existence  of  pain  of  any  sort  is  objected  to  as  inconsist- 
ent with  the  divine  benevolence.  No  thoughtful  person 
will  venture  to  affirm  that  the  mystery  of  physical  pain 
can  be  entirely  cleared  up  ;  but  it  can  certainly  be  less- 
ened. On  the  other  hand,  no  one  has  a  right  to  declare 
it  an  outcome  of  malevolence,  unless  he  has  a  complete 
knowledge  of  the  system  of  things.  Pain  in  general  has 
a  double  function.  It  appears  either  as  a  warning  and 
an  incentive  to  development,  or  as  the  consequence  of 
transgressing  some  condition  of  existence.  As  a  warn- 
ing, its  function  is  plainly  beneficent,  and  as  an  incen- 
tive to  development,  things  being  as  they  are,  it  is  plainly 
necessary.  There  is  no  assignable  way  of  preserving 
organisms  from  speedy  destruction  without  making  them 

subject  to  possible  pain.    Again,  if  pain  did  not  exist  in 
24 


364  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

possibility,  it  is  impossible  to  see  what  security  we 
should  have  for  either  physical  or  mental  development. 
Even  the  animal  world  would  lose  itself  in  a  mollusk 
flabbiness,  as  devoid  of  meaning  as  it  would  be  of 
beauty.  To  this  the  pessimist  will  reply,  that  God 
should  have  made  things  perfect  from  the  start.  Mind 
and  body  should  both  have  been  complete,  and  the 
dangers  and  risks  of  development  should  have  been 
avoided.  He  is  willing  to  allow  that,  as  things  are,  pain 
and  privation  have  in  general  a  beneficent  function. 
Exercise,  resistance,  struggle,  and  the  spurs  and  finger- 
posts of  pain,  are  all  necessary  for  the  development  of 
such  beings  as  actually  exist:  But  why  are  things  as 
they  are  ?  Why  does  not  another  kind  of  beings  exist  ? 
Above  all,  why  does  not  God  interfere  to  prevent  all 
ill,  when  he  might  just  as  well  do  it  as  not  ?  Mr.  Mill 
gives  the  extremest  expression  to  this  feeling  in  the 
following  passage: — 

"  For,  how  stands  the  fact  ?  That  next  to.  the  great- 
ness of  these  cosmic  forces,  the  quality  which  most 
forcibly  strikes  every  one  who  does  not  avert  his  eyes 
from  it,  is  their  perfect  and  absolute  recklessness.  They 
go  straight  to  their  end,  without  regarding  what  or 
whom  they  crush  on  the  road.  Optimists,  in  their  at- 
tempts to  prove  that  '  whatever  is,  is  right,'  are  obliged 
to  maintain,  not  that  Nature  ever  turns  one  step  from 
her  path  to  avoid  trampling  us  into  destruction,  but 
that  it  would  be  very  unreasonable  in  us  to  expect  that 
she  should.  Pope's  l  Shall  gravitation  cease  when  you 
go  by?'  may  be  a  just  rebuke  to  any  one  who  should  be 
so  silly  as  to  expect  common  human  morality  from  na- 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  365 

ture.  But  if  the  question  were  between  two  men,  in- 
stead of  between  a  man  and  a  natural  phenomenon,  that 
apostrophe  would  be  thought  a  rare  piece  of  impudence. 
A  man  who  should  persist  in  hurling  stones  or  firing 
cannon  when  another  man  f  goes  by,'  and  having  killed 
him,  should  urge  a  similar  plea  in  exculpation,  would 
very  deservedly  be  found  guilty  of  murder."  * 

It  is  curious  what  different  opinions  men  hold.  When 
the  Christian  teaches  a  doctrine  of  divine  providence, 
according  to  which  God  is  in  living  and  loving  contact 
with  every  being  in  the  system,  and  is  caring  for  all, 
and  guiding  all  to  the  best  results,  his  doctrine  is  often 
denounced  as  a  miserable  anthropomorphism ;  but  here 
Mr.  Mill  appears  with  a  demand  that  gravitation  shall 
be  suspended,  fire  shall  not  burn,  water  shall  not  drown, 
cold  shall  not  freeze,  and  no  natural  law  have  its  prop- 
er effect,  if  in  any  way  we  should  be  injured  there- 
by. Some  speculators,  especially  of  Mill's  own  school, 
will  not  allow  God  to  suspend  a  law  of  nature  in  order 
to  attest  a  divine  revelation  to  man;  but  if  laziness  or 
blockheadism  bring  one  into  trouble,  God  must  hasten 
to  shield  him  from  the  consequences,  under  penalty  of 
being  charged  with  murder,  etc.  It  is  difficult  not  to 
detect  an  odor  of  insanity  in  the  passage  we  have 
quoted,  for  certainly  it  would  be  impossible  to  imagine 
a  more  contemptible  system  than  one  in  which  such 
perpetual  miracle  should  occur.  It  would  be  a  uni- 
versal nursery  for  the  perpetuation  of  helplessness  and 
incompetency.  Surely  if  any  one  will  criticise  the  uni- 
verse, he  ought  to  suggest  improvements  instead  of 
*  "  Three  Essays  on  Religion,"  p.  28, 


366  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

disastrous  modifications.  Yet  the  improvements  sug- 
gested by  various  critics  have  always  been  such  as  would 
pr  >ve  calamitous  if  adopted.  In  this  state  of  the  case 
the  critics  fall  back  upon  the  suggestion  that  every 
thing  might  have  been  quite  otherwise  to  advantage. 
But  such  a  statement  is  verbal,  and  belief  in  the  divine 
goodness  is  not  seriously  endangered  by  these  attacks. 

The  amount  of  evil  in  the  animal  world,  apart  from 
man,  is  commonly  greatly  exaggerated,  owing  to  the 
influence  of  what  is  called  biological  anthropomorphism. 
Evil  in  this  realm  is  purely  a  question  of  pain;  and 
there  is  no  proof  that  the  lower  animals  endure  any 
thing  like  the  pain  which  human  beings  suffer.  On  the 
contrary,  a  multitude  of  facts  indicate  that  even  the 
more  highly  organized  animals  are  far  less  sensitive  to 
pain  than  men  are;  and  no  one  can  see  a  wasp  continu- 
ing to  eat  after  its  waist  has  been  cut  in  two,  and  believe 
that  it  suffers  much  from  the  operation.  Keen  senses 
and  keen  sensibility  are  by  no  means  necessarily  connect- 
ed; the  latter  seems  reserved  especially  for  man.  While 
no  one  would  care  to  maintain  that  there  is  no  excess  of 
pain  among  the  lower  animals  above  what  is  needed  to 
warn  and  develop  them,  it  is  still  a  grave  error  of 
physiology  to  attribute  to  animals  any  thing  like  human 
sensibility.  With  the  simple  organic  fofims,  sensibility 
is  probably  a  vanishing  quantity.  Moreover,  even  with 
men,  who  live  rationally,  the  amount  of  physical  pain  is 
very  small,  whether  in  living  or  in  dying.  It  is  in  our 
personality,  in  our  power  of  looking  before  and  after, 
and,  above  all,  in  our  affections  and  conscience,  that  we 
find  the  chief  source  of  woe,  If  these  were  away,  our 


DELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  36? 

physical  pains  would  be  very  small,  after  deducting 
those  which  we  bring  on  ourselves.  Where  these  are 
away,  as  in  the  case  of  the  animals,  and  where  the  phys- 
ical sensibility  is  certainly  much  less,  the  a'mount  of 
physical  evil  is  not  so  great  as  the  pessimist  would  have 
us  believe.  So  far  as  pain  in  the  animal  world  tends  to 
the  preservation  and  development  of  life,  it  is  a  good, 
and  testifies  to  divine  beneficence.  So  far  as  it  seems 
motiveless  and  malignant,  the  pessimist  is  entitled  to 
his  conclusion  only  as  he  shows,  (1)  that  it  is  without 
any  justifying  outcome;  and,  (2)  that  it  is  really  the 
work  and  purpose  of  God.  Man  has  wrought  evil  and 
devastation  in  nature,  and  it  is  an  entirely  possible 
thought  that  there  are  more  potent  energies  of  diabo- 
lism than  the  human  will.  Of  course  it  will  be  said,  that 
allowing  this,  it  only  removes  the  difficulty  one  step 
farther  back.  We  shall  deal  with  this  question  here- 
after. For  the  present,  we  content  ourselves  with  point- 
ing out  that  the  amount  of  necessary  and  unrelieved 
physical  evil  in  the  animal  world  is  far  enough  from 
warranting  a  denial  of  the  divine  benevolence. 

In  considering  the  case  of  man,  we  deal  first  with  the 
natural  evil  to  which  he  is  subject.  The  human  saul, 
as  it  exists,  can  be  made  perfect  only  through  struggle 
and  suffering.  Nowhere  else  have  these  elements  so 
beneficent  an  office  as  in  the  case  of  man.  The  higher 
manifestations  of  character  spring  almost  entirely  from 
the  soil  of  sorrow.  If  we  should  strike  out  from  human 
history  the  heroic  and  saintly  characters  which  have 
been  born  from  suffering,  all  that  is  noble  and  reverend 
in  it  would  depart.  If  we  should  strike  from  literature 


368  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

all  to  which  sorrow  has  given  birth,  its  inspiration 
would  perish  forever.  Even  the  presence  of  death  has 
brought  a  solemn  tenderness  and  dignity  into  human 
affection  which  had  otherwise  been  impossible.  Virtue, 
too,  acquires  sturdiness  only  from  resisted  temptations; 
and  even  mind  itself  grows  only  through  obstacle  and 
resistance.  But  it  will  be  objected  that  all  these  things 
might  have  been  made  outright,  and  thus  the  struggle 
and  the  pain  would  have  been  escaped.  To  which  we 
say,  (1)  It  is  by  no  means  clear  that  they  could  have 
been  created;  and,  (2)  It  is  very  far  from  certain  that 
the  well-being  would  have  been  any  greater.  For  well- 
being  is  measured  only  by  happiness,  and  not  by  quan- 
tity of  attainment  or  possession.  Bodies  might  easily 
have  been  made  in  their  mature  form;  but  it  would  be 
an  incalculable  loss  to  humanity  if  the  ministry  of  child- 
hood were  wanting.  It  is,  also,  conceivable  that  the 
mental  faculties  should  begin  in  a  far  more  developed 
stage  than  they  do;  but  it  is  not  clear  that  the  outcome 
for  well-being  would  have  been  much  greater.  There 
is  a  distinct  demand  in  human  nature  for  self -develop- 
ment; and  hence  no  one  has  a  tithe  of  the  enjoyment  in 
things  or  thoughts  inherited,  which  he  has  in  things  or 
thoughts  produced  by  himself.  Even  the  child  finds 
more  delight  in  the  crudest  toy  of  his  own  manufacture 
than  in  the  finest  product  of  the  shops.  The  joy  of  in- 
tellect does  not  consist  in  mere  knowing,  but  in  con- 
scious development  and  growing  self-possession.  Mental 
good  does  not  consist  in  reaching  some  fixed  altitude, 
but  in  ever  moving  onward.  Concerning  the  relation 
of  physical  nature  to  man,  it  must  be  said  that  its  per- 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  369 

fection  consists  in  its  imperfection.  A  nature  which 
furnished  no  obstacle  to  man,  but  spontaneously  sup- 
plied all  his  wants,  would  not  only  be  paralyzing,  it 
would  be  intolerable.  A  perfect  physical  world  would 
be  for  human  purposes  a  perfect  failure.  We  want 
something  to  conquer  and  subdue;  and  in  such  conquest 
we  win  vastly  more  delight  than  from  any  amount  of 
inactive  gratification.  We  also  want  something  to  crit- 
icise. Over-against  the  stupidity  of  nature  we  want  to 
put  our  conception  of  a  better;  and  we  seek  to  force 
nature  to  accept  our  improvement.  To  the  healthy 
mind  there  is  no  more  contemptible  conception  of  hu- 
man destiny  than  simply  immortal  good  feeling.  No 
true  man  wants  to  have  good  showered  upon  him;  he 
wants  only  a  fair  chance  to  win  good  for  himself.  The 
beggar  is  willing  to  live  on  charity;  but  the  man  insists 
upon  earning  his  bread. 

Even  in  the  case  of  the  lower  and  constitutional 
goods,  the  mind  is  dissatisfied  unless  it  has  a  share  in 
their  production.  In  the  case  of  the  higher  goods  of 
character,  the  mind  will  not  recognize  them  as  goods 
at  all,  unless  they  are  its  own  product.  Created  or 
automatic  sainthood  it  does  not  understand.  Here  is 
the  field  for  the  imperial  will.  And  whatever  of  hard- 
ship may  be  necessary  for  the  development  of  good 
character  the  soul  cheerfully  accepts  as  the  condition 
of  its  chief est  blessing.  The  high  good  of  independ- 
ence is  impossible  to  contented  beggary;  and  for  the 
reason  that  the  two  notions  are  contradictory,  except  in 
a  lying  consciousness.  So  the  supreme  good  of  virtuous 
character  is  incompatible  with  any  thing  but  self -con- 


370  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

quest  and  self-determination.  For  the  great  good  in 
moral  development  is  not  so  much  the  point  reached, 
as  it  is  the  self-development  in  accordance  with  the 
perceived  laws  of  righteousness.  This  highest  of  goods 
cannot  be  created,  because  that  is  a  contradiction.  It 
must  be  won,  or  conquered,  by  every  being  for  him- 
self. The  goods,  then,  which  the  human  mind  in  its 
normal  condition  most  craves  and  venerates,  are  not 
passive  pleasures  of  any  sort,  but  goods  of  the  active 
nature,  and  the  very  notion  of  these  implies  obstacle, 
resistance,  and  hardship,  as  their  necessary  condition. 
Moreover  there  are  good  reasons  for  believing  that  a 
perfectly  friendly  nature  would  be  less  favorable  to 
moral  development  than  a  partially  hostile  one.  The 
theist  believes  that  the  immortal  soul  is  rich  only  in 
itself  and  God.  The  temporal  and  the  earthly  furnish 
the  conditions  of  moral  action;  but  there  is  a  strong 
tendency  in  the  soul  to  forget  itself  and  God  in  its 
surroundings.  To  correct  this,  a  certain  hostility  of 
nature  is  necessary.  Thus  only  can  the  soul  be  thrown 
back  upon  the  spiritual,  and  the  divine,  and  the  eter- 
nal. This  general  feature  of  our  system,  therefore,  is  a 
proof  of  the  divine  benevolence.  It  will  be  seen  other- 
wise only  to  the  epicurean  mind,  from  which  all  that 
is  noble  and  reverend  has  departed.  -In  addition,  the 
theist  will  also  hold  that  great  physical  calamities 
may  at  times  be  introduced  for  the  express  purpose 
of  checking  moral  evils  of  corresponding  magnitude. 

But  the  reply  will  be  made,  that  these  general  con- 
siderations do  not  remove  the  fact  that  evil  is  overdone 
in  connection  with  man.  There  are  frightful  evils 


RELATION  OF  GOD  TO  TRUTH.  371 

which  develop  nothing,  but  rather  crush  out  both  fac- 
ulty and  possibility.  They  also  reproduce  themselves, 
and  like  some  malignant  venom  spread  from  man  to 
man,  and  from  generation  to  generation,  poisoning 
soundness  and  blighting  life  with  death.  The  laws  of 
heredity  and  of  social  solidarity  are  leagued  for  human 
ruin.  By  the  former  the  sins  of  the  fathers  are  visited 
upon  the  children  unto  distant  generations:  by  the 
latter,  whole  classes  of  men  are  handed  over  to  igno- 
rance and  destitution  of  all  that  makes  up  a  truly  hu- 
man existence.  It  is  hardly  possible  for  multitudes 
to  be  human  beings,  owing  to  the  miserable  arrange- 
ments of  society.  But  none  of  these  things  are  good. 
Their  only  effect  is  blighting  and  destructive. 

All  this  and  vastly  more  is  true.  But  it  must  be 
pointed  out  that  none  of  these  results  are  necessary 
consequences  of  the  system.  They  are  implied  in  it  as 
possibilities,  but  the  actual  outcome  is  determined  by 
man  himself.  The  chief  ills  under  which  man  suffers 
are  the  results  of  his  own  doing.  Even  our  physical 
ills,  the  physicians  tell  us,  are  mostly  the  product  of 
our  artificial  and  improper  modes  of  living.  Few 
bodies  are  engines  of  torture  until  physiological  law  has 
been  outraged  and  violated,  either  by  the  person  him- 
self or  by  his  ancestors.  When  used  rightly,  the  body 
is  a  willing,  faithful,  and  effective  servant  of  the  soul. 
Only  as  it  is  abused  does  it  break  out  into  rebellion. 
The  law  of  heredity,  too — that  fruitful  source  of  fright- 
ful ills — is  in  its  natural  operation  most  beautiful  and 
beneficent.  It  is  the  only  thing  which  makes  our  chil- 
dren truly  our  own,  and  knits  the  generations  together 


372  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

in  vital  unity.  With  no  law  of  the  present  order  would 
we  longer  refuse  to  part  than  with  this,  if  men  were 
what  they  ought  to  be.  Human  sin  it  is  which  has 
changed  this  law  into  a  curse.  And  so  with  the  law  of 
social  unity.  Universal  community  of  interest,  all  for 
each  and  each  for  all,  is  a  divine  ideal.  Absolute  self- 
sufficiency  of  the  person,  and  indifference  toward  others, 
is  not  an  ideal  state  for  either  God  or  man.  But  the 
mutual  interdependence  which  this  ideal  implies  makes 
it  possible  that  this  law  should  be  the  prolific  mother 
of  woes.  But  the  system  is  not  to  be  charged  with 
the  results  of  its  abuse.  The  benevolent  purpose  of  the 
Creator  is  thwarted  by  the  creature;  and  the  creature 
alone  is  to  blame. 

This  brings  us  to  the  problem  of  moral  evil.  The 
existence  of  sin  has  been  viewed  by  some  as  a  reflec- 
tion on  the  divine  righteousness  and  benevolence.  This 
view  also  arises  partly  from  overstraining  the  meaning 
of  omnipotence,  and  partly  from  denying  the  freedom 
of  the  creature.  There  is  no  vindication  of  God  pos- 
sible on  any  deterministic  theory.  Such  a  view  makes 
him  the  real  sinner  in  all  sinning;  and  the  apparent 
sinners  are  but  the  cunning  automata  through  which  the 
omnipotent  sinner  works.  But  we  leave  this  point  for 
the  present,  and  point  out  that  moral  evil  cannot  exist 
if  there  be  no  moral  order.  .In  its  very  notion  it  is  a  de- 
parture from  moral  order;  and  hence  necessarily  implies 
it  in  the  system.  Sin  in  the  system,  therefore,  implies 
righteousness  in  the  founder  of  the  system;  and  the 
sin  appears  as  a  rebellion  against  the  moral  law  which  has 


DELATION  Of  GOl)  TO  T&UTH.  373 

been  legislated  into  the  very  nature  of  things.  If  the  sys- 
tem were  not  essentially  founded  in  righteousness,  there 
could  be  no  proper  sin.  Where  there  is  no  law,  there  is 
no  transgression.  Where  there  is  only  unrighteous  law 
transgression  is  not  sin,  but  virtue.  Sin  is  impossible, 
then,  where  righteous  law  does  not  pre-exist.  But  how 
can  this  law  be  transgressed  ?  Why  does  not  God  prevent 
it  ?  We  answer :  A  free  system  is  better  than  a  me- 
chanical system ;  and  freedom  necessarily  implies  the 
possibility  of  sinning.  This  possibility,  then,  is  given  in 
the  fact  of  freedom.  But  could  not  God  so  act  upon 
the  will  by  some  hidden  constraint  of  motive,  as  to  lead 
it  in  any  given  direction  ?  Some  hold  that  God  does  so 
act  in  every  case,  and  thus  becomes  properly  the  author 
of  sin.  This  device  of  a  secret  constraint  is  a  favorite 
method  for  reforming  incorrigible  sinners  and  devils. 
But  in  truth,  it  is  only  a  roundabout  way  of  canceling 
freedom,  and  a  return  to  the  notion  of  automatic  saint- 
hood. It  is  a  demand  that  the  free  being  be  degraded 
to  an  automaton  and  mechanically  rearranged.  If  it  be 
asked,  How  could  sin  originate  in  a  state  of  innocence? 
the  reply  is  easy:  We  have  a  complex  nature,  every 
part  of  which,  in  its  place,  is  innocent  and  becoming. 
Moreover,  our  desires  and  impulses  are  in  themselves 
unlimited  and  also  unmoral.  But  the  health  of  the  soul 
demands  that  an  ideal  order  be  maintained  in  it;  and 
morality  consists,  not  in  introducing  new  factors  into 
the  soul,  but  in  ruling  ourselves  according  to  the  soul's 
ideal  law.  At  bottom,  sin  is  allowed  disorder.  It  is 
permitting  the  soul  to  live  at  random.  It  is  the  acquies- 
cence of  the  will  in  a  usurpation  of  supreme  rule  by  the 


374  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

lower  powers.  But  the  possibility  of  sinning  does  not 
necessarily 'involve  a  taint  or  evil  tendency  in  the  soul. 
But  not  all  these  considerations  suffice  to  fully  explain 
the  facts  of  life.  If  the  consequences  of  sin  were  con- 
fined to  the  sinner,  there  would  be  less  difficulty  in  the 
problem.  But  as  it  is,  the  innocent  suffer  and  perish  as 
well  as  the  guilty.  Why  was  sin  permitted  to  have 
such  terrific  consequences?  We  may  admit  the  good- 
ness of  the  laws  of  heredity  and  social  solidarity  in  a 
righteous  world,  but  their  effect  is  so  blighting  and  so 
unjust  in  a  sinful  world,  that  it  seems  as  if  they  could 
not  be  excused.  To  this  there  is  but  one  sufficient 
answer.  The  present  life  is  a  time  of  probation ;  and  as 
such,  it  is  a  time  of  abnormal  moral  adjustment.  But 
there  is  another  life  in  which  every  one  shall  be  judged 
according  to  that  which  he  hath,  and  not  according  to 
that  which  he  hath  not.  There  men  shall  take  their 
places  according  to  their  moral  character;  and  there  the 
Judge  of  all  the  earth  shall  do  the  best,  for  saint  and 
sinner  alike,  which  the  eternal  laws  of  righteousness  will 
permit.  To  one  who  has  this  faith,  life  presents  indeed 
a  dark  problem;  but  to  one  who  has  it  not,  blindness 
is  the  only  refuge  from  despair.  There  is  no  use  in 
further  argument.  We  admitted  at  the  start  that  a 
speculative  solution  is  impossible,  and  we  now  repeat  the 
admission.  We  do  not  agree  with  the  pessimist,  but 
our  chief  reason  is,  our  faith  in  a  future  life.  If  he  can- 
not advance  to  this  faith,  we  shake  hands  and  separate. 
He  chooses  the  gospel  of  despair;  we  choose  the  gospel 
of  hope.  The  future  must  decide  between  us. 


TEE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.     3*75 


CHAPTER  X. 
THE  SOTJL:  SPIRITUALISM  OB  MATERIALISM. 

A  THEISM  is  commonly  allied  to  materialism  and 
•^  physical  fatalism;  and,  conversely,  these  doctrines 
rarely  fail  to  pass  into  atheism.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
belief  in  an  active,  substantial  soul,  implies  a  belief  in  a 
personal  God.  If  the  spiritual  philosophy  can  be  justi- 
fied, most  of  the  objections  to  theism  disappear.  Hence 
the  propriety  of  discussing  the  subject  in  the  present 
work. 

The  tendency  'of  the  uncritical  mind  is  to  lose  itself 
in  its  objects.  Hence  it  finds  nothing  so  real  as  the  ob- 
jects of  sense-perception.  The  typical  conception  of 
the  real  is  the  tangible  or  visible.  When  this  tendency 
is  uncorrected  by  either  reflection  or  instinct,  we  have 
the  coarsest  type  of  materialism.  From  constant  deal- 
ing with  the  object,  the  subject  at  last  forgets  that 
there  is  and  must  be  a  subject  of  knowledge.  Because 
of  this  objective  tendency  of  the  unreflecting,  the  ma- 
terialistic argument  seems  very  strong  to  crude  common 
sense.  We  know  nothing  of  mental  phenomena  except 
in  connection  with  a  body.  Mind  and  body  begin  to- 
gether, advance  together,  decay  together,  and,  so  far  as 
our  observation  goes,  they  perish  together.  In  fact  as 
well  as  in  poetry,  the  grave  remains  the  undiscovered 
country  from  whose  bourn  no  traveler  returns.  There 


376  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

is  nothing  in  experience  to  suggest  that  mind  and  body 
are  separable.  During  life,  the  mind  is  most  rigorously 
conditioned  by  the  body;  and  we  never  find  it  apart 
from  the  body.  What  conclusion,  then,  can  be  more 
probable  than  that  the  mind  is  simply  a  function  of  the 
organism?  By  this  is  not  meant  that  mental  phenom- 
ena are  material,  or  that  they  can  be  assimilated  to  any 
mechanical  phenomena  whatever;  it  would  never  occur 
to  any  sane  materialist  to  teach  such  a  doctrine.  His 
theory  is,  that  mind  is  only  a  general  word  for  mental 
phenomena;  and  that  these  phenomena  result  from 
physical  organization.  They  are  the  melody  of  the  in- 
strument. They  are  the  rainbow  which  is  painted  on 
the  dark  cloud.  And  as  the  melody  is  unlike  the  in- 
strument, and  the  rainbow  is  unlike  the  cloud,  so  men- 
tal phenomena  are  totally  unlike  the  dark  physiological 
processes  which  underlie  them.  But  as  the  melody  dies 
when  the  instrument  is  broken,  and  the  rainbow  vanishes 
when  the  cloud  is  shed;  so  mental  phenomena  disap- 
pear when  the  organism  is  shattered.  Mind  does  not 
belong  to  the  substances,  but  only  to  the  phantoms  of 
the  universe. 

This  argument  seems  to  be  in  perfect  harmony  with 
common  sense;  and  the  inductive  canon,  known  as  the 
method  of  concomitant  variations,  appears  to  justify  the 
conclusion.  Yet  the  superficiality  of  the  argument  is 
evident.  Materialism  always  starts  with  the  assumption 
that  matter  is  a  perfectly  clear  notion,  and  that  it  is 
known  as  a  noumenon.  It  is  an  almost  impossible  in- 
sight to  the  materialist  that  matter  as  noumenon  is  a 
purely  metaphysical  and  speculative  notion,  It  rarely 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.     377 

or  never  occurs  to  him  that  his  atoms  and  molecules  are 
as  purely  matters  of  inference  as  are  God  and  the  soul. 
Accordingly,  he  insists  that  there  is  no  telling  what 
matter  can  do.  Every  day  it  is  growing  in  mystery  and 
capacity.  Hence,  h#  says,  it  is  the  height  of  rashness  to 
say  what  matter  cannot  do.  We  see  it  explaining  the 
organism;  and  we  see  nothing  but  matter  in  the  organ- 
ism. The  simplicity  of  this  position  both  disarms  crit- 
icism and  renders  it  unnecessary.  We  merely  mention 
it  to  put  the  reader  on  his  guard  against  the  unconscious 
imposition  which  the  materialist  practices  upon  himself 
at  this  point.  In  truth,  materialism  is  based  less  on  ob- 
servation than  on  a  metaphysical  theory;  and  its  meta- 
physics are  based  on  the  imagination  rather  than  on 
reason.  It  does  not  think  in  concepts,  but  in  images; 
and  its  reasoning  is  a  train  of  misapplied  sense-pictures. 
In  this  respect  materialism  is  still  on  the  level  of  the 
brute  mind;  in  which,  probably,  all  seeming  reasoning  is 
but  a  semi-pictorial  association  of  sense-experiences. 
The  essence  of  superstition,  also,  consists  in  mistaking 
sense-images,  with  their  spatial  and  temporal  conditions, 
for  thoughts  and  principles.  In  this  respect  material- 
ism belongs  to  the  family  of  superstitions. 

We  said  that  to  unreflecting  common  sense  the  ma- 
terialistic argument  must  seem  very  forcible.  However, 
common  sense  lives  more  by  instinct  than  by  logic;  and 
on  this  account  it  has  never  favored  materialism.  The 
word  soul,  occurring  in  all  cultivated  languages,  and  the 
content  of  the  word,  indicates  a  general  belief  that  the 
soul  is  not  a  passing  phase  of  matter,  but  an  abiding 
essence.  In  its  spontaneous  language  the  race  has  re* 


378  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

corded  its  verdict  against  materialism;  and  this  fact 
constitutes  a  great  presumption  in  favor  of  the  spiritual 
philosophv.  We  proceed  to  the  argument. 

The  positive  argument  for  materialism  is  weak  and 
indecisive.  Apart  from  any  opposing  facts  or  argu- 
ments, it  could  never  prove  more  than  a  possibility. 
This  positive  argument  consists  entirely  in  repeating  the 
unquestioned  fact  that  the  body  affects  the  mind.  But 
this  is  no  new  discovery;  it  has  been  known  and  un- 
doubted from  the  beginning.  And  the  various  discov- 
eries of  physiology  in  connection  with  the  nerves  and 
the  brain,  have  no  more  significance  than  the  general 
fact  of  interaction  between  mind  and  body.  Confusion 
is  very  common  at  this  point.  Some  one  discovers  that 
if  some  little  nerve  be  diseased,  or  if  some  peculiar  drug 
be  taken,  there  may  be  an  abnormal  mental  outcome. 
And  such  a  fact  is  at  once  trumpeted  abroad  as  a  new 
proof  of  materialism.  Yet  such  a  fact  reveals  no  new 
principle.  It  is  only  one  further  specification  of  the 
undoubted  fact  that  the  body  affects  the  mind.  The 
general  fact  means  as  much  as  any  amount  of  detailed 
fact;  for  the  detailed  fact  is  but  the  general  fact  speci- 
fied. Suppose  it  were  proved  that  the  brain  acts  in 
parts,  or  that  the  localization  doctrine  were  fully  estab- 
lished, materialism  could  find  no  more  in  such  a  fact, 
than  in  the  general  fact  that,  at  present,  the  mind  is 
conditioned  by  the  brain.  To  say  that  the  mind  acts 
through  the  brain  at  all,  is  fully  as  materialistic  as  to 
say  that  it  acts  through  certain  parts  of  the  brain.  In 
seeing,  the  optic  nerve  is  chiefly  concerned.  In  hear- 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.     379 

ing,  the  auditory  nerve  is  chiefly  concerned.  What  is 
there  more  materialistic  in  saying  that  in  some  forms  of 
mental  activity,  some  particular  part  of  the  brain  may 
be  concerned  more  than  some  other  part  ?  A  curious 
delusion  seems  to  possess  both  the  spiritualist  and  the 
materialist  on  this  point.  The  spiritualist  admits  the 
general  fact  of  interaction  with  great  cheerfulness;  but 
he  forgets  that  a  general  interaction  can  exist  only 
through  a  multitude  of  specific  and  particular  interac- 
tions; and  hence  he  grows  nervous  when  he  hears  of 
some  new  doctrine  about  the  brain.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  materialist  fancies  that  detailed  and  obscure  inter- 
actions have  vastly  more  significance  than  the  patent 
ones  with  which  we  have  always  been  familiar.  Both 
views  are  plainly  erroneous.  The  fact  that  rum  or 
opium  produce  peculiar  mental  effects,  or  that  when  the 
brains  are  out  the  man  will  die,  is  fully  as  significant,  as 
far  as  materialism  is  concerned,  as  the  most  occult  facts 
of  brain  physiology.  And  this  universal  admission  of 
interaction  between  soul  and  body  renders  the  material- 
istic conclusion  from  it  worthless.  For  upon  any  the- 
ory the  same  facts  would  exist.  Those  who  believe  in 
the  existence  of  the  soul  never  pretend  that  it  is  inde- 
pendent of  the  body,  or  that  it  can  carry  on  its  activities 
without  regard  to  physical  conditions.  On  the  contrary, 
they  clearly  recognize  that  at  present  mental  activity  is 
conditioned  by  the  body,  and  more  especially  by  the 
nervous  system.  This  being  so,  they  expect  the  condi- 
tion of  the  organism  to  affect  the  mental  product.  It 
is  perfectly  plain  on  their  supposition,  that  the  condi- 
tion of  the  body  must  be  a  factor  of  the  mental  out- 
25 


380  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

come.  If  the  machine  be  in  order,  so  that  it  follows  its 
proper  law,  and  supplies  the  right  conditions  for  the 
unfolding  of  mental  activity,  then  we  may  expect  a 
normal  unfolding.  But  if  the  machine  be  abnormal,  of 
course  the  mental  phenomena  must  be  disturbed  and 
abnormal  also.  If  the  nerves  should  begin  to  storm 
the  soul  with  strange  and  chaotic  sensations,  which 
should  traverse  and  break  up  the  accustomed  order,  the 
mind  would  be  lost  in  hopeless  bewilderment  and  insan- 
ity. If,  on  the  other  hand,  the  mind  were  in  full  pos- 
session of  itself,  but  the  nerves  were  disordered,  the 
signals  by  which  one  mind  communicates  with  another 
would  become  incoherent  and  meaningless.  If,  then, 
these  facts  were  all,  the  result  must  be  a  drawn  battle 
between  materialism  and  spiritualism.  The  materialist 
would  hardly  be  willing  to  allow  this;  but  that  only 
shows  that  he  cannot  distinguish  between  facts  of  expe- 
rience and  his  metaphysical  theory,  that  all  being  is 
material.  But  as  this  theory  is,  to  say  the  least,  sheer 
assumption,  we  allow  it  no  weight  as  an  argument. 

The  question  is :  How  shall  we  account  for  the  facts 
of  the  mental  life  ?  The  spiritualist  says,  that  we  must 
assume  an  abiding  mental  subject.  The  materialist  says, 
that  we  can  explain  it  by  the  activities  of  matter.  And 
here  we  repeat  once  more,  that  this  is  not  a  case  of  fact 
against  theory,  but  of  theory  against  theory.  The  ma- 
terialist's matter  is  as  much  a  speculative  assumption  as 
is  the  spiritualist's  soul.  Nor  is  the  question,  what  we 
shall  call  the  cause  of  mental  phenomena;  but,  rather, 
how  we  shall  think  of  it.  A  great  difficulty  of  the  ma- 
terialistic doctrine  is,  that  it  makes  more  of  the  word 


TEE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.     381 

matter  than  of  the  thing.  We  have  no  definition  of 
matter;  and  while  the  name  is  constantly  repeated,  the 
notion  is  left  very  indefinite.  The  spiritualist  points 
out  that  matter,  as  commonly  conceived,  cannot  be  the 
cause  of  mental  phenomena,  because  mentality  and  ma- 
teriality are  absolutely  incommensurable.  The  essential 
phenomenon  of  matter  is  motion.  The  essential  phe- 
nomena of  mind  are  thought,  feeling,  and  volition.  By 
no  possibility  can  these  be  identified,  or  can  the  latter 
be  deduced  from  the  former.  To  explain  one  phenom- 
enon by  another  consists  in  identifying  it  as  a  special 
case  of  the  other;  and  when  there  is  no  common  factor, 
identification  is  impossible,  as  a  matter  of  definition. 
Now  if  we  conceive  a  brain  composed  of  material  ele- 
ments, and  conceive  all  kinds  of  shakings  to  take  place 
in  it,  we  see  nothing  but  other  shakings  as  the  result. 
No  matter  how  complicated  or  rapid  these  motions  may 
be,  they  remain  motions  still.  In  short,  the  movable, 
as  such,  is  only  capable  of  motion;  and  motion  is  totally 
unlike  thought.  It  is  a  matter  of  definition  only,  that 
the  merely  movable  contains  no  explanation  of  mind. 
The  complete  unlikeness  of  mental  and  material  phe- 
nomena makes  it  impossible  to  regard  the  former  as 
phases  of  the  latter.  A  small  quibble  is  sometimes  at- 
tempted, based  on  the  double  meaning  of  such  words  as 
light,  heat,  sound,  etc.  Sound  is  unlike  the  instrument, 
but  is  a  product  of  it,  nevertheless.  The  answer  is  evi- 
dent. Sound,  physically,  is  vibration  either  in  the  in- 
strument or  in  the  air.  Sound,  physiologically,  exists 
only  in  the  mind,  and  is  not  properly  produced  by  the 
instrument.  While  we  remain  in  the  physical  realm  we 


382  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

have  only  vibration  following  vibration,  and  no  essen- 
tial unlikeness.  The  same  is  true  for  the  other  words. 
The  modern  materialist  recognizes  this  difficulty,  and 
proposes  to  escape  it  by  a  new  definition  of  matter. 
Matter,  as  the  movable,  explains  only  motion;  but  may 
not  matter  as  mystic  explain  mind  ?  Mentality  and  ma- 
teriality are,  indeed,  incommensurable,  but  both  are  phe- 
nomenal. Why  may  they  not  both  be  the  manifestation 
of  the  same  substance,  so  that  what  appears  here  as 
matter,  appears  yonder  as  mind  ?  If  by  matter  we  mean 
only  a  swarm  of  little  lumps,  like  grains  of  sand  but 
very  much  smaller,  of  course  it  is  impossible  to  get  life 
and  thought  from  them.  But  why  may  we  not  enlarge 
our  notion  of  matter,  and  think  of  it  as  something  higher 
and  better  than  we  have  been  accustomed  to  do  ?  We 
think  of  it  as  something  crude  and  groveling,  and  fail 
to  notice  the  wonderful  and  mystic  powers  which  it  has. 
Among  recent  writers,  no  one  has  insisted  upon  this 
extension  more  strongly  than  Professor  Tyndall.  The 
notion  that  matter,  as  ordinarily  conceived,  can  explain 
life  and  mind,  he  denounces  as  "  absurd,  monstrous,  and 
fit  only  for  the  intellectual  gibbet."  At  the  same  time 
he  "  prolongs  his  vision  backward,  and  discerns  in  mat- 
ter the  promise  and  potency  "  of  every  thing.  To  the 
philosophical  student,  this  doctrine  is  nothing  new.  He 
recognizes  in  it  the  hylozoism  of  the  early  Greek  spec- 
ulators, according  to  which  matter  is  a  plastic  something 
with  wonderful  powers,  which  it  manifests  upon  occa- 
sion. The  doctrine  is  just  vague  enough  to  suit  the 
materialist.  By  forgetting  that  atoms,  if  real,  are  indi- 
viduals, the  doctrine  can  be  turned  into  pantheism,  By 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.     333 

resuming  the  principle  of  individuality,  we  can  pass 
back  to  atomism.  By  judiciously  remembering  and 
forgetting,  we  can  be  atomists  and  pantheists  at  pleas- 
ure. We  can  reduce  every  thing  to  molecular  mechan- 
ics, and  we  can  dilate  on  the  unknowable  "mystery  of 
matter."  By  leaving  the  notion  of  matter  quite  unde- 
termined, it  is  also  easy  to  deduce  every  thing  from  it. 
We  have  but  to  assume  that  all  being  is  material,  and 
enlarge  the  notion  to  meet  the  exigency.  If  we  only 
call  it  matter,  we  can  rely  on  common  sense,  taking  the 
word  in  its  ordinary  meaning;  while  by  meaning  some- 
thing, no  one  knows  exactly  what,  but  at  all  events 
something  quite  out  of  the  common,  we  shall  be  able  to 
defend  ourselves  against  the  spiritualists.  This  indefi- 
niteness  is  of  great  value  in  materialistic  polemics. 
The  argument  is  rather  curious.  We  cannot  tell  what 
matter  can  do,  therefore,  it  may  well  explain  mind. 
After  a  moment's  stay  in  the  potential  mood,  nothing  is 
easier  than  to  pass  into  the  indicative,  and  announce  that 
matter  is  all-sufficient.  The  fact  that  the  known  prop- 
erties of  matter  give  no  hint  of  an  explanation  of  mind 
would  seem  to  form  a  presumption  that  the  unknown 
properties  will  succeed  no  better.  A  possible  yes  is 
also  a  possible  no.  But  this  simple  fact  never  occurs  to 
the  materialist.  The  great  art  of  materialistic  argu- 
ment at  present,  consists  in  appeals  to  the  unknown  pos- 
sible, and  in  calling  that  unknown  possible,  matter. 
Matter  will  not  explain  thought  and  feeling,  says  the 
spiritualist.  How  do  you  know  it  will  not  ?  asks  the 
materialist.  Its  known  properties  do  not,  of  course, 
but  its  unknown  properties  do.  And  this  is  an  expla- 


384  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

™  Uion !  As  if  the  debate  were  about  a  name,  or  as  if 
one  speculator  had  not  as  much  right  to  the  unknown 
possible  as  another.  Every- where  else  explanation  of  one 
thing  by  another  must  rest  upon  what  we  know;  but  here 
explanation  may  rest  upon  what  we  do  not  know,  and 
may  pass  for  explanation  still!  Every  other  speculator 
must  show  some  positive  title  before  taking  possession; 
the  materialist  moves  in,  like  an  intellectual  squatter, 
and  refuses  to  go  without  a  writ  of  ejectment.  Yet  this 
dealing  with  fancied  possibilities  serves  to  amuse  the 
materialist,  and  to  confuse  the  simple-minded.  Through- 
out this  hylozoistic  speculation,  there  run  the  baseless 
assumptions  to  which  we  have  referred:  (1)  That  matter 
is  known  as  causal  noumenon.  (2)  That  all  being  is  ma- 
terial. (3)  That  creation  is  impossible.  It  is  further 
vitiated  by  the  notion  that  the  name  is  the  thing  in  de- 
bate; whereas,  since  matter  is  an  undetermined  notion, 
we  set  out  to  determine  how  we  shall  think  of  it,  in 
order  to  make  it  the  sufficient  explanation  of  the  facts. 
The  hylozoists  forbid  us  to  think  of  it  as  common  sense 
does.  It  is  the  mystic  and  marvelous  something,  accord- 
ing to  Professor  Tyndall,  which  performs  all  the  won- 
ders of  nature.  It  being  mystic  and  marvelous,  what 
shall  hinder  us  from  viewing  it  as  intelligent,  if  the 
facts  point  that  way?  If  we  can  tell  what  matter  is  only 
by  observing  what  it  can  do,  why  may  we  not  ascribe 
intelligence  to  it,  if  it  acts  intelligently?  Certainly  in- 
telligence is  a  better  explanation  of  intelligible  action 
than  any  amount  of  mystical  qualities.  Here  the  hy- 
lozoist  draws  back,  and  thus  shows  the  contradiction  of 
his  position.  At  one  time  he  holds  the  vulgar  notion 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.     385 

of  matter,  at  another  he  holds  the  hylozoistic.  It  is 
perfectly  clear  that  if  we  give  no  definition  of  matter 
except  that  it  is  the  cause  of  nature,  and  explain  mind 
by  spiritualizing  or  mysticizing  matter,  the  debate 
threatens  to  become  a  war  of  words.  Indeed,  this  hylo- 
zoistic revival  must  be  viewed  as  a  scientific  regress. 
It  is  useless  to  the  theoretical  physicist,  as  he  stops  with 
molecular  mechanics,  and  does  not  ask  how  mechanics 
is  possible.  It  is  also  useless  in  scientific  explanation. 
There  are  two  clear  notions,  mechanism  and  final  cause, 
on  which  all  rational  explanation  depends.  Mechanism 
as  the  law  of  all  spatial  changes,  and  final  cause  as  the 
determining  principle  of  mechanism,  afford  the  mind 
rest  and  rational  satisfaction  when  a  phenomenon  is  in- 
terpreted by  them;  and  no  other  principles  will  be 
found  sufficient.  But  hylozoism  confounds  both  and 
leaves  room  for  neither.  It  has  no  more  value  in  psy- 
chology. It  does  not  explain  mentality,  but  by  an  act 
of  violence  posits  mentality  and  materiality  side  by 
side  in  the  same  subject.  This  juxtaposition  of  incom- 
mensurable qualities  is  mistaken  for  an  explanation. 
The  hylozoistic  revival  is  entirely  due  to  the  attempt 
to  make  matter  all-embracing.  By  consequence,  all 
principles  and  definitions  are  confounded,  and  the  out- 
come is  still  greater  confusion.  "Mind-stuff"  and 
"  double-faced  somewhats  "  are  now  playing  an  import- 
ant part  in  materialistic  arguments.  The  result  is  a 
school  of  philosophical  mermaids,  such  as  cannot  be 
found  this  side  of  the  earliest  Greek  speculation. 

We  shall  gain  nothing  by  further  examination  of  the 
materialistic  argument.     In  its  best  estate,  it  is  less  an 


386  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

argument  than  an  uncritical  and  infantile  assumption. 
The  largest  possible  conclusion  of  the  argument,  as  we 
have  seen,  is  the  possible  truth  of  materialism;  but  as 
the  same  facts  are  equally  well  accounted  for  on  the 
opposite  theory,  the  result  thus  far  is  a  drawn  battle. 
For  the  sake  of  progress,  therefore,  we  pass  to  inquire 
whether  there  are  any  facts  of  our  mental  life  which 
turn  the  scales  in  favor  of  spiritualism.  And  in  dis- 
cussing this  question  we  limit  materialism  to  some  form 
of  the  atomic  theory.  When  matter  is  viewed  as  one 
rather  than  discrete,  it  is  not  properly  materialism  but 
pantheism,  or  philosophic  substantialism.  With  this 
understanding,  we  are  willing  to  allow  both  the  hylo- 
zoist's  and  the  idealist's  assumptions  concerning  the 
atoms.  Even  if  we  view  each  atom  as  having  a  soul, 
or  as  endowed  with  a  kind  of  life  and  the  most  myste- 
rious and  wonderful  powers,  it  is  still  impossible  to  un- 
derstand the  mental  life  without  assuming  a  single  and 
abiding  soul.  There  are  great  capital  facts  of  expe- 
rience which  cannot  be  explained  on  any  other  theory. 
There  are  the  unity  and  possibility  of  conscioupness,  the 
facts  of  memory  and  reasoning,  and  our  power  of  action. 
This  last  fact  is  often  described  as  freedom,  but  the  two 
notions  are  not  coextensive.  Determinism,  as  well  as 
true  freedom,  is  incompatible  with  materialism.  For 
whatever  can  act,  even  though  its  activity  be  deter- 
mined, is  a  true  subject.  It  is  not  necessary,  therefore^ 
to  insist  upon  proper  freedom;  a  power  of  determined 
action  is  inconsistent  with  materialism.  These  general 
facts  have  long  been  urged  by  the  spiritualist,  and  have 
never  been  explained  away.  In  this  strait  of  his  sys- 


TEE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.       387 

tern  the  materialist  contents  himself  with  calling  the 
argument  an  old  one,  as  if  an  old  argument  might  not 
be  solid.  Until  it  is  refuted,  therefore,  the  spiritualist 
will  continue  to  urge  it.  We  deal  with  the  facts  in 
the  order  mentioned. 

The  unity  of  the  thinking  subject  is  affirmed  by  many 
to  be  a  direct  utterance  of  consciousness.  This  is 
rather  hasty.  Consciousness  does  not  tell  us  how  we 
are  made;  and  we  cannot  properly  be  said  to  be  con- 
scious of  the  falsehood  of  materialism.  The  unity  of 
the  thinking  subject  is  less  a  deliverance  of  conscious- 
ness than  a  necessary  condition  of  all  consciousness. 
We  shall  return  to  this  point  hereafter;  at  present  we 
call  attention  to  some  unquestioned  facts  of  conscious- 
ness. Thus  I  think,  I  feel,  I  act.  I  exist  to-day;  I  ex- 
isted yesterday,  and  through  all  the  past  to  which  my 
memory  reaches.  No  one  can  question  these  facts  as 
they  exist  for  himself.  To  deny  them,  or  to  throw 
doubt  upon  them,  would  plunge  us  into  hopeless  skep- 
ticism, and  science  does  not  lie  in  that  direction.  Now, 
wherever  there  is  an  act  there  is  something  which  acts. 
Wherever  there  is  a  state,  there  is  a  subject  of  that 
state.  Wherever  there  is  thought  there  is  a  thinker. 
Now,  I  think;  what  is  this  "I"  which  thinks?  The 
spiritualist  says  it  is  the  unitary,  substantial  soul,  which 
abides  across  the  years,  and  gathers  up  its  past  and 
present  experiences  in  the  unity  of  its  own  existence. 
This  view  is  so  much  like  the  direct  voice  of  conscious- 
ness, that  many  fail  to  distinguish  between  them.  It 
is  in  complete  harmony  with  the  facts  of  experience 


388  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

and  with  universal  common  sense.  The  materialist  de- 
nies that  there  is  any  substantial  soul  which  thinks, 
feels,  acts,  etc.;  but  he  is  bound  to  tell  us  what  does 
think,  etc.  He  will  say  that  the  brain  thinks,  but  this 
is  not  clear.  The  brain  is  not  a  unit,  but  an  assemblage 
of  atoms;  and  an  assemblage,  as  such,  is  nothing.  The 
reality  of  an  assemblage  is  the  elements  which  make  it 
up.  We  are  apt,  here,  to  confuse  ourselves  with  the 
notion  that  when  several  things  work  together  they  may 
do  something  for  which  no  one  of  them  is  accountable. 
Of  course,  things  may  act  differently  in  combination, 
but  the  act  is  still  the  act  of  the  things,  and  not  of  the 
combination;  for  a  combination  is  only  the  sum  of  the 
individuals,  and  the  act  of  a  combination  is  only  the 
sum  of  the  acts  of  the  individuals,  just  as  public  opinion 
is  only  the  integral  of  individual  opinions.  The  effect 
must  be  distributed  among  the  causes;  and  if  there  be 
any  effect  which  is  indivisible,  it  must  be  referred  to  a 
single  cause.  Hence,  to  say  that  the  brain  thinks,  can 
only  mean  that  the  elements  think  which  compose  the 
brain.  But  which  of  them?  Do  they  all  think  ?  Why, 
then,  is  not  the  ego  many  instead  of  one  ?  Is  my  com- 
plete thought  in  each  of  the  elements  just  as  it  is  in  each 
mind  which  thinks  it?  In  that  case  we  explain  my 
thought  by  positing  an  indefinite  number  of  thinkers, 
instead  of  the  single  thinker  which  the  spiritualist  af- 
firms. But  if  my  complete  thought  is  not  in  each  of 
them,  what  is  meant  by  attributing  a  fraction  of  a 
thought  to  each?  And  how  could  these  fractions  be 
brought  together  to  form  a  complete  thought?  The 
notion  baffles  comprehension,  and  still  more,  construe- 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.     -389 

tion.  But  if  all  the  elements  do  not  think,  but  now  one 
and  now  another,  how  does  the  second  know  what  was 
going  on  in  the  first,  so  that  it  can  take  up  the  thread 
of  conscious  thought  just  where  the  other  dropped  it, 
and  that,  too,  so  deftly  that  mental  continuity  is  in  no 
way  disturbed  ?  How  comes  there  to  be  any  unity  in 
our  mental  life  on  this  theory  ?  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that  these  atoms  are  ontologically  just  as  distinct 
as  the  persons  in  a  crowd;  and  hence  they  contain  no 
explanation  of  the  unity  of  the  ego.  But  as  they  ap- 
pear to  be  substantial  and  abiding  egos,  why  not  allow 
our  own  souls  to  be  such  also? 

But  the  materialist  would  hardly  have  the  courage 
to  attribute  proper  thought  and  consciousness  to  the 
elements.  He  thinks  that  in  some  way  thought  and 
consciousness  may  result  without  any  substantial  sub- 
ject. Accordingly,  he  says  that  the  elements  do  not 
properly  think,  although  they  are  very  mysterious;  but 
when  the  elements  are  combined  in  certain  ways  mental 
phenomena  result.  These  hang  over  the  physical  stream 
as  the  bow  hangs  over  the  cataract,  but  they  have  no 
substantial  subject.  Here,  however,  consciousness  pro- 
tests, and  declares  that  the  ego  is  the  substantial  sub- 
ject of  the  mental  life;  but  materialism  assures  us  that 
consciousness  is  quite  mistaken.  The  ego  which  seems 
to  think,  feel,  and  act  is  nothing  but  the  sum  of  the 
phenomena,  and  never  their  source.  In  fact,  there  is 
nothing  which  thinks  and  feels;  but  there  is  thinking 
and  feeling.  The  elements  do  not  think,  and  the  self  is 
nothing.  But  this  is  so  long  a  step  toward  utter  skep- 
ticism that  we  hesitate  to  take  it.  If  the  self  who 


390  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

thinks  is  really  not  the    determining   subject  of   the 
thought,  one  can  hardly  trust  the  thought;  that,  also, 
may  well  be  a  chimera.     But  here  the  understanding 
protests  that  it  cannot  even  conceive  what  is  meant  by 
thoughts  and  feelings  without  a  subject.      They  are 
words  which  have  a  meaning  only  in  connection  with 
some  subject  which  feels  and  thinks.     Apart  from  this 
connection  they  are  empty  of  all  content.     We  have 
here  a  depraved  form  of   scholasticism.      Sensations, 
thoughts,  etc.,  are  only  known  as  states  or  acts  of  a 
mind.     The  materialist  breaks  them  from  the  only  con- 
nection in  which  they  have  any  meaning,  and  then  pa- 
rades them  as  the  prim  of  the  mind  itself.     Now,  as  the 
materialist  will  not  allow  the  substantiality  of  self,  and 
as  thoughts  must  have  a  subject,  the  materialist  can  only 
return  to  the  doctrine  that  the  atoms  think.     But  this 
brings  back  all  the  difficulties  which  beset  the  attempt 
to  explain  the  unity  of  thought  and  consciousness  from 
the  action  of  a  manifold.     We  pass  over  these  objec- 
tions, and  point  out  that  proper  consciousness  cannot 
exist  at  all  without  a  unitary  subject.     The  conscious- 
ness of  an  instant  is  a  vanishing  quantity;  and  if  there 
were  no  means  of  summing  up  many  states  into  one, 
consciousness  would  perish  as  fast  as  it  is  born.     The 
fleeting  state  must  in  some  way  be  fixed  before  con- 
sciousness is  possible;  and  this  can  be  done  only  by  an 
abiding  subject,  which  gathers  up  in  the  unity  of  its  ex- 
istence the  states  which  else  were  lost.     In  any  act  of 
consciousness  we  find  a  composite  of  this  kind.     Pres- 
ent states,  remembered  states,  imagined  states,  all  enter 
into  a  single  phase  of  consciousness.      But  these  fall 


TEE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.       391 

hopelessly  asunder,  except  as  they  are  the  states  of  a 
common  subject.  At  this  point  both  materialist  and 
empiricist  commit  a  grave  oversight.  They  both  speak 
of  consciousness  as  a  series  or  succession  of  states,  and 
never  raise  the  question  how  a  series  is  possible,  or  how 
succession  can  be  known  as  such.  Succession  can  be 
known  only  by  something  which  abides.  We  must  be 
able  to  contrast  the  passing  with  the  abiding  before  suc- 
cession can  be  recognized.  Hence,  a  consciousness  which 
was  only  a  succession  could  never  be  aware  of  itself  as 
such.  Moreover,  succession  is  not  a  series.  That  things 
should  really  follow  one  another  does  not  constitute 
them  a  series.  They  form  a  series  only  as  the  members 
of  the  succession  are  grasped  in  one  and  the  same 
thought.  The  necessary  condition,  therefore,  for  the 
existence  of  a  series  is,  that  one  and  the  same  being  shall 
grasp  all  its  members  in  one  thought.  If  the  subject 
were  composite,  the  series  or  the  succession  could  never 
be  known  to  exist.  Hence,  the  many  can  exist,  as  such, 
only  for  the  one.  Apart  from  the  unifying  thought, 
the  many  is  but  a  repetition  of  the  individual.  It  is  not 
number,  but  the  unrelated  unit  repeated,  and  it  becomes 
properly  plural  only  in  thought.  Hence  we  say  that 
not  merely  our  consciousness  of  unity,  but  much  more 
our  consciousness  of  plurality,  is  impossible  without  the 
strict  unity  of  the  thinking  subject.  While,  then,  the 
materialist  insists  that  our  consciousness  of  our  unity 
may  be  illusive,  we  point  out  that  the  unity  of  self  is 
an  indispensable  condition  of  all  consciousness  whatever. 
We  pass  next  to  the  fact  of  memory.  This  fact, 
again,  cannot  be  questioned  without  landing  us  in  hope- 


392  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

less  skepticism.  Now,  physiology  teaches  that  the  body 
is  incessantly  changing,  but  none  the  less  does  the  per- 
sonality remain  unchanged.  I  am  the  same  person  that 
I  was  years  ago,  and  I  now  recall  the  events  which  then 
happened  to  me.  Here  is  another  fact  which  every  the- 
ory must  explain.  Spiritualism  explains  it  by  saying  that 
the  soul  is  a  substantial  subject  which  has  existed  through 
these  years,  and  which  is  able  to  gather  up  its  parts  and 
carry  it  with  it.  Materialism  rejects  this  view,  but  none 
the  less  must  it  account  for  the  fact.  There  is  memory ; 
what  remembers?  Consciousness  says  I,  the  abiding 
person,  remember;  but  materialism  says,  there  is  no 
abiding  self.  What,  then,  does  remember?  Sometimes 
it  says,  the  brain  remembers;  but  this  we  cannot  allow, 
for  the  reasons  recently  given.  If  the  brain  remembers, 
that  can  only  mean  that  the  elements  which  make  the 
brain  remember.  But  the  elements  in  the  brain  to-day 
are  not  the  elements  which  composed  the  brain  a  month 
or  a  year  ago.  And  yet  these  elements,  which  now  ap- 
pear here  for  the  first  time,  have,  somehow  or  other,  got 
possession  of  my  past  mental  life.  Here  is  a  capital 
fact.  The  materialist  has  to  explain  it.  Here  is  the 
passing  stream  of  atoms,  but  here  is  the  abiding  person. 
The  atoms  which  had  my  past  experience  have  gone,  and 
we  should  suppose  they  would  have  carried  the  expe- 
rience with  them.  But,  strangely  enough,  the  experience 
has  remained,  and  these  new  atoms  know  all  about  it. 
Did  the  passing  atoms  whisper  it  to  the  new-comers  as 
they  slipped  out?  Were  they  able  to  give  a  kind  of 
pass-word  or  countersign  as  they  went  away?  And 
were  the  incoming  atoms  able  so  to  improve  the  hint 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.       393 

given  that  we  should  never  dream  of  the  change?  But 
Uhis  would  be  to  turn  science  into  sheer  fetichism,  and  to 
invoke  magic  as  an  explanation.  No  one  can  seriously 
believe  that  any  thing  of  the  kind  takes  place.  Yet 
here  are  the  elements  which,  by  hypothesis,  are  here 
for  the  first  time,  and  yet  they  have  with  them  the 
whole  of  our  mental  life.  The  materialist  must  give 
some  explanation. 

To  escape  these  whimsical  implications  of  his  doc- 
trine the  materialist  often  resorts  to  an  illustration. 
He  will  not  allow  that  the  elements  remember,  but  there 
i?  remembering  without  any  thing  which  remembers. 
In  a  sense,  he  says,  the  body  remembers  its  past  expe- 
rience. In  particular,  scars  abide  across  all  bodily 
change,  and  never  wash  nor  wear  out.  Here  we  have  a 
case  of  physical  memory.  Unfortunately,  this  is  only  a 
figure  of  speech,  and  the  illustration  fails  to  illustrate. 
If  the  scar  were  conscious  of  itself  •  as  a  unitary,  think- 
ing subject,  and  an  abiding  personality,  then  the  illus- 
tration would  be  pertinent.  Until  we  have  some  ground 
for  regarding  a  scar  as  a  conscious  ego,  we  shall  reckon 
this  illustration  among  the  superficialities  which,  like  a 
clinging  curse,  seem  inseparable  from  materialistic  rea- 
soning. In  fact,  a  scar  is  not  ontologically  the  same  for 
any  two  consecutive  instants;  but,  like  a  river,  has  its 
identity  only  in  the  mind  of  the  observer.  The  same  is 
true  for  the  claim  that  the  identity  of  the  personality 
rests  on  the  identity  of  the  body.  In  a  proper  sense, 
the  visible  body  has  no  identity.  As  Leibnitz  long  ago 
pointed  out,  we  know  of  only  one  case  of  true  identity, 
and  that  is  the  case  of  the  conscious  spirit.  This  is  the 


394  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

type  of  all  unity  and  identity  to  us,  and  we  know  of 
no  other.  Now  if  we  allow  the  existence  of  a  unitary 
soul  in  connection  with  the  body,  the  facts  of  memory 
become  clear  and  luminous.  If  we  deny  it,  they  are 
utterly  opaque  and  unintelligible.  The  mental  lif  3  falls 
asunder,  and  becomes  merely  a  magical  illusion.  But 
we  must  go  further,  and  declare  of  memory,  as  of  con- 
sciousness, that  it  is  strictly  impossible  without  a  unit- 
ary subject.  For  memory  is  not  constituted  by  a  suc- 
cession of  experiences.  It  exists  only  as  the  successive 
experiences  are  gathered  up  in  a  single  act  which  binds 
them  together  in  one.  Some  materialists,  however,  ap- 
ply heroic  treatment  to  this  question.  They  say  that 
memory,  like  all  mental  acts,  is  only  a  function  of  mat- 
ter, and  precisely  similar  bodies  must  have  precisely 
similar  memories,  no  matter  what  their  past  history 
may  have  been.  Imagine  a  body  about  to  be  formed 
which  shall  be  an  exact  copy  of  that  of  Socrates  as  he 
was  conversing  with  his  disciples  on  the  fatal  night. 
The  deed  is  done,  and  a  living  being  stands  before  us 
whose  memory  reports  the  trial,  the  conviction,  the 
sentence,  and  all  the  other  events  of  the  real  Socrates's 
life.  It  would  be  the  real  Socrates.  Memory,  there- 
fore, has  no  relation  to  time.  It  is  only  a  peculiar  phase 
of  mental  action,  and  the  distinction  of  past  and  pres- 
ent is  delusive.  On  this  theory,  for  all  we  know,  we 
have  just  been  made.  This  view  needs  no  criticism;  its 
statement  is  enough.  And  yet  consistent  materialism 
must  accept  this  view,  or  else  allow  that  the  atoms  truly 
remember,  and  that  the  outgoing  atoms  pass  the  history 
on  to  those  which  come  after  them.  Any  theory  which 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.       395 

makes  the  mental  life  depend  merely  on  the  form  or 
mode  of  combination  of  the  elements,  is  forced  to  deny 
that  memory  has  any  relation  to  time,  but  is  only  a 
special  form  of  mental  illusion. 

The  general  fact  of  reasoning  needs  only  a  brief  no- 
tice, as  the  course  of  the  argument  is  evident.  The  sim- 
plest syllogism  is  impossible  unless  the  mental  subject 
is  strictly  one.  If  A  think  the  major  premise  and  B 
the  minor,  there  can  be  no  conclusion.  All  reasoning 
implies  that  the  same  subject  shall  think  both  premises 
in  order  to  the  conclusion.  If  the  subject  be  plural  or 
composite,  the  conclusion  fails.  Now  the  whole  of  our 
rational  life  is  a  process  of  comparing  and  distinguish- 
ing, and  its  product  is  a  system  of  relations.  The  dis- 
covery of  relations  is  the  great  aim  of  science  and  reason- 
ing. But  to  compare  and  relate,  the  comparing  subject 
must  be  a  strict  unity.  Thus  from  every  side  the  unity 
and  reality  of  the  soul  are  forced  upon  us.  These 
amazing  atoms,  it  must  be  remembered,  are  no  facts  of 
observation;  they  are  merely  the  materialist's  hypoth- 
esis for  explaining  the  unity  of  thought  and  conscious- 
ness. And  as  they  utterly  fail  to  account  for  the  facts, 
we  decide  for  the  spiritual  theory,  which  finds  the  sub- 
ject of  the  mental  phenomena  in  a  single  substantial 
soul.  As  a  rule,  materialism  is  held  more  from  thought- 
lessness than  any  thing  else.  Its  disciples  commonly 
fail  to  come  to  close  quarters  with  the  problem,  but 
content  themselves  with  a  few  metaphors  about  the 
bow  on  the  mist,  the  melody  from  the  deaf  instrument, 
etc.  These  figures  of  speech  contain  all  the  argument 

needed;  to  inquire  whether  they  apply  to  the  case  would 
26 


396  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

be  a  useless  labor.  The  reason  why  the  professional 
materialist,  who  is  forced  to  recognize  the  capital  facts 
we  have  mentioned,  prefers  his  violent  distortions  of  ex- 
perience to  the  simple  and  luminous  doctrine  of  the  soul, 
is,  that  he  assumes  at  the  start  that  all  being  is  material. 
His  argument  owes  all  its  force  to  this  begging  of  the 
question.  Some  of  the  coarsest  type  of  materialists 
would  say  that  they  believe  in  matter  because  they  can 
see  it,  while  they  cannot  see  a  spirit;  but  any  material- 
ist whose  opinion  is  entitled  to  any  consideration,  would 
be  ashamed  of  such  crudeness. 

The  last  fact  we  offer  in  evidence  is  our  power  of  ac- 
tion. I  think,  is  no  more  a  fact  of  experience  than  I 
act.  I  count  for  something  in  the  course  of  events;  I 
am  a  source  of  activity;  I  am  a  power.  These  facts  are 
given  in  the  universal  consciousness,  and  materialism 
must  furnish  some  explanation.  This  power  of  action, 
however,  must  not  be  confounded  with  freedom.  Thus 
the  atom,  if  real,  has  a  power  of  acting  under  given 
circumstances,  and  of  acting  out  of  itself.  Whenever 
it  does  act,  it  is  the  source  of  the  action;  yet  the  atom 
is  not  free.  A  thing  may  have  power,  and  yet  be  de- 
termined in  its  activity;  but  whatever  has  power  must 
be  a  thing.  A  power  of  action  is  just  what  constitutes 
a  thing  and  distinguishes  it  from  nothing.  The  mate- 
rialist oddly  enough  confounds  philosophic  determin- 
ism with  physical  fatalism;  and  then  claims  all  deter- 
minists  as  agreeing  with  him!  But  the  two  notions  are 
totally  distinct  in  philosophy,  though  identical  for  mor- 
als. In  philosophic  determinism,  the  soul  is  a  true  sub- 
ject, but  its  activity  is  determined.  This  determination, 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.       39V 

however,  is  from  within  and  not  from  without.  It  is  a 
determination  by  the  soul's  nature,  and  not  by  external 
agency.  This  doctrine  allows  that  the  soul  is  a  source 
of  action,  but  claims  that  under  given  circumstances  it 
can  act  in  only  one  way.  No  more  does  it  question  our 
consciousness  that  we  act,  but  only  the  alleged  con- 
sciousness that  we  might  have  acted  otherwise.  Leib- 
nUz,  who,  with  Spinoza,  is  the  founder  of  determinism, 
also  asserted  in  the  strongest  manner  the  spontaneity 
and  reality  of  the  soul.  Both  writers  repudiated  the 
notion  of  an  external  compulsion  of  any  kind.  Physical 
fatalism,  on  the  other  hand,  denies  that  the  soul  is  any 
thing.  It  rejects  not  merely  our  alleged  consciousness 
of  pluripotentiality,  but  our  consciousness  of  action  of 
any  kind.  We  do  not  act.  Our  volition  counts  for 
nothing.  But  as  this  is  opposed  to  consciousness,  we 
must  declare  our  consciousness  of  action  to  be  sheer  de- 
lusion. We  must,  also,  declare  that  consciousness  in 
general  is  only  a  powerless  attendant  upon  the  physio- 
logical processes;  for  otherwise  we  should  have  to  at- 
tribute power  to  it.  These  processes  determine  every 
thing,  and  would  go  on  just  the  same  if  consciousness 
were  away.  For  since  consciousness  is  powerless,  its 
presence  adds  nothing,  and  its  absence  would  change 
nothing.  The  body  is  properly  an  automaton,  and  the 
mental  life  is  a  sort  of  delusive  halo  which  glows  about 
the  automaton,  yet  without  in  any  way  affecting  it. 

Nor  is  this  merely  a  conclusion  of  our  own.  Some  ex- 
pressly declare  that  we  are  only  conscious  automata, 
and  that  consciousness  itself  depends  on  the  imperfect 
adjustment  of  physiological  processes.  But  the  adjust- 


398  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

ment  of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations  is  ever  grow- 
ing in  exactness;  and  the  physiological  processes  are 
working  more  and  more  smoothly.  When  the  adjust- 
ment is  complete,  consciousness  will  cease;  and  whereas 
we  are  now  conscious  automata,  we  shall  then  be  un- 
conscious automata,  perfectly  adjusted  to  the  "  environ- 
ment." In  a  scheme  of  "  universal  progress,"  this  notion 
is  remarkable  as  a  specimen  of  anticlimax.  Now  to  this 
notion  of  physical  fatalism,  we  oppose  the  testimony  of 
universal  consciousness;  and  we  expressly  forbid  the 
attempt  to  smuggle  this  notion  into  respectability  by 
fathering  it  upon  philosophical  determinists.  A  doc- 
trine which  can  be  held  only  by  flying  in  the  face  of 
universal  common  sense  must  be  hooted  from  the  world 
of  thought,  unless  it  can  show  the  strongest  evidence  in 
its  favor.  And  what  is  this  evidence  ?  What  justifies 
this  buffeting  and  crucifixion  of  common  sense?  Why, 
the  simple  postulate  that  all  being  is  material.  Where  is 
the  proof  of  this  postulate?  There  is  no  proof;  postu- 
lates are  assumed.  Yet  to  carry  through  this  postulate, 
which  is  totally  without  proof,  and  which  belongs  only 
to  the  infancy  of  speculation,  consciousness  is  denied, 
common  sense  is  outraged,  and  science  is  plunged  into 
hopeless  skepticism.  Finally,  to  make  the  farce  as 
roaring  as  possible,  this  procedure  styles  itself  advanced 
science.  In  truth,  it  is  simply  insane  speculation,  the 
dogmatism  of  the  five  senses.  The  history  of  thought 
abounds  with  insanities,  but  certainly  with  none  greater 
than  this.  When  once  the  unifying  and  formulating 
mania  takes  possession  of  a  man,  unless  regulated  by 
constant  comparison  with  reality,  it  L  sure  to  treat  him 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  Oft  MATERIALISM.      399 

0 

as  the  devils  used  the  Gadarenes'  swine.  It  drives  him 
over  bush  and  brier,  and  finally  plunges  him  down  steep 
placesof  absurdity  into  unfathomable  depths  of  nonsense. 
But  nothing  avails  to  cast  the  mania  out.  Every  thing  is 
sacrificed  to  it.  To  his  whim  of  making  matter  all  suffi- 
cient, the  materialist  sacrifices  God,  religion,  science,  phi- 
losophy, the  universal  convictions  of  the  race,  memory, 
consciousness,  and,  finally,  his  own  personality.  Every 
thing  is  delusion  which  conflicts  with  the  sole  reality  of 
matter.  And  how  do  we  know  that  matter  is  all?  We 
have  the  materialist's  word  of  honor  for  it;  and  this, 
together  with  a  boisterous  and  vehement  assertion  of  the 
fact,  must  suffice.  The  entire  theory  is  an  odd  illustration 
of  the  principle  that  all  things  are  possible  to  him  that 
believeth.  But  reason  has  its  revenge.  Materialism 
repudiates  it,  and  it  repudiates  materialism. 

On  all  these  accounts  we  reject  materialism  as  a 
theory  of  the  mental  life,  and  decide  for  the  spiritual 
theory.  The  plainest  facts  of  consciousness  establish 
the  reality  and  unity  of  the  soul.  Both  from  the  side 
of  philosophy  and  from  the  side  of  the  facts,  material- 
ism appears  as  an  uncritical  and  superficial  dogmatism. 
Its  explanations  are  no  explanations,  and  its  conclusions 
are  mainly  a  begging  of  the  question,  based  on  the  as- 
sumption, (1)  that  matter  is  known  in  itself  and  as 
causal;  and  (2)  that  all  being  is  material.  According 
to  spiritualism,  body  and  soul  mutually  condition  each 
other.  At  present  the  soul  depends  on  the  body  for 
the  conditions  of  mental  manifestation;  and  the  bodv  is 
the  appointed  servant  of  the  soul.  It  is,  however,  ex- 
ternal to  the  soul,  and  is  in  fact  only  that  portion  of  the 


400  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

t 

outer  world  with  which  the  soul  stands  in  immediate 
relations  of  interaction.  The  existence  of  such  a  rela- 
tion is  purely  contingent.  That  a  mental  life  should 
exist  apart  from  a  body  is  fully  as  conceivable  as  that 
it  should  exist  in  connection  with  a  body.  The  present 
order  can  only  be  viewed  as  founded  in  a  purpose  which 
to  some  will  appear  scrutable,  to  others  inscrutable. 

The  bearings  of  pantheism  upon  the  doctrine  of  the 
soul  have  been  partly  discussed  in  the  chapter  on  The- 
ism and  Pantheism.  Pantheism,  as  well  as  materialism, 
cannot  be  allowed  to  ignore  facts  in  the  interests  of  a 
theory.  We  have  admitted  that  there  are  no  decisive 
facts  against  resolving  all  impersonal  being  into  the 
activity  of  the  infinite;  and  we  have  pointed  out  that 
personality  is  the  only  sure  test  of  finite  existence.  But 
pantheism  must  recognize  the  facts  of  the  mental  life 
on  which  we  have  been  dwelling.  No  matter  how  we 
are  made,  no  matter  what  our  relations  to  the  infinite 
may  be,  we  are  active  persons.  As  such  we  have  a  rela- 
tive existence  and  independence  over  against  the  infi- 
nite. To  deny  this  can  only  land  in  skepticism  and  the 
break-down  of  reason  and  science.  It  will  be  very 
hard  for  the  average  pantheist  to  steady  himself  at  this 
point.  One  is  hardly  himself  when  the  unifying  mania 
seizes  him.  Therefore,  the  pantheist  will  deny  the 
facts  in  the  interest  of  his  theory.  Such  an  act,  how- 
ever, must  not  be  viewed  as  founded  in  reason,  but  in 
a  certain  irrational  itch  of  the  speculative  faculty.  But 
every  one  who  cares  for  facts,  and  who  seeks  to  save 
philosophy  from  the  insane  extravagances  which  in 
time  past  have  made  the  very  word  a  stench  to  sober 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.      401 

common  sense,  will  insist  with  equal  emphasis  on  the  im- 
manence of  God,  and  on  the  reality  of  the  soul. 

Concerning  the  future  of  the  soul,  philosophy  can  say 
but  little.  The  pantheistic  doctrine  of  absorption  is 
an  utterly  untenable  notion,  resting,  as  it  does,  on  a 
crude  image  borrowed  from  the  senses,  and  repudiated 
by  reason.  Materialism,  of  course,  holds  that  death 
ends  all;  but  on  its  own  principles  this  conclusion 
is  hasty.  Our  personality  is  not  dependent  on  the 
whole  body,  nor  even  on  the  whole  brain.  Great  losses 
of  brain  matter  are  compatible  with  consciousness  and 
the  possession  of  all  our  faculties.  Besides,  material- 
istic physiologists  have  made  us  very  familiar  with  the 
notion  of  physiological  units  which  contain  the  directive 
force  of  the  organism.  It  is  equally  possible  to  imagine 
molecular  units  which  contain  the  principle  of  person- 
ality. These  units  may  be  the  basis  of  all  organization, 
and  through  organization  they  may  come  to  conscious- 
ness. It  is,  therefore,  possible  to  conceive  some  such 
organic  units  surviving  the  wreck  of  the  visible  body, 
and  reproducing  its  conscious  life  in  other  places  and 
forms.  Of  course  this  is  merely  a  speculation,  but  it  is 
no  wilder  than  materialism  itself;  and  materialism  must 
allow  such  a  possibility.  It  is  very  strange  that  ma 
terialists  and  atheists  are  willing  to  attribute  wonderful 
wisdom  to  matter  until  we  come  to  man,  and  then  mat- 
ter suddenly  turns  blockhead.  It  is  omniscient  and 
omnipotent  up  to  this  point,  and  then  an  inherent  dolt 
ishness  manifests  itself.  This  seems  to  be  an  inconse 
quence.  This  matter,  which  has  done  so  much,  must  sure- 


402  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

Ij  be  able  to  do  all  things  well.  When  the  scientist  finds 
the  realm  of  law  forever  growing  on  the  realm  of  dis- 
order, he  hastens  to  proclaim  law  strictly  universal. 
So  when  we  find  matter  managing  the  universe  with  a 
skill  which  even  intelligence  could  not  surpass,  and  also 
with  an  eye  to  moral  ends,  the  continuity  of  thought 
seems  to  demand  the  conclusion  that  whatever  wisdom 
and  righteousness  may  call  for,  that  matter  will  victo- 
riously accomplish.  But  the  materialist  regards  such  a 
conclusion  as  absurd.  Yet  why  absurd?  We  can  tell 
what  matter  can  do  only  by  observing  what  it  does  do. 
Would  it  not,  then,  be  the  supreme  glorification  of  mat- 
ter to  boldly  claim  that  omnipotent  and  omniscient 
love  and  righteousness  cannot  surpass  the  capabilities 
of  matter?  With  well-grounded  faith,  therefore,  may 
we  intrust  ourselves  and  our  lot  to  mysterious  matter. 
It  may  well  have  great  experiences  in  store  for  us,  and 
some  which  shall  even  rival  the  Christian  conception  of 
the  heavenly  life.  It  strikes  us  as  a  new  kind  of  blas- 
phemy that  the  materialist  should  declare  that  matter 
has  found  in  man  and  his  longings  more  than  its  match. 
But  half-heartedness  is  one  of  humanity's  besetting  sins. 
The  Christian  distrusts  God  when  things  do  not  go  as 
he  wishes,  and  the  materialist  has  not  full  faith  in 
matter. 

Our  doctrine  that  the  soul  is  a  simple  agent  is  held 
by  many  to  imply  eternal  life.  The  soul,  as  a  simple 
substance,  is  incapable  of  dissolution,  and  is  hence  im- 
mortal. This  conclusion  by  no  means  follows.  A  sim- 
ple agent  might  cease  to  be  through  the  vanishing  of 


THE  SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM  OR  MATERIALISM.     403 

its  power  of  action; 'and  this  power  is  not  a  thing  of 
parts,  but  of  intensity.     All  that  can  be  allo  wed  is  this : 
Since  nature  shows  no  trace  of  annihilation,  there  is  a 
presumption  that  nothing  perishes.     When,  then,  the 
soul  no  longer  manifests  itself  in  the  accustomed  way, 
there  is  a  certain  presumption  that  the  soul  itself  has 
not  ceased  to  exist.     The  ordinary  channels  of  commu- 
nication no  longer  exist,  and,  by  consequence,  the  man- 
ifestation ceases.     This,  however,  establishes  no  more 
than  a  presumption.     From  our  stand-point  no  finite 
thing  has  a  right  to  continued  existence.     It  begins  to 
be  solely  because  the  divine  order  and  plan  call  for  it. 
If,  then,  at  any  time  a  thing  should  lose  significance  for 
the  general  order,  it  would  cease  to  be.     But,  owing  to 
our  ignorance  of  the  system,  we  cannot  reach  any  spe- 
cific conclusions  from  this  principle.     That  brute  souls 
will  or  will  not  continue  to  exist,  we  cannot  say.     Their 
significance  may  be  exhausted  in  this  life;  and,  on  the 
other  hand,  they,  too,  may  be  called  to  endless  devel- 
opment and  unfolding.    A  certain  vulgarity  of  imagina- 
tion, aided  by  a  corresponding  weakness  of  the  under- 
standing, always  finds  this  latter  view  hopelessly  absurd; 
but  the  difficulty  is  purely  subjective.    On  the  other  hand, 
that  human  souls  have  such  supreme  significance  for  the 
system  that  they  are  to  pass  on  to  a  future  life,  is  also 
something  which,  on  grounds  of  experience,  we  cannot 
positively  assert.     No  more  can  we  assert  that  any  soul 
wiK  e-  er  so  lose  its  value  for  the  great  whole,  that  it 
shall  cease  to  be.     This  indecision  of  the  speculative 
reason  can  only  be  overturned  by  arguments  drawn 
from  the  moral  nature  or  from  revelation.     If  there  be 


404  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

such  arguments,  neither  science  nor  philosophy  has  one 
word  of  valid  protest;  rather  must  they  both  rejoice 
that  what  appears'  to  them  only  as  a  possibility,  with  a 
vague  presumption  in  its  favor,  has  been  lifted  into 
reality.  For  our  belief  in  a  future  life  we  are  thrown 
back  upon  our  trust  in  the  divine  love  and  righteous- 
ness; and  as  it  is  forever  impossible  to  justify  the  ways 
of  God  to  men,  if  death  ends  all,  we  hold  that  a  belief 
in  a  future  life  flows  necessarily  from  our  conception  of 
God,  and  is  the  only  one  which  is  compatible  with  rev- 
erence for  him.  Whether  all  men  shall  share  in  this 
life,  or  whether  the  great  mass  of  spiritual  rubbish  shall 
cease  with  death,  cannot  be  decided  by  speculation. 
Personally,  we  believe  that  God  can  be  trusted  with  our 
future.  This  most  singular  and  extraordinary  belief 
seems  shared  by  very  few.  All  kinds  of  speculations 
are  rife  in  religious  quarters  concerning  both  the  pres- 
ent and  the  future;  through  all  of  which  there  runs  the 
tacit  assumption  (1)  that  God  does  not  know  what  he  is 
doing,  and  is  in  sad  need  of  our  advice ;  and,  (2)  that  God 
cannot  be  trusted  to  do  what  is  right.  We  advise,  we 
prescribe;  and,  in  a  kind  but  firm  way,  we  announce, 
what  must  be  found  very  discouraging,  that  we  shall  be 
unable  to  trust  God  if  our  advice  is  not  taken.  Some 
dyspeptics  conclude  that  things  are  so  out  of  joint  that 
God  must  quickly  appear  to  wind  up  the  world.  Others 
spend  their  time,  not  in  combating  sin,  but  in  informing 
God  how  he  must  deal  with  sinners  if  he  is  to  retain 
their  respect.  That  the  Judge  of  all  the  earth  will  do 
right,  is  denied  by  no  theist;  and  it  is  .a  necessary  as- 
sumption of  religion.  But  when  it  comes  to  prescribing 


SOUL:  SPIRITUALISM:  OR  MATERIALISM.     405 

what  the  eternal  laws  of  righteousness  call  for  in  carry- 
ing on  the  universe,  we  may  well  doubt  whether  we 
have  the  data  for  detailed  judgments;  and  we  may  well 
question  whether  it  be  not  more  compatible  both  with 
reverence  and  with  reason,  to  leave  the  government  of 
the  world  in  the  Creator's  hands  with  the  confession, 
that  both  the  administration  and  the  criticism  of  the 
universe  demand  a  deeper  knowledge  than  ours.  We 
have  established  a  right  to  believe  in  a  God  of  love  and 
righteousness  as  the  author  and  administrator  of  nature, 
who  is  also  the  Father  of  our  spirits;  and  we  repeat  our 
strange  confession  of  faith,  that  man  and  the  world  are 
safe  in  his  hands. 


406  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 


CHAPTER  XL 

POSTULATES    OF   ETHICS. 

TN"  chapter  iii  we  showed  that  every  system  of  rna- 
terialism,  or  of  aimless  evolution,  ends  necessarily  in 
skepticism  and  the  destruction  of  knowledge.  A  sifting 
chaos  of  atoms,  or  a  blind,  self-transforming  world-sub- 
stance, leave  no  place  for  either  truth  or  error.  We 
concluded,  therefore,  that  a  free,  personal  God,  is  the 
postulate  and  support  both  of  science  and  philosophy. 
This  conclusion  plainly  embraces  the  less  comprehensive 
one  that  God  is  the  necessary  postulate  of  theoretical 
morals,  and  hence  we  might  rest  content  with  this 
showing.  Yet  owing  to  the  peculiar  state  of  affairs  in 
the  speculative  world,  it  seems  well  to  examine  more  in 
detail  some  of  the  fundamental  postulates  of  ethics. 

Irreligious  speculators  have  always  had  trouble  with 
morals  and  religion;  and  never  have  they  been  in 
greater  straits  than  now.  In  the  last  century,  when  one 
advanced  to  atheism  and  fatalism  he  commonly  had  the 
courage  of  his  opinions,  and,  in  theory  at  least,  repudi- 
ated religion  and  morality  altogether.  There  was  a  cer- 
tain whole-heartedness  about  the  old-fashioned  atheist 
which  was  not  without  its  attraction  on  the  score  both 
of  clearness  and  of  honesty.  But  a  change  has  come 
over  our  modern  atheists;  and  the  result  is  a  certain 
inconsistency  in  dealing  with  the  claims  of  morals  and 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  407 

religion.  They  are  shy  of  the  names  of  atheist  and 
materialist,  and  prefer  to  call  themselves  agnostics. 
But  agnosticism  is  only  atheism  spelled  and  pronounced 
in  a  different  way.  No  sensible  atheist  claims  to  prove 
the  negative  that  God  is  not;  he  only  claims  that  expe- 
rience and  the  visible  universe  give  no  proof  of  his  ex- 
istence. He  does  not  pretend  to  know  that  there  is  no 
God ;  he  claims  only  that  he  finds  no  ground  for  affirm- 
ing the  divine  existence.  But  this  position  differs  in 
nothing  from  agnosticism;  both  allow  a  possibility,  and 
both  deny  any  ground  in  experience  for  regarding  the 
possibility  as  real.  The  name  materialist,  too,  is  a  great 
offense  to  our  advanced  speculators.  They  do  not  hes- 
itate to  teach  that  the  human  mind  is  only  a  function  of 
matter  in  certain  combinations,  which  will  certainly 
perish  when  the  combination  breaks  up ;  but  when  they 
are  charged  with  materialism,  they  frequently  break 
out  into  indignation  against  the  slander.  They  are  not 
atheists ;  they  are  not  materialists.  Then  follow  sundry 
hysterical  remarks  about  flinging  dirt,  and  the  odium 
theologicum.  It  has  come  to  pass  that  references  to 
the  odium  theologicum  are  as  useful  to  the  irreligious 
speculator,  and  are  used  in  much  the  same  way,  as  the 
burst  of  tears  with  which  some  women  reduce  refractory 
and  recalcitrant  husbands  to  obedience  and  submission. 
Meanwhile  the  simple  critic  who  imagines  that  the  use 
of  words  is  to  denote  things,  is  filled  with  wonder  at 
this  rejection  of  the  word  when  the  thing  is  retained; 
and  if  he  be  acquainted  with  Bible  history,  he  will  not 
fail  to  recall  the  cursing  and  swearing  of  Peter  when 
charged  with  being  a  disciple  of  Christ.  It  seems  to  us, 


408  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

that  atheism  and  materialism  are  the  very  best  of  isms,  if 
true;  and  we  see  no  reason  for  being  ashamed  of  them. 
On  the  contrary,  the  enthusiasm  of  humanity  and  every 
instinct  of  manhood  call  for  a  vigorous  assertion  of  the 
new  truths,  and  a  rigid  deduction  of  their  consequences. 
Our  friends  of  the  other  side  have  often  assured  as  that 
truth  can  never  do  harm;  and  hence  we  are  all  the  more 
alarmed  at  this  half-heartedness;  for  thereby  humanity 
suffers  loss.  A  scientific  generalization,  whose  conse- 
quences are  not  developed,  remains  comparatively,  if 
not  quite,  unfruitful.  It  is  desirable,  therefore,  that  the 
new  truths  shall  be  thoroughly  and  fearlessly  developed; 
otherwise  we  shall  lose  the  greater  and  perhaps  the 
richer  part  of  the  blessings  contained  in  them.  It  is  a  sad 
evidence  of  human  frailty,  perhaps  of  the  debilitating 
influence  of  Christianity,  that  many  gentlemen  of  the 
advance  seem  to  lose  both  heart  and  head  at  this  point, 
and  make  desperate  attempts  to  sew  the  new  cloth  on 
the  old  garment,  with,  of  course,  the  usual  result  of  this 
experiment.  This,  however,  is  not  true  for  all.  Nota- 
bly in  Germany,  where  they  do  nothing  by  halves,  some 
are  beginning  to  raise  their  voice  in  favor  of  consistency. 
Having  abandoned  the  postulates  of  ethics  and  religion, 
they  demand  that  ethics  and  religion  be  abandoned  also. 
But  this  meets  with  no  favor  from  the  majority.  They 
speak  of  the  sturdy  and  honest  animalism  of  their  pre- 
decessors as  "obsolete  brutality;"  and  do  their  best  to 
show  that  a  high  type  of  morality,  if  not  of  religion,  is 
compatible  with  their  views. 

This  inconsistency  in  irreligious  speculation  is  a  sign 
of  moral  progress.     The  obsolete  brutalities  of  Hobbes 


^POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  409 

and  D'Holbach  would  find  as  little  echo  among  the  bet- 
ter class  of  skeptics  to-day  as  in  Christian  circles.  For 
somehow  the  idea  has  got  abroad  that  moral  distinc- 
tions are  facts  which  every  theory  must  recognize;  and 
that  any  theory  which  has  no  place  for  them  is  thereby 
condemned.  No  matter  how  the  notion  originated,  it 
is  here  in  power;  and  speculators  have  to  take  account 
of  it.  In  this  way  the  moral  nature  is  proving  itself 
more  and  more  an  embarrassment  to  advanced  specula- 
tion. Scarcely  a  point  can  be  touched  concerning 
which  the  question  does  not  arise,  What  about  con- 
science ?  And  worst  of  all,  the  sturdy  disturber  will 
not  be  ignored.  By  consequence  we  find  most  atheistic 
and  materialistic  speculators  making  very  earnest  efforts 
either  to  provide  some  satisfaction  for  the  religious  and 
moral  nature,  or  else  to  assure  the  world  that  in  any 
case  morals  are  safe.  The  notion  that  morals,  or  even 
religion,  depend  on  a  belief  in  God  and  freedom,  is  de- 
clared to  be  a  mistake.  Mill  and  Comte  have  sought  to 
provide  a  religion  without  a  God,  collective  humanity 
being  the  object  of  worship.  Strauss  and  Clifford  ex- 
hort us  to  worship  the  Cosmos,  thus  replacing  theism  by 
idolatry.  The  efforts  in  this  line  can  hardly  be  pro- 
nounced a  success.  If  there  be  no  God  to- worship,  we 
can  do  better  than  go  back  to  ancestor- worship,  espe- 
cially as  we  now  know  that  our  ancestors  were  only 
functions  of  carbonic  acid,  water,  and  ammonia.  We 
propose  to  inquire  whether  the  assurances  that  morals 
are  safe  have  any  logical  foundation;  and  oui  thesis  is, 
that  the  denial  of  God,  freedom,  and  immortality,  leave 
morals  without  any  foundation. 


410  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

Common  sense  is  the  Philistine  of  philosophy.  It  is, 
in  the  first  place,  somewhat  incredulous  of  all  specula- 
tion, and,  at  least,  takes  little  interest  in  it.  It  is 
strongly  inclined  to  keep  its  feet  on  the  solid  earth,  and 
it  lives  mainly  by  instinct.  The  speculators  rail  at  it; 
but  none  of  these  things  move  it.  This  fact  has  both  a 
good  and  a  bad  side;  and  the  bad  side  is  sometimes  un- 
pleasantly prominent.  This  indifference  of  daily  life  to 
speculation  often  results  in  a  positive  protection  of 
error.  A  system  stands  or  falls  by  its  logic,  and  is 
responsible  for  whatever  is  logically  contained  in  it. 
An  inconsistent  system  is  none.  But  great  practical 
common  sense  cares  nothing  for  systems,  but  lives  in- 
tellectually from  hand  to  mouth;  and  as  long  as  the 
upholders  of  a  theory  behave  themselves,  common  sense 
is  willing  to  live  and  let  live.  In  this  way,  many  a 
theory  which,  if  compelled  to  be  consequent,  would 
perish  at  once,  is  enabled  to  live  along,  and  even  to  lay 
claim  to  recognition  and  respect.  Sensationalism  in 
philosophy  and  fatalism  in  morals  live  only  on  these 
conditions.  They  can  always  rely  on  common  sense  to 
protect  them  from  themselves,  and  thus  they  have  all 
their  strength  for  attack.  Another  vexation  must  be 
mentioned.  Certain  critics,  with  eyes  only  in  the  back 
of  their  heads,  seeing  that  the  instincts  of  common  sense 
commonly  serve  to  correct  the  aberrations  of  theory, 
grow  by  turns  merry  and  severe  over  deducing  "  logical 
consequences."  Dreadful  logical  consequences,  they  say, 
have  been  deduced  from  almost  every  thing  since  the 
world  began,  and  yet  it  has  contrived  to  keep  a-going. 
And  this  fact  they  oddly  mistake  for  a  proof  that  life 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  411 

and  morals  are  independent  of  any  belief.  'That  this 
is  the  outcome  of  the  instinctive  side  of  man  which  has 
counteracted  the  belief,  they  cannot  see.  That  a  sys- 
tem must  be  judged  by  its  logic,  and  that  it  cannot  be 
saved  by  the  inconsistencies  of  its  holders,  is  to  them 
an  utterly  impossible  insight.  Accordingly  they  mis- 
take speculative  inconsequence  for  speculative  justifi- 
cation. Meanwhile  the  philosopher  who  is  so  unfortu- 
nate as  to  stand  by,  cannot  help  recalling  Cardinal 
Wolsey's  reflection:  "How  much,  methinks,  I  could 
despise  this  man,  but  that  I  am  in  charity  bound 
against  it." 

In  claiming,  however,  that  morals  depend  on  a  belief 
in  God,  freedom,  and  immortality,  we  do  not  mean  to 
assert  a  conscious  connection  between  our  sense  of  duty 
and  any  belief  whatever.  Morals  depend  on  God  just 
as  reason  depends  on  God.  The  connection  in  both 
cases  is  an  intricate  one,  and  manifests  itself  only  in  the 
reflective  consciousness.  We  live  and  act  long  before 
we  reflect  and  speculate.  Our  life  at  the  start  is  spon- 
taneous and  instinctive,  and  the  mind  makes  just  such 
assumptions  as  the  special  case  calls  for.  But  when  we 
come  to  full  and  reflective  self-consciousness,  we  begin 
to  ask  for  the  foundations  of  our  mental  life,  and  wheth- 
er its  several  factors  are  in  harmony.  Then  the  anti- 
nomies of  reason  manifest  themselves,  and  doubts  take 
wing,  until  at  last  we  are  forced  to  say  with  Descartes 
that  God  is  the  only  foundation  of  truth  and  knowledge. 
In  like  manner  our  moral  life  begins  in  instinct,  and  we 
yield  ourselves  to  the  law  within  us  without  thought  of 

its  authority  or  of  what  it  is  going  to  do  with  us.     But 

27 


412  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

by  and  by  the  restless  reason,  which  questions  all  things, 
turns  its  glance  in  this  direction  also,  and  asks  for  the 
authority  and  foundation  of  the  moral  law.  And  then 
it  appears  that  God  is  the  postulate  and  support  of  con- 
science as  well  as  of  intelligence.  Nor  do  we  mean  to 
say  that  conscience,  as  a  psychological  fact,  is  depend- 
ent on  belief,  but  only  that  its  authority  is  not  a  self- 
centered  thing.  The  skeptic  does  not  deny  that  we 
have  conceptions  of  reality,  but  he  insists  that  they  are 
subjective  illusions.  They  remain  just  as  they  were, 
psychologically,  but  their  significance  has  gone.  The 
moral  skeptic,  also,  does  not  question  the  existence  of 
conscience  as  a  subjective  fact;  he  allows  the  fact,  but 
regards  it  as  illusive.  The  question  with  him  is  not  the 
existence,  but  the  authority  of  conscience.  Finally,  we 
do  not  mean  to  affirm  that  atheists  and  fatalists  are  nec- 
essarily bad  men.  We  do  not  deny  that  the  sense  of 
right  and  wrong,  and  of  the  beauty  of  right  living,  may 
be  very  strong  in  men  who  think  themselves  atheists 
and  without  any  immortal  destiny.  As  Ernest  Naville 
says:  "There  are  men  all  of  whose  convictions  have 
fallen  into  ruins  while  their  conscience  remains  stand- 
ing, sole  remaining  witness  of  a  demolished  building." 
It  would  be  strange  if  there  were  no  cases  of  this  kind. 
God,  the  eternal  Love,  is  not  to  be  abolished  by  any 
one's  unbelief.  The  Holy  Spirit,  the  Light  and  Life  of 
men,  is  not  extinguished  even  if  man's  faith  does  falter 
and  die.  And  human  love,  too,  abides  in  the  human 
heart,  burning  up  baseness  and  spreading  its  flaming 
wings  for  illimitable  flight.  It  is  not  strange,  then,  that 
a  sense  of  moral  beauty  and  obligation  should  remain 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  413 

after  its  rational  supports  have  fallen.  Indeed,  we 
should  view  it  as  a  most  atheistic  utterance  to  say  that 
the  work  of  God  in  the  heart  and  in  the  world  would 
cease  if  human  faith  should  falter.  The  kingdom  of 
righteousness  is  built  on  something  stronger  than  man's 
opinions.  Our  only  claim  is,  that  morality  has  no  ra- 
tional ground,  and  that  conscience  itself  abates  its  high 
claims  when  God,  freedom,  and  immortality  are  denied. 
Morality  may  live  on,  as  a  blind  and  irrational  instinct, 
under  such  circumstances;  but  it  can  offer  no  rational 
justification  of  its  existence.  Concerning  the  practical 
tendency  of  such  denial  there  is  no  need  to  speak.  The 
history  of  philosophy  records  the  results  of  many  such 
experiments.  Modern  speculators,  when  questioned 
concerning  the  effect  of  their  speculations  on  conduct, 
assume  that  conscience  is  well  able  to  stand  alone.  They 
do  not  know  that  the  experiment  has  been  tried  again 
and  again,  and  invariably  the  theoretic  denial  has  in- 
volved morals  in  ruin.  Whatever  else  is  doubtful,  it  is 
better  to  be  noble  than  base,  true  than  false,  loving 
than  selfish.  Here,  says  the  speculator,  I  take  my  stand. 
And  yet  the  deepest  and  most  persistent  doubt  of  the 
human  mind  has  been  on  just  these  points.  Is  it  better 
to  be  noble  than  base?  false  than  true?  loving  than  self- 
ish? Is  there  any  difference  at  bottom?  Are  not  both 
sin  and  righteousness  the  subjective  illusions  of  a  bub- 
ble thrown  up  by  the  seething,  aimless  tides  of  the  in- 
finite? With  the  human  mind  in  general,  as  judged  by 
its  history,  these  are  the  points  where  doubt  first  mani- 
fests itself.  Conscience  and  duty,  least  of  all,  can  claim 
exemption  from  the  inroads  of  skepticism.  And  if  the 


414  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

denials  mentioned  are  maintained,  we  believe  that  this 
practical  result  admits  of  theoretic  justification. 

In  examining  the  assurances  of  our  advanced  specu- 
lators, that  in  any  case  morality  is  safe,  we  are  struck 
by  a  peculiar  inconsequence  with  regard  to  the  moral 
nature  in  general.  They  are,  in  short,  sensational  mor- 
alists, who  are  forced,  by  the  straits  of  their  position, 
into  holding  the  highest  type  of  intuitional  ethics.  The 
resulting  idol  is  a  very  odd  compound  of  gold  and  clay. 
When  one  suggests  that  atheism  or  materialism  is  fatal 
to  rational  ethics,  we  are  always  treated  to  a  homily 
conceived  in  the  spirit  of  the  highest  intuitional  mo- 
rality. God  or  no  God,  we  are  told,  there  is  an  eternal 
distinction  between  right  and  wrong.  Whether  there 
be  a  future  life  or  no,  it  is  still  an  imperative  duty  to 
live  nobly  here.  In  particular  the  eternal  sanctity  of 
truth,  and  its  supreme  value  for  the  seeking  soul,  are 
largely  dwelt  upon.  The  advanced  thinker  must  have 
no  other  motto  than  the  heroic  words,  "  I  covet  truth;" 
and  he  must  resign  all  the  comforts,  all  the  joys,  all  the 
hopes  of  his  heart,  if  they  seem  to  conflict  with  the  eter- 
nal veracities.  No  illusions,  no  dreams  for  him.  No 
belief  because  it  is  useful  or  because  it  is  pleasant. 
However  bleak  and  barren  it  may  be,  he  will  know  the 
truth.  It  may  leave  him  an  orphan  and  hopeless  in  the 
universe,  still  he  will  know  the  truth.  Christians  are 
often  twitted  with  believing  immorally, — that  is,  with 
preferring  the  rest  and  happiness  of  unfounded  beliefs 
to  the  heroic  and  noble  disquiet  of  absolute  loyalty  to 
truth.  Even  the  belief  in  immortality  is  rejected,  not 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  415 

merely  as  unproved,  but  as  tending,  by  its  selfish 
hopes,  to  dim  the  luster  of  absolute  loyalty  to  right 
and  duty.  The  homily  is  apt  to  close  with  a  whis- 
pered prayer,  just  loud  enough  to  be  overheard,  that 
he  "  may  join  the  choir  invisible  of  those  immortal  dead 
who  live  again  in  souls  made  better  by  their  presence." 
By  this  time  the  objector  is  heartily  ashamed  of  him- 
self, and,  as  he  gazes  on  this  noble  being,  in  whom 
self  is  crucified  and  duty  is  all  and  in  all,  he  wonders 
how  he  could  ever  have  made  his  unfortunate  sugges- 
tion, that  any  conceivable  change  of  opinion  could  re- 
move from  duty  the  seal  of  inviolable  obligation.  This 
moral  enthusiasm  glows  with  all  the  fervor  of  a  He- 
brew prophet;  but,  unfortunately,  our  satisfaction  and 
appreciation  are  partly  obscured  by  the  fact  that  when 
the  origin  and  nature  of  conscience  are  in  debate,  the 
same  eloquent  worthies  are  quite  sure  to  tell  us  that 
conscience  has  a  very  earthly  origin.  Then  we  learn 
that  there  is  no  absolute  right,  and  that  moral  opinions 
depend  entirely  on  custom  and  circumstance.  The 
moral  nature  has  its  roots  in  physical  desire.  Love  of 
pleasure,  fear  of  pain,  a  bit  of  sympathy,  and  a  large 
amount  of  selfish  expectation,  will  produce  a  conscience 
when  thrown  together  in  the  same  being,  and  worked 
over  by  the  chemistry  of  association.  Our  distinctions 
of  right  and  wrong  rest  upon  no  eternal  nature  of 
things,  but  express  merely  the  way  in  which  we  have 
been  brought  up.  Had  the  "  environment "  been  dif- 
ferent, both  truth  and  righteousness  would  have  been 
different.  Let  the  theist  but  construct  an  argument  for 
the  existence  of  God  on  the  nature  of  conscience,  and 


416  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

he  will  quickly  learn  that  conscience  has  little  reason 
to  be  proud  of  its  pedigree.  Now,  one  cannot  help 
feeling  surprise  when  he  learns  that  the  expounder  of 
this  doctrine  is  the  same  superior  being  who  before 
made  such  a  glowing  and  thrilling  defense  of  absolute 
truth  and  right.  We  should  be  justified  in  calling  a 
halt  right  here,  and  insisting  on  a  choice  between  these 
two  views.  Both  cannot  be  held  at  once.  If  conscience 
have  the  genesis  just  described,  it  is  folly  to  speak  of 
any  obligation  higher  than  that  of  common  prudence. 
What  has  been  put  together  can  be  taken  apart.  It  is 
vain  to  imagine  that  conscience  could  maintain  its  au- 
thority if  this  view  of  its  origin  were  fully  accepted. 
Self-respect  would  not  permit  us  to  be  ruled  by  an  im- 
postor, and  the  mob  of  passions  would  turn  out  in  wild 
glee  to  drag  the  usurper  from  power.  If  this  did  not 
happen,  it  would  be  because  the  holy  voice  of  nature 
secretly  condemned  the  theory,  even  in  the  moment  of 
its  triumph.  The  absolute  authority  of  conscience  can- 
not be  united  with  this  theory  of  its  origin.  To  hold 
now  one  view  and  now  another,  according  to  the  exi- 
gencies of  the  argument,  impresses  one  with  the  same 
feeling  of  awe  which  invaded  the  minds  of  William 
Nye  and  Truthful  James  at  the  wonderful  play  of  "  Ah 
Sin."  Common  honesty,  and  that  supreme  truthfulness 
which  has  been  set  up  as  the  chief  virtue,  demand  that 
a  choice  be  made  here.  We  say  it  deliberately  and 
with  emphasis;  this  fundamental  inconsistency  can  be 
rescued  from  the  charge  of  knavery  only  by  postulating 
an  ignorance  alike  dense  and  profound.  If  truth  be  so 
supremely  valuable,  and  if  our  views  lead  to  the  over- 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  417 

throw  of  ethics,  why  not  say  so?  This  halting  between 
two  opinions,  and  holding  both  and  neither  upon  occa- 
sion, is  not  calculated  to  produce  a  favorable  impres- 
sion either  of  one's  truthfulness  or  of  one's  insight. 

We  pass  to  the  specific  denials  mentioned;  and,  first, 
we  consider  the  denial  of  freedom.  One  point  on 
which  advanced  speculators  seem  to  be  agreed  is,  that 
the  soul  is  properly  nothing,  and  that  all  mental  states, 
feelings,  thoughts,  aspirations,  and  volitions,  are  the 
necessary  outcome  of  the  physiological  processes  which 
underlie  consciousness.  But  when  we  object  to  this 
view,  that  it  denies  and  overturns  true  morality,  the 
speculator  is  very  fond  of  using  the  great  Calvinistic 
theologians  to  screen  himself  from  attack.  When  Pro- 
fessor Huxley  made  his  address,  "  Are  Animals  Autom- 
ata?" he  warned  his  critics  in  advance  that  if  he  were 
to  be  summoned  to  answer  for  his  doctrine  of  autom- 
atism, he  should  not  appear  alone,  but  should  bring 
Calvin  and  Edwards  with  him.  This  position  is  partly 
the  confusion  of  philosophic  determinism  with  physical 
fatalism,  to  which  we  referred  in  the  last  chapter,  and 
partly  a  misrepresentation  of  Calvinism.  Calvinism 
does  not  deny  freedom,  but  sets  up  other  doctrines 
which  its  opponents  regard  as  incompatible  with  free- 
dom. The  predestination  which  it  aifirms  is  expressly 
said  to  be  of  a  kind  which  does  not  conflict  with,  but 
rather  establishes,  the  freedom  of  the  creature.  To  the 
average  mind  this  is  not  much  of  a  predestination  after 
all,  but  it  is  certainly  intolerable  to  charge  the  Calvinist 
with  denying  freedom.  Indeed,  it  would  be  much  near- 
er the  truth  to  say  that  Calvinists  were  first  among 


418  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

modern  theologians  to  affirm  a  natural  freedom  in  man. 
But,  however  this  may  be,  the  question  before  us  is  not 
one  of  great  names,  but  of  simple  logic.  For  our  own 
part,  we  should  be  quite  undismayed  if  Edwards  and 
Calvin  did  appear  as  Mr.  Huxley's  supporters.  The 
law  of  identity  and  non-contradiction  cannot  be  broken 
by  any  weight  of  authority.  No  more  is  the  question 
whether  theoretic  deniers  of  liberty  have  practically  ad- 
mitted it.  No  system  can  be  saved  by  the  inconsisten- 
cies of  its  friends.  The  great  attraction  of  advanced 
thought  is  its  claim  of  consistency.  If  it  is  to  abandon 
logic  and  consistency,  and  live  by  instinct,  we  might  as 
well  stay  where  we  are.  Christianity  suits  our  instincts 
as  well  as  physical  fatalism;  and  if  the  latter  can  show 
no  better  logic  there  is  no  reason  for  exchange.  Incon- 
sistent theology  is  bad  enough,  but  inconsistent  atheol- 
ogy  is  worse. 

Let  us,  then,  deny  freedom,  what  would  theoretically 
follow?  The  fatalist,  appealing  this  time  to  Butler, 
says  nothing  would  follow.  If  there  be  any  necessity 
we  are  now  living  under  it,  and  daily  life  would  re- 
main unchanged  if  we  became  conscious  of  that  neces- 
sity. But,  as  usual,  the  fatalist  mistakes  his  author- 
ity. He  mistakes  Butler's  argumentum  ad  hominem 
for  a  defense  of  fatalism.  Now,  the  claim  that  daily 
life  would  remain  the  same  applies,  at  best,  only  to 
the  external  form  of  action,  and  not  to  the  inner  life. 
This  sameness  of  external  form  is,  probably,  what  Pro- 
fessor Huxley  means  by  one  of  his  symposium  utter- 
ances, which  says  that  when  it  is  seen  that  the  conse- 
quences of  moral  law  are  as  inexorable  as  those  of 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  419 

physical  law,  men  will  break  the  one  no  sooner  than 
they  will  the  other.  A  fatalist  will  not  put  his  hand  in 
the  fire  any  sooner  than  the  believer  in  freedom;  and 
when  it  is  clear  that  moral  law  has  consequences  just  as 
fixed,  no  theory  will  seriously  affect  conduct.  In  so 
far  as  morality  is  identical  with  prudence,  there  is  a 
certain  force  in  this,  although  even  this  doctrine  tacitly 
denies  physical  fatalism.  That  which  can  foresee  re- 
sults, and  determine  itself  accordingly — that  which  can 
"  think  twice  "  before  acting — is  a  person  and  not  a  ma- 
chine. Here  again  Mr.  Huxley  confounds  philosophic 
determinism  with  physical  automatism.  A  machine 
does  not  think  twice.  Consciousness  has  no  power  over 
the  mechanism.  The  outcome  is,  in  every  case,  but  the 
resultant  of  mechanical  processes  which  are  independent 
of  our  imaginary  volitions.  To  advance  thus  far  is  pure 
skepticism;  to  stop  short  is  to  abandon  fatalism.  More- 
over, if  we  may  trust  consciousness  at  all,  we  know 
that  the  resulting  action  would  not  remain  unchanged. 
The  kind  of  opinions  which  our  brains  grind  out  de- 
pends very  largely  on  the  kind  already  there.  Spencer 
represents  reasoning  and  volition  as  a  conflict  between 
different  ideas,  which  in  turn  are  but  the  subjective  side 
of  nervous  action.  "  Nascent  motor  excitations  "  orig- 
inate in  the  brain.  Subjectively  these  appear  as  differ- 
ent ideas.  When  a  nascent  motor  excitation  occurs 
alone  it  passes  at  once  into  action.  Such  are  instinctive 
and  reflex  action.  But  when  two  or  more  arise  to- 
gether there  is  a  conflict.  Subjectively  this  conflict  ap- 
pears as  comparison  and  reasoning.  Finally,  the  strong- 
est carries  the  day,  and  issues  in  action.  Subjectively 


420  STUDIES  IN  THEISM 

this  appears  as  volition.  But  the  original  and  independ- 
ent fact  is  the  conflicting  nascent  motor  excitations, 
and  volition  and  reasoning  are  only  the  subjective  shad- 
ow which  the  objective  realities  cast.  We  see,  on  this 
theory,  how  important  it  is  to  have  the  right  kind  of 
nascent  motor  excitations  in  the  brain.  Now,  as  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  the  nascent  motor  excitations  corresponding 
to  ideas  of  right,  duty,  freedom,  responsibility,  are  the 
great  breakwaters  which  prevent  other  unpleasant  nas- 
cent motor  excitations  from  issuing  in  action,  which,  on 
the  old  theories  of  ethics,  would  be  decidedly  objection- 
able and  blameworthy.  We  are  persuaded,  therefore, 
that  the  removal  of  these  conservative  nascent  motor 
excitations  would  lead  to  the  appearance  of  other  nas- 
cent motor  excitations  whose  result  would  not  be  pleas- 
ant to  contemplate.  If,  for  instance,  the  lazy  and  crim- 
inal classes  were  freed  from  the  sense  of  right  and 
wrong  which  now  turns  them  into  cowards,  many  social 
problems  would,  we  doubt  not,  receive  a  sudden  solu- 
tion. To  the  claim,  therefore,  that  action  would  be 
unaffected  by  an  acceptance  of  fatalism  and  a  denial  of 
guilt  and  responsibility  we  oppose  this  most  scientific 
showing,  based  on  the  profound  doctrine  of  nascent 
motor  excitations.  Indeed,  it  is  a  necessary  conclusion 
from  physical  fatalism  that  any  change  of  opinion  points 
to  a  change  in  the  nervous  processes,  and  must,  there- 
fore, lead  to  a  change  in  action.  It  is,  then,  highly  un- 
scientific to  teach  that  new  opinions  are  compatible 
with  the  old  forms  of  action.  Poor,  pachydermatous 
common  sense  is  so  imbued  with  the  instinct  of  free- 
dom, that  it  fails  to  hold  these  speculators  to  their  own 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  421 

views,  and  mistakes  the  implications  of  the  theory  for 
aberrations  of  the  critic. 

But  even  if  we  should  allow  that  action  would  re- 
main unchanged,  we  have  not  saved  morals.  We  have 
no  longer  a  moral  system,  but  only  a  caricature.  What 
we  have,  in  fact,  is  a  herd  of  automata  who  exter- 
nally mimic  the  action  of  moral  beings.  They  re- 
ward and  punish,  praise  and  blame,  just  as  if  good 
and  ill  deserts  were  facts,  but  in  truth  they  are  only 
"the  cunningest  of  nature's  clocks."  Now,  we  are  so 
made  that  when  we  fairly  grasp  this  view  we  can  no 
longer  attribute  merit  or  demerit,  guilt  or  innocence, 
or  responsibility  of  any  kind,  to  such  beings.  Sin  and 
righteousness  vanish.  Remorse  and  shame  fade  away, 
and  the  sting  of  sin  is  drawn.  Punishment  is  not  ret- 
ribution, but  self-defense.  It  has  no  element  of  justice 
in  it;  it  is  but  the  brute  struggle  for  existence.  The 
so-called  good  man  has  no  claim  to  approval,  and  the 
bad  man  deserves  no  blame.  Both  alike  are  what  their 
viscera  have  made  them.  Healthy  viscera  give  rise  to 
what  we  call  right  action;  diseased  viscera  produce 
wrong  action.  If  there  were  only  some  way  of  making 
one  responsible  for  his  viscera,  we  might  save  morals; 
but,  unfortunately,  the  viscera  are  too  strong  for  us. 
The  morals  of  fatalism,  then,  must  be  purely  external, 
and  the  difference  of  action  must  be  sought  in  the  out- 
come. There  is  no  moral  difference  in  the  actors.  But, 
unfortunately,  even  this  system  of  external  morals  is 
not  plainly  possible  on  the  principles  of  fatalism.  If 
there  were  some  one  somewhere  who  was  independent 
of  his  viscera,  and  who  could,  by  modifying  the  condi- 


422  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

tions,  guide  the  viscera  of  others  to  happy  external  re- 
sults, there  would  be  some  hope.  Or  if,  among  these 
"  cunningest  of  nature's  clocks,"  there  were  some  self- 
adjusting  clock  which  could  also  re-adjust  the  other 
clocks  when  they  get  out  of  order,  the  case  would  not 
be  hopeless.  But  when  all  are  automata,  it  seems  im- 
possible to  change  the  future.  Prudence,  and  foresight 
of  results,  we  are  told,  would  avail  to  prevent  immoral 
action  even  in  a  fatalistic  world;  but,  unhappily,  fore- 
sight of  results  seems  quite  useless  unless  we  have  some 
power  of  acting  in  accordance  with  the  new  knowledge. 
A  foresight  of  results  will  not  help  one  out  of  the  cur- 
rent of  Niagara.  In  fact,  prudence  and  foresight,  as 
controling  factors,  are  as  incompatible  with  physical 
fatalism  as  are  merit  and  demerit.  Even  determinism 
has  always  had  difficulty  at  this  point,  and  has  been 
forced  to  posit  a  power  of  "  thinking  twice,"  and  of  in- 
definitely postponing  action.  By  skillfully  and  judi- 
ciously overlooking  this  difficulty  one  may  contrive  to 
give  an  air  of  rationality  to  fatalism;  and  common  sense, 
the  great  philosophical  pachyderm,  will  always  take  the 
hard-pressed  fatalist  under  its  protection  because  of  his 
inconsistencies.  If,  after  announcing  pure  automatism 
and  fatalism,  the  speculator  is  only  careful  to  say,  "Now 
let  us  all  do  our  duty,"  every  one  is  satisfied.  If  some 
unhappy  bystander  should  ask  how  an  automaton  can 
have  duties,  the  speculator  at  once  holds  him  up  as  a 
moral  outcast;  and  thick-headedness  says,  "Served  him 
right."  But  there  are  previous  questions  in  morals  as 
well  as  elsewhere;  and  when,  then,  the  teachers  of  phys- 
ical automatism  urge  us  to  do  the  duty  which  lies  next 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  423 

us,  we  shall  insist  on  knowing  how  an  automaton  can 
have  duties.  In  the  present  state  of  the  case  an  answer  to 
this  question  is  much  more  important  than  any  amount  of 
moral  exhortation.  It  is  also  a  duty  of  theists  to  insist 
upon  consistency  or  surrender  at  this  point.  Gentlemen 
of  the  advance,  take  heart  and  courage.  Remember  what 
you  have  said  about  the  supreme  virtue  of  truthfulness. 
Remember,  also,  your  high  claims  in  the  matter  of  log- 
ical consistency;  and  either  abandon  the  language  of 
morals,  which  has  meaning  only  in  a  scheme  which  you 
repudiate,  or  else  confess  that  you  dare  not  and  cannot 
be  consistent.  In  the  latter  case,  reflect  on  this  ques- 
tion: Is  illogical  atheism  in  any  way  superior  to  illog- 
ical Christianity?  The  new  cloth  will  not  join  to  the 
old  garment. 

Happily,  however,  these  inconsistencies  are  disap- 
pearing. An  enthusiastic  German  evolutionist,  F.  v. 
Hellwald,  in  a  work*  published  in  1874,  insists  upon 
the  struggle  for  existence,  and  the  right  of  the  stronger 
as  the  only  basis  of  morals.  There  is  neither  freedom  nor 
soul,  neither  absolute  truth  nor  absolute  morality.  He 
claims  that  the  word  morality  should  be  banished  from 
scientific  writings,  because  it  is  empty;  and  he  describes 
all  philanthropic  efforts  to  raise  men  to  ideal  manhood  as 
"  humanity-hypocrisy,"  (humanitats-henchelei.)  Worst 
of  all,  he  insists  that  advanced  speculation  must  come  to 
this.  If,  now,  we  ask  how  to  deal  with  social  problems 
in  such  a  scheme,  Professor  Tyndall  gives  us  an  answer 
in  his  address,  "Science  and  Man,"  before  the  Bir- 
mingham and  Midland  Institute.  He  represents  him- 
*  Culturgeschichte  in  Hirer  naturlichen  Entwickdung. 


424     -  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

self  as  arguing  the  point  with  a  "  robber  and  ravisher,'* 
and  he  gives  the  conclusion  of  the  whole  matter  as 
follows  :  "  You  off  end,  because  you  cannot  help  offend- 
ing, to  the  public  detriment.  "We  punish  you,  because 
we  cannot  help  punishing,  for  the  public  good."  When 
proposing  to  put  the  "  robber  and  ravisher  "  to  death, 
the  professor  says  to  him:  "The  public  safety  is  a 
matter  of  more  importance  than  the  very  limited  chance 
of  your  moral  renovation."  Of  lesser  punishment  he 
says  :  "  It  will  make  you  think  twice  before  venturing 
on  a  repetition  of  your  crime."  To  the  robber  afore- 
said he  says  :  "  We  entertain  no  malice  or  hatred 
against  you,  but  simply  with  a  view  to  our  own  safety 
and  purification,  we  are  determined  that  you,  and  such 
as  you,  shall  not  enjoy  liberty  of  evil  action  in  our 
midst."  Now  this  is  something  like.  The  professor  recog- 
nizes that  no  one  is  to  blame,  and  expressly  founds  the 
right  to  punish  on  public  utility.  Our  only  ground  of 
hesitation  is,  that  remark  about  "  thinking  twice ;  "  for 
we  have  seen  that  thinking  twice  is  incompatible  with 
physical  fatalism.  A  striking  peculiarity  of  advanced 
speculation  is,  that  a  profound  and  subtle  exegesis  is 
commonly  required  to  find  what  the  writers  mean;  and 
nothing  is  more  common  than  charges  of  misrepresenta- 
tion, after  the  critic  has  done  his  best.  Sometimes, 
too,  the  critic  is  overwhelmed  with  indignation,  and 
held  up  as  a  moral  outcast,  for  doing  what  he  could 
not  help.  However,  the  explosion  of  wrath  is  also 
necessary,  although  only  in  unreflecting  minds.  But 
in  spite  of  traces  of  the  superstition  of  freedom,  a  care- 
ful collation  of  passages  indicates  that  the  professor 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  425 

means  to  deny  all  spontaneity,  and  to  base  all  differ- 
ence of  action  on  its  outcome. 

The  professor  has  done  well ;  but  we  regret  that  he 
has  not  done  better.  He  has  merely  made  a  very  feeble 
beginning,  and  has  quite  failed  to  appreciate  the  grandeur 
of  the  new  ethics.  Perhaps  it  would  be  well  to  let  the 
doctrine  remain  an  esoteric  one,  otherwise  our  reasoning 
might  be  retorted  upon  ourselves.  The  criminal  is  no 
more  dangerous  to  society  than  society  is  to  the  crim- 
inal ;  and  he  is  morally  no  worse  than  the  best.  Which 
shall  be  called  criminal  and  which  virtuous  is  only  a 
question  of  relative  frequency,  or  of  majorities.  It  is 
quite  conceivable  that  criminals  should  be  in  the  majority, 
and  should  begin  to  say  to  us  :  "  We  entertain  no  malice 
or  hatred  against  you,  but  simply  with  a  view  to  our 
safety  and  comfort,  we  are  determined  that  you,  and 
such  as  you,  shall  not  live  in  our  midst."  We  experi- 
ence great  enthusiasm  for  the  new  ethics,  but  such  is 
the  hardness  and  uncircumcision  of  the  natural  heart, 
that  the  coarse  f  etichisms  of  Christianity  will  probably 
be  necessary  for  the  mob  for  some  time  to  come.  But 
we  may  suggest  for  the  inner  circle  of  the  initiated 
some  valuable  applications  of  the  new  principles.  We 
have  got  clear  of  God  and  goodness,  and  have  set  up 
utility  as  the  justification  of  action.  Now  it  is  a  sad 
fact  that  the  mass  of  men  do  not  seem  worth  keeping. 
They  are  without  any  assignable  reason  for  existence, 
and  they  are  undoubtedly  a  great  embarrassment  both 
to  themselves  and  to  society.  Under  the  old  notions 
of  right  and  wrong  and  God,  such  people  were  a  knotty 
problem  for  society;  but  how  beautifully  simple  the 


426  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

question  is  from  the  new  stand-point.  The  new  prin- 
ciple is  in  sociology  what  the  law  of  gravitation  is  in 
astronomy.  At  once  the  social  heavens  fall  into  order. 
Why  should  not  such  people  be  killed  off?  Some  one  will 
reply  that  they  have  done  nothing  worthy  of  death  ;  but 
he  is  still  in  the  gall  of  bitterness  and  the  bondage  of 
Christian  iniquity.  He  forgets  that  there  is  no  longer 
any  crime  in  the  old  sense ;  being  a  nuisance  is  the  only 
crime  recognized  under  the  new  dispensation.  Why  not, 
then,  abate  the  nuisance  by  practical  measures  ?  The 
bondage  of  the  old  morality  may  still  be  strong,  and  our 
feelings  may  at  first  be  shocked,  but  that  only  proves 
that  we  are  not  fully  indoctrinated.  Advance  to  new 
truth  is  never  accomplished  without  mental  friction  ; 
and  there  is  always  a  tendency  to  import  the  old  into 
the  new.  The  early  Jewish  Christians  insisted  on  car- 
rying Judaism  into  Christianity;  and  it  needed  all  the 
logic  of  Paul  and  of  events  to  convince  them  that  the 
day  of  the  old  was  done.  This  most  paltry  and  un- 
worthy illustration  may  serve  to  show  how  the  tradi- 
tions of  the  old  gospel  will  for  a  time  creep  in  and 
corrupt  the  new  and  most  glorious  gospel  of  advanced 
speculation,  unless  we  resolutely  keep  watch  against 
them.  There  is  a  seduction  in  all  forms  of  error ;  and 
the  old  gospel  is  peculiarly  seducing.  It  has  little  in 
it  fitted  for  the  strong  man,  but  most  men  are  not 
strong.  Human  hearts  will  ache,  owing,  of  course,  to 
maladjustment  to  the  environment ;  but  they  ache 
nevertheless.  The  cry  of  the  mourner  goes  up  from 
every  quarter  under  heaven.  And  the  conscience,  too, 
is  filled  with  pain  and  with  gloomy  and  solemn  sus- 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  427 

picions.  Hence  the  old  faith,  with  its  absurd  and  de- 
grading doctrines  of  a  Father  in  heaven,  a  loving  and 
forgiving  God,  and  a  future  life,  is  just  fitted  to  capture 
the  crowd  who  reason  only  with  their  feelings  and  from 
their  pains  and  longings.  It  is  a  sad  fact  that  Christ,  and 
Moses,  and  the  prophets,  seem  to  the  mob  better  teach- 
ers than  the  advanced  speculators.  This  makes  it  neces- 
sary always  to  be  on  our  guard  against  the  poison  of 
the  old  contagion.  So  subtle  is  it  and  pervasive,  that 
only  eternal  vigilance  will  secure  immunity.  Now  in 
any  case  there  is  little  hope  of  the  moral  improvement 
of  the  wretches  we  have  mentioned  ;  and  if  it  should 
occur,  it  would  only  be  an  improved  kind  of  physiolog- 
ical action.  What  relief  would  come  to  society  and  to 
families  if  tramps  and  criminals,  and  sickly,  deformed, 
helpless  and  unpromising  children,  and  persons  who 
are  hopelessly  diseased  or  are  in  their  second  child- 
hood, could  be  quietly  disposed  of;  not,  indeed,  with 
malice  or  hatred,  but  gently,  as  if  we  loved  them !  How 
many  there  are,  also,  who  have  large  possessions  which 
they  are  not  using  for  the  public  good,  but  which  their 
heirs  are  eager  to  send  into  the  general  circulation. 
Yet  these  people  live  on,  obstinately  and  even  mali- 
ciously, and  apparently  with  no  purpose  but  to  balk  the 
happiness  of  their  friends.  What  a  field  for  operation 
in  this  direction !  And  not  only  do  public  and  private 
interests  demand  that  the  classes  mentioned  be  dis- 
patched, but  philanthropy  and  the  enthusiasm  of  hu- 
manity re-echo  the  demand.  We  owe  it  to  the  future 
to  root  out  some  of  this  accursed  stock.  We  who 

labor  for  ideal  manhood  and  for  ideal  society  are  con- 
28 


428  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

stantly  disheartened  by  the  tremendous  force  of  hered- 
itary evil  which  works  ceaselessly  and  mightily  against 
us.  What  solution  is  there  so  simple  and  so  thorough 
as  to  kill  off  a  million  or  two  of  this  class  every  year, 
until  the  festering  cess-pools  and  miasmatic  swamps  of 
humanity  shall  be  freed  from  their  poison  and  defile- 
ment ?  Such  action  would  probably  beget  a  new  set 
of  nascent  motor  excitations  in  those  who  remain,  and 
might  result  in  very  general  reformation.  Hitherto  we 
have  kept  our  hands  off  of  these  wretches  only  on  ac- 
count of  sundry  obsolete  notions  of  God  and  human 
rights  ;  but  now  that  we  are  freed  from  these  whims, 
can  we,  as  lovers  of  our  race,  stand  by  and  see  the  pesti- 
lence threatening  posterity  without  making  determined 
efforts  to  stamp  it  out  ?  We  avow  it :  the  reigning 
sentimentality  in  this  matter  is  the  outcome  of  Chris- 
tian superstition.  The  old  philosophers  knew  better. 
The  divine  Plato  recommended  the  exposure  of  infants 
and  the  killing  off  of  the  helpless.  The  Fijians,  too, 
with  the  profound  insight  of  a  nature  uncorrupted  by 
contact  with  Christianity,  did  the  same  thing  ;  but  since 
the  advent  of  the  missionaries  they  have  fallen  from 
this  high  estate.  Some  of  them  carried  considerations 
of  utility  still  further,  and  ate  such  people  as  it  was 
found  inconvenient  to  keep  ;  but  this  action,  though 
quite  allowable  on  the  new  principles,  and  not  without 
its  advantages  on  the  score  of  economy,  is  hardly  in 
accordance  with  our  present  tastes.  Perhaps  a  com- 
promise might  be  effected  on  the  basis  of  the  opinions 
of  some  advocates  of  cremation,  who  have  dwelt  at 
length  on  the  waste  of  the  present  custom  of  burial. 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  429 

These  matters  of  detail,  however,  may  be  left  to  the 
progress  of  opinion ;  but  at  all  events  it  is  plain  that 
nature  is  bent  on  rooting  out  the  unfit  ;  and  both  duty 
and  interest  call  upon  us  to  lend  a  hand.  The  mawk- 
ish and  invertebrate  sentimentality  of  Christian  philan- 
thropy is  a  foul  sin  against  the  Cosmos  and  posterity. 
Think  of  the  wretches  it  tolerates  and  vainly  tries 
to  reform.  Think  of  the  great  army  of  deaf,  and 
dumb,  and  blind,  and  helpless,  and  idiotic,  and  insane, 
which  it  taxes  us  to  keep.  What  a  blot  on  the  other- 
wise brilliant  universe  !  What  a  trial  to  our  feelings 
and  taste !  Above  all,  what  an  expense  !  And  even 
Christianity  itself,  and  the  whole  machinery  of  religion, 
what  an  expense  to  no  purpose  !  Heavens  and  hells 
have  vanished.  The  fires  are  out ;  and  the  furnaces 
are  cold ;  and  the  great  white  throne  is  a  dream.  There 
is  large  room  for  killing  in  this  direction.  It  is  not 
to  be  thought  of  that  we  should  leave  the  weak,  and 
ignorant,  and  credulous,  to  be  preyed  upon  by  these 
pious  swindlers.  For  a  time,  perhaps,  we  may  allow  it 
to  go  on ;  but  our  conscience,  our  self-respect,  and  our 
regard  for  humanity  will  not  forever  tolerate  these  mum- 
meries which  merely  frighten  and  deceive,  and  which 
serve  no  purpose  except  to  maintain  an  army  of  locusts 
which  eat  up  every  green  and  good  thing.  Already 
we  have  laws  against  getting  money  on  false  pretenses ; 
it  is  plain  that  the  whole  swarm  of  ministers  come 
under  its  operation.  Of  course  we  have  no  feelings  of 
malice  or  hatred  for  any  one,  because  no  one  is  blam- 
able.  The  unhappy  Christian  or  theologian  is  not  re- 
sponsible for  his  obsolete  notions,  but  we  think  that  the 


430  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

pointings  of  utility  and  duty  are  very  plain  in  the  mat- 
ter. Perhaps,  however,  they  are  not  so  plain.  Upon 
reflection,  we  find  that  we  have  unconsciously  been 
false  to  our  new  principle.  On  the  old  theory,  the 
falsehood  of  religion  would  warrant  our  opposing  it  ; 
but  on  the  new  theory,  we  may  find  a  use  for  religion 
after  all.  Now  these  notions  of  God  and  duty  have  an 
undoubted  value  for  society.  The  highest  and  most 
valuable  satisfactions  of  life  depend  upon  them.  Let 
a  man  be  fully  possessed  by  them  and  he  will  become  a 
better  father,  or  husband,  or  son,  or  brother,  or  citizen, 
or  neighbor.  This  cannot  be  doubted  ;  and  hence  we 
are  thrown  into  doubt  concerning  the  propriety  of  clear- 
ing out  the  preachers.  On  the  contrary,  since  the  ad- 
vanced speculator  has  done  little  for  science  and  specu- 
lation except  to  disgrace  them  ;  and  since  his  views 
have  no  public  utility,  but  great  public  mischief  in 
them,  must  we  not  conclude  that  the  most  judicious  thing 
would  be  to  kill  off  the  speculators  and  leave  the 
preachers  ?  This  seems  to  be  a  plain  pointing  of  utility. 
It  is  to  be  regretted,  that  Professor  Tyndall  did  not 
extend  his  principle  to  these  cases.  Our  conclusions 
seem  to  us  to  be  the  plainest  deductions  from  his 
premises.  Man  is  a  machine,  totally  without  moral 
character;  our  moral  notions  are  the  product  of  custom 
and  prejudice  ;  and  earthly  utility  is  the  foundation 
of  such  morals  as  remain.  Perhaps,  however,  he 
failed  to  state  them  because  of  their  evident  truth, 
deeming  it  sufficient  to  lay  down  the  principle,  and 
leave  it  to  others  to  apply  it.  It  is  possible  that  even 
the  professor  would  draw  back  from  some  of  these  de- 


POSTVLA  TES  OF  ETHICS.  431 

ductions;  for  reformers  are  seldom  conscious  of  the 
full  results  of  their  principles;  but  that  would  only 
prove  a  certain  mental  inertia  or  ossification  which  pre- 
vents his  shaking  off  all  the  influences  of  association 
and  habit.  To  the  pure  reason,  however,  all  is  clear. 
Towering  above  the  mists  and  miasms  of  custom  and 
superstition,  it  clearly  perceives  the  goodly  land  flowing 
with  milk  and  honey.  As  a  means  of  helping  one  to 
an  appreciation  of  the  new  ethics  we  suggest  the  follow- 
ing problems  :  Why  should  we  not  set  up  the  law  of 
the  strongest  as  the  law  of  life  ?  And  why  should  not 
a  man  kill  and  eat  his  mother  if  his  tastes,  inclinations, 
or  interests  should  lie  in  that  direction?  It  is  hoped, 
however,  that  no  advanced  speculator  will  attempt  to 
solve  this  problem  by  the  method  of  instincts;  for  if 
we  are  to  work  out  problems  by  this  method,  we  had 
better  go  back  to  Christianity,  as  that  satisfies  the  in- 
stincts very  much  better  than  do  materialism  and  fatal- 
ism. The  great  attraction  of  the  advanced  doctrines  is, 
their  logical  consistency ;  if  that  is  abandoned,  they 
have  no  reason  of  existence. 

Let  us  pass  to  the  second  point,  the  denial  of  a  future 
life.  Here,  too,  the  denier  takes  high  ground  in  favor 
of  intuitional  morality,  and  repeats  the  common  re- 
marks about  the  absolute  sanctities,  etc.  If  there  be  no 
life  to  come,  it  is  a  duty  to  be  noble  and  not  base. 
There  is  a  sublime  grandeur  in  heroic  struggle  and  sac- 
rifice, oven  if  we  sink  into  nothingness  the  next  moment. 
He  is  also  careful  not  to  miss  the  opportunity  of  ex- 
pressing his  scorn  for  the  selfishness  of  those  who  look 


432  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

for  a  future  life.  But  unfortunately,  this  worthy  is 
commonly  entangled  in  the* doctrines  concerning  con- 
science and  freedom  which  we  have  mentioned;  and 
that  leaves  us  in  doubt  whether  his  fine  talk  is  due  to 
ignorance  or  knavery.  There  is  no  noble  and  no  base 
on  his  theory,  for  every  thing  is  opinion  and  prejudice. 
There  is  also  no  noble  and  no  base,  for  every  thing  is 
mechanical.  What  fine  strategy  this  is,  to  grab  up  for 
the  sake  of  a  sneer  notions  which  elsewhere  he  expressly 
repudiates !  What  an  instructive  illustration  of  his  no- 
tions of  truthfulness  and  honesty!  It  is  possible  to  raise 
a  very  small  quibble,  and  say  that  there  is  difference  of 
worth  even  in  mechanisms;  and  hence  that  the  mechan- 
ical doctrine  does  not  exclude  the  distinction  of  noble 
and  base.  But  the  answer  is  evident.  A  watch  is  bet- 
ter than  a  piece  of  pig-iron;  and  a  horse  is  better  than 
a  hog.  But  the  better  in  these  cases  has  no  moral  sig- 
nification; while  the  better  and  worse  which  we  are 
considering  are  exclusively  moral.  But  we  omit  to 
press  these  difficulties;  and  point  out  that  struggling, 
agonizing,  etc.,  are  not  heroic  in  themselves,  but  only 
when  they  have  aii  heroic  object.  One  might  struggle, 
and  even  agonize  mightily,  to  walk  a  thousand  miles  in 
a  thousand  hours,  but  it  would  not  impress  any  one  as 
especially  heroic.  To  struggle  for  nothing  is  the  mark 
of  a  fool  and  not  of  a  hero.  Hence  before  we  give  way 
to  sentiment  about  self-sacrifice  and  agonizing,  reason 
asks,  (1)  how  an  automaton  can  struggle  and  sacri- 
fice itself;  and  (2)  what  the  self-sacrifice  and  agonizing 
are  for.  These  are  previous  questions  in  moral  theory, 
and  demand  an  answer.  The  facts  on  which  this  seem- 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  433 

ingly  high-toned  morality  is  based  are  these :  The  moral 
law,  as  revealed  in  every  normal  conscience,  is  not  cut  out 
on  the  pattern  of  prudence  or  of  self-interest.  No  more 
is  it  cut  out  with  supreme  regard  to  animal  or  earthly 
interests;  on  the  contrary,  it  claims  to  outrank  them  if 
they  collide  with  it.  Any  thing  may,  and  must,  be  sac 
rificed  rather  than  violate  the  sanctity  of  conscience. 
Thus  the  moral  law  appears  in  our  lives  as  an  uncon- 
ditional imperative,  commanding  and  giving  no  reasons. 
It  is  not  based  on  calculation,  but  appears  as  an  orig- 
inal instinct  of  our  nature.  It  is  this  fact  which  has 
led  many  intuitionists  to  imagine  that  the  law  is  self 
supporting.  But  this  law,  like  all  other  laws,  must 
justify  itself  to  our  reason.  This  instinct,  barely  as  in- 
stinct, may  rule  the  life  until  reason  comes;  but  then  it 
must  give  some  account  of  itself.  As  a  simple,  opaque 
fact,  disturbing  animal  happiness  and  flouting  earthly 
prudence,  we  want  to  know  its  authority  and  its  mean- 
ing. No  amount  of  sentiment  can  avail  to  answer  or 
resist  this  rational  demand;  and  it  is  one  of  the  great 
services  of  the  utilitarian  moralists  so  to  have  forced 
this  point  upon  the  consideration  of  intuitionalists  that 
it  is  now  generally  admitted.  The  law  of  a  being  de- 
pends on  its  destiny  and  flows  from  it.  There  is  a  dis- 
tinct absurdity  in  placing  a  temporal  being  under  the 
law  of  the  eternal;  and  there  is  intolerable  injustice  in 
placing  a  being  under  a  law  which  is  hostile  to  its  inter- 
ests, or  which  is  out  of  all  proportion  to  its  well-being. 
Any  law  which  any  being  is  under  obligation  to  obey 
must  be  a  law  contrived  for  its  highest  good;  and  if  it 
appear  that  any  law  runs  counter  to  our  true  good,  that 


434  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

law  ceases  to  have  any  obligation,  both  reason  and  con- 
science being  judges.  The  law  of  a  being,  we  repeat, 
must  be  measured  by  its  nature  and  destiny.  There  is 
nothing  unbecoming  in  an  earthly  being's  living  for  the 
earth;  and  if  the  heavenly  life  is  a  dream,  it  is  both  ra- 
tional and  becoming  that  we  should  live  for  this.  It 
cannot  be  a  duty  to  live  for  the  unattainable;  the  bare 
notion  is  an  insult  to  both  reason  and  conscience.  The 
thoughtless  intuitionist  will  be  startled  at  this,  and  may 
possibly  advance  to  denial;  but  this  is  due  to  over- 
looking our  stand-point.  We  do  not  mean,  that  practi- 
cally, men  measure  duty  by  utility,  or  are  constantly 
asking,  What  shall  we  have  therefore?  But  while  we 
may  in  practice  command  obedience  without  asking 
reasons,  we  must  in  theory  always  be  able  to  give  rea- 
sons. Otherwise  our  command  is  irrational  and  arbi- 
trary. Without  doubt  the  stand-point  of  practical 
morals  is  that  of  command ;  but  theoretical  morals  must 
furnish  some  justification  of  the  command.  What, 
then,  is  the  authority  and  meaning  of  this  moral  law, 
which  disturbs  our  lives,  crosses  our  plans,  and  mars 
our  peace?  Christianity  gives  an  answer.  It  says  that 
we  are  under  a  law  too  big  for  the  earthly  life,  because 
our  real  life  is  not  measured  by  our  earthly  existence. 
This  life  is  but  the  beginning,  and  not  the  end.  It  re- 
veals this  life  as  photographing  itself  indelibly  upon 
the  life  to  come.  It  tells  of  moral  development  and 
dignity  beyond  all  thought  at  present.  We  are  called  to 
communion  with  God.  We  are  called  to  be  like  God. 
We  are  called  to  eternal  life  with  God.  This  is  our 
destiny,  and  our  law  is  correspondingly  great.  What- 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  435 

ever  conflicts  with  this  destiny  must  be  trodden  under 
foot.  Hence  when  hand  or  foot  offends,  we  must  cut  it 
off  and  cast  it  from  us.  Hence  we  are  to  struggle  and 
agonize  to  enter  into  life;  for  the  gain  of  the  world 
were  nothing  if  the  soul  were  lost.  At  once  we  see  the 
tremendous  significance  of  action,  and  the  baseness  of 
surrender  to  the  brute  within  us.  It  is  infinitely  worse 
than  Prince  Hal,  if  he  had  preferred  to  remain  among  his 
boon  and  boozy  companions  in  the  Boar's  Head  at  East- 
cheap  when  called  to  the  throne  of  England.  From 
this  stand-point  the  moral  law  appears  as  no  wanton  or 
arbitrary  impertinence,  but  as  the  organic  law  of  the 
soul's  life  and  peace.  But  if  we  reject  this  view,  the 
law,  so  far  as  it  transcends  earthly  prudence,  appears 
as  monstrous  injustice.  The  moral  nature  itself  turns 
against  it.  The  law  no  longer  appears  as  something 
godlike,  but  rather  as  a  demon-hand  thrust  enviously 
up  to  clutch  at  the  little  happiness  which  his  short  life 
makes  possible.  Man  is  called  upon  to  render  justice, 
and  shall  the  universe  be  unjust  to  him? 

Christianity  gives  a  reason  for  the  moral  law,  and 
justifies  it  to  our  intelligence.  Let  us  abandon  the 
Christian  theory  and  see  what  rational  ground  there  is 
for  obeying  the  moral  law  beyond  the  limits  of  earthly 
prudence.  Much  sentiment  is  poured  out  at  once,  and 
in  particular  the  selfishness  of  our  view  is  dwelt  upon. 
We  will  not  insist  on  the  fact  that  this  decrier  of  self- 
ishness is  commonly  the  one  who  bases  the  moral  na- 
ture on  the  most  abject  selfishness,  and  who  by  his 
doctrine  of  fatalism  denies  and  destroys  all  moral  dis- 
tinctions. For  the  sake  of  a  sneer  he  is  willing  to  steal 


436  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

the  notions  which  belong  only  to  his  opponent;  and  we 
are  willing  to  indulge  him  in  it.  But  we  must  point 
out  that  this  attack  on  selfishness  misses  its  mark.  It 
is  not  the  selfish  instincts,  but  the  moral  nature,  which 
protests  against  a  law  out  of  all  proportion  to  the  good 
of  its  subjects.  Nor  is  it  the  selfish  who  have  insisted 
upon  a  future  life,  but  Socrates  and  Plato,  Paul  and 
Christ.  Not  the  brutal,  but  the  spiritual,  perceive 
what  a  ghastly  farce  this  life  is  when  taken  alone.  The 
implied  claim  of  the  positivists,  that  they  themselves  are 
the  only  ones  who  have  emancipated  themselves  from 
selfishness,  would  be  infamous  if  it  were  not  so  ludi- 
crous. But,  it  is  urged  again,  it  certainly  is  selfish  to 
refuse  to  sacrifice  ourselves  for  the  good  of  others  unless 
we  see  our  own  advantage  in  it.  Here,  also,  the  objec- 
tion fails  to  touch  bottom.  There  is  nothing  more  ab- 
horrent to  the  moral  nature  than  just  this  law  of  sacri- 
fice, except  on  one  condition.  That  the  one  should  be 
essentially  and  utterly  sacrificed  to  the  many  is  to  empty 
all  morality  and  reason  out  of  the  system  of  things; 
and  the  world  becomes  the  strict  parallel  of  a  helpless 
ship  in  mid  ocean,  whose  crew,  driven  to  cannibalism  by 
starvation,  kill  the  weaker,  one  by  one,  in  order  to  satisfy 
their  horrid  hunger.  If  such  were  the  case,  both  pity 
and  conscience  would  command,  not  that  some  should 
submit  to  be  eaten,  but  that  all  should  stand  by  and  go 
down  together.  No  amount  of  sentiment  will  help  us 
out  of  this  trouble,  or  make  such  a  universe  other  than 
a  moral  horror.  Our  atheistic  sentimentalists,  in  their 
attempts  to  escape  selfishness,  constantly  undermine 
their  own  position.  Absolute  unselfishness  in  theory 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS. 

reduces  to  absolute  selfishness  in  practice.  For  if  one's 
own  happiness  ought  not  to  be  a  good  to  himself,  there 
is  no  reason  why  he  should  secure  happiness  in  another. 
If  every  one  should  find  happiness  in  another's  good, 
then  we  can  do  the  best  for  others  by  doing  the  best 
for  ourselves,  and  letting  others  know  how  well  off  we 
are.  Or  instead  of  living  for  the  future,  we  should 
rather  live  for  ourselves,  and  let  the  future  rejoice  in 
knowing  what  a  good  time  we  had.  The  general  sum 
of  happiness  would  remain  the  same;  and  a  bird  in  the 
hand  is  notoriously  worth  more  than  a  flock  in  the  bush. 
No  one  ought  to  care  for  happiness;  hence  it  can  be  no 
duty  to  produce  it.  Every  one  ought  to  find  his  hap- 
piness in  that  of  others;  hence  we  can  best  further  the 
moral  welfare  of  others  by  letting  them  rejoice  in  our 
prosperity.  Thus  the  theory  passes  into  its  opposite 
and  cancels  itself.  Of  course,  men  do  instinctively 
recognize  the  duty  of  unselfish  action;  but  they  do  not 
instinctively  recognize  the  postulates  of  such  a  moral 
community.  We  look  only  at  the  side  of  the  indi- 
vidual, and  not  at  the  side  of  those  benefited.  We 
take  it  for  granted  that  it  is  quite  the  noble  thing  for 
them  to  take  all  they  can  get.  They  tell  of  a  Russian 
woman  in  a  sleigh  with  her  children  pursued  by  wolves. 
And  as  the  wolves  were  about  to  overtake  the  sleigh, 
she  threw  a  child  to  them.  This  she  did  again  and 
again,  and  finally  reached  the  village  alone.  She  told 
her  story;  and  a  peasant,  seizing  his  ax,  cleft  her  head 
at  a  blow.  She  had  no  right  to  be  saved  at  such  a  cost. 
And  that  is  precisely  what  the  universe  is  if  there  be 
no  hereafter  in  which  the  interests  of  the  one  and  the 


436  STUDIES  IX  THEISM. 

many  shall  be  reconciled.  No  rational  theory  of  self-sac- 
rifice is  possible  on  the  supposition  that  the  one  is  really 
and  essentially  sacrificed  to  the  many.  Here  is  an  an- 
tinomy of  conscience  which  conscience  itself  cannot  re- 
solve. Intuitional  moralists  have  almost  invariably 
overlooked  the  dualism  of  conscience  on  this  subject; 
for  conscience  justifies  a  rational  self-love  as  much  as  it 
does  self-sacrifice.  The  New  Testament  reconciliation 
is  the  only  possible  one:  He  that  saveth  his  life  shall 
lose  it.  This  is  the  law  of  unselfishness.  But  he  that 
loseth  his  life  the  same  shall  save  it.  This  is  the  clause 
which  reconciles  the  law,  not  to  our  selfish  feelings,  but 
to  our  conscience,  our  reason,  and  our  sense  of  justice. 
Personal  good  and  the  universal  good  must  be  at  bot- 
tom one;  and  this  they  cannot  be  if  the  individual's 
faithfulness  is  to  result  in  his  destruction.  Without 
this  assumption  there  is  nothing  upon  which  the  con- 
science turns  more  fiercely  than  upon  this  law  of  sacri- 
fice. If  one  is  unwilling  to  admit  this  reconciling 
thought  of  a  future  life,  let  him  at  least  cease  to  dwell 
on  the  duty  of  self-sacrifice.  Of  course  if  any  one  finds 
delight  in  self-sacrifice,  no  one  objects.  As  a  refined 
form  of  egoism,  it  justifies  itself;  but  it  can  never  be 
commanded  as  a  duty.  Of  course,  the  advanced  specu- 
lator will  once  more  forget  his  theory  that  right  and 
wrong  are  conventional,  and  that  men  are  only  autom- 
ata, and  will  swagger  out  sundry  attempts  to  sneer 
at  this  doctrine  as  base  and  groveling;  but  such  an  ex- 
hibition will  merely  serve  as  a  standard  of  his  mental 
power. 

Our  claim,  then,  is  not  merely  that  selfishness  over- 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  439 

rides  conscience  when  a  future  life  is  denied,  but  that 
conscience  itself  abandons  its  high  claims  in  that  case. 
Here  are  the  facts:  In  a  few  years  it  will  make  no  dif- 
ference to  me  what  I  have  been.  In  a  few  centuries 
it  will  make  no  difference  to  the  universe  what  the 
human  race  has  been.  Whether  happy  or  unhappy, 
moral  or  immoral,  all  will  have  passed  away  and  left  no 
sign.  The  difference  between  right  and  wrong  will 
have  disappeared,  and  the  righteous  and  the  wicked  will 
have  reached  a  common  goal.  Now  the  holder  of  this 
view  attempts  to  preach  morality,  and  what  can  he  say  ? 
Worldly  prudence  every  one  can  understand,  and  we 
need  no  moralist  to  teach  that.  But  what  room  is  there 
for  any  thing  more  ?  Of  course  we  do  not  mean  that 
every  body  would  plunge  into  beastliness  if  the  belief 
in  immortality  were  gone.  Differences  of  taste  would 
still  remain,  but  that  is  all.  Duty  would  be  an  empty 
word,  and  taste  and  prudence  must  give  the  law  of  life. 
But  taste  has  no  law,  and  every  one  must  be  left  to  his 
own  devices.  Here  it  might  occur  to  some  enthusiastic 
moralist  to  speak  of  the  joy  and  dignity  of  right  living; 
but  as  for  the  joy,  most  of  us  find  duty  a  yoke  and  a 
burden;  and  as  for  the  dignity,  we  now  know  that  it  is 
only  an  improved  kind  of  physiological  action,  and 
nothing  to  be  proud  of.  Sadly  enough,  the  taste  of  the 
masses  does  not  lie  in  the  direction  of  moral  growth 
and  self-development.  Men  are  annoyed  and  vexed  at 
any  apparition  of  duty,  and  they  would  gladly  shut  it 
out  of  both  thought  and  life.  Now  how  could  a  hu- 
mane unbeliever  in  immortality  justify  himself  in  dis- 
turbing a  pleasant  worldly  life  by  this  nightmare  of 


440  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

duty?     Even  if  his  fatalism  did  not  make  appeals  to 
duty  miserably  irrelevant,  there  could  be  no  duty  to 
strive  after  the  unattainable.    Whereupon  the  advanced 
speculator  once  more  breaks  out  in  his  grand  way,  that 
there  is  an  essential  nobility  in  duty;   but  in  the  as- 
sumed circumstances,  this  can  only  mean  that  his  tastes 
run  in  that  direction,  and  that  he  chooses  to  stigmatize 
the  tastes  of  others  as  base  and  groveling.     But  he  has 
no  right  to  do  so.     His  egoism  and  self-esteem  are  sat- 
isfied in  one  way,  and  he  then  assumes  to  lord  it  over 
others  who  differ  from  him.     To  increase  at  once  his 
own  glory  and  the  opprobrium  of  his  opponents,  he 
calls  his  own  views  noble,  dignified,  etc.,  while  those 
of  the  other  side  are  called  base  and  brutal.     But  in 
all  this  we  detect  the  influence  of  heredity  and  the 
moral  environment.     Such  notions  Avill  disappear  when 
he  fairly  masters  his  own  principles.      Each  must  be 
allowed  to  go  his  own  way,  free  from  all  interference, 
except  such  as  utility  may  suggest,  and  from  insolent 
assumption  of  superiority  on  the  part  of  others.     If  the 
egoism  of  one  man  delights  in  certain  psychological 
fineries,  let  him  choose  them,  so  far  as  he  can  choose 
them.     If  another  is  better  pleased  with  the  more  sub- 
stantial goods  of  the  senses,  let  him  be  equally  free,  so 
far  as  he  can  be  free.     Above  all,  let  moral  absolut- 
ism, which  alone  is  true  morality,  die  the  death.     The 
critic  must  allow  that  if  a  future  life  be  denied,  the 
present  life  would  be  more  comfortable  if  the  sense  of 
duty  were  toned  down.     If  at  any  time  the  advanced 
speculator  should  feel  tempted  to  attack  these  conclu- 
sions, let  him  first  of  all  reflect  on  his  own  theory,  that 


POSTULATES  OF  ETHICS.  441 

right  and  wrong  are  purely  conventional,  and  that  men 
are  merely  machines  without  any  proper  moral  charac- 
ter. If  this  does  not  avail  to  stop  the  nuisance  of  his 
periodic  outcry,  let  him  further  reflect  whether  a  theory 
which  he  denies  every  time  he  opens  his  mouth,  and 
which  in  turn  denies  all  those  truths  by  which  men  and 
societies  live,  be  not  a  doubtful  one.  Or  is  it,  perhaps, 
the  glory  of  advanced  speculation  to  be  received  only 
by  pure  faith,  and  in  opposition  to  all  the  teachings  of 
life  and  reality? 

It  is  unnecessary  to  discuss  the  effects  of  atheism 
upon  morality,  as  it  implies  the  difficulties  already  men- 
tioned. We  close  this  discussion  by  pointing  out  that 
upon  any  theistic  theory  it  is  impossible  to  justify  the 
ways  of  God  either  to  conscience  or  to  reason  without 
a  future  life,  and  without  the  Christian  theory  of  that 
life.  God  is  either  the  perfect,  or  he  is  nothing.  His 
purposes  also  must  be  worthy  of  him,  or  the  mind  will 
deny  him  outright.  To  think  less  than  the  highest  of 
God  will,  by  an  inner  dialectic  of  thought,  pass  on  to 
his  denial.  But  creation  has  as  yet  reached  no  end 
which  justifies  it  to  our  reason.  If  we  think  of  a  period 
a  few  thousand  years  further  on,  when  the  present  order 
shall  have  passed  away,  and  the  ancient  silence  and 
loneliness  of  God  shall  have  returned,  we  cannot  help 
asking  the  question,  What  is  it  all  for  ?  This  meaning- 
less stir  of  creation,  which  is  soon  to  sink  back  again 
into  silence,  is  it  worth  while  ?  It  is  at  this  point  that 
we  comprehend  the  despair  of  the  Indian  religions. 
We  Occidentals  have  had  a  childish  readiness  to  view 
God  as  the  creator  of  the  finite  order;  that  is  just  what 


442  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

the  Oriental  mind  has  found  impossible.  It  did  not 
doubt  the  Infinite,  but  questioned  whether  the  Infinite 
could  connect  itself  with  such  a  finite.  The  finite,  as 
we  know  it,  is  unworthy  of  the  Infinite.  He  cannot 
descend  from  his  sacred,  everlasting  calm  and  silence  to 
found  or  take  part  in  this  stupid,  senseless  turmoil  of 
the  finite.  Hence  the  finite  does  not  exist.  It  is  a 
dream  only,  an  illusion.  God  is  not  in  it,  for  it  is  un- 
worthy of  him.  Hence  let  us,  also,  seek  to  escape  from 
it,  and  by  reflection  on  the  eternal,  and  by  withdrawal 
from  action,  let  us  lose  ourselves  in  the  infinite  rest  and 
silence.  Until  very  recently,  this  conception  was  im- 
possible to  Western  thought.  It  was  a  matter  of  course, 
that  God  could  not  want  any  better  business  than  to 
make  and  maintain  our  world.  As  for  the  world,  it 
was  a  great  success — a  little  blackened,  indeed,  by  the 
Bible,  but  upon  the  whole  a  very  excellent  thing.  All 
this  has  changed.  Pessimism  has  made  mighty  ad- 
vances in  science  and  philosophy.  It  is  becoming  fash- 
ionable to  deride  the  universe,  and  the  cant  of  progress 
is  receding.  Whoever  has  the  words  of  eternal  life,  it 
is  at  last  settled  that  science  and  philosophy  have  them 
not.  From  the  Indian  stand-point  the  Indian  notion  is 
profoundly  true.  The  finite,  as  we  experience  it,  is  not 
worthy  of  God.  If  the  drama  of  our  existence  is  to  end 
with  the  earthly  act,  there  is  no  unity  in  it,  and  we  can- 
not ascribe  it  to  a  rational  being.  Conscience  and  rea- 
son are  satisfied  only  as  we  advance  to  the  Christian 
doctrine — that  the  full  purpose  and  magnificence  of  cre- 
ation become  manifest  only  in  eternity.  "  It  doth  not 
yet  appear  what  we  shall  be;  but  when  He  shall  appear, 


POSTULA  TES  OF  ETHICS.  443 

we  shall  be  like  him,  for  we  shall  see  him  as  he  is." 
By  a  necessity  of  thought,  when  we  abandon  this  stand- 
point speculation  recedes  toward  atheism  or  panthe- 
istic substantialism.  All  speculation  between  these  ex- 
tremes is  in  unstable  equilibrium. 

We  have  not  sought  to  prove  that  our  advanced  spec- 
ulators are  bad  men,  but  that  their  doctrines  deny  mo- 
rality. Neither  sentiment  nor  personal  character  is  con- 
cerned, but  simply  and  solely  logic.  Hence  appeals  to 
sentiment  and  charges  of  misrepresentations  are  irrele- 
vant in  reply.  We  do  not  urge  the  results  deduced  as 
any  disproof  of  the  premises,  we  only  insist  that  they 
flow  from  the  premises.  There  is  no  injustice  in  put- 
ting premises  and  conclusion  together.  If  it  be  said 
that  the  conclusions  are  insane,  we  do  not  deny  it;  but 
that  does  not  prove  that  they  do  not  follow  from  the 
premises,  but  rather  that  the  premises  are  insane  also. 
And  we  suggest,  as  a  topic  for  reflection,  whether  a 
doctrine  which  denies  consciousness,  conscience,  and  all 
the  great  principles  on  which  life,  and  society,  and  gov- 
ernment are  founded,  has  not  almost  reached  a  reductio 
ad  absurdum.  But  if  any  will  insist  on  holding  the 
premises,  let  them  be  forced  to  accept  the  conclusion. 
We  have  given  the  question  this  prominence  because 
we  believe  that  mischief  has  been  done  by  ignoring  it. 
The  minds  of  many  are  confused  by  the  prevailing  in- 
consistency on  this  point.  They  are  led  to  assent  to 
much  solely  by  the  assurance  that  morals  shall  suffer  no 
harm.  The  critic,  of  course,  cares  nothing  for  conse- 
quences, but  he  must  insist  on  consistency.  We  might 
29 


444  STUDIES  IN  THEISM. 

as  well  fall  back  on  Christianity,  if  we  are  to  give  up 
logic.  The  old  faith  had  its  Nemesis,  according  to  its,, 
critics,  and  its  Nemesis  was  always  logic.  If  the  Nem- 
esis was  fatal  to  the  old,  why  should  it  show  pity  on 
the  new?  Let,  then,  the  question  be  dragged  into 
light,  and  let  it  be  kept  there  until  loose-jointed  skepti- 
cism shall  learn  what  it  is  doing,  and  until  speculative 
trickery  shall  be  forced  to  be  consistent,  and  to  accept 
the  logical  outcome  of  its  opinions.  The  question  for 
our  advanced  speculators  to  consider  is,  whether  we 
shall  live  by  instinct  or  by  logic  ?  If  by  instinct,  then 
logic  has  nothing  to  do  with  life  and  practice;  and  we 
are  left  to  find  that  theory  of  life  and  the  world  which 
shall  best  satisfy  our  instincts,  and  bring  most  peace 
and  dignity  into  life.  But  if  we  are  to  live  by  logic, 
then  let  us  live  by  logic,  and  abandon  all  views  which 
are  not  in  hirmrinjr  Trjthrmr  professed  opinions. 


THE  END. 


THIS  BOOK  IS  DUE  ON  THE  LAST  DATE 
STAMPED  BELOW 


AN  INITIAL  FINE  OP  25  CENTS 

WILL  BE  ASSESSED  FOR  FAILURE  TO  RETURN 
THIS  BOOK  ON  THE  DATE  DUE.  THE  PENALTY 
WILL  INCREASE  TO  SO  CENTS  ON  THE  FOURTH 
DAY  AND  TO  $1.OO  ON  THE  SEVENTH  DAY 
OVERDUE. 


A    "tcy,.T 


21 


Jtf  USE 


MAY  14  1960 


LD  21-95w-7,'37 


